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
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
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The Journal
OF
PHILOLOGY.

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
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
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
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ERRATUM.

p. 49, *for* Gildermeister *read* Gildemeister.



J. Jobbins



THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

TWO KASÍDAHs OF THE PERSIAN POET ANWARÍ.

AUHAD UD DÍN ANWARÍ was born in a village near Mahnah in the plains of Kháwarán in the province of Abíward. His original *takhallus*, or poetical surname, was Kháwarí, which he changed to Anwarí by the advice of his teacher 'Umárah. His early life was spent in poverty, but he at length attracted the notice of Sultan Sanjar, and became one of the most famous poets of his court. Sultan Sanjar was the sixth monarch of the Seljúk dynasty; he had been for several years governor of Khorassan, but in A.D. 1117 he became Sultan, on the death of his brother Muhammad, and reigned for forty years. His reign is a glorious era in Persian history, as he was a munificent patron of literature; but it closed in disgrace and ruin.

A colony of the Turkmán tribe of Ghuzz had been allowed to settle near Balkh, but had revolted against the oppression of the governor. The Sultan determined to support his officer's authority, and marched with an army to suppress the insurrection; but his troops were defeated and he himself became a prisoner. He remained nearly four years a captive and was treated with great barbarity, but he at length made his escape. He had however hardly reached his capital Merv, when he died in 1157 (A. H. 552) in his 73rd year. At his death, his empire fell into fragments, which were seized by different

branches of his family, or by independent chiefs. His nephew Ruknuddín Mahmúd, who was the son of a sister married to the descendant of a great chief of Turkistán, held Khorassan for a few years and fixed his capital at Samarkand; but he was afterwards dethroned and blinded by one of his ministers. It was to this prince that Anwarí probably addressed the first of the following *Kasídahs*.

Anwarí was a great astrologer as well as a great poet, and on the occasion of a conjunction of the seven planets in *Libra*, on the 29th of the month *Jumáda' ii*, A.H. 582 (A.D. 1186, Sept. 16)¹, he predicted a terrific storm which would produce unparalleled devastation. On the very night however, when the storm was to burst on Persia, the air was so still that a light on the top of a minaret was not extinguished, and during the year there was so little wind that much of the corn could not be winnowed in the fields. The following note from Lingard's history is a curious illustration of the incident.

"In the present year (1186) all the Christian nations, both Greek and Latin, were terrified with the expectation of the evils which would follow the conjunction of most of the planets in the sign *Libra*, on the 16th of September. A pestilential wind, accompanied with earthquakes, was to sweep the face of the earth, overturning trees and houses, and burying in sand the towns of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Arabia, and other arid regions. The Mahometan astrologers in Spain derided these predictions. They contended that the malignant influence of Saturn and Mars would be balanced by the benignity of Venus and Jupiter, and that the worst that could happen, would be a scanty harvest, many shipwrecks, and much bloodshed in battle.—Hoved. 356—358. Bened. Abb. II. 414. Fortunately Baldwin, Archbishop of Canterbury, to avert these calamities,

¹ Daulat Sháh in his life of Anwarí places it in the reign of Sanjar, but the historians all agree in fixing it in the reign of the last Seljúk prince Toghrál bin Arslán. Khándamír places it in A.H. 581 (which commenced April 4, A.D. 1185), but IbnAsír in his

Kámil ut Tawáríkh gives the right date, 582; see Defrémery, *Hist. des Seldjoukides*, p. 104. Its accuracy is proved by the concurrence of the 29th of *Jumáda' ii*. with Sept. 16 in A. P. 582.

ordered a fast of three days throughout his province (Gervase 1479); and as the season proved more than usually serene the astrologers, to save their credit, were enabled to ascribe to the piety of the people the non-accomplishment of their predictions."

Anwarí is said to have been so disconcerted at his failure as an astrologer, that he left Merv and took up his residence in Balkh, where he died A.H. 586 (A.D. 1190). His tomb is still shown "on the side of that of the saint Ahmad Hazrawaih" (Dr Sprenger's *Oude Catalogue*).

His works consist of Kasídahs, Kitáhs, Ghazals, and Rubá'ís; but, though they fill a good-sized volume, hardly anything from them has ever been printed except a few short extracts which Prof. Falconer used to give in the *Asiatic Journal*. The two following odes are famous in Persian literary history and are good specimens of Anwarí's best style. Mr. Palmer and I have compared for our text the following MSS.:—A. a good copy, and D. a poor one¹, in my own collection; B. a fair MS. in the Library of Christ's College; and C. a fair MS. in that of King's. We have endeavoured in our notes to illustrate the various allusions of the original, and Mr. Palmer has added a spirited translation of both pieces in English verse.

¹ This MS. formerly belonged to Professor D. Forbes, who had written against the first ode the words which we have taken as our title. Since this

article has been in type we have unexpectedly found a poetical version of the first ode in the *Asiatic Miscellanies*, published in 1785 at Calcutta.

E. B. COWELL.

در عرض حال اهل خراسان در حضرت بادشاه
(فَاعْلَانَنَّ فِعْلَاتَنَّ فِعْلَاتَنَّ فِعْلَانَّ or فَعْلَانَّ)

بر سمرقند اگر بگذری ای باد سحر
نامهٔ اهل خراسان¹ بپیر خاقان بر
نامهٔ مطلع او ریخ تن و آفت جان
نامهٔ مقطع او درد دل و سوزِ جگر
نامهٔ بر رقص آه غریبان پیدا
نامهٔ در شکنش خون شهیدان مضمَر
نقش تحریرش از سینهٔ مظلومان خشک
مطر عنوانش از دیدهٔ محرومان تر
ریش گردد ممرِ صوت از او گاه سماع
خون شود مردمک دیده از او گاه² نظر
تا کنون حالِ خراسان ورعایا بودست
بر خداوند جهان خاقان پوشیده مگر
نی نبودست که پوشیده نباشد بروی
ذرهٔ نیک و بد نه فلک و هفت اختر

¹ سوي D.

² وقت A.

THE TEARS OF KHORASSAN.

OH gentle Zephyr! if o'er Samarcand
Some dewy morning thou should'st chance to blow,
Then waft this letter to our monarch's hand
Wherein Khorassan tells her tale of woe.
Wherein the words that for the heading stand
Are present danger and destruction nigh;
Wherein the words that are inscribed below
Are grief, and wretchedness, and misery;
On every fold a martyr's blood appears,
From every letter breathes a mourner's sigh;
Its lines are blotted with the orphan's tears,
Its ink the widow's burning anguish dries!
Its bare recital wounds the listener's ears,
Its bare perusal scathes the reader's eyes.
What! is Khorassan's most unhappy case
Unknown to him in whose domain she lies?
No, for his knowledge doth all things embrace,
Whate'er of good or evil is displayed
In earth's wide limits or in boundless space.

کارها بسته بود بی شک در وقت و کنون
 وقت آنست که راند سوی ایران لشکر
 خسرو عادل و خافان معظم کر جد
 بادشاهی است جهاندار بهفتاد پدر
 دایمیش فخر بدین است که درپیش ملوک
 پسرش^۱ خواندی سلطان سلاطین سنجر
 باز خواهد ز غزان کینه که واجب باشد
 خواستن کین پدر بر پسر خوب سیر
 چون شد از عدلش تا سرحد توران آباد
 کی روا دارد ایران را ویران یکسر
 ای کیومرث بقا بادشه کُرسی عدل
 وی منوچهر لقا خسرو افریدون فر
 قصه اهل خراسان بشنو از سر لطف
 چون شنیدی زسر رحم درایشان بنگر
 این دل افکار جگر سوختگان میگویند
 کای دل و دولت و دین را ز تو شادی و ظفر^۲
 خبرت هست کرین زیر و زبر شوم غزان
 نیست یکتا^۳ زخراسان که نشد زیر و زبر

^۱ پدرش C.

^۲ شادیست خطر A. نظر D. C.

^۳ یکده C.

For such things doubtless was provision made,
And now at length, to Iran's succour—now
His conquering armies shall the land invade.
Thou, just as Khosrau, mighty monarch, thou,
In whom the blood of seventy kings doth run,
Thy lineage and the diadem on thy brow,
These are proud boasts, but surely thou hast none
So proud as this—that to the kings of earth
Great Sultán Sanjar owned thee for his son!
Avenge as should a son of noble birth
Thy father's wrongs upon this Tartar horde!
If of thy wardship Túrán¹ knows no dearth,
Shall 'Irán be uncared for by her lord?
Kaiyumers king of good renown and just,
Great Kusra swift to punish or reward,
Manúchehr in his presence so august,
Afrídún² in his majesty and might—
Compared with thee, these were but vilest dust.
Oh! hear the story which I now recite,
And when thou hearest it compassionate
And let thy slaves find favour in thy sight.
Oppressed and humbled by opposing fate,
To thee, her hope, her glory, and her joy,
Khorassan pleads in her forlorn estate.
No soul, thou knowest well, may there enjoy
A moment's safety from the Tartar Troop,

¹ Trans-Oxiana as opposed to Cis-Oxiana.

kings in the legendary history of Persia.

² These are the names of ancient

خبرت هست که از هر چه در او خیري بود
 در همه ایران امروز نماندست اثر
 بر بزرگان زمانه شده خردان سالر
 بر کریمان جهان گشته لثیمان مهتر
 بر در دنوان احرار حزین و حیران
 در کف رندان ابرار اسیر و مضطر
 شاد الا بدر مرگ نه بیدنی مردم
 بکر جز در شکم مام نیایی دختر
 مسجد جامع هر شهر ستوران‌شان را
 پایگاه‌یست نه سقفش پیدا و نه در
 خطبه نکنند بهر خطه^۱ بنام غز از آنکه
 در خراسان نه خطیب است کنون نه منبر
 کشته فرزند گرامی خود ار^۲ ناگاهان
 بیدند از بیم خروشید نیارد مادر
 آنکرا صدره غز زر ستد و باز فروخت
 دارد آن جنس که گویش خریداست بزر
 بر مسلمانان زان شکل کنند استحقاق
 که مسلمان نکند صد یک از آن با کافر
 هست در روم و خطا امن مسلمانان را
 نیست یکذره سلامت بمسلمانی در

^۱ C. and D. زجور

^۲ A. D. گرامی راگز

All trace of good from 'Irán they destroy.
 Good men to bad men are compelled to stoop,
 The noble are subjected to the vile,
 The priest is pressed to fill the drunkard's stoup.
 No man therein is ever seen to smile
 Save at the blow that brings release—and doom!
 No maiden lives that they do not defile,
 Except the maid within her mother's womb.
 In every town the mosque and house of prayer—
 To give their horses and their cattle room—
 Is left all roofless desolate and bare.
 "Prayer for our Tartar rulers" there is none
 In all Khorassan it is true—for where,
 Where are the preachers and the pulpits gone?
 There mothers, when by the assassin's steel
 They see their children murdered one by one,
 Dare not give utterance to the grief they feel.
 The freeman kidnapped by the Tartar chief,
 And sold again, rejoices in the deal;
 For change—a change of *masters* brings relief.
 Their law-courts give such fair—God save us!—play
 When Muslims litigate with unbelief
 Not one in fifty ever gains the day.
 In Room and Khata¹, in the very lands
 Where Káfirs hold an undisputed sway,
 The Muslim on an equal footing stands;
 For Muslim countries is the right reserved
 To wrest the right from out the Muslim's hands!

¹ The Byzantine empire and Cathay.

خلق را زين غم فرياد رس اي شاه نژاد
 ملك را زين ستم آزاد كن اي پاك نهم
 بخداي كه بپيراست بنامت دينار
 بخداي كه بپاراست بفرقت افسر
 كه كني فارغ و آسوده دل خلق خداي
 زين فرومايه غز شوم پي غارتگر
 وقت آنست كه يابند ز رحمت پاداش
 گاه آنست كه بينند ز تيغت كيگر
 زن و فرزند و زر جمله بيك حمله چو باز
 بردي امسال روانشان بدگر حمله ببر
 آخر ايران كه از او بودي فردوس برشك
 وقف خواهد شد تاحشر برين شوم حشر
 سوي آن حضرت كز عدل تو گشتست چو خلد
 خويشتن زينجا كر ظلم غزان شد چو سقر
 هر كه باري و خري داشت بحيلت افگند
 چكند آنكه نه بارست مراورا ونه خر
 رحم كن رحم بر آن قوم كه نبود شب و روز
 در مصيبت شان جز نوحه گري كار دگر
 رحم كن رحم بر آن قوم كه جويند جوين
 از پس آنكه نخوردندي از ناز شكر

Oh thou who never from the right hast swerved,
Release thy country from this load of shame,
For God's sake—God whom thy forefathers served,
Who on our coinage hath inscribed thy name,
Who on thy brow hath placed the regal crown,
And given thee all things, power and wealth and fame!
For God's sake who on tyranny doth frown,
For God's sake hear a sorrowing land's request,
And put these plundering Tartar ruffians down.
Now is the time to set thy lance in rest,
Now is the time to draw the avenging blade;
Last year their strongholds did thine arms invest,
Thou didst bear off in one successful raid,
Wives, wealth, and children—make a fresh attack,
And of their very lives shall spoil be made!
Fair 'Irán rivalled Paradise, alack!
Though humbled sorely she will make a stand
Against the oppressors and will drive them back
If thou but bid her. Thou didst make the land
Like Eden's bowers, while those who on her prey
Have made her worse than hell's hot sulphurous strand.
If one possesseth in Khorassan, say
An ass or mule, he keepeth them by stealth,
Or sells the treasure at what price he may;
What, pray, shall he do who hath no such wealth?
Oh pity those who every day and hour
In fruitless wailing waste their time and health!
Oh pity those who craving coarsest flour,
Whilome despised the daintiest of sweets!

رحم کن رحم برآن قوم که رسوا گشتند
 از پس آنکه بزیبای بودند سمر
 رحم کن رحم بر آنها که نیابند نمود
 از پس آنکه زاطلس شان بودی بستر
 گرد آفاق چو اسکندر بر گرد از آنکه
 تویی امروز جهانرا بدل اسکندر
 از تو رزم ای شه و از بخت موافق نصرت
 از تو عزم ای ملک و از ملک العرش ظفر
 همه پوشند کفن چون تو بپوشی خفتان
 همه خواهند امان چون تو بخوای مغفر
 ای سرافراز جهانبانی کر غایت فضل
 حق سپردست بعدل تو جهانرا یکسر
 بهره باید از عدل تو نیز ایرانرا
 گرچه ویران شده بیرون ز جهانش مشمر
 تو خور روشنی و هست خراسان اطلال
 نه بر اطلال بتابد چو بر آبادان خور
 هست ایران بمنزل شوره تو ابری ونه ابر
 هم بیفشاند بر شوره چو بر باغ مطر
 بر ضعیف و قوی امروز تویی داور حق
 هست واجب غم حق ضعفا بر داور

Oh pity these who though in dust they cower,

Whilome in honour held the loftiest seats!

Oh pity those who lie on felt, in place

Of sleeping softly in their silken sheets!

Like Alexander, wander o'er the face

Of earth and conquer over land and sea,

For Alexander by the heavenly grace,

Hath no successor on the earth but thee.

Thine is the purpose, may success be thine!

Thine is the conflict—victory must be

Of Him who did the universe design.

Such earthly sovereignty, such power and might

Are given to thee by warranty divine,

When thou dost deck thee in thy armour bright

Thy foeman decks him in his funeral pall;

Thy foeman calls for quarter and respite,

When thou dost for thy plumed helmet call.

'Irán should of thy justice have a share,

Look not upon her in her hour of fall

As though there were not such a country there!

Thou art the sun, Khorassan ruined lies;

The sun is ne'er in his regards unfair,

Alike o'er town and ruin doth he rise.

Thou art the raincloud, 'Irán is a field

Where every green thing withers up and dies;

Doth not the raincloud then its treasures yield

Both on the desert and the flowery mead?

Thou art a king—a king should be a shield

To strong and weak in every hour of need.

کشور ایران چون کشور توران چو تراست
 از چه محروم است از رافت تو این کشور
 گر نیاراید پای تو برین عزم رکاب
 غر مدبر نکشد باز عنان تا خاور
 کی بود کی که زاقصای خراسان آرند
 از فتوح تو بشارت بر خورشید بشر
 بادشاه علما صدر جهان خواجه شرع
 مایه فخر و شرف قاعده فضل و هنر
 شمس اسلام فلک مرتبه برهان الدین
 آنکه مولش بود شمس و فلک فرمان بر
 آنکه از مهر تو تازه است چو از دانش روح
 و آنکه بر چهر تو فتنه است چو بر شمس قمر
 چو قلم گردد این کار گران صدر بزرگ
 نیزه کردار ببندد زپی کینه کمر
 یاورش بادا حق عز و جل در همه کار
 تا درین کار بود با تو بهمت یاور
 بتو ای مایه حق خلق جگر سوخته را
 او شفیع است چنانکه آمت را پیغمبر
 خلق را زین حشر شوم اگر برهانی
 کردگارت برهاند زحطر در محشر
 پیش سلطان جهان سنجر کو پروردت
 ای^۱ چوتو بادشاه دادگر حق پرور

۱. پردر دست هجوتو D.

'Írán and Túrán both on thee depend,
Shall Túrán thrive and 'Írán ne'er be freed?
Never, until thou shalt her cause defend
And urge thy charger in the battle's storm,
Shall crushed Khorassan once more rise and send
Back to their native wilds this Tartar swarm.
When shall thy shout of victory reach the skies?
When shall Khorassan's rallying legions form?
Thou hast a minister, in counsels wise,
Learned in the mysteries of law, and one
Who over Islám like a sun doth rise,
Who from thy light hath all his greatness won
As souls from knowledge—who for thy fair face
Longs as the moon longs for the glorious sun¹.
When all our wrongs, our misery and disgrace
Are written, he, on direst vengeance bent,
Will couch his spear and gird him for the race.
May Heaven aid him in his good intent
That by his counsels he may give thee aid;
His office is as of a Prophet sent
By God to mediate for the things He made.
Oh free thy nation from this gathering pest,
And on the day when men's accounts are paid
That act of thine shall rank thee with the blest.
Great Sultan Sanjar, who thy childhood trained,
(Oh, thou of kingly qualities possessed!)

¹ The loves of the sun and moon are a common-place in Persian poetry.

دیده خواجه آفاق کمال الدین را
 که نباشد بجهان خواجه از او کاملتر
 نیک دانی که چه و تا بجای داشت برو
 اعتماد آن شه دین پرور نیکو محضر
 هست ظاهر که برو هرگز پوشیده نبود
 هیچ زاسرار ممالک چه زخیر و چه زشر
 روشنست آنکه بدانگونه که خور گردون را
 بود ایران را رایش همه عمر اندر خور
 و اندر آن مملکت و سلطنت و آن دولت
 چه اثر بود ازو هم بسفر هم بحضر
 با کمال الدین ابنا خراسان گفتند
 قصه ما بخداوند جهان خاقان بر
 چون کند پیش خداوند جهان از سر سوز
 عرضه این قصه رنج و غم و اندوه و فکر
 از کمال کرم و لطف تو زبید شاها
 کر کمال الدین داری سخن ما باور
 زو شنو حال خراسان و غزان ای شه شرق
 که مر اوزاست همه حال چو الحمد از بر

So long as o'er 'Iránian lands he reigned,
Kemál-ud-dín was ever at his side
And still the credit of his name maintained¹.
Thou saw'st how then his probity was tried;
Can'st not thou now implicitly rely
On whom a monarch like thy sire relied?
Nothing escaped his penetrating eye
In Persia, whether it were good or bad,
E'en as the sun that shining in the sky
Makes with his rays the whole creation glad,
Such genial influence over Persia's fate
His guiding care and ruling wisdom had.
He, in the field, in business of the state,
Right faithful service to thy house hath shown;
And now have we implored him to relate
Khorassan's wrongs before the imperial throne;
Perchance the tale may make a teardrop start
When all our wrongs and miseries are known.
Thou who hast played a faithful sovereign's part,
Give credence to a faithful vizier's word;
He has the story, like his prayers, by heart.

¹ Alluding to the signification of his name Kemál-ud-dín, "The perfection of the faith."

تا کشد رای چو تیر تو در آن قوم کمان
خویشتن پیش چنین حادثه کردست سپر
آنچه او گوید محض شفقت باشد از آنکه
بسطت ملک تو میخواهد نه جاه و خطر
خسروا در همه انواع هنر دستت هست
خاصه در شیوه نظم خوش و اشعار غرر
گر مگر بود ایطای درین قافیتیم
چون ضروریست شها پرده این نظم مدر
هم بر آن گونه که استاد سخن عمیق گفت
خاک خون آلود ای باد باصفاهان بر
بی گمان خلق جگرسوخته را دریابد
چون ز درد دل شان یابد ازین گونه خبر
تا جهان را بفروزد خور گردون پیمای
از جهان داری ای خسرو عادل برخوردار

He is our shield, be thou the avenging sword;
 He speaks but for the welfare of the land,
 And not to earn advancement or reward.
 In many an art thou hast a master's hand,
 But most of all in poesy divine;
 If then, mayhap, I should convicted stand
 Of repetition in this verse of mine,
 Judge not too harshly of my feeble lay,
 'Twas direst need that did the rhymes entwine.
 'Amák¹, the greatest poet of his day,
 This thought appropriate to my theme expressed:
 "Oh Zephyr, waft this bloodstained dust away
 "To Ispahán," and should our sad request
 Be in such manner to the king conveyed,
 Khorassan's wrongs may e'en be yet redressed.
 Not till the sun hath his last journey made
 Around the sky and rested him for aye;
 Not until then be thy dominion stayed;—
 And thy petitioners shall ever pray.

¹ 'Amák of Bokhara was one of the most eminent poets at the court of Sultan Sanjar, and was chiefly renowned for his pathetic elegiacs. One of these upon a daughter of Sultan

Sanjar who died young is still quoted and admired. He lived, it is said, to a very advanced age, but the biographers are not agreed as to the date of his decease.

درتبری خود از تهمت هجو گفتن
 فاعلاتن فاعلاتن فاعلاتن فاعلن

ای مسلمانان فغان از دور چرخ چندی
 واز نفاق تیر و قصد ماه و سیر مشتری
 کار آب نافع اندر مشرب من آتشیست

شغل خاک ساکن¹ اندر کلبه² من صرصی
 آسمان در کشتی عمرم کند دایم دو کار
 گاه شادی بادبانی وقت انده لنگری

گر بخندم وان پس از عمریست گوید زهر خند
 ور بگیرم وان همه روزیست گوید خون گری
 بر سر من مغفری کردی کله وان در گذشت
 بگذرد بر طیلسانم نیز دور معجری

¹ A and D سکنه.

PALINODIA.

AH! the Spheres are incessantly rolling,
 And the Archer is shifting his ground,
 And the Moon is for ever patrolling,
 And Jupiter going his round.
 The water that tastes to another
 Refreshing and cool on the lip,
 Is as fire that no efforts can smother
 In the cup which I sip.

The dust that all quiet is lying
 When others recline on the ground,
 Around me in volumes is flying
 Like a desert where whirlwinds abound.
 And fate in the ship of my being
 In happiness hurries me past,
 But if ever from sorrow I'm fleeing,
 It anchors me fast.

If I smile in society gaily
 But once in a lifetime, it sneers;
 If I weep, which, alas! I do daily,
 It bids me shed blood for my tears.
 I mind, when caparisoned knightly,
 A helmet and vizor I bore;
 But a dishclout befouled and unsightly
 I yesterday wore¹.

¹ Daulat Sháh who quotes this verse tells us that the people of Balkh, enraged at the insult offered to their city, pursued Anwarí, and by way of humiliating him threw a woman's cast off

veil over his head, and would have proceeded to still greater indignities, had not the chief *oádhi*, *Hamíd-ud-dín*, protected him from the fury of the mob.

روزگارا گر ز عفتا می نیاموزی ثبات
چون زغن تاجند سالی مادگی سالی نری
به پیوسی از جهان دانی که چون آمد مرا
همچنان کر بارگین امید کرن کوثری

از ستمهای فلک چندانکه خواهی گنج هست
وائقم زیرا که بامن هم بدین گنبد دري
گوئیا تا آسمانرا رسم دوران آمدست
داده اندی فتنه را قطبی بلرا محوري

گر بگرداند بپهلو . هفت کشور مر ترا
یکدم از مهرت نگوید کر کدامی کشوری¹
بعدها کاندل لکد کوب حوادث چند سال
بخت شورم خنجری کردست و دورش خنجری

خیر و خیرم کرد صاحب تهمت اندر هجو بلخ
تا همیگویند کافر نعمت آمد انوری
فَبَّهَ الْاِسْلَامَ را هجو ای مسلمانان که گفت
حاشِ لِلّٰهِ بِاللّٰهِ ار گوید جهود خیبری

¹ B and C یکشب.

O fate, you should learn to be stable
 From the mythical 'Anka's career',
 Not to shift like the crow in the fable,
 Which changes its sex every year.¹
 Ah! to hope in this world full of muddle,
 How false and fallacious it seems!
 'Tis like hoping to find in a puddle
 Elysian streams.

Dame Fortune has laid up a treasure
 Of sorrows unnumbered in store,—
 I know it, because I've the pleasure
 Of keeping a key to the door.
 Day dies and gives birth to the morrow,
 And as long as the universe rolls,
 Its axes are anguish and sorrow,
 And treason its poles.

If it turns round old Tellus and shows you
 The frigid or temperate zone,
 It never pretends that it knows you,
 Or cares to know which is your own.
 I've suffered each kick and each buffet
 Of fortune for many a year,
 And as if I'd not suffered enough, it
 Now stabs with its spear.

To the words which I uttered in jesting,
 A spiteful construction they give;
 And they call me an ingrate, protesting
 I libel the land where I live.
 What! I commit such profanation!
 I libel religion and you?
 I'd not believe such defamation
 Of a Khaibarí Jew²!

¹ The 'Anka or Símurgh is a mythical bird residing on Mount Káf where it sits to all eternity wrapped in silent contemplation.

² This superstition also attaches to the rabbit and some other animals.

³ The Khaibarí Jews are so called from Khaibar, a town near Mecca,

آسمان ار طفل بوي بلخ كردي دايگيش
مگه داند كرد معمور جهان را مادري
افتخار خاندان مصطفي در بلخ و من
كرده هم سلمانى اندر خدمتش هم بونري

آن نظام دولت و دين كانتظام عدل او
در دل اغصان كند باد صبارا رهبري
آنكه نا بيناي مادر زاد اگر حاضر شود
در جبين عالم آرايش به بيند مهترى

در پناه سده جاه رعيت پرورش
بر عقاب آسمان فرمان دهد كبك درى
هم نبوت در نسب هم بادشاهي در حسب
كو سليمان تا در انگشتش كند انگشترى

مسند قاضى القضاة شرق و غرب آراسته
آنكه هست لژ مسندش عباسيان را برترى
آنكه پيش كلك و نطقش آن دو سحر آنكه حلال¹
صد چو من هستند چون گوساله پيش سامري

¹ A marginal correction in C gives *كان* دو سحر آمد حلال

Why, where would you find such another
 To nurse it, if Heaven were young,
 As Balkh? (It would have for its mother
 The land whence the Chosen One sprung.)
 The land of the Prophet's descendants¹
 Is Balkh, and in serving it, I,
 Like one of the Prophet's dependents,
 Would willingly die.

And first in that eminent cluster
 Is he whose impressive decrees
 Could guide the wild winds as they bluster,
 And keep them from harming the trees.
 If a mortal afflicted with blindness
 From birth were in front of him now,
 He would see the great soul and the kindness
 That beam from his brow.

Did he an asylum accord it,
 The timidest creature that flies,
 Like an emperor proudly might lord it
 O'er the eagle that soars in the skies.
 In his lineage doth prophecy linger,
 To his household doth royalty cling,
 There remains but to place on his finger
 King Solomon's ring.

My lord the Chief Justice, the famous;
 The pride of the Abbaside throne;
 Who at once into silence can shame us
 By the force of his language alone.
 'Tis like Sámari's natural magic,
 It can force us to weep and to laugh,
 While we poets both comic and tragic
 Are dumb as the calf².

where they had settled before Mohammed's time. They are believed, on good authority, to be the descendants of those Bechabites mentioned in Jeremiah, xxxv. 2. They are now the

terror of the pilgrim caravans.

¹ In the text *Selmán* and *Búzar*, two of the Prophet's companions.

² Mohammedan legends ascribe the making of the Golden Calf to a certain

آب و آتش را اگر در مجلسش حاضر کنند
از میان هر دو بر دارد شکوهش داری
گو حمید الدین اگر خواهی که وقتی در دو لفظ
مطلقاً هرچه حمید است از صفتها بشمري

در زمان او هنر نشگفت اگر قیمت گرفت
گوهرست آري هنر او بادشاه گوهری
خواجۀ ملت صفی الدین عمر در صدرِ شرع
آنکه نبود دیورا با سایه او قادری

مفتی مشرق امام مغرب آنکه از رتبش
عرش زبید منبرش کوتاش کردی منبری
حکم دین هر ساعت از فتوای او فربه تر است
دیدۀ فربه کنی چون کلک او از لاغری

ز احتساب تقوای او دانکه هنگام کسوف
آفتاب اندر حجاب مه شد از پی چادری
از رخس هر روز فال مشتری گیرد جهان
کیست آنکو نیست فال مشتری را مشتری

And water and fire, if you mixed them
 And found that they wouldn't agree,
 To settle the matter betwixt them
 He'd quickly pronounce a decree!
 If you wish to make mention concisely
 Of all to which men should aspire,
 Hamîd-ud-dîn's name would precisely¹
 Give all you require.

In his time men had ceased to be cruel
 To Virtue, which puzzled her sore,
 Till she found herself held as a jewel,
 And one which he constantly wore.
 There's Saffy-ud-dîn whose jurisdiction
 So strengthens authority's arm,
 That the Devil for fear of conviction
 Is powerless to harm.

He's Muftî of East and he's Canon
 Of West, and should Heaven aspire
 As a pulpit to put such a man on,
 You must raise it a step or two higher.
 To his legal decisions we listen
 With pleasure and wonder, but when
 He writes them, our very eyes glisten
 Like ink in his pen.

Abashed at the brilliant prælection
 And wisdom that fall from his lips,
 The Sun takes the moon for protection,
 Resorting to total eclipse.
 The world takes its happiest omen
 Each day from his fortunate star;
 From such omens I fancy that no man
 Himself would debar.

Sâmari instead of to Aaron, and add that he caused it to bleat like a living calf by casting upon it some dust which he had picked up from under the hoofs of Gabriel's steed when that archangel

led the Egyptian hosts to their destruction at the Passage of the Red Sea.

¹ Hamîd-ud-dîn signifies "laudable in the faith."

نو الفقار نطق تاج آلدین شریعت را بدست
 آن بمعنی توامان با نو الفقار حیدری
 بلبل بستان دین کر وجد مجلسهای او
 صبح را چون گل طبیعت گشته پیراهن دري

توبه کردندي اگر در یافتندی مجلسش
 هم مه از تمامی و هم زهره از خنیاگری
 من نمی دانم که این جنس سخن را نام چیست
 نی نبوت می توانم گفتنش نی ساحری

ساقیان لهجه او چون شراب اندر دهند
 هوش گوید گوش را هدین ساغری کن ساغری
 بازوی برهان بتقریر نظام آلدین قویست
 آنکه شایستی که کردی جبرئیلش چاکری

آنکه بر اسرار شرع اندر زمان واقف شوی
 از ورقهای ضمیرش یک ورق گر بنگری
 نامدی اوراق اطباق فلک هرگز تمام
 گر ضمیر او نکردی علم دین را دفتری

And Táj-ud-dín's delicate sallies
 Cut always in opposite ways,
 Like that two-edged weapon of 'Alf's,
 So famous in chivalrous days.
 In the garden of clerical learning
 Like a nightingale sweetly he'll sing;
 And daybreak to hear him is yearning
 Like a rose in the spring.

His sermons are free from all dulness—
 And, did they form part of his flock,
 The Moon would repent of her fulness,
 And Venus feel modesty's shock.
 I know not by what appellation
 I ought of his language to treat,
 It's neither divine inspiration
 Nor sorcery's cheat!

When out of his bottled-up speeches
 His eloquence draweth the stop,
 The ear, like a tankard, upreaches,
 And trembles at losing a drop.
 Since the proofs of the Scriptural story
 Which Dr Nizám-ud-dín gave,
 The very archangel would glory
 To act as his slave.

The arguments used in his treatise
 Have never so much as a flaw,
 Each page in itself so complete is,
 'Twould teach you the whole of the law.
 If you wanted the heavens and missed'em,
 In vain for the *tracts* might you look,
 Unless he had got the whole system
 Bound up in a book.

یارثان انبیا اینک چنین باشند کوست
 علم و تقوی بی نهایت پس تواضع بر سری
 در ثنای او اگر عاجز شوم معذور دار
 تا کجا باشد توان دانست حدّ شاعری

لاشۀ ما کی رسد آنجا که او رخی کشد
 کاروانی کی رسد هرگز بگرد لشکری
 باچنین سگان که گر از قدر شان عقدی کند
 فارغ آید چرخ اعظم از چه از پی زیوری

هجو گویم بلخرا هیهات یا ربّ زینهار
 خود توان گفتن که زنگارست زر جعفری
 بالله ار بر من توان بستن بمسمار قضا
 جنس آن بد سیرتی یا نوع این بد گوهری

خاتم حجت در انگشت سلیمان سخن
 افترا کردن بدو در گیرد از دیو و پری
 باز دان آخر کلام من زمنحول حسود
 فرق کن نقش آلهی را ز نقش آزری

Such as he are the heirs of the prophets,
 In knowledge and piety dressed,
 Yet he knows that but little it profits,
 If modesty crown not the rest.
 If I cannot do justice to him, it's
 A fault, but a venial one,
 For poetry you see has its limits,
 His merits have none.

This hack of a muse in my stable
 Can never his Pegasus¹ catch,
 Was there ever a caravan able
 The march of an army to match?
 Of such is the grand corporation
 That dwells in this city of mine,
 Where each as a bright constellation
 In Heaven would shine.

Yet for libelling Balkh they abuse me,
 (Oh Lord! that such lies should be told!)
 Why they might when about it accuse me
 Of finding a canker on gold.
 By Heaven! I think it would task all
 The tricks at which fate is so pat,
 To prove me to be such a rascal—
 To fix me with that!

The proof of a Solomon's reckoned
 To lie in the ring of his Song;
 The talent to forge such a second
 Can scarce to a devil belong².
 Be logical in your deductions,
 Don't palm off such fustian as mine!
 Don't you know one of 'Azar's productions³
 From creatures divine?

¹ Bakhsh, the celebrated horse of Rustum the Persian Hercules.

² Alluding to the legend that Solomon was for some time deprived of his kingdom by a demon who surrepti-

tiously obtained possession of his magical ring.

³ 'Azar, the father of Abraham, was a celebrated maker of graven images. Coran, vi. 74.

عیش من زین افترا تلخی گرفت وتو هنوز
چربک او همچنان چون جان شیرین میخری
مرد را چون ممتلی شد از حسد کار افتراست
بد مزاجان را قی افتد در مجالس از پری

چون مر اورا واضح خر نامه خواندی ریش گاو
گاو او در خرمن من باشد از کون خری
آن نمی گویم که در طی زبان آورده ام
آن هجا کان نزد من یالی بود از کافری

گر بخاطر بگذرانیدستم اندر عمر خویش
یا نیم چونانکه گرگ یوسف از تهمت بری
جاویدان بیزا رم او ذاتی که بیزاری او
هست در بازار دین صراف جان را بیزی

آن توانای ودانای که در اطوار غیب
دام بد بختی نهاد و دانه نیک اختری
آنکه تاثیر صبا صنع اورا آمدست
گل فشان اختران بر گنبد نیلوفری

My life is for ever embittered
 By being accused of such trash,
 And you—all your lifetime is frittered
 In stirring this trumpety hash!
 He was bursting with envy and from it
 This impudent calumny forged:—
 Well, a weak but full stomach must vomit
 When overmuch gorged.

They've made a great bull of it somewhere¹;—
 The libel on him has been tacked,
 And said bull, bent on mischief, has come where
 My corn was all quietly stacked.
 I'm not, indeed, simply denying
 That my tongue ever spoke such a word,
 And that I should call worse than lying
 And twice as absurd.

But I swear that the thought never came in
 My head since the day I was born—
 Ah! the wolf must come in for defaming
 When Joseph is said to be torn.—
 As I hope for God's help and assistance—
 And the soul He puts out of the pale,
 In the market of human existence
 Must evermore *fail*.

He who by His wisdom can view in
 The future the secrets of fate,
 Who spreads out the meshes of ruin
 And lures with prosperity's bait;
 Whose influence can if He pleases
 Besprinkle the stars o'er the sky
 As the rose petals stirred by the breezes
 Are scattered and fly.

¹ A libellous poem entitled the *Khar Nāmah* or "Book of Asses" had been circulated and ascribed by some of his detractors to Anwari.

آنکه خاری از دها دندان عقب نیش را
 شمنگی دامت بر اقطاع گلبرگ تری
 تا بزل مایه شب خاک را تربین نداد
 روز بر گوش شفق نهاد زلف عنبری

باز شد چون قدرتش گیسوی شب را شانه کرد
 در خم آبروی گردون دیده‌های عنبری
 بزم منعش را ز نیلوفر چو گردون عود سوخت
 آفتاب و آب کرد این آتشی آن مخمري

آنکه اندر کارگاه کن فکان ابداع او
 بی اساس مایه از مایه‌های عنبری
 داد یک عالم بهشتی روی ارزق پوش را
 خوشترین رنگی منور بهترین شکلی کُری

آنکه عونش بر تن ماهی و بر فرق خروس
 پیرهن را جوشنی داد و کله را مغفوی
 آنکه گر آلائی^۱ او را گنج بودی در عدد
 نیستی جذر اسم را عیب^۱ گنگی و کُری

^۱ B. and C. غبن

The dragon-toothed thorn in the garden
A sting like a scorpion's shows;
He hath posted it there as a warden
To watch o'er the delicate rose.
Till over the neck of the Heaven
The ringlets of evening flow,
Night veils not with locks like the raven
Day's maidenly glow.

Then lo! from the hemisphere darkling
Night's tresses He deftly doth part,
And from Heaven's arched eyebrows outsparkling
Eyes bright as narcissuses dart.
The sun sinketh down in the ocean
And azure-hued vapours arise,
'Tis the incense of nature's devotion
Perfuming the skies.

Ere atoms were yet in existence
His "be and it was so" had birth;
He needed not matter's assistance
In forming this beautiful earth.
Yet its shape is symmetrical rigour,
Its hues are most pleasing and bright;
For a sphere is perfection in figure,
In colouring, light.

To the fishes bright armour He giveth,
Unto chanticleer giveth a crest—
His praise by no mortal that liveth
Can ever be duly expressed,
Till the dumb man shall make an oration,
Till the stocks and the stones shall find voice,
Till the whole of the silent creation
In language rejoice.

آنکه در لوح زبانها خط اول نام اوست
 این همیگوید اِله آن ایزد و آن تنگري
 آنکه از ملکش خراشی دیده باشی بیش نه
 گر روی بر بام این سقفی بدین پهناوری

آنکه در امعای کرمی از لعاب چند برگ
 کار او باشد نهادن کارگاه شستري
 آنکه در احشای زنبوری کمال رافتش
 نوشرا با نیش داد از راه صحبت صابري

آنکه از تجویف نای ساقی احسان او
 جام گه مصري نهد بر دستها گه عسکري
 آنکه چون بر آفرینش سرفراری کرد عقل
 گفت می را گوشمالش ده بدست مستگري

آنکه قهرش داد انجم را شیاطین افگنی
 وانکه لطفش داد آتش را سمندر پروري
 آنکه ترک يك ادب از پیشگاه حضرتش
 وقف کرد ابلیس را بر آستان مدبري

All nations and languages know Him,
 Even infancy lispeth His name,
 Allah, Tangarí¹, Yezdán, Elohim—
 Tis the earliest sound we can frame.
 All space and all limits excelling,
 To the roof of the Universe soar,
 And you may see a tile of His dwelling—
 One tile and no more.

A worm sucks the juices that issue
 From a handful of mulberry leaves,
 And He makes it to rival the tissue
 Which Susa's best factory weaves.
 The honey delicious in flavour
 He teacheth the bee to secrete,
 And joineth with infinite favour
 The sting and the sweet.

When nature, His page, is entrusted
 The cane's hollow goblet to brim,
 With crystals the cup is encrusted
 Or syrup runs over the rim².
 When over the whole of creation
 Man's Reason He caused to preside,
 He ordered the drunkard's potation
 To humble its pride.

His anger with meteors smiteth
 The demons who dare to aspire³;
 His grace made the beast that delighteth
 To dwell in the midst of the fire⁴.
 His mandates are fixed and eternal:
 One breach has laid Lucifer low
 On the threshold of torment infernal
 In infinite woe.

¹ Tangarí is the Mongol, and Yezdán the old Persian, name for God. The former word is not in any of the modern dictionaries, although it occurs in D'Herbelot.

² In the text Missrî (Cairene) and Askerî sugar, Cairo being famous for

treacle and 'Asker for crystallized or loaf sugar.

³ The Mohammedans believe that meteors are brands hurled by angels against the demons whom they find eaves-dropping at the gates of heaven.

⁴ The Salamander.

آنکه آدم را عَصَى آدَمَ زبِي افکنده بود
 گر نه هم نَمَّ اجْتَبَاهُ اوش دادِي باوري
 آنکه قوم نوح را از پهر گفت لَا تَذَرُ
 در دودم کرد از زمین آسِيب قهرش اسپري

آنکه چون خلوت سراي خَلَّتْش خالي کند
 شعله ريحاني کند آنجا نه اخگر اخگري
 آنکه دست جادوي را از عصای کم کند
 يك شبان از ملك او بي تهمت مستبكري

آنکه نيل مادری بر چهرهٔ مريم کشيد
 حفظ او بي آنکه باطل شد جمال دختری
 آنکه از مهري که بودی مصطفی را بر کتف
 ختم کردست ازیس عهدش درو¹ پیغمبري

¹ B. and C. در

"Thus Adam rebelled," was a sentence
 Had settled our doom at the Fall,
 Till the words, "He approved his repentance,"
 Gave hope of atonement for all¹.
 Ere Noah had his "leave them not" spoken,
 Denouncing the whole of his race,
 The flood-gates of Heaven were broken
 And deluged Earth's face².

When His love for His Friend He discloses
 And his storehouse of mercy lays bare,
 He turneth the fire into roses,
 And embers forget what they were³.
 A shepherd of lowly condition
 The Mount of His Holiness trod,
 And confounded the skilful magician
 With only a rod.

The markings of motherhood's honour
 He drew upon Miriam's face,
 Conferring His Spirit upon her,
 Nor robbed her of maidenhood's grace⁴.
 The shoulder of Ahmed his chosen
 The stamp of a Prophet revealed,
 And the fountain prophetic was frozen⁵.
 And evermore sealed⁵.

¹ Coran, xx. 119—120. "*Thus Adam rebelled against his Lord, afterwards He approved his repentance and was turned unto him and directed him.*"

² Coran, lxxi. 27. "And Noah said, Lord, leave not any families of the unbelievers on the earth."

³ Alluding to the legend that when Abraham (who is always called *Khalil*. *Allah*, the Friend of God) was cast into the fire by Nimrod for ridiculing the idolatrous worship of his fellow-

countrymen, the burning pile was miraculously changed into a bed of roses.

⁴ Oriental women consider the tattooing of the face as a great ornament.

⁵ Mohammed is said to have borne "the seal of prophecy" between his shoulders, that is, a natural mark in the shape of a seal containing the Muslim profession of faith: "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is the prophet of God." *Ahmed* is a name of Mohammed.

آنکه از ایمای انگشتی دو گیسو بند کرد
از چه از یک آینه بر سقف چرخ چندری
آنکه بر دعویش چون برهان قاطع خواستند
در زبان سوسمار آورد حُجَّت گستری

آنکه گر بر اسپ فکرت جاودان جولان کنی
از نخستین آستان حضرتش در نگذری
آنکه هم در عقل ممنوع است و هم در شرع شرکت
جز بذاتش گر بعزم و قصد سوگندی خوری

اندرین سوگند اگر تاویل کردم کافرم
کافری باشد که در چون من کسی این ظن بری

خود بیا تا کج نشینم راست گویم یک سُخن
تا ورق چون راست بُنّیان زین کجیها بستری
چون مرا در بلخ هم از امطناع اهل بلخ
دق مصری چادری کردست و رومی بستری

¹ One of the miracles attributed to Mohammed is the *Shakk el Kamar* or "the division of the moon" into two parts at his bidding. In the present verse the two crescents are likened to curls and the whole disc of the moon to a mirror.

² The prophet was one day standing

in the midst of an assemblage of his followers, when a certain Bedawī, who had caught a lizard and was carrying it home, passed by. On learning that the object of attraction was a person who claimed to be the Prophet of God, he approached the assembly and addressing Mohammed, declared that if

He beckons the moon, and dissolving
 Apart into crescents it flies;
 'Twain curls in a mirror revolving
 High up in the roof of the skies¹.
 Of the powers which His prophet was claiming
 They needed an evident sign,
 And behold the sleek reptile proclaiming
 His office divine².

On the steed of your fancy's ideal
 On, on for Eternity, ride
 Through the regions of space empyreal!
 O'er His threshold you never will stride.
 By Him—and 'tis veriest treason,
 The deadliest treason of all,
 Alike to religion and reason,
 On others to call—

By Him—and should I have been trying
 Some means of evading the oath,
 Or should any accuse me of lying
 We're infidels, either or both.
 [Were I not far above all suspicion,
 How to perjure myself should I dare,
 When 'twould doom me to lasting perdition
 Such oaths to forswear?]

Come! let us sit down for a minute;
 Your mind is a crumpled-up page,
 But I'll smooth every wrinkle that's in it
 When once we in converse engage.
 Now here's what I'm fancied to sin in—
 I'm living at ease in the town,
 I'm clad in the finest of linen,
 I'm resting on cushions of down;

it would not expose him to the charge of rashness he would slay him. "For," said he, "thou art the greatest liar that woman ever bore." Omar, enraged at this vituperative language, be-

sought Mohammed to allow him to kill the Bedawi; but the former reproved his haste, saying that the merciful man was half a prophet himself. On this the Bedawi drew the lizard from

بر سر ملکی چنان فارغ نباشد کس چو من
حبذا ملکی که باشد افسرش بی افسری
دی ز خاک خاوران نذر مجهول آمده
گشته امروز اندرو چون آفتاب خاوری

با چنانها این چندینها زاید از خاطر مرا
ای عجب از آب خشکی زاید از آتش تری
این همه بگذار آخر عاقلم در نفس خویش
کادیمی را غفل هست از امکانات اکبری

پس چه گوئی هجو گویم خطه را کز درش
گر در آید دیو بنهد از بیرون مستکبری
تا تو فرصت جوی کردی در کمین گاه حسد
غصه ده ساله را باری بصره آوری

هیچ عاقل این کند جز آنکه بیرون¹ افکند
اصل نیکو اعتقادی رسم نیکو محضری
دشمنان را مایه دادن نزد من دانی که چیست
جمع کردن موش دشتی با پلنگ بربری

¹ B. and C. یکسو

By great and by small I am treated
 As though I were lord of the town;
 Hurrah! for a throne where I'm seated
 Without all the weight of a crown.
 I was once in obscurity pining,
 An atom on Kháwarí ground;
 Now the sun of my presence out shining
 Sheds lustre around¹.

And favours like these I'm returning
 With scurrilous verses like these!
 Then water has taken to burning
 And fire in an aqueduct flows!
 Now do, my good sir, for a season
 Be rational, pray, if you can.
 For there is such a matter as *reason*
 Attaching to man.

Do you think I'd fall foul of a country
 Where, before he could enter the door,
 The devil must drop his effront'ry
 And never rebel any more.
 And *that* when I know you will take up
 The very least slip of my pen,
 And are lying in ambush to rake up
 Old grudges again.

There's no one in any society
 Would do it, unless he were mad
 And had lost every sense of propriety
 And every good point which he had.
 To play in his hands and rely on
 An enemy's honour,—to me
 Is like matching the field mouse and lion
 In hopes they'll agree.

his sleeve and threw it at the prophet, adding that "he would believe upon him when that lizard did and not till then." The reptile immediately acknowledged the truth of Mohammed's mission in plain Arabic and the Bedawí, convinced by the miracle, became one

of the prophet's most devoted followers. *Damiri. Haiyát el Haiwán el Kubrá. Boulak 2nd Edition, Vol. II. p. 94.*

¹ The poet was born at Kháwarán, from which he took the *sobriquet* of Khawarí, which he subsequently changed to Anwari, "shining."

مستقیم احوال شو تا خصم سرگردان شود
 بس که پرکاری کند او چونتو کردی مسطری
 این دقایق من چنان بیزم که از بی فرصتی
 نکته گیرد این و آن بر بو فراس بختری

از عقاب و پوستینس ار نگویم به بود
 گرچه در دریا تواند کرد خربط کازری
 چند رنجی گر قبولم تازه شاخی می دهد
 هرکجا پنداری ای مسکین که پنجه می بری

رو که از یاجوج بهتان رخنه هرگز کی فند
 خاصه در سدی که تاییدش کند اسکندری
 یک حکایت بشنوی هم از زبان شهر خویش
 تادرین اندیشه باری رای باطل نسپری

دی کسی در نقص من گفت او غریب شهر ماست
 بلخ گفت این از کمال اوست چند ار بنگری
 او غریب اندر جهان باشد چو از رتبت مرا
 آسمان هر ساعتی گوید جهان دیگر

Be just though your enemy cozen,
 And he'll very soon look like a fool;
 Like the compass he'll turn by the dozen,
 Do you be as straight as the rule.
 I've sifted the matter and know it,
 That to mind one's own business is hard,
 If they can't find a spot in the poet
 They will on the pard¹.

There's a tale of a daw and an eagle²—
 But I needn't allude to the verse,
 For a duck may dress up like a seagull
 And no one be twopence the worse.
 Because I'm admired as a singer,
 With envy you're ready to die.
 Are you to put *your* dirty finger
 In every one's pie?

Get out! for though Gog, *redivivus*³
 As Calumny, batter and storm,
 He won't of our rampart deprive us,
 If Sikander's alive and in form.
 Now in case you are tempted too greatly
 To tread on such delicate ground,
 I'll tell you a story that's lately
 Been going the round.

A fop that I wont waste a curse on,
 To make me look stupid and small
 Says, "Who is that strange-looking person?
 "I can't recollect him at all."
 Says Balkh, "Well he is as you've reckoned,
 "But I can the matter arrange,
 "As *I'm* a new world every second,
 "No wonder *he's* strange."

¹ *Nukta gtrifan*, "to criticize sharply," literally signifies "to find spots."

² Or, as we should say, of a daw and a peacock.

³ *Coran*, xxiii. v. "And they said, Dhu'l Karnain (Sikander or Alexander), verily

Gog and Magog waste the land; shall we therefore pay thee tribute, on condition that thou build a rampart between us and them? He answered..... I will set a strong wall between you and them."

خاك پاي اهل بلخم كر مقام شهر شان
هست بر اقران خویشم هم سري هم سروري
حبذا تاريخ اين انشا كه فرمان ده ببلخ
رايت طغرل تكيني بود و رای ناصري

As for Balkh I devotedly serve it—
I'm as dust under foot in a town
Where I and all such as deserve it
Get honour and wealth and renown.
Than the present, my rhymes could have been at
No brighter or luckier date,
With a Násir and Togral Takín¹ at
The head of the state².

¹ Probably Toghrál bin Arslán, the last of the Seljúkián dynasty, who reigned 571—590 A.H.

² A Násir-ed-dín seems from this to have been the local Governor of Balkh;

it is however quite possible that the reference is to Násir-ed-dín the then Caliph of Baghdad, though the latter appears to have been hostile to Sultán Toghrál.

E. B. COWELL.

E. H. PALMER.

ATHENIAN BILINGUAL INSCRIPTION.

THIS inscription was found 22 Feb. 1861, at Athens, near the church of *Ἁγία Τριάς*, and is now in the Theseum.

Between the shorter Greek and the Phœnician inscriptions is a rude representation of a corpse stretched upon a bier, over which a lion and a man are contending; behind the latter is the prow of a ship.

REFERENCES. *Bulletino dell' Instituto di corrisp. archeol.* di Roma, Tom. xxxiii. 1861, p. 321. Lenormant, *Monographie de la voie sacrée Éleusiniennne*, Tom. i. p. 120—132. De Vogüé, *Mélanges d'Archéologie Orientale*. Paris, 1868, p. 16.

ΑΝΤΙΠΑΤΡΟΣΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΟΥΑΣΚΑ
ΔΟΜΣΑΛΩΣΔΟΜΑΝΩΣΙΔΩΝΙΟΣΑΝΕΘΗΚΕ

ጸሐይ ልብ ወለድ የክርስቲያን መንፈሳዊ አደጋ
የጸሐይ ልብ ወለድ የክርስቲያን መንፈሳዊ አደጋ

ΜΗΘΕΙΣΑΝΟΡΟΨΩΝΟΑΥΜΑΞΕΓΩΕΙΚΟΝΑΤΗΝΔΕ
ΩΣΠΕΡΙΜΕΝΜΕΛΕΩΝΠΕΡΙΔΕΓΠΡΟΙΡΙΓΚΤΕΤΑΝΥΣΤΑΙ
ΗΛΟΕΤΔΡΕΙΧΟΡΟΛΕΩΝΤΑΜΟΕ.ΩΝΣΙΤΟΡΑΣΑΙ
ΑΛΛΑΦΙΛΟΙΤΗΜΥΝΛΗΚ.ΙΜΟΥΚΤΗΡΙΣΑΝΤΑΦΟΝΟΥΤ.
ΟΥΣΕΟΕΛΟΝΦΙΛΕΩΝΙΦΡΥΣΔΠΟΝΗΟΣΙΟΝΤΕΣ
ΦΟΙΝΙΚΗΝΔΕΛΙΤΟΝΤΕΙΑΙΧΟΟΝΙΣΟΜΑΚΕΚΡΥΝΜΑΙ

Ἀντίπατρος Ἀφροδισίου Ἀσκαλωνίτης.
Δομσάλως Δομάνω Σιδώνιος ἀνέθηκε.

אנך שמר בן עבר עשתרת אשקלני
אש ימנאתי אנך דעם צלח בן דעם חנא צדני

μηθεὶς ἀνθρώπων θαυμάζετω εἰκόνα τήνδε,
ὡς περὶ μὲν με λέων, περὶ δ' αὖ πρῶρ' ἐκτεάνυσται·
ἦλθε γὰρ ἐχθρολέων ταλαὸν με θέλων σίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ φίλοι τ' ἤμυναν καὶ μου ἑτέρισαν τάφον οὗτοι,
οὓς ἔθελον φιλέων, ἱερᾶς ἀπὸ νηὸς ἰόντες·
Φοινίκην δὲ λιπὼν τῇδε χθονὶ σῶμα κέκρυμμαι.

אנך I.

שמר The last letter is partly obliterated. Lenormant proposes
𐤌, Prof. Gildormeister '𐤌'; but neither of these readings is
satisfactory, as they do not correspond to ΑΝΤΙΠΑΤΡΟΣ.
שמר however is nearly the equivalent of this name, the
root signifying *defendit ab aliquo, conservavit*. In reading
ך no violence is done to the text. This emendation was
suggested by Mr Sandys.

בן עבר עשתרת The son of the servant of Ashtoreth. This
exactly corresponds to Ἀφροδισίου.

אשקלני Ascalonian. The Biblical orthography of the word,
but without the ך.

אש which.

ימנאתי I set up or dedicated. A causative form in יפעל of a
verb, the *kal* form of which is found in Davis' Cartha-
ginian inscriptions (British Mus.), No. 90. The final י in
the first person is unusual in Phœnician.

דעם צלח (נעם صلح) Blessed or prospered of Dom=ΔΟΜΣΑ-
ΛΩΣ. The root צלח, Arab. صلح, is common to nearly all
the Semitic idioms. M. le Comte de Vogüé, following
Journal of Philology. VOL. IV. 4

the other commentators, makes the rather startling remark that "Ce nom Dom, דעם n'appartient même pas, comme racine, aux langues sémitiques." It is of common occurrence in Arabic in the sense of to "support or prop up," "and hence," as Lane tells us in his Arabic Lexicon, "دعامة signifies also a lord."

דעם חנא (دعم حنا) *Dom hanná*. Favoured of Dom = ΔΟΜΑΝΩ.

Cf. Hannibal, compounded with the same verb and the name of the god Baal.

צדני Sidonian.

The consecutive translation is :

"I (am) Shomer, son of Abd Ashtoreth, of Ascalon,
Which I Dom-sallah, son of Dom-hanna, of Sidon, set up."

E. H. PALMER.

At Mr Palmer's request, I have endeavoured to restore the Greek portions of the inscription recently copied by him in the Theseum, and the result of my endeavour is printed on page 49. A few details, however, demand a brief commentary, before commencing which I ought perhaps to explain that it was not until my restoration was almost completed that I was aware that others had made the same attempt.

Ἀντίπατρος] It is impossible to identify the person, in whose memory the inscription is written, with any of the persons of that name with whom we are acquainted. Antipater of Sidon is one of the poets of the Greek Anthology, and is mentioned in Meleager's *Garland* :

ἐν δ' ἄρ' ἀμάρakon ἦκε, Πολύστρατον, ἄνθος ἀοιδῶν,
Φοίνισσάν τε νέην κίπρον ἀπ' Ἀντιπάτρου.

Anthologia Palatina, IV. 1. 42.

But this cannot be the Antipater in question ; indeed, there can be little doubt that *Ἀντίπατρος* is meant for a translation

of the Phœnician name of the Ascalonite here commemorated : and that name may very well have been 𐤍𐤕𐤕, which in its sense of 'guardian and protector' may be approximately rendered by 'Ἀντίπατρος, 'one who stands *in loco parentis*.' I may add that 'Shomer' occurs as a proper name in 1 Chron. vii. 32, and also in 2 Kings xii. 22; also that several of the Bilingual inscriptions given in Böckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum* supply instances of similar attempts to translate Phœnician names into Greek equivalents; thus Abd-melcarth becomes 'Ἡράκλειος; Abd-osir, Διονύσιος; and Abd-Shemesh, 'Ηλιόδωρος. So also, in this very inscription, the father of 'Shomer', Abd-Ashtoreth, is translated 'Αφροδίσιος, a name which gains additional significance when we remember that his home was Ascalon, the principal seat of the worship of Ashtoreth. In Herodotus, I. 105 we read: ἐπεὶ τε...ἐγένοντο ἐν 'Ασκάλῳ πόλι... ἐσύλησαν τῆς οὐρανίης 'Αφροδίτης τὸ ἱρόν· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἱρόν...πάντων ἀρχαιότατον ἱρὼν ὅσα ταύτης τῆς θεοῦ.

1. 2. λέων] M. Lenormant, after quoting the passage in Herodotus (vii. 126), where the *habitat* of lions in Europe is described as limited to the district bounded towards the West by the Achelous in Acarnania, and towards the East by the Macedonian river Nestus, makes a naïve suggestion that the deceased on landing at the Peiræus was torn in pieces by a lion that had broken loose from a menagerie. It may be noticed in passing that the exhibition of lions and bears, as part of the spectacles of a πανήγυρις, is attested by a passage in Isocrates *de permutatione*, § 213. But as the inscription does not state that the death took place at Athens, M. Lenormant's ingenious hypothesis appears uncalled for. It would be safer, perhaps, to suggest that on the voyage from Phœnicia 'Shomer' and his comrades landed on the coast of Lycia or Caria; that he was there surprised by a lion, or more probably a panther; and although rescued by his friends, died before the vessel reached Athens. The panthers of Cibyra, the inland district, north of Lycia and east of Caria, are the subject of repeated importunities on the part of Cicero's correspondent Caelius, who was anxious to secure some specimens to give éclat to his aedileship. (Cicero, *ad Att.* v. 21, 5 and *ad fam.* viii. 2, 2. 4, 5. 6, 5. 9, 3.) The

alleged early existence of lions, in Greece and Asia Minor, is carefully discussed, and decided in the affirmative, in a series of Articles in *Notes and Queries* (Second Series, Vol. XI.) written by Sir George Cornwall Lewis.

περί δ' αὖ πρῶρ' ἐκτεάνυσται] I find that M. Wachsmuth proposes περί δ' ἡ πρῶρη 'κτεάνυσται, and M. Rhousopoulos περί δὲ πρῶρ' (*sic*) ἐκτεάνυσται (Lenormant, p. 128). *Judicet lector*.

1. 3. ἐχθρολέων] This word, which is apparently coined for the occasion, is of greater philological interest than any other in the inscription. It is evidently equivalent to ἐχθρὸς λέων, and may be added to the group of 'parathetic' compounds formed by an adjective followed by a substantive, and retaining the exact sense of their component parts, not a few of which have been collected by Lobeck in his *Paralipomena Grammaticae Graecae*, Dissert. v. § 10, p. 373. In the best and earliest poets, words of this formation are very rare. We have, however, *Κακοῖλιος* in Homer (*Od.* 19. 260, 597, and 23. 19), also *αἰνόπαρις* in Alcman, 50 (= 31) *Δύσπαρις αἰνόπαρις, κακὸν Ἑλλάδι βωτιανείρῃ*, and in Euripides, *Hecuba*, 944; lastly, *πάτερ αἰνόπατερ* in Aeschylus, *Choephorae*, 315. Later poets, following the hint, coined *αἰνολέων* (Theocr. 25. 168), *αἰνογίγας* (Nonnus, *Dion.* 4. 447), *αἰνοτύραννος* (*Anthol. Planud.* 5. 350), and *αἰνόλυκος*, in *Anthol. Palat.* 7. 550. Leonidas, the writer of the epigram last quoted, goes still further, and, *l. c.*, 6. 221, invents *μουνολέων*; lastly, in Callimachus, in *Cererem*, 117, *ἐμοὶ κακογείτονες ἐχθροί*, an instance which is not so certain as those previously quoted (v. Otto Schneider's *Callimachea*, I. p. 394).

ταλαὸν με θέλων σίνεσθαι] *ταλαός* = *τλήμων* occurs in Aristophanes, *Av.* 687, *ταλαὸι βροτοί*. My conjecture assumes that the carver on finishing O in *ταλαὸν* thought that he had reached Θ in *θέλων*, and, leaving out the intervening portion, chiselled the letters *ταλασελων*. It appears that M. Rhousopoulos suggested *τὰμὰ θέλων σπαράσαι*, making the line a pentameter, and assuming that *σπαράσαι* is bad Greek for *σπαράξαι*, while M. Wachsmuth proposed *σποράσαι*, from an unknown verb *σποράζω*, *dissipare*. I prefer making a spondaic hexameter of it; but I have no great confidence in my emendation.

A great improvement thereon is gained by a suggestion due to Mr VanSittart, ἐλκλαίετο δ' ὅστέα ῥάξαι, which is excellent Greek; only too good, I fear, for the pitiful poet who composed the epitaph.

l. 4. In the next line the metre is neglected, and an unprecedented construction given to κτερίζειν. τάφῳ κτερίζειν occurs (Soph. Antig. 204), and another construction is generally quoted from the elegant epigram of Simonides (113 = Anthol. Pal. 7. 270):

τούσδε ποτ' ἐκ Σπάρτας ἀκροθίνια Φοίβῳ ἄγοντας
ἐν πέλαγος, μία νύξ, εἰς τάφος ἐκτέρισεν.

The metre of the line may be set right by suggesting

ἀλλὰ φίλος τ' ἤμυνε καὶ ἐκτέρισαν τάφον οὔτοι κ.τ.λ.

οὔτοι] οὔτη is proposed by M. Wachsmuth, 'nove dictum pro ταύτη'! I prefer οὔτοι, which is due to M. Rhousopoulos.

l. 5. οὓς ἔθελον φιλέων] Apparently means 'those who, in my friendship, I desired (should rescue and bury me)'.

ἱερᾶς...νηός] This use of ἱερὸς is a revived archaism, borrowed from the earlier poets and preserving the memory of the times when ἱερὸς meant little more than 'great' or 'grand.' Cp. ἱερὸς ἰχθύς (Il. 16. 407), ἱερὸν μένος, ἱερὴ ἴς, and the Sanskrit *ishiras* ('mighty,' 'vigorous') for *is-ara-s*, with which ἱερὸς and its Aeolic form *ιαρός* are connected by Curtius (*Grundzüge der Griech. Etym.* § 614).

l. 6. σῶμα] Possibly a *paronomasia* on the conjectural name *Shomer*.

The whole of the rude inscription may be roughly rendered as follows:

Let none think strange that o'er me are displayed,
On left, a Lion; and on right, a Prow:
A ruthless lion onslaught on me made,
But my true comrades left the good ship's bow,
And saved my body; thus, with burial blest,
Far from Phoenicè, in this land I rest.

In conclusion, though the Greek of the epitaph is obviously of a second-rate character, and the versification in one case hazardous in the extreme, yet the comparative rarity of similar bilingual inscriptions, and the minor points of interest attaching to some of the details, will perhaps be an adequate excuse for introducing the subject to the readers of the *Philological Journal*.

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P.S. As a pendant to the above I send another bilingual epitaph of a more recent date and a simpler character. When at Basle a few years ago, I walked to the village of Dornach, and from the many exquisite inscriptions in its neatly ordered churchyard, selected the following, which commemorates the death of four sons and daughters of the Ditzler family, all of whom died within a single month in 1865.

Hier ruhen in Gott unsere lieben Kinder, u.s.w.

* *

Wir blicken auf, von schwerer Last
Vonummer überwogen;
Denn alle unsere Kinder hast
Du der sie gabst entzogen

* *

O Gott, sie sind bei Dir;
Was aber bleibt uns hier?
Ein ödes Haus, ein Trauerkleid
Ein Herz ertrückt von bitterm Leid.

The rendering offered below was composed in the Albtal the day after.

Πένθεσιν ἀλγεῖνοις βεβαρμένοι, οἰδμασί τ' ἄτης
χειμασθέντες, ὁμῶς εἰς θεὸν ἀμβλέπομεν.
τέσσαρα γὰρ φίλα τέκνα σὺ μὲν θεὸς ὤπασας ἡμῖν,
πάντα δ' ἄρ' αὐτός ὁ δοῦς ἐμπάλιν ἀντέλαβες.
ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δήπου τοῖς κοῖς ἐν γούνασι κεῖνται
νῶν δ' αἶψά τοῖν ἐπὶ γῆς τίπτ' ἔτι λοιπὸν ὄραν;
δῶματα μὲν γὰρ ἔρημα καὶ εἶματα λυγρὰ λείπεται,
ἀμφοῖν δ' οἰκτροτάταις σπλαγχνὰ βέβριθε δάαις.

J. E. S.

ON GLOSSOLOGY.

By the late PROF. GROTE.

[The following pages form a digression in a course of Lectures on Philosophy, and were intended to be preparatory to the analysis of different technical terms belonging to Moral Philosophy.]

I.

In order to analyze the language which philosophers have employed in respect of Morals it will be necessary for me to make use of one or two new-coined words, which I will begin by defining as accurately as I can.

I shall not use the term 'word' as a technical term at all, but instead of it when I mean words as sounded I shall use the term *phone* (like *zone*, *φωνή*, *ζώνη*), and when I mean words as thought I shall use the term *noem* (*νόημα*) like *poem*. Similarly I shall use the adjectives *phonal* and *noematic*; and I shall give the name of phonal or noematic *schematisms* to modifications of the primary noems and phones. Without some such nomenclature as this (the particular words are a matter of indifference), I do not think it is possible to represent the real nature of grammar and the true relation of one language to another.

It will be seen that languages differ from each other, first *noematically*, in regard to that which is expressed by them, and secondly, *phonally*, in regard to the expressing sounds.

Each language has therefore its separate noematism, which in fact, so far as we may unify or generalize it, is the *fassung*, comprehension or view of things, which for one reason or another the formers and speakers of that language had. Man and nature being (to speak broadly) every where nearly the same, the *entire* noematism of one language, according to its extent, is not far different from that of another; but this substantial or general likeness admits a vast deal of circumstantial difference.

The *phonism* of one language differs from that of another in,

- 1st. The different radical phones used in it.
- 2nd. The different distribution of these among the noems, and
- 3rd. The different laws and ways in which the phones are schematized. These three points, together with the difference of the noems requiring to be phonized (i. e. of the noematism mentioned above), make up the variety of languages.

I would wish it to be understood that I use the word *noem* simply as a term in respect of language, without any consideration of the logical nature of the thing, and in fact expressly to avoid such logical consideration. Logically, a noem may be called a concept, a notion, or what we will; but I would have the term bear simply a relation to language, and mean the thought-word, that, whatever it is, which the sound stands for, for every word is of course used as standing for something.

Every noem the unity of which is not either strongly marked in physical nature, or else capable of mental measurement, is of course to a certain degree necessarily vague; we cannot make altogether sure of its identity in different minds; though its vagueness is limited by use and communication. This want of mutual correspondence becomes greater when we compare one language with another, and there may be apparent identity of two noems where really the degree of coincidence is but imperfect. Still a very considerable latitude in this respect will not interfere with practical use, and most terms of one language may be converted into those of another without any great degree of periphrasis. This is the substantial unity of noematism in different languages; but, though sufficient for use, yet for philosophical purposes greater accuracy is required.

Accuracy of thought and of language consists mainly in the clear mental view of the noems, their exact force and bearing, their extent, &c.; and, in accordance with this, in the careful use of the phones which express the noems. Such a clear view is exceedingly difficult, and hence the difficulty of ascertaining the exactness and the degree of coincidence of noems in different languages. Yet such clearness of view is essential for any valuable consideration of the moral noems which form my special subject at the present time.

Before however examining these moral noems specifically, there are two other technical terms which I shall employ and which need some explanation.

Since the primary unifications¹ are naturally physical and the common recognition of physical objects is therefore the basis of the communication of ideas between men, it is plain that all abstract, moral, or other than physical ideas are, and must be, expressed in language by means of physical ideas. In all these abstract words therefore we have of necessity besides the actual noematism, or meaning of the word in use, something which for our present purposes I will call its *dianoematism*; that is, on examining the phonism we find it expressing something different from what the word means, and if we trace its history we find it leads ultimately to a physical idea. This is a matter which has lately had much attention drawn to it, and in one way and another I shall perhaps have to speak more about it. At present I would ask you to remember carefully that a *noem* is a thought-word as it exists in use, as it is meant by the speaker and understood by the hearer, quite independent of its *dianoematism*, or the noems and phones *through* which, in fact and historically, it has come to be expressed.

The historical change of the meaning of words is the other fact which is of so much glossological importance that it seems to me to need a distinct term to express it, and I shall call it *perinoematism*. The subject has been treated most ably and beautifully for his particular purpose of practical conclusion and instruction by Mr Trench, but it is a thing which evidently besides its practical importance has its regular laws, capable of investigation and valuable for scientific purposes. For the present however I have merely wished to describe the word.

For glossology, or the science of language, with whatever view we cultivate it or to whatever use we apply it, it seems to me that the distinction of phone and noem, or whatever other words we like to express the thoughts by, is the step which is necessary now. I have adopted it for my own private use, not with reference to philosophy more than to the general consider-

¹ The term 'unify' had been used in previous lectures to express the formation of general terms.

ation of language. The way in which it is concerned with the present subject is, that one most important part of philosophy of any kind is the fixing of its terms, and such fixing of the terms must be done upon some principles given by glossology.

Glossology, or general study of language, is thus, speaking generally, the *comparative study of noematism*, and the *comparative study of phonism*. This latter part of it is what we commonly call the study of language now. We assume that all languages are pretty accurately intertranslatable, or similar in noematism, and we take pleasure in examining how the noems are differently phonized, one special part of this pleasure in these days of etymology being the tracing of the distribution of the phones among the noems, and the discovery of phonal coincidence where the noems are different. The phonal difference between one given language and another may conceivably vary from close resemblance to absolute dissimilarity or total incomparability. The noematic difference has in the nature of things a different character. Simple percepts are noematically common to all languages: and so are a very large number of natural and direct unifications connected with man's wants, his feelings of pleasure and pain, &c. But when we come to more refined and abstract noems, in reference to character, &c., in the first place it is likely that the noems formed by different races will be different according to their circumstances: in the next place they will choose different physical metaphors to express these; the dianoematism will be different. In this respect every language is a perfectly new sphere of thought. For it is to be considered that the noematism is not a matter simply of substantives and verbs; there is the noematic syntax, or thought-relation of the words together, which by means of the order of words, &c., gives significance to a thousand shades of meaning which the most delicate verbal distinctions would fail to express.

While therefore languages are always comparable as to their concrete and perceptual part, the noematic difference between them as to the more abstract parts may vary from nothing to infinity. This difference will be found not only in the unschematized noems, but in the vocabular and sentential schematism, in the grammar, syntax, &c. Certain parts of the noema-

tic schematism, as well as certain noems, may perhaps be considered perceptual, and as therefore necessarily existing in all language. Such are the modifications of noems by the ideas of space and time, as certain cases in nouns and tenses in verbs; but the more refined relational and modal ideas superinduced by grammar upon these are of course infinitely variable. They must be all in some way or other expressed dianoematically through the former, like abstract noems through physical.

A philosophical language is a supposed perfect noematism expressed in a natural and consistent phonism. Noematic variation being, as we have seen, infinite, a complete noematism or *noematicon* is inconceivable: but, on some assumed principle of comparative value of noems, we might suppose a best conceivable noematism, that is, a noematicon, or dictionary of ideas, comprehending, besides the universal or common percepts, a distinct unification of every relation which is of moral value or logical significance; and these again expressed through the percepts in a supposed best conceivable dianoematism. But when philosophers in their *explicit* logic, have come up to the infinitely subtle *implicit* logic of grammatical and syntactical expression in actual language, which so far as I can see they have not done yet, it will be time for them to make a language on better principles than these are made on.

In respect of the comparative study of noematism, the subject of morals is naturally about the most important, as being that in which the noematism is the most abstract, and therefore both the most difficult to fix and likely to be the most variable.

The variety of language *in general* is often spoken of as a calamity to the human race, a hindrance to sociability, and to general intellectual improvement. The observation seems to me at least to need qualification. Of sociability I say nothing: difference of language is only one of many differences which separate contemporary nations in different states of civilization from sympathy with each other, and it is not by any means the most important, because it is one which the more civilized nation, if it wishes to do so, may always overcome, and which, as for example in missions, is thus constantly overcome. Different races of men are unsympathetic for a vast

variety of reasons, and supposing by some miracle they all spoke the same language they would not be much less so. But as to general intellectual improvement I must avow my conviction that the hindrance to thought from variety of language has been far more than compensated. There is no more foolish prejudice than that languages differ merely in sound, and all mean exactly the same thing and are mentally the same: the *chrestic* identity which enables people to translate from one to the other is by no means a full representation of that full noematic force which is the value of the language as *thought*; and it is this latter which makes the true soul and specific character of the literature of one language as distinguished from another. National literature is the expression not only of the particular circumstances of a people but of the individuality of their language. These special individualities suggest different lines of thought, the comparison of which is far more helpful, than the labour which they involve is obstructive, to the search after truth; so that the becoming acquainted with the noematism of a new language gives us a fresh view of nature and of man, and, as it were, opens to our eyes a new universe.

No doubt the variety of language is a hindrance to true *world society*, so far as this is to be conceived possible independently of it; and S. Augustine¹ enumerates among the miseries of the world, and objections to the Stoic doctrine of the three kinds of *societas* (that of the *domus*, the *urbs*, and the *orbis terræ*): "In quo primum linguarum diversitas hominem alienat ab homine: facilius igitur animalia muta, etiam diversi generis, quam sæpe duo qui sunt homines ambo, sociantur. Ita ut libentius homo sit cum cane suo, quam cum homine alieno." But really, for *practical* society, people's *ὁμόγλωσσοι* are enough for them.

The variety of noematism in the *same* language is of three kinds:

- (1) Its variety of *space* in *dialects*.
- (2) Its variety in *use* by different *classes* of people.

¹ *Civ. D.* 19. 7.

(3) Its variety in *time* in the successive *changes* of the language.

The dialectic variety of language does not concern me now, since each dialect constitutes a separate language for purposes of noematic comparison. I will only observe that there is very often a regular shading off by means of them between one language and another, so that to a certain degree, in space as in time, language is continuous.

In speaking of the variation of language, according to the class by which it is used, I must first distinguish three different uses of language,

the 1st, to think with,
the 2nd, to speak with,
the 3rd, to write in.

In regard of the individuality of one language as distinguished from another, a language is what it is in the second use; and the third is merely a weakened reflexion from that. Of all the gratuitous interferences of law and regulation where intelligent liberty was its own best law, the laying down by criticism of the canons of proper and elegant writing seems to me about the most uncalled for; assuming as it does, that the artificial mould into which a language is thus thrown, by people often most incompetent to do it, is the true form and type of the language; as though language were spoken only in order that it might be written, and were not in reality *speech*, which has a capacity of being represented to the eye. For my own part, much as I love books, I should be disposed rather to deter you from book-worship, and to protest, in the name of the best uses of language, for idiom against literature, and for truth and vigour of expression against the arbitrary sway of custom and criticism.

But besides its great use to speak with, there is another use of language which I will not call a higher one, because the sociability of speech is better than the solitude of thought, and because whatever a man thinks, his thoughts cannot help, I imagine, depending very much on others:—I mean its use to *think* in.

Any one who knows more than one language cannot help

seeing that there are a great many ideas, *noems* I call them, in one language which have no expression, except periphrastic, in another, and any one who thinks will probably find that there are various ideas continually being suggested which have no individual expression in use in his own language, but which are perfectly expressible according to analogy: and the difference, for purposes of reasoning, between having one word and half-a-dozen to express a thing, may be tried in various ways, as, for instance, by writing out a proposition in Euclid with the definitions of the mathematical terms in it instead of the terms themselves: and why therefore English for Englishmen to think in should necessarily be confined to Johnson, is what I have never been able to see¹.

In giving you therefore such words as *noem* and others, I have no thought or idea of making new words for what lexicographers may call the English language, which those people may take care of who feel an interest in setting out its boundaries. I merely give defined terms to express certain relations of thought, because without such terms it would hardly be possible to say what I have to say; and the best advice I can give to any one is, not to follow my nomenclature, but to make his own for himself as he can.

To return to the contemporaneous variation of language according to the *class* of people who use it: this is very considerable, much more so than we should be disposed to imagine from simply looking at a language as expressed by its literature: and it appears to me that the consideration of it is of value, as helping to explain many difficulties in the next and more important variation of language to which we will now proceed.

This is what I call *perinoematism*, the change which takes place in the signification of words with the lapse of time, and

¹ It is to be borne in mind as to Horace's rule (Ep. 2. 2),

'Adsciscet nova, quæ genitor produxerit usus,'

that *usus* of course cannot originate

words, and professing to leave the origination of them to this is really leaving them to chance.

Usus here means two steps, first chance, then popular acceptance. A good instance of it is *omnibus*.

which, with regard to all noems which are not *percepts* or objects of physical perception, I think we may consider to be in the *spoken* language, continuous, the literature acting as a drag, but being probably unable, when at its conceivably utmost influence, entirely to stop and prevent it. This perinoematism is evidently a most important element of consideration in the moral noematism we are to speak of: I shall say a word about it.

The most usual process with a word is likely to be either what we may call its *inspecification* or its *despecification*. The former process, the inspecification of a word, represents with respect to the noematism a *divergence* of it: one noem extends into two: the other process, despecification, represents a *convergence* of noematism: two or three noems become by degrees nearly if not entirely coincident, little more than one polyphonal noem. This latter process has been called by Mr Trench after Coleridge 'desynonymization.' Synonyms are examples of homœonoematism: they are noems nearly coincident.

Despecification (i.e. the word's becoming less specific and significant), which we might express by various metaphors, as degradation, detrition, or even, if we liked, evaporation, is simply the want of point, sharpness, and definite significance which results from common, and often unintelligent, use of the word, and which brings it to resemble in meaning various others which have undergone the same process.

The most important case—for to a certain degree it is a case of this—which now concerns us is the *moral* change of meaning in words, which is almost universally *in malam partem*, so that words which originally carried with them nothing of blame, disapproval, or contempt, by degrees come to do so. This arises I suppose from two reasons, both of which imply something immoral, and both are alluded to by Mr Trench as doing so; but I am inclined to think that the prevailing reason is the one to which Mr Trench seems to assign less weight: they are

(1) Association of wrong with the noem of the phone, and the substitution of the associated form of blame for the original noem which has itself vanished in the despecification.

(2) Euphemism, or calling things by mild names, by which

of course the mild name itself becomes deteriorated so that the noem is continually significative of more and more of evil.

Mr Trench seems inclined to attribute noematic deterioration to the former cause, I should certainly attribute it to the latter.

II.

I have kept the above in the form in which it was first written (as an introduction to a course of lectures on the exact comparative significance of certain moral terms in Greek, Latin, and English), partly because I thought it would be a trouble to myself, without advantage to any one, to write it again, and partly because it may perhaps appear to some that the distinctions which I have called attention to are of importance, not only for linguistic study, but for more general considerations of philosophy. At present, however, it is the application of them to the former that I shall dwell on.

By a 'noem,' as I have said, I mean whatever any word or group of words stands for; not merely substantives, but verbs, particles, &c.; not merely single words, but sentences. I use the word 'noematism' to represent generally all that stands between the phenomenal or intelligible variety or sum of the universe and the phonal variety or sum of language which expresses it. That there is something between them is clear: because we might conceive of language as not phonal, as stopping short, that is, of phonism, or taking some other direction (this I say subject to some qualification which will afterwards appear): and yet language is by every idea of it something more than painting or simple presentation and imitation of what is seen or understood: it involves of necessity the idea of symbolism. Noematism, therefore, in the simplest idea of it, is an abstraction from actual phonal language, is language in itself, so far as we can represent it to ourselves independently of the actual sounds or phonism, and as possibly expressible otherwise than by them. It is thus co-extensive with actual phonal language in all its parts, and these parts bear, speaking generally, the same relation to each other in the one case that they do in the other, phonism being an expression of noematism. But as noe-

matism is thus, logically, and as we are considering it now, an abstraction made by philosophers from actual language, so, on the other hand, historically, and as it arises in fact, it is an abstraction from the actual universe, made by man as a part of his nature for the purpose of translating reality into language (if we may speak of *purpose* where all is one impulse, and there is no distinction of *time*); it is the universe as, in its various parts, perceived and known preparatory to these being phonized and made matters of reasoning and communication between men. As a step, therefore, which must of necessity be *supposed* between reality and language, noematism may be considered in different ways an abstraction from each.

I do not want to go here more into philosophy than is necessary, but it will be perceived that what I mean to express by the word *noem* is exactly what (according to the usually received dianoematism) must have once been the meaning of the word *thing*, i.e. a unit of the intelligible universe, the unity being given by the understanding. There are all sorts and orders of such units or unities; with a single flash of thought we contemplate an object or an action, either qualified or unqualified, the unqualified making in language a single noun or verb, the qualified a description or a sentence; we put together individual unities into sentential, and develope or draw out sentential unities into individual. To say, in the vast matter of understanding which we call the universe, what are the real unities and distinctions, other than those which we, according to our nature, make, is beyond philosophy: the universe is to us a mass of movement in which we are both agents and patients, and which we are naturally impelled to analyze and distinguish into different actions, different individuals, &c.: these (so far as they lead to language, which is in fact, so far as they are really knowledge) compose noematism. The term *noem* however is of more general application than *thing* in various ways, principally in respect of its being not merely substantival, not having reference merely, that is, to supposed substantial existence, but applicable to actions, relations, &c. of every kind; to whatever, on the one side, is conceivable in the universe, and, on the other side, is expressible, or a part of expression, in language. There is one

sort of noematic unity in a sentence, another in an idiom or special way of expression in a sentence, another in a concrete or representable noun, another in an abstract or unrepresentable one, &c. I say nothing here as to the relation of these different sorts of unity to each other: to what extent sentences are to be considered logically anterior to words, and words as formed by development, abstraction, analysis, out of them. Looking at language as it naturally presents itself, its apparently most simple units are what we call words, and therefore I describe a noem as a *thought-word*, leaving the idea however as extensible and applicable to *every thing* in language *as thought*, or, if any one would rather have it so described, meaning by *word* all that was meant by the Greek term *ῥῆμα*, whatever is an object of expression in language.

(To be continued.)



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ANTIQUE BRONZE RAM IN THE MUSEUM AT PALERMO.

ON A BRONZE RAM, OF ANCIENT GREEK WORKMANSHIP, NOW IN THE MUSEUM AT PALERMO.

THE bronze ram figured in the lithograph is one of the noblest ornaments of the Museum at Palermo, and has hitherto¹ remained undescribed and unpublished in this country.

To the kindness of Professor Antonino Salinas of Palermo, who accompanied me to the museum, I am indebted for the following measurements:—Height, 30 4-5 in.; length (from the root of the tail to the end of the left fore-foot) 50 4-5 in.; *i.e.* about life-size. The tail, the left hind leg (below the hock), and the left ear are recent restorations.

The local tradition, that the figure before us is one of *four* rams of Byzantine workmanship, cast by order of George Maniaces and by him brought to Sicily in 1040 A.D., by no means deserves implicit credence. All that can be said with certainty as to its history is, that *two* rams, of which the present is one, long adorned the entrance to the Torre di Maniace at Syracuse, until, in the year 1448, the Marchese di Geraci, Giovanni da Vintimiglia, received them from king Alphonso as the reward of an infamous service², and transported them to his palace at Castelbuono. On his grandson's banishment, they were confiscated with the rest of his property, and removed to the royal palace at Palermo, where, at the revolution of 1848, one fell a victim to the violence or rapacity of the mob, the other was, in the year 1860, bestowed by the present king on the museum now located in the *ci-devant* convent of the order of S. Philip Neri.

Strangely different as are the proportions of the figure before us from those which the scientific breeding of the last few years has given to our English ram, yet from its general symmetry and the vigour expressed in the suddenly turned head and half-open mouth, the best period of Greek art is that in which we would seek for the date of this noble bronze. The

¹ A lithograph, and a brief essay from the pen of Professor Heydenau, appeared in the *Archäologische Zeitung*, N. S., Vol. III. of last year.

² The murder of twenty Syracusan nobles of the opposition party, whom he had treacherously decoyed to a banquet.

artist, whether Calamis¹, or whosoever he may have been, has certainly not deserved the blame which Pliny² gives to Myron, '*animi sensus non expressisse, capillum quoque.....non emendatius fecisse quam rudis antiquitas instituisset*:' not only are the curls of the wool gracefully rendered, but the inflated nostril and partly raised leg skilfully betoken an upstarting in surprise and anger. The *motive* of the attitude must remain uncertain; the fact of there having been *two* rams may point to that "good old cause" of duels amongst stags also.

"Worthy to bear Phrixus and Helle" is Göthe's expression of admiration on seeing the pair of which this is the survivor³; the hero and his sister, however, certainly rode pillionwise, if ancient art is to be trusted.

In Greek and Roman art, the ram, whether in the whole⁴ figure or symbolized by a horn, finds frequent expression both in reference to the myth which has been already quoted and more often as a type of Jupiter Ammon. In the former sense Pompeii and Herculaneum each yield a frescoed group⁵ in illustration: the latter is suggested by the name of *Ammonite*, and is well known by frequent occurrence on the coins of Cyrene, Delphi, Tanagra, Tenos, Lysimachus, &c., where a ram is frequently associated with Hermes as being the tutelary divinity of flocks and herds—ὅτι Ἑρμῆς μάλιστα δοκεῖ θεῶν ἐφορᾶν καὶ αὐγεῖν ποίμνας, as Pausanias informs us⁶. His worship at *Tanagra* he refers to the belief that a plague in that city was suddenly stayed on a ram being solemnly carried round the walls. Relative to the connection of Hermes with Osiris and Egyptian ritual a sesterce⁷ of M. Aurelius may be cited, which bears on its

¹ Whose statue of Hermes bearing a ram on his shoulders is probably reproduced on the bronze coin of Tanagra, an engraving of which is given on the opposite page.

² *Hist. Nat.* xxiv. 19.

³ *Italiänische Reise*, Vol. i.


⁴ The denarii of the *gens Rustia* present an example of both kinds of illustration; here, perhaps, the ram is a type of *rusticity*.

⁵ *Mus. Borbon.* ii. 19, and vi. 19; cf. *Ovid Fast.* iii. 865; *Mart. Epigr.* viii. 51, 9—14.

⁶ ii. 3, 4: compare iv. 23 with v. 27 and ix. 22.

⁷ Quoted by Dr Newman (Preface to Fleury's *Ecclesiastical History*, p. cxix) in support of the miracle of the Thundering Legion (174 A.D.): the coin, however, is dated eight years earlier.

reverse a temple of Mercury, on the tympanum of which a *ram* is grouped with a cock, tortoise, caduceus, petasus, and purse¹. The glyptic art also offers many illustrations of our subject, amongst which may be mentioned a sard (engraved in *Impronte Gemmarie*², and in King's *Horace*³)—where a ram's head on a warrior's helmet, accompanied by a crook in the field, probably indicates a rebus on the name *Philopoemen*. Embossed on each side of the helmet of Athena, the ram's head is doubtless a symbol of persevering pugnacity. On a translucent heliotrope, now in the possession of the Public Orator, *Ἑρμῆς κριοφόρος* is figured seated with a cock, the emblem of vigilance, at his feet, and in his right hand a ram's head.



Coin of Tanagra in the British Museum (from an electrotpe).

Obv. Head of Apollo—adjuncts bow and mouse (?)—enclosed in a wreath of olive.

Rev. Hermes Kriophoros—legend TANAPAIΩN.

So, too, it appears on a vase from Volci, figured by Müller in the *Denkmäler der alten Kunst*⁴, a type which seems to have been often adopted in later times by Christian artists⁵ as a symbol of the Good Shepherd. In the various illustrations of the worship of Cybele also the *ram* appears—sometimes serving as a steed for her devotee Atys, as on an ivory relief figured by Müller⁶. On the coins of Antioch, the ram looking back on the sun and moon doubtless represented Aries, the zodiacal sign, under which the city was built. The song quoted by Aristophanes⁷ *τὸν κριὸν ὡς ἐπέχθη* is probably a punning allusion to the name of the wrestler Krios, such as is seen in the favourite type of the gens Rustia, which has been alluded to already.

S. S. LEWIS.

¹ Figured by Donaldson, *Architect. Numism.* Pl. xxv.

² III. 86.

³ *Carm.* II. 12.

⁴ Vol. I. pl. 45, and II. pl. 29: com-

pare Hirt's *Bilderbuch*, pl. viii. 5.

⁵ Bottari, *Roma Sotterranea*, III. tav. 148, 163 et alibi.

⁶ *Denkm.* II. 812. ⁷ *Nub.* 1356.

NOTES ON TWO PASSAGES OF EXODUS.

Ex. iii. 14. **אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה**. Auth. Vers. I AM THAT I AM.

The explanation of this passage to which I wish to call attention is not a new one, though it has occurred to me quite independently of any research. It is at least as old as the 12th century, for it is found in Aben Ezra, and possibly may be older still. But though it seems to me the only true explanation, it has been treated somewhat cavalierly by commentators. It is simply this: the three Hebrew words above quoted form, not a single proposition, but a sentence of two clauses; the first word being the name which God communicates to Moses, and the other two the explanation of the name. So Aben Ezra, "**אֶהְיֶה**", and its interpretation is **אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה**; as (Zech. xii. 8), 'And the house of David shall be *as God*;' and after that, '*as the angel of Jehovah* before them;' which is the interpretation of '*as God*.'

If we read the previous verse, this will appear more clearly. "And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them?"

The answer to this question would surely be the communication of the name, and not an abstract proposition, like that which appears in our Authorized Version, "I am that I am," which is so printed as if the whole sentence were the name of God. But it is evident from the last clause of the verse that

the first word only contains the name: "Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, אֲהִיָּה hath sent me unto you." If therefore we separate אֲהִיָּה from the other two words, as it is already separated by the Hebrew accents, though I would not lay too much stress on this, we bring out the natural meaning with much greater clearness.

"And God said unto Moses,

אֲהִיָּה (*Ehyeh*); because I am,

(or)

Ehyeh; who am."

That is, My name is *Ehyeh*, because I am He who alone can say of himself אֲהִיָּה. I have purposely transliterated the first word, because it is clearly a proper name and connected with יהוה. Whether we render אֲשֶׁר by 'because' (as in Gen. xxxi. 49 and many other passages), or by the simple relative 'who,' is a matter of comparatively minor importance. Personally I prefer the former. Nor do I very much care whether in the clause which contains the interpretation of the name we render the verb 'I am' or 'I will be.' Perhaps the slightest change from the A.V. would be to print the words thus: "I AM; because I am." What I chiefly contend for is the separation of the words, so that the first shall represent the name, and the others the explanation or reason of the name. In support of this I will only quote a remarkable passage of Jehudah ha-Levi (*Kusari*, iv. 3). "And when he asked Him, and said, And they say unto me, What is his name? He answered him, saying, What have they to do to seek that which they are unable to comprehend?—just as the angel said, Wherefore dost thou ask after my name, seeing it is wonderful?—Tell them only אֲהִיָּה, and its interpretation אֲשֶׁר אֲהִיָּה. The meaning is, the Being who will be (lit. be found) for them at the time when they shall seek me. Let them not seek a greater proof than my being with them, and so let them receive me; and say אֲהִיָּה hath sent me unto you." It is clear from this that Jehudah ha-Levi separated the first word from the other two.

The renderings ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ὥν of the LXX., *ego sum qui sum* of the Vulgate, and 'I am that I am' of the English Authorized

Version are objectionable, because they represent the first word of the clause simply by the copula and first personal pronoun, which in Hebrew would rather require **אני הוּא**.

Ex. xxii. 4 (5).

This verse is rendered as follows in the Authorized Version, and the rendering is that which is generally adopted :

“If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man’s field ; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution.”

I must confess this appears to me to yield at best an obscure sense. Whose is the field first mentioned ? Is it the man’s own, or his neighbour’s ? If the latter, as seems generally to be understood, how is the construction **וְשָׂחָה אֶת־בְּעִירוֹ** to be accounted for ? We should rather expect **בְּשָׂחָהוּ** if it is merely an explanation of the preceding clause.

But a much better sense may be obtained by a very slight alteration in the text, which is simply to read **אֶת־הַבְּעִירָה**, lit. ‘the kindling,’ for **אֶת־בְּעִירוֹ** ‘his beast.’ This change will bring the verse into close connexion with that which follows, and both may be read with Judg. xv. 5 for an illustrative comment. The one law provides redress in case of incendiarism, the other in case of accidental fire. The first of the two verses would then read :

‘If a man shall set on fire a field or a vineyard, and shall put the burning fuel so that he burn up the field of another ; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution.’

Here the first field and vineyard mentioned are the man’s own, and the fire he lights in them is probably for burning up the stubble and rubbish. For **שָׂחָה** in connexion with fire, see Judg. xv. 5, Am. i. 4, &c., and for the construction of **בְּעִיר** with the thing set on fire preceded by the preposition **ב** see Ez. xxxix. 9, 10. The next verse deals with the compensation to be made for damage done by accidental fire.

‘If fire break out and catch hold of thorns so that shocks of corn or the standing crop or the field be consumed, he that set fire to the burning fuel shall make full restitution.’

That is, the compensation shall be in proportion to the damage done. In the former case, where the fire is wilfully caused, the compensation is something in excess of the damage; it is to be of the *best* of the man’s own field or vineyard. The ‘thorns’ in the latter verse are the thorn hedge separating the fields of two neighbours (Is. v. 5; Ecclus. xxviii. 24), and the spreading of the fire is accidental. This is shown by the word **קִצָּה**, which would hardly have been used, if the object of the fire had been to consume the thorns in the owner’s field. Nor is it likely that the Hiphil of **בָּעַר** would be employed in two such different senses, ‘cause to be eaten,’ and ‘kindle,’ in two consecutive verses, as in the Authorized Version.

The only other instances given by Gesenius in support of the meaning *deparit*, which he attaches to the Piel of this verb, are Is. iii. 14, v. 5, and there is nothing in these to show that *cremavit* or *combussit* is not equally appropriate.

WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT.

ON THE EISANGELIA.

AMONGST the discoveries which have been made of the works of ancient writers there is scarcely one more deserving of our notice than that of the papyri of Hyperides. These mss. written at a very early period are to us a rich source of information on the pronunciation of the Greek language as spoken at that time; Sauppe, whom J. B. Lightfoot agrees with, thinks that the papyri of the three judicial orations were not written later than the middle of the second century B.C. and Babington concludes from the characters and marks used in the ms. of the funeral oration that it is at least as old as the second century after Christ. The spelling of *προδεδάνισται, μιρακίων, μεικράς, βέλτειον* etc. proves that *ει* was sounded as *ι*; as in many other mss. and Egyptian inscriptions (Letronne, *Recueil des inscriptions* vol. II p. 31) *ι* is added to the terminations in *α η ω* where it ought not to be and has been omitted where it is required, from which we may conclude that it was silent, see Strabo XIV p. 648; *ε* seems to have been confounded with *αι*, e.g. Or. Fun. c. 5, 17 *ἐπεδ[εύθησαν]* and J. B. Lightfoot conjectures that *καί* has been left out between *ἀκούειν κελεύειν* (pro Lycophr. c. 9, 20) through the conformity of the sound of *καί* with the first syllable of *κελεύειν*; see *αιτιαι οικειοι* for *αἱ αἰτιαὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι* in the same oration. But when E. M. Geldart the recent defender of the similarity of the pronunciation of ancient and modern Greek maintains that *αι* has always had the sound of *ε* he seems to have overlooked Dionys. Halic. de compos. verb. c. 22: *ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἡ τῶν φωνηέντων παράθεσις ἡ κατὰ τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ κῶλου τοῦδε γενομένη ἐν τῷ 'Καὶ Ἀθηναίων' διακέκρουκε*

τὸ συνεχές τῆς ἀρμονίας καὶ διέστακε, πάνυ αἰσθητὸν τὸν μεταξὺ λαβοῦσα χρόνον· ἀκέραστοί τε γὰρ αἱ φωναὶ τοῦ τε ι καὶ τοῦ α καὶ ἀποκόπτουσαι τὸν ἦχον; so also spellings like μετε for μήτε, οικητας for οἰκέτας prove that η had still at that time its genuine sound etc. Since we are in possession of these papyri we are enabled in some degree to form a judgement upon the eloquence of Hyperides which I shall attempt to give at some future time. In a passage from his oration contra Demosthenem (c. 19) we find fresh data for ascertaining the time of the birth of Demosthenes; the funeral oration throws some light on the first proceedings of the Lamian War and on the allies of the Athenians and the Macedonians, about which we gain only imperfect information elsewhere etc. So also we find that the orations of Hyperides pro Lycophrone and pro Euxenippo contain valuable information with regard to the *εἰσαγγελία* which has not yet been sufficiently applied to its elucidation. To point out what in those orations I consider of the greatest interest on this subject and to adduce some other passages not yet applied by others will be the object of the present essay.

εἰσαγγελία signifies in its literal and general sense an information of any kind; in the language of the Attic courts, however, it has been peculiarly applied to three classes of causes, as we learn from Harpocration s. v. *εἰσαγγελία*· δημοσίας τινὸς δίκης ὄνομά ἐστι, τρία δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη εἰσαγγελιῶν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δημοσίοις ἀδικήμασι μεγίστοις καὶ ἀναβολὴν μὴ ἐπιδεχομένοις, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς μήτε ἀρχὴ κατέστηκε μήτε νόμοι κεύνται τοῖς ἄρχουσι καθ' οὓς εἰσάξουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἢ τὸν δῆμον ἢ πρώτη κατάστασις γίνεται (see Schol. on Hermog. εἰς στάσεις Par. in marg. Rhet. Gr. IV p. 72 Walz), καὶ ἐφ' οἷς τῷ μὲν φεύγοντι, ἐὰν ἀλφῶ, μέγισται ζημίαι ἐπικεύνται, ὁ δὲ διώκων, ἐὰν μὴ ἔλῃ, οὐδὲν ζημιούται, πλὴν ἐὰν τὸ ἐ μέρος τῶν ψήφων μὴ μεταλάβῃ τότε γὰρ χιλίας ἐκτίνει. τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν καὶ οὗτοι μειζόνως ἐκολάζοντο. ἑτέρα δὲ εἰσαγγελία λέγεται ἐπὶ ταῖς κακώσεσιν· αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα, καὶ τῷ διώκοντι ἀξήμιοι, κἂν μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ ἐ μέρος τῶν ψήφων. ἄλλη δὲ εἰσαγγελία ἐστὶ κατὰ τῶν διαιτητῶν· εἰ γὰρ τις ὑπὸ διαιτητοῦ

ἀδικηθείη, ἐξὴν τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλλειν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς, καὶ ἄλλοις ἡτιμούτο. Schoemann de comit. Athen. p. 181, and before him Heraldus Animadv. ad Salmas. vii, 4 p. 221, think that the word was used in its primary meaning by Andoc. i, 37. 43 and Lys. xii, 48. xiii, 50; but the reader will see from what follows why I am inclined to differ from this opinion with regard to the passages above-mentioned, while it is evident that in passages like Andoc. ii, 19. Dem. i, 4 εἰσαγγέλλειν has its literal signification. I shall pass over the second and third class of causes also bearing the name of εἰσαγγελία although having very little resemblance to the first in their mode of procedure, at once beginning with the most important question before us, viz.: to which offences was the first class of eisangelia described by Harpocration applicable. The opinion generally adopted originating with Pollux is: that the process in question was applicable to all extraordinary crimes committed against the state and for which there was no special law provided and to the offences enumerated by Pollux, as specified by Schoemann l. c. p. 188, whose statement has been approved of by Meier 'Attischer Process' p. 262 sqq, Platner 'Process und Klagen' i p. 365, Ch. R. Kennedy the Orations of Demosthenes against Leptines, Midias etc. p. 360, J. S. Mansfield in W. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, also Boehnecke 'Demosthenes, Lykurg und Hyperides' vol. i p. 41 etc. Pollux says (viii, 51): ἡ δ' εἰσαγγελία τέτακται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγράφων δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων κατὰ τὸν νόμον εἰσαγγελικὸν ἢ εἰσαγγελτικόν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ λέγουσιν· ὃς λέγει· περὶ (Dobree, Advers. i p. 578) ὧν οὐκ εἰσὶ νόμοι, ἀδικῶν δέ τις ἀλίσκεται ἢ ἀρχῶν ἢ ῥήτωρ, εἰς τὴν βουλὴν εἰσαγγελία δίδοται κατ' αὐτοῦ· κἂν μὲν μέτρια ἀδικεῖν δοκῇ, ἢ βουλὴ ποιεῖται ζημίας ἐπιβολὴν, ἂν δὲ μείζω, παραδίδωσι δικαστηρίῳ, τὸ δὲ τίμημα, ὃ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι. ἐγίνοντο δὲ εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ κατὰ τῶν καταλόντων τὸν δῆμον ἢ ῥητόρων μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ λεγόντων ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἄνευ τοῦ πεμφθῆναι ἀπελθόντων, ἢ προδόντων φρούριον ἢ στρατιὰν ἢ ναῦς, ὡς Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ [δ'] περὶ νόμων. I, however, cannot agree with that opinion though generally adopted and I hope that the reasons which have induced me to dissent from their judge-

ment and which at the same time enabled me to form a different view on this subject will recommend themselves to the reader. That passage of Pollux seems to mix up two separate ideas of the *eisangelia* which we find clearly placed in juxtaposition in the *Lexicon Rhetoricon Cantabrigiense* s. v. *είσαγγελία*: κατὰ καινῶν καὶ ἀγράφων ἀδικημάτων. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ Καικιλίου δόξα. Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ νόμων φησὶ γενέσθαι, ἐάν τις καταλήῃ τὸν δῆμον ἢ ῥήτωρ μὴ τὰ ἄριστα συμβουλεύῃ χρήματα λαμβάνων, ἢ ἐάν τις προδιδῷ χωρίον ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν στρατιάν, ἢ ἐάν τις εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀφικνῆται (ἄνευ τοῦ πεμφθῆναι παρὰ τοῦ δήμου) ἢ ἐνοικῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ στρατεύηται μετ' αὐτῶν δῶρα λαμβάνων.—Καικίλιος δὲ οὕτως ὠρίσατο· *είσαγγελία* ἐστὶν ὃ περὶ καινῶν ἀδικημάτων δεδῶκασιν ἀπενεγκεῖν οἱ νόμοι. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μελετώμενον ἐν ταῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβαῖς¹. According to Theophrastus *eisangelia* was applicable only to some certain offences and the same is corroborated by Hyperides (pro Eux. c. 22): διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὑπὲρ πάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἴσα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, νόμους ἔθεσθε χωρὶς περὶ ἐκάστου αὐτῶν. ἀσεβεί τις περὶ τὰ ἱερά.—ἀρχὴ τῶν ἑνδεκα καθέστηκε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων πάντων καὶ νόμους καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δικαστήρια τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν ἀπέδοτε. ὑπὲρ τίνων οὖν οἴεσθε δεῖν τὰς *είσαγγελίας* γίνεσθαι; τοῦτ' ἤδη καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἐγράψατε, ἵνα μὴ ἀγνωστὴ μηδεὶς. As an example of *είσαγγελία ἀγράφων ἀδικημάτων* Schoemann cites the law-suit of Leocrates; but in the first place it would seem that the expression in question is a mere invention of the rhetors and sophists from its never having been used by any orator; and secondly this denunciation of Lycurgus is not at all an *eisangelia* of such a kind, it was an *είσαγγελία προδοσίας*, as we may gather from several passages, where Lycurgus charges him with treason and calls him a *προδότης*, especially § 59. The same we may learn from the Argument καὶ παρρησιαζομένου (Λεωκράτους) αὐτοῦ κατηγο-

¹ The same opinion, with slight differences and unimportant additions, is brought forward by Schol. on Plat. Legg. viii. p. 517, Suidas and Zonaras s. v. *είσαγγελία*, Lex. Rhetor. in Bekk.

Anecd. i. p. 244, Bachmann, *Anecd.* i. p. 210, 4, Exc. *Guelferbytana* p. 814 *Thomae Magistri ecloga Vocum Attic.* ed. Ritschl.

ρίαν ποιείται ὁ Λυκούργος αὐτοῦ ὡς προδότου. ἡ δὲ στάσις ὅρος ἀντονομάζων (see Libanius in the Argum. of Dem. XXI). ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ καὶ Λεωκράτης ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν, οὐ μέντοι προδιδόναι. The defence of the accused was that he left Athens for the purposes of trade, whilst Lycurgus interpreted his departure as treason in view of the imminent danger of Athens after the battle of Chaeronea; in this way using the term loosely and not according to its strict legal acceptation he was able to institute an *εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας*. Ariston seconded by Lycurgus proceeded against the adulterer Lycophron by an *eisangelia* but by an *εἰσαγγελία καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου*, not at all by an *εἰσαγγελία μοιχείας*. Polyeuctus to justify his accusation of Euxenippus under *eisangelia* may be supposed to have argued that it was not necessary to confine the process to orators as mentioned in the law, but it might be adapted to others committing a like offence; to this we find Hyperides replying that such a departure from the intention of the law was not allowable. All these offences seem to have been construed as crimes under the law in their general results. Boeckh (Seeurkunden, xv. xvi p. 103) gives a decree of the senate: *ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τῶν νεωρίων ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐφ' Ἡγησίου ἄρχοντος παραλαβούσης τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κωπέας μὴ ἀναγράψωσιν εἰς τὴν στήλην, ἣ ὁ γραμματεὺς τῶν ἑνδεκα μὴ ἀπαλείψῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀφλήματος τοῦ Σωπόλιδος τὸ γινόμενον τῶν κωπέων κατὰ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα τῇ βουλῇ, ὀφειλέτω ἕκαστος αὐτῶν xxx δραχμὰς τῷ δημοσίῳ, καὶ ὑπόδικος ἔστω Σωπόλιδι καὶ τοῖς Σωπόλιδος οἰκείοις τῆς βουλευσεως τοῦ ἀργυρίου τῆς τιμῆς τῶν κωπέων, ὧν ἂν ἡ πόλις παρειληφύῃα ἢ παρὰ Σωπόλιδος καὶ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν Σωπόλιδος εἶναι δὲ καὶ εἰσαγγελίαν αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν, καθάπερ ἐάν τις ἀδικῇ περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις*. This decree directed that the persons named should be accused under *eisangelia*, but under the *eisangelia* which was *ἐάν τις ἀδικῇ περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις*. Thus I arrive at the conclusion that *εἰσαγγελία* was applied to crimes enumerated in the νόμος *εἰσαγγελτικός*, but also to all other crimes with, however, the restrictions that they must be referred to some section of the law and proceeded against under the name of one of the crimes specially designated.

I shall proceed now to give the single parts of the νόμος *εἰσαγγελτικός* and enumerate the law-suits referable to each part; Hyperides quotes this law as far as the part under which Euxenippus was accused.

I. *ἐάν τις τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καταλύῃ ἢ συνή ποι ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἑταιρικὸν συναγάγῃ*; see Lex. Rhet. Cant.: *ἐάν τις καταλύῃ τὸν δῆμον*, Poll.: *κατὰ τῶν καταλύντων τὸν δῆμον*.

Some days before the preparations for the Sicilian expedition had been finished, the Hermae in Athens were found to have been all mutilated or defaced by some unknown conspirators. This incident made a profound impression on the Athenian people and all the more so that it was evidently the deliberate act of a considerable organisation, Thuc. VI, 27. 28: *τοῦ τε γὰρ ἑκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσία ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι*; Andoc. I, 36. Large rewards were offered for the discovery of the perpetrators of the outrage and impunity promised even to any accomplice whose confession might reveal the authors of the plot. Further a public vote was passed decreeing rewards and ordering citizens metoecs and even slaves to furnish any information which they might possess about this, or any previous acts of impiety. Thus when the last public assembly was held for the departing officers, Pythonicus rose to impeach Alcibiades (Andoc. I, 11. 27) as a profaner of the holy mysteries in a private house. Though Alcibiades implored the people to investigate the charges at once, his enemies proposed delaying the trial until a certain number of days after his return (Thuc. VI, 29). The expedition departed but soon after another accuser appeared named Thessalus and the ceremonial trireme called the Salaminian was sent requiring Alcibiades and some others to come home and stand their trial. Plut. Alcib. 22 calls this information an *εἰσαγγελία ἀσεβείας*; but he was not merely charged with acts of impiety, see Thuc. VI, 61—*πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ μυστικά ὧν ἐπαίτιος ἦν, μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐδόκει πραχθῆναι* and Isocr. XVI, 6: *εἰδότες δὲ (οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐχθροὶ) τὴν πόλιν τῶν μὲν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα ἂν ὀργισθεῖσαν, εἴ τις εἰς τὰ μυστή-*

ρια φαίνονται ἑξαμαρτάνων, τῶν δ' ἄλλων, εἴ τις τολμῶη τὸν δῆμον καταλύειν, ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας συνθέντες τὰς αἰτίας, εἰσάγγελλον εἰς τὴν βουλὴν λέγοντες ὡς ὁ πατὴρ συνάγει μὲν τὴν ἑταιρίαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἐν τῇ Πολυτίωνος οἰκίᾳ συνδεδυμένοι τὰ μυστήρια ποιήσκειν and Diod. Sic. XIII, 5: διέβαλον αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις ὡς συνωμοσίαν κατὰ τοῦ δήμου πεποιημένον; Corn. Nep. Alc. 3. The common form prescribed by the Attic laws for the impeachment of impiety was the *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* as we may learn from Hyperides (pro Eux. c. 21). In addition to the slave Andromachus produced by Pythonicus other informers soon appeared: a metoec Teucus, a woman named Agariste, Lydus the slave of a citizen named Pherecles and lastly Diocleides who (*ἐπαρθεῖς τοῖς τῆς πόλεως κακοῖς εἰσαγγέλλει εἰς τὴν βουλὴν* Andoc. I, 37) designated forty-two individuals out of the three hundred whom he pretended to have seen taking part in the mutilation of the Hermae. All these whose names had been denounced by Diocleides were seized and imprisoned (Andoc. I, 45; only Mantitheus and Aphepsion escaped); amongst these were Andocides and many of his nearest relatives and, implored by one of these named Charimides to make a voluntary disclosure of all that he knew, Andocides became informer and delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermae. Andocides calls the informations of Andromachus, Teucus, Agariste and Lydus *μηνύσεις*; for with exception of Agariste they were either slaves or metoecs and could not appear as accusers. For the denunciation of Diocleides as a citizen and for his own he uses *εἰσαγγέλλειν* and *εἰσαγγελία* §§ 37. 43 (only § 42 *μηνίσων*), II, 3 see Ps. Plut. p. 834 C. The mutilation of the Hermae and the parody of the mysteries were interpreted not only as irreligious acts but as crimes against the constitution; Peisandrus and Charicles who acted as *ζητηταί* loudly proclaimed that the whole had been done *ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δήμου κυριαίᾳ* (Andoc. I, 36). Thus I also believe that *εἰσαγγέλλειν* is used in its peculiar meaning by Lysias XIII, 50; XII, 48. The oligarchical party thought it necessary to seize some leaders of the democracy who resisted with all possible energy the conclusion of the peace proposed by Theramenes; with this pur-

pose Theocritus tendered an accusation to the senate against Strombichides, together with several others, of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace (Lys. XIII, 21) and was supported by Agoratus (§ 48: *μηνύσας αὐτοὺς τῇ πόλει ἐπιβουλεύειν*) who pretended to be himself their accomplice. A sentence of death upon all was given, only Agoratus was acquitted in consideration of his information, § 50: *ἔπειτα ἡ κρίσις ἦν ἐκρίθη ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ ἀφείθη, διαβρῆδην λέγει· 'διότι' φησὶν 'ἔδοξε τάληθ' εἰσαγγεῖλαι.'* I can hardly think that in a public document *εἰσαγγέλλειν* was used in a sense different from that of its ordinary technical employment in the language of the Attic courts.

Callimedon had kept up a communication with the Athenian exiles at Megara: Din. I, 94: *Καλλιμέδοντα εἰσαγγέλλων (Δημοσθένους) συνιέναι ἐν Μεγάροις τοῖς φυγάσιν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου.*

When Antigonus and his son Demetrius took possession of Athens, Demetrius the Phalerian, who for more than ten years had exercised there unlimited authority under the patronage of Cassander and the Macedonian garrison, fled to Thebes; he had become anxious for his safety, and in fact after his departure he was formally impeached as well as many of his political friends amongst whom was Dinarchus, see Dion. Halic. de Din. 3: *ὕστερον δὲ εἰσηγγέλθησαν πολλοὶ πολιτῶν, ἐν οἷς καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς; c. 2: ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀναξικράτους ἄρχοντος, ἐφ' οὗ κατέλυσαν τὴν ἐν τῇ Μουνυχίᾳ φρουρὰν, ὑπὸ Κασσάνδρου κατασταθεῖσαν, οἱ περὶ Ἀντίγονον καὶ Δημήτριον βασιλεῖς, αἰτίαν ἔχων, ἅμα τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις Ἀθηναίοις, καίτοι ξένος αὐτὸς ὢν (Δεῖναρχος) καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον etc. Ps. Plut. p. 850 D: χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον αἰτιαθεὶς εἰς λόγους παραγίνεσθαι Ἀντιπάτρω καὶ Κασσάνδρῳ περὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τῆς Μουνυχίας ἡνίκα ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Δημητρίου ἐφρουρήθη etc. ἐφρουρήθη is evidently wrong; I conjecture ἡ ἐν αὐτῇ φρουρὰ κατελύθη.*

Another time we shall speak more at length about the *εἰσαγγελία καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου* made by Ariston against the adulterer Lycophron; see Hyp. pro Lyc. c. 10: *καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν αἰτία ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον.* Meier (Lyc. deperdit.

orat. fragm. p. cxxvii) is mistaken in calling this law-suit an *εἰσαγγελία ὕβρεως*.

The title of the xxvth oration of Lysias *δήμου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία* is spurious; the speaker undergoing the *δοκιμασία* for holding a public office defended himself against some criminal charges which Epigenes, Demophanes, and Cleisthenes had brought against him and especially against that of having put down the democracy, and thus the above title seems to have been given (Blass, *die attische Beredsamkeit von Gorgias bis zu Lysias*, p. 508). The case is the same with the title of the xth oration of Lysias which Harpocration s.v. *Πολύστρατος* gives as *ὑπὲρ Πολυστράτου δήμου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία* (see § 13), whilst in the cod. Palatinus it bears the title of *ὑπὲρ Πολυστράτου*. The title of a spurious oration of Dinarchus is *κατὰ Τιμοκράτους εἰσαγγελτικός (λόγος) δήμου καταλύσεως*. The Scholiast on Dem. xxiv, 63 defines *εἰσαγγελία* thus, *εἰσαγγελία ἐστὶν ὄνομα δίκης κατὰ τῶν καταλόντων τὴν δημοκρατίαν καθ' ὅλον δήποτε τρόπον* and on xix, 103: *εἰσαγγελία ἐστὶ τὸ παρέχειν εὐθύνας ὡς ὑπὲρ καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου*. The law which appears [Dem.] xlvi, 26 directing a *γραφὴ πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, εἰάν τις ἐταιρίαν συνιστῇ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου* etc. is an interpolation.

II. *Ἐάν τις πόλιν τινὰ προδῶ ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιάν*; see Poll.: *ἢ κατὰ προδόντων φρούριον ἢ στρατιὰν ἢ ναῦς*; Lex. Rhet. Cant.: *ἢ εἰάν τις προδιδῶ φρούριον ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν στρατιάν, ἢ εἰάν τις εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀφικνῆται (ἄνευ τοῦ πεμφθῆναι παρὰ τοῦ δήμου) ἢ ἐνοικῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ στρατεύηται μετ' αὐτῶν δῶρα λαμβάνων. συνομολογεῖ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ Θεοφράστου ἢ κατὰ Θεμιστοκλέους εἰσαγγελία, ἣν εἰσήγειλε κατὰ Κράτερον Λεωβότης Ἀλκμαίωνος Ἀγρυλῆθεν*.

Regarding the case of Themistocles see Corn. Nep. Them. 8; *Lacedaemonii legatos Athenas miserunt qui eum absentem accusarent, quod societatem cum rege Persarum ad Graeciam opprimendam fecisset*; Plut. Them. 23: *ὁ δὲ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβότης ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος Ἀγρυλῆθεν ἅμα συνεπαλιωμένων τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν*; Thuc. I, 135.

The Generals seem to have been prosecuted very often under this law; they not having sufficient means of paying

their soldiers were often compelled to levy contributions upon the allies and to plunder the trading vessels they met with at sea, and although they might be unable from the desertion of their crews, which were chiefly mercenaries, and the unfit state of the ships, to wage war with success, they were personally held responsible for everything which did not come up to the expectations of the Athenian people, and were often charged with peculation, and treachery, or, at the least, with negligence; see Dem. VIII, 28: *εἰ γὰρ δεινὰ ποιεῖ Διοπείθης καὶ κατὰγει τὰ πλοῖα, μικρὸν, ὃ ἄ. Ἀ., μικρὸν πινάκιον ταῦτα πάντα κωλύσαι δύνασθ' ἂν, καὶ λέγουσιν οἱ νόμοι ταῦτα τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας εἰσαγγέλλειν* etc.; Hyp. pro Eux. c. 38. Demosthenes gives a great number of names of Generals, who had not been able to recover the Thracian Chersonesus, a province which was of great importance to Athens with regard to the commerce of the Euxine and its vicinity to Asia, and most of these we shall see were brought to trial by an *εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας*; Dem. XIX, 180: *τοῦτο τοίνυν αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἡλίκον ἔστ' ἀδίκημα, τὸ Θράκην καὶ τὰ τεῖχη προέσθαι, μυρὶ ἂν εἴη λέγειν καὶ ὅσοι διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπολώλασι παρ' ὑμῖν, οἱ δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλ' ὠφλήκασιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν δεῖξαι, Ἐργόφιλος, Κηφισόδοτος, Τιμόμαχος, τὸ παλαιὸν ποτε Ἐργοκλῆς, Διονύσιος, ἄλλοι, οὓς ὀλίγου δέω σύμ-παντας εἰπεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν πόλιν βεβλαφέναι τούτου.*

In the case of Ergocles, the xxviiith oration of Lysias gives us some hints regarding the single charges §§ 1. 11. 12. 17, see also XXIX, 2.

Cephisodotus had been appointed to the command of the armament sent to besiege the pirates who had occupied the promontory of Alopecconesus; he was forced to raise the siege through Charidemus coming to the relief of the pirates. Cephisodotus, therefore, concluded a treaty with Charidemus, the terms of which it seems were not considered very honourable; see Dem. XXIII, 167; Aesch. III, 51. 52 and the Schol.: *οὗτος πολιορκήσας Ἀλωπεκόννησον, εἰσαγγελλεὶς διὰ τὴν συνθήκην τὴν πρὸς Χαρίδημον γενομένην* etc.¹.

¹ A. Schaefer (Demosthenes u. seine Zeit, Bd. I. p. 410), places the sending of Cephisodotus about Ol. 105, †.

With the help of the Scholiast on Aesch. I. c. we are enabled to fix the date with greater accuracy, and some

Timomachus αἰτίαν ἔσχευεν ὡς προδοὺς Κότυϊ τὴν Χερρόνησον, Schol. on Aesch. I, 56; see Aesch. I, 55; Dem. XXIII, 115; XXXVI, 53.

Hyp. pro Eux. c. 18: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρίτερον εἰσηγγέλλοντο παρ' ὑμῖν Τιμόμαχος καὶ Λεωσθένης καὶ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Φίλων ὁ ἐξ Ἀναίων καὶ Θεότιμος ὁ Σηστὸν ἀπολέσας καὶ ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι· καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς αἰτίαν ἔχοντες προδοῦναι, οἱ δὲ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων, ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ ὧν λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ. About Timomachus we have already spoken above.

Ol. 104, 3 (361). Alexander of Pherae had plundered the Cyclades and laid siege to Peparethus, to the relief of which Leosthenes was sent; Alexander was defeated by him, and forced to raise the siege, but soon afterwards he delivered his troops blockaded in Panormus, took six galleys and 600 prisoners and entered the port of Peiraeus. Diod. Sic. xv, 95: οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παροξυνθέντες τοῦ Λεωσθένους ὡς προδότου θάνατον κατέγνωσαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐδήμευσαν; Polyae. vi, 2.

The General Φίλων ὁ ἐξ Ἀναίων is only mentioned here.

Theotimus ὁ Σηστὸν ἀπολέσας. Ariobarzanes, to whom Sestus belonged, is said by Cornelius Nepos Timoth. I, whom Thirlwall follows, to have ceded it to Timotheus, but see Isocr. xv, 112: ἐντεῦθεν τοίνυν ἀναπλεύσας Σηστὸν καὶ Κριθώνην ἔλαβε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον ἀμελουμένης Χερρόνησου ὑμᾶς αὐτῇ τὸν νοῦν ἐποίησεν. Not long after it was again wrested from Athens, the people of Sestus, aided by those of Abydos, releasing themselves from the Athenian yoke, see Dem. xviii, 158. It was recovered by Chares, Ol. 106, 3 or 4, see Diod. Sic. xvi, 34.

Aristophon was impeached for treason, as I suppose, by Hyperides (pro Eux. c. 38). The Scholiast on Aesch. I, 64 says: κεκομψόθηται ὁ Ἀριστοφᾶν ὡς—καὶ ὡς στρατηγήσας ἐν Κέφῳ καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν πολλὰ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τοὺς ἐνοι-

time earlier. The words of the Scholiast are: ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Καλλιμάχους τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑκατοστῆς πέμπτῃς Ὀλυμπιάδος, ὃ ἔτει Φίλιππος ἐβασίλευσε Μακεδονίας, Ἀθηναῖοι δόναμιν εἰς Ἑλλάσποντον ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπ'

αὐτῇ Κηφισόδοτον, ὃς ναυμαχίᾳς Λαμψακηνῶς εἰσηγγέλθη ὡς προδεδωκώς, etc. Here is the only place where a sea-fight with the Lampsaceni is mentioned.

κοῦντας, ἐφ' ᾧ γραφεῖς ὑπὸ Ὑπερείδου παρανέμων ἐάλω; the last words are incorrect, for Aristophon did not lose this lawsuit, as we may learn from Hyperides and the Schol. on Dem. XVIII, 70. Therefore, I agree with Meier (l. c. p. CVI, 4), who conjectured παρ' ὀλίγον ἐάλω; -similarly Demosthenes says, παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους (XXIV, 138).

Also Gylon, the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes, was charged with treason, as having betrayed Nymphaeum to the enemy, Aesch. III, 171.

After the battle at Arginusae there was no care taken to recover the bodies of the slain soldiers, which were left floating in the water, nor to search the wrecks for those who might have taken refuge there, on account of a storm having arisen, which made it impossible to perform this duty; but the Athenian people disbelieved the reports given by the Generals of the violence of the storm, and the six Generals at Athens at the time seem to have been accused of treason; Xenoph. Hell. I. 7, especially 33: *προδοσίαν καταγρόντες ἀντὶ τῆς ἀδυναμίας οὐχ ἱκανοὺς γενομένους διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα πράξαι τὰ προσταχθέντα*. See Egger, *Revue Archéologique*, 1862, VI. p. 141, about an oratorical declamation on a similar case; he quotes Diod. Sic. XV, 35 and Onosander *στρατηγικός* c. 36 α' to illustrate the duties of the Generals. The trial of the six Generals is thought by Schoemann (l. c. p. 206) to be an eisangelia; neither Xenophon nor Diodorus (XIII, 97) in speaking of it make use of this term.

When the frontier town of Oropus, which on account of its position with regard to Euboea, was of great importance to Athens, was wrested from that town, the Athenians tried to recover it; but at last they had to agree to the proposition to place the town in the hands of the Thebans, until the rights of the Athenian people should be adjusted. The Athenians were very much displeased with the supposed authors of that compromise: Chabrias and Callistratus were both charged with treason. Chabrias was said to have had cognizance of the plot against Oropus, and to have been in collusion with the Thebans (Schol. on Dem. XXI, 64: *ὑπωπτεύθη οὖν ὁ στρατηγὸς ὡς συνειδὼς καὶ προδοσίας ἐκρίθη*, Aristot. Rhet. III. 10 p.

1411 B, 6), and Callistratus to have devised this treacherous plan (Aristot. Rhet. I, 7 p. 1364, 19); see also Diog. Laert. III, 23. 3¹.

Chares, supported by Aristophon, arraigns Iphicrates, Menestheus and Timotheus of treason, the charge was to the effect that they had taken bribes of the Chians and Rhodians, and on that account deprived him of their assistance in the battle; see Din. I, 14 (III, 17) *ὅτι χρήματ' αὐτὸν* (Timotheus) *Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων;* Diod. Sic. XVI, 21; Polyæn. III, 9. 29; Corn. Nep. Tim. 3; Aristot. Rhet. II, 23 p. 1398, 4: *Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίῃ ἂν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν οὐ φάσκοντος δὲ εἶτα* *εἶπεν* *σὺ μὲν ὦν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δ' ὦν Ἰφικράτης.* 'As appears from Dion. Hal. de Lys. c. 12, the accusation was entered as *eisangelia*, the judicial sentence, however, followed, and was based on the account rendered by the accused Generals.' These are the words of A. Schaefer (Bd. I, p. 154), whom I have followed in his description of the course of procedure. Dionysius treats of this process in two places, the apparent contradiction between which Schaefer explains by the hypothesis, that in the second of the two passages Dionysius was only concerned to state the time in very general terms. The reference to the Social War suffices to show that Lysias cannot be the author. Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 13: *εἴρηται γὰρ*

¹ Regarding this event the Scholiast on Aesch. III. 85 gives us important information: *Θεμισίων ἦν Ἑρετριέων τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ τύραννος. οὗτος Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων Ἑρωπὸν καὶ εἰρήνης οὐσης καὶ σπονδῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας καταλαμβάνει τὸν Ἑρωπὸν. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐπιστρατεύσαντες ἐπολιόρκουν αὐτὸν ὅντα ἐν Ἑρωπῇ. ὅστερον συνέβησαν ἀμφότεροι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ὁ τύραννος ὥστε παρακαταθῆσθαι Θηβαίοις τὸν Ἑρωπὸν, ἕως ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ διακριθῶσι. Θηβαῖοι δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις λαβόντες τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀμφοτέρους ἀπεστέρησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ ταῦτα ἀρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Πολυζήλου.* This statement is rather different from what Xenophon says (Hell. VII, 4). Diodorus (XV, 76),

whom A. Schaefer follows (Bd. I, p. 98), places this fact in OL 103, 3. 366; the Scholiast, however, in OL 103, 2. We learn from Diodorus that Chares went to the relief of the Phliasians, OL 103, 2, and after two battles returned to Athens the same year (XV, 75: *ἐπ' ἀρχαυτος Πολυζήλου—and νικήσας τοὺς Ἀργεῖους δυσὶ μάχαις καὶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν περιποιήσας τοῖς Φλιασίοις ἐπαυήθη εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας.* c. 76: *τοῦ δ' ἐνιαυσίου χρόνου διεληλυθότος Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἤρχε Κηφισόδωρος, κ.τ.λ.*), and as appears from Xenophon Chares was sent for from Thyamia; therefore the Scholiast is quite right in placing the capture of Oropus in OL 103, 2.

ἔτι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζώντος κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ' ἣ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑποσχὼν ἐάλω. Τιμόθεος δὲ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίστρατον, ὅτε καί... (Ol. 106, 3) and de Lys. c. 12: παραθεῖς τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ὀλίγοις ἔτεσιν εὖρον ὑστεροῦσαν (τὴν ἀπολογία) τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ ῥήτορος (sc. Lysias), ἀλλὰ καὶ κ' ὅλοις. ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν Ἰφικράτης ἡγώνισται καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὑπέσχηκε τῆς στρατηγίας, ὡς ἐκ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές. οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἑλπίην ἀρχοντας. When Diodorus subjoins the account of the trial and deposition of the Generals immediately to his recital of the battle, he must be understood, as the subsequent course of his narrative shows, to be speaking by anticipation (xvi, 21). According to Dionysius, the trial took place Ol. 106, 3; in agreement with which date is the fact, that Demosthenes in his Leptinean oration (68. 69. 84—86) magnifies the exploits of Conon, Timotheus and Iphicrates, with the view of commending the accused to the people (see Westermann, *Ausgewählte Reden des Demosthenes*, Bd. II, p. 195). Timotheus was fined 100 talents, see Isocr. xv, 129.

Some of these cases show the facility with which such charges might be made, especially in times of political excitement. About the case of Leocrates we have spoken before; under the term of *προδοσία* was included every betrayal of the interests of the state, and it would be such a betrayal to go as ambassador into the country of the enemy without being elected by the people in assembly, see Poll.: κατὰ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἄνευ τοῦ πεμφθῆναι ἀπελθόντων.

After the deposition of the Four Hundred, the envoys of the last embassy, sent to Sparta with instructions to purchase peace at any price, were impeached, especially by Theramenes who had opposed their being sent (Lys. xii, 67; Thuc. viii, 92; Xen. Hell. ii, 3. 15). Of the ten ambassadors, all, except Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles, seem to have already left Athens; Phrynichus had been assassinated some days before; these three men were accused *πρεσβευόμενοι εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἐπὶ κακῷ τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεῖν ἐπὶ πολεμίας νεῶς καὶ πεζεῦσαι διὰ Δεκελείας*

Ps. Plut. p. 833 E, see Thuc. VIII. 68. Onomacles fled before the decree passed by the senate was executed, the two others were condemned to the penalties of treason, the vacant sites of their razed houses were marked by columns, with the inscription 'Ἀρχεπολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος τοῖν προδόταιν.' Except these two, we know only of one more of the Four Hundred oligarchs put to death by the democracy, Aristarchus, who is said to have been formally tried and condemned, Xen. Hell. I, 7. 28: 'Ἀριστάρχῳ μὲν πρότερον τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντι, εἶτα δ' Οἰνόην προδίδόντι Θηβαίοις πολεμίοις οὖσιν. Oenoe, a very important position to Athens, on the Boeotian frontier, was laid under siege by the Corinthians and Boeotians at the time when Aristarchus escaped from Athens; in concert with the besiegers, he deceived the Athenian garrison, by saying that one condition of a peace just concluded between Athens and Sparta was to surrender that place to the Boeotians and, as one of the Generals, he ordered the garrison to do so.

Amongst the envoys of the third embassy to Philip and to the council of the Amphictyons was Aeschines; at first he had declined this commission under the pretext of ill health, but soon after, under circumstances entirely changed in the mean time, he consented to go on this embassy. To this event is to be referred Aesch. II, 139: *πρεσβεύοντος ἐμοῦ τὴν τρίτην ἤδη πρεσβείαν ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, ἐφ' ἣν τολμᾷς με λέγειν ὥς οὐ χειροτονηθεὶς ὀχίμην, ἐχθρὸς δ' ὢν οὕτω καὶ τήμερον ἠθέληκας μ' εἰσαγγεῖλαι παραπρεσβεύσασθαι*, see Dem. XIX, 125. 131. Demosthenes never executed his threat; Aeschines was quite right to go on this embassy, because a decree had renewed the original elections, see Aesch. II, 94: *ψήφισμα τὸ μὲν ἀνέγνως* (Dem. XIX, 130), *τὸ δὲ ὑπερέβης*, and Dem. XIX, 172.

III. *ἡ ῥήτωρ ὦν μὴ λέγῃ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων*, see Lex. Rhet. Cant.: *ἡ ῥήτωρ μὴ τὰ ἄριστα συμβουλεύῃ χρήματα λαμβάνων*, Poll.: *ἡ ῥητόρων μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ λεγόντων*.

Hyp. pro Eux. c. 18: *ὁ δὲ* (Callistratus) *ῥήτωρ ὦν λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ*. Callistratus, who was from the first averse to the alliance with Thebes, is, as it appears probable, either the

author, or the most active promoter, of the decree of the Athenian people to send an embassy to Sparta to negotiate a peace, [Dem.] LIX, 27; after the death of Epameinondas, the anti-Theban party, to which he belonged, was overthrown. Our acquaintance with this case is rather imperfect.

Schoemann maintains that Philocrates was charged with *παράπρεσβεία* (de Com. Ath. p. 195), but as we learn from Hyperides (pro Eux. c. 39), it was an *eisangelia* of the kind we are discussing, under which he was really prosecuted: *τοῦτον εἰσαγγείλας ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ὧν Φιλίππῳ ὑπηρετήκει κατὰ τῆς πόλεως —καὶ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἔγραψα δικαίαν καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, ῥήτορα διῖτα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τάναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ*; see Dem. XIX, 116 and the Schol. on § 120; Schol. on Aesch. III, 79: *εἰσαγγελλθεὶς ἐπὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖν*. Philocrates, as well as Aeschines, had received bribes and grants from Philip, see Dem. XIX, 206. 114 etc; Schol. on Aesch. I, 3. Regarding Hermogenes, Schol. Rhet. Gr. IV p. 164 Walz., see Dem. XIX, 309.

Aeschines had given assistance to Antiphon when brought before the assembly by Demosthenes, as having the intention of firing the arsenal—so Demosthenes asserts in a speech made many years after—the result of which seems to have been that the Areopagus deprived Aeschines of his office as ambassador in the Delian business. Therefore, not long before he was brought to trial by Demosthenes, he threatens to *εἰσαγγέλλειν* him (Dem. XIX, 209), according to the most probable conjecture, for having recommended bad measures to the assembly, but he never executed his threat. As we learn from Aesch. III, 223, he intended to proceed against Demosthenes by an *eisangelia*, but abandoned it in consequence of the seizure of Anaxinus (Dem. XVIII, 137); perhaps he would have charged him with the crime above-mentioned, see Aesch. III, 221.

Hyperides, in his speech in defence of Euxenippus, attacks the form of prosecution, chosen by Polyeuctus, on the ground that Euxenippus was no *ῥήτωρ*, but an *ιδιώτης*, c. 40: *ιδιώτην δ' ὄντα κρίνεις ἐν τῇ τοῦ ῥήτορος τάξει*. This suggests the question who were those *ῥήτορες*, to whom the paragraph of the law

now under discussion was applicable? The view of Petit (Legg. Attic. III, 3 p. 344—349), that they constituted a distinct class invested with a kind of public authority, has already been refuted by Schoemann. Every citizen who was of the proper age and not labouring under *ἀτιμία* had the right to speak in the public assembly. Inasmuch, however, as the majority of the Athenians did not avail themselves of their right (Dem. XXIII, 5 XXII, 30), we must understand by *ρήτορες* such as made it their business to lead the deliberations of the people, and to bring forward bills. These as speakers by profession were contrasted with *ιδιωταί*; see Hyp. c. Dem. c. 20. 21; Lyc. c. Leocr. 31; Aesch. I, 7; Dem. XXII, 37; x, 70; Din. I, 71 etc. Suidas explains *ρήτωρ* τὸ παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ δῆμος συμβουλευῶν καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ δῷ ἀγορεύων (see Thom. Mag. p. 324 ed. Ritschl), εἶτε ἱκανὸς λέγειν εἶτε καὶ ἀδύνατος; Photius λέξ. συναγ. 478, 15: *ρήτορες* οὐχ οἱ συνήγοροι, ἀλλ' οἱ τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην λέγοντες. Dem. XXI, 189: ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν ὁ συμβουλευῶν ὅ τι ἂν συμφέρειν ὑμῖν ἡγήται, καὶ τοῦτ' ὅχρι τοῦ μηδὲν ὑμῖν ἐνοχλεῖν, μήδε βιάζεσθαι, *ρήτωρ* ἐστίν, οὔτε φύγοιμ' ἂν οὔτ' ἀπαρνοῦμαι τοῦτο τοῦνομα· εἰ μέντοι *ρήτωρ* ἐστίν οἷους ἐνίους τῶν λεγόντων ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς δὲ ὁρᾶτε, ἀναιδεῖς καὶ ὑφ' ὑμῶν πεπλουτηκότας, οὐκ ἂν εἶην οὗτος ἐγώ· see also VIII, 1; Hyp. pro Eux. c. 23: *παρ' οἷς* (sc. *ρήτορσι*) ἔστιν καὶ τὸ γράφειν τὰ ψηφίσματα (the same Schol. on Aesch. I, 195; Bekk. Anecd. Gr. p. 310); Lys. XXXI, 27: τίς γὰρ ἂν ποτε *ρήτωρ* ἐνεθυμήθη ἢ νομοθέτης ἡλπισεν ἀμαρτήσεσθαι τινα τῶν πολιτῶν τοσαύτην ἀμαρτίαν (Dem. XXIV, 142). The possession of the *βῆμα* was confined to a few men whom the people heard with pleasure and with confidence. When Euthycles accused Aristocrates by *γραφὴ παρανόμων* he apologized as follows in the opening sentences of his speech: *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐνοχλούντων ὑμᾶς οἷδὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ πιστευομένων παρ' ὑμῖν ὦν πρῶτα τηλικούτον φημι δείξειν πεπραγμένον* § 4. The supineness of the citizens was encouraged and turned to advantage by these orators; as Demosthenes complains (XXIII, 209. 210), they habituated the people to an exclusive admiration of one or two men, readily yielding them all fame and all emolument as a rightful inheritance, so that, instead of being the masters, the people had come to be the servants of their states-

men. As Hyperides says (pro Eux. c. 23): τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς ὀφελίας ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες καρποῦνται, and according to another passage from the same orator (c. Dem. c. 21) they enjoyed these ὀφελίαι, οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδοκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, but solely by the πραότης and φιλανθρωπία of the people. In this way, according to Hyperides (compare Din. i, 41—45. 70), Demosthenes and Demades are said to have received 60 talents each ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ψηφισμάτων καὶ προξενιῶν. With most of these orators everything might be bought for gold; pay them their price, and they would propose or support any bill you chose (Dem. xx, 132; xxiii, 184. 201; lviii, 35; Lys. xiii, 72; xxix, 6 etc.), so that not the welfare of the state, but the advantage of the venal swarm of orators decided the questions at issue (Lys. xviii, 16; Isocr. xii, 12). Was there a lack of coin in the Exchequer, they were ready in a moment with proposals for confiscating the property of the rich, and no inconsiderable proportion of the wealth so confiscated rewarded them for their patriotism (Lys. xxv, 26; xxvii, 1; Hyp. pro Eux. c. 45. 46; Plat. de Rep. viii, 565 A; Aristoph. Equ. 1358 etc.). From this well-known avarice and fondness for bribery ῥήτωρ had become a word of reproach (Thom. Mag. p. 325 ed. Ritschl) as much as δημαγωγός which we find used still in its proper meaning, Lys. xxvii, 10; Isocr. viii, 126; xv, 234. Solon is said to have made the law μήτε ἄρχειν τὸν σφόδρα νέον μήτε συμβουλεύειν (Stob. Serm. cxv, 26), but it seems not to have been more strictly observed than the regulation that those persons who were above fifty years of age should be called upon to speak first in the public assembly, a provision which at a later time became quite obsolete. When Demades made the proposal to give Alexander the divine honours he claimed, the motion was opposed by Pytheas, and when it was observed by some people that he was not yet of an age to give advice on matters of such importance, he replied, that he was older than Alexander, whom they proposed to make a God (Plut. Polit. praec. p. 804 B, an seni ger. resp. p. 784 C; see Isocr. vi, 6; Anaxim. Rhet. c. 18; Xen. Memor. Socr. iii, 6. 1). I concur in the opinion of K. Fr. Hermann (Lehrbuch der Gr. Staatsalterthümer § 129, 9), who inclines to think that this passage of

Dinarchus (c. Dem. 71), τοὺς μὲν νόμους προλέγειν τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πίστιν ἀξιοῦντι λαμβάνειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, γῆν ἐντὸς ὅρων κεκτῆσθαι, πάσας τὰς δικαίας πίστεις παρακαταθέμενον οὕτως ἀξιῶν προστάναι τοῦ δήμου, refers only to those orators who were orators by profession, yet I do not agree with Hermann (§ 129, 11) when he supposes that these orators were entirely irresponsible quoting Dem. XIX, 182: ἀγανακτήσει—εἰ μόνος τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ λεγόντων λόγων εὐθύνας ὑφέξει. As Schaefer (Bd. III, Beil. p. 72) has shown, it seems likely, that Demosthenes inserted this passage in the course of the revision of his speech before its publication with reference to Aesch. II, 178. 118. Demosthenes in the following paragraphs characterizes the objection as wholly futile: οἷς γὰρ ἐστ' ἐν λόγοις ἡ πολιτεία, πῶς, ἂν οὗτοι μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν, ἀσφαλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι; ἂν δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς ἃ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει δῶρά τις λαμβάνων λέγῃ, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ κινδυνεύσετε; § 103, he says: εἰ γέ τι τῶν προσηκόντων ἐγίνετο, ἐν εἰσαγγελίᾳ πάλαι ἂν ἦν, see § 116, and as we saw above Philocrates was accused ῥήτορα ὄντα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ. Aeschines had deceived the people by means of false representations, had prevented Demosthenes who wished to give a true account of the matter from speaking, and counselled a course of action injurious to the interests of the state (XIX, 8). Demosthenes says (XVIII, 189): ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης—ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν· ὁ μὲν γε πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γνώμην ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον τοῖς πεισθεῖσι, τῇ τύχῃ, τοῖς καιροῖς, τῷ βουλομένῳ· ὁ δὲ συγῆσας ἡνίκ' ἔδει λέγειν, ἂν τι δύσκολον συμβῇ, τοῦτο βασκαίνει, see § 111; VIII, 69; x, 70; Thuc. III, 43. 4. From these passages I venture to think that the orators, in the event of the actions resulting from their counsels turning out injuriously for the state, or of their being suspected of having recommended bad measures in consequence of bribes, were liable to be placed upon trial for the advice which they had given. Such a trial, however, could not in the nature of things have borne much resemblance to the εὐθύνη of a public officer; a γραφὴ παρανόμων could be presented against them (Lyc. c. Leocr. 7), or an

είσαγγελία of the kind we are speaking of (Hyp. pro Eux. c. 37. 38); see Dem. xviii, 13 and Din. i, 100. 101.

Sycophants might also be proceeded against by *είσαγγελία*, see Isocr. xv, 314: *περὶ τῶν συκοφαντῶν χαλεπωτέρους ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς νόμους ἔθεσαν, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μεγίστοις τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐν ἐνὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων τὰς κρίσεις ἐποίησαν. κατὰ δὲ τούτων γραφὰς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, εἰσαγγελίας δ' εἰς τὴν βουλὴν, προβολὰς δ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, and Lex. Rhet. Cant.: *ἐνιοὶ τῶν ῥητόρων εἰώθεσαν καλεῖν καὶ τὰ μὴ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα εἰσαγγελίαν. ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐμβάλλοντες τοὺς συκοφαντούμενους εἰσήγγελλον.*

IV. *ἔάν τις ἀδικῇ περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις*, Boeckh Seeurkunden xv. xvi p. 534; see Poll. ix, 56: *ἐν τῷ Ὑπερείδου ὑπὲρ Λυκόφρονος εὖρον γεγραμμένον ἢ νεωρίων προδοσίαν ἢ ἀρχείων ἐμπυρισμὸν ἢ κατάληψιν ἄκρας [εἰσαγγέλλειν χρή, Meier l. c. p. cxxvii].*

After the death of Cephisodorus his brother Sopolis discharged his liabilities to the state and paid part of the debt by timber intended to be made into oars. It was in reference to this that the senate passed a decree, the last words of which we have already quoted. For a more ample discussion of the matter, the reader is referred to Boeckh. l. c. p. 212. 213.

Theophemus was brought to trial by the person who delivered [Dem.] XLVII: *ὡς ἀδικῶν καὶ διακωλύων τὸν ἀπίστολον, διότι τὰ σκεύη οὐκ ἀπεδίδου καὶ τὰ ἐνέχυρα ἀφείλετο καὶ συνέκοψε τὸν εἰσπράττοντα καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντα τῇ πόλει (§ 42)*, a case which seems to belong to this kind of *eisangelia*. The necessity of preventing delays in the naval service might induce the senate to look seriously on the offence of Theophemus, but from the issue of the affair we may conclude that the plaintiff had exaggerated it (Kennedy, l. c. p. 363). It happened under the archonship of Agathocles, Ol. 105, 4 356 (§ 44).

To these four parts of the *νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός* I would add a fifth, the words of which I consider can nearly exactly be obtained from the title of a lost oration of Dinarchus *κατὰ Πυθέου περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐμπόριον εἰσαγγελία* (Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 10).

Dem. xxxiv, 50: *ὤμεῖς γάρ ἐστε οἱ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὸν ἐπιδεδα-*

νεισμένον ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπορίου πολλὰ χρήματα καὶ τοῖς δανεισταῖς οὐ παρασχόντα τὰς ὑποθήκας θανάτῳ ζημιώσαντες εἰσαγγελθέντα ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ταῦτα πολίτην ὑμέτερον ὄντα καὶ πατὴρ ἐστρατηγηκότος. ἡγείσθε γὰρ τοὺς τοιούτους οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινῇ βλάπτειν τὸ ἐμπόριον ὑμῶν.

Some corn-dealers had bought up more than fifty φορμοί at one time, and the prytanes having been informed of this brought the matter before the senate. The person for whom Lysias wrote his xxxiind oration came forward as the accuser. Although the word εἰσαγγέλλειν is not to be found in this oration, the peculiar conduct of the case shows that the corn-dealers have been brought to trial by an eisangelia. Considering the anxiety of the Athenians for plentiful supplies of corn caused by the insufficiency of the production of the country (Dem. xviii, 37; xx, 31), I can account for the application of an eisangelia to offences of such a nature, as well as to the subversion of the democracy, treason, and recommendation of bad measures by an orator. Thus, I think that I can hardly be mistaken in supposing that an eisangelia was also applicable to offences committed against the commercial laws.

At the first glance it may appear that some of the cases of εἰσαγγελία known to us cannot be ranged under the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός as above stated; but it is to be taken into consideration that many of those crimes which were prosecuted against by it had nothing in common with this law, see Hyp. pro Eux. c. 19: οὕτως ὑπὲρ μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων καὶ περιφανῶν αἱ εἰσαγγελίαι τότε ἦσαν. νυνὶ δὲ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει πάννυ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν. Διογνίδης μὲν καὶ Ἀντίδωρος ὁ μέτοικος εἰσαγγέλλονται ὡς πλέονος μισθοῦντες τὰς αὐλητρίδας ἣ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, Ἀγασικλῆς (see Harpocr. s. v.) δ' ὁ ἐκ Πειραιέως ὅτι εἰς Ἀλιμουσίους ἐνεγράφη, Εὐξένιππος δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ὧν φησιν ἑωρακέσθαι. ὧν οὐδεμία δὴπου τῶν αἰτιῶν τούτων οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ. At one time the informer, in the event of the defendant being acquitted, was subjected to no penalty even if he did not obtain the votes of as many as a fifth of the judges, and this impunity was discontinued διὰ τοὺς ῥαδίως εἰσαγγέλλοντας (Poll. viii, 53); he pretended that the imputed crime was peculiarly heinous and required a heavier

punishment than was permitted to be imposed by the ordinary laws, and therefore he adopted the process in question to excite the greater odium against the accused, especially if the accused was a person of great influence in the state. Only by these means we may understand how eisangelia could be defined thus: *ἡ περὶ καινῶν καὶ δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων δίκη* etc. It was a common trick of the orators to excite the prejudices of the Athenian people against the accused by charging them with *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου* (Lyc. c. Leoc. 147; Aesch. III, 200. 235; Dem. XIII, 14; LVIII, 34; Aristoph. Vesp. 488); adultery, which does not amount to *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου* in the usual sense of the term, was nevertheless made the subject of a charge brought under eisangelia. Offences of the most different kind amounted to the crime of *προδοσία*; e.g. Lycurgus saw, in the departure of Leocrates from Athens after the defeat at Chaeronea, a betrayal of the state, and seven years afterwards, when he returned home, impeached him for his flight by an *εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας*. Perhaps Lycurgus proceeded also by an eisangelia of this kind against Autolycus, because he had removed his family to a place of safety; see the last words of the Argument of the oration against Leocrates: *ἔοικε δὲ ἡ τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσις τῇ τοῦ κατὰ Αὐτολύκου*; a decree of the public assembly was passed subjecting even emigration to the penalties of treason. The author of the lives of the x orators, p. 843 D, says:—*καὶ Λεωκράτην καὶ Αὐτόλυκον δειλίας*, and seems to have misled Kiessling (fragm. Lyc. p. 22) and Boehnecke (Forschungen auf d. Gebiete d. Att. Redner I p. 549), who speak of these trials as of *εἰσαγγελίαι δειλίας*. Nissen (de Lyc. vit. et rebus gest. p. 68) thinks that also Lysicles, the general in the battle at Chaeronea, was brought to trial under eisangelia by Lycurgus. Perhaps to delude the people by promises was also an instance of treason by implication. Timotheus had promised the people to bring a *γραφὴ ξενίας* against Iphicrates, but soon after he gave his daughter in marriage to the son of Iphicrates, [Dem.] XLIX, 66. 67: *ἵστε γὰρ τοῦτον ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ὁμόσαντα καὶ ἐπαρασάμενον αὐτῷ ἐξώλειαν, εἰ μὴ γράψαιτο Ἴφικράτην ξενίας καὶ καθιερώσαντα τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ. ὁμόσας δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὑποσχόμενος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ οὐ πολλῶ*

χρόνῳ ὕστερον ἔνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος αὐτῷ ἔδωκε τῷ νύμφῳ τῷ ἐκείνου τὴν θυγατέρα. ὃς οὖν οὐθ' ὑμᾶς ἡσχύνθη ἐξαπατῆσαι ὑποσχόμενος, νόμων ὄντων, εἰάν τις τὸν δῆμον ὑποσχόμενος ἐξαπατήσῃ, εἰσαγγελίαν εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ. Demosthenes speaks twice (xx, 100. 135, see also Anaxim. Rhet. c. 1) about an old law by which death is appointed as the usual punishment for delusion of the people by false promises, but he does not mention that the offender might be proceeded against by eisangelia. It may seem presumptuous for any one, with our limited means of information, to conclude forthwith that this form of eisangelia is here intended; yet we must bear in mind the facility with which charges of treason could be made at Athens. The speaker of Dinarchus' oration against Demosthenes brought to trial Pistias an Areopagite by an eisangelia, perhaps by an εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας, since he calls him *πονηρὸν καὶ προδότην* (§ 52); Dinarchus seems to have composed for him the speech for the prosecution, see Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 10: *εἰσαγγελία κατὰ Πιστίου*; Ps. Plut. p. 834 A: *ὁ Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πιστίου*; and Harpocr. s. v. *βουλευσεως Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πιστίου τοῦ Ἀρειοπαγίτου*.

Lys. x, 1: *Λυσίθεος Θεόμνηστον εἰσήγγειλε τὰ ὕπλα ἀποβεβληκότα, οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, δημηγορεῖν*. Against soldiers who had been guilty of cowardice, there was to be instituted a *γραφὴ δειλίας* and the defendant, if convicted, incurred *ἀτιμία* and was not allowed to appear at the public sacra (Aesch. i, 29; iii, 176; Isocr. viii, 143), but his property was not confiscated (Andoc. i, 74); no charge had been made, however, against Theomnestus, and therefore he made use of his right and spoke before the assembly of the people. Such persons as exercised rights while labouring under *ἀτιμία* were to be prosecuted by an *ἐνδειξις* (Poll. viii, 49; Argum. of Dem. xxv), Lysitheus, however, proceeded against Theomnestus by eisangelia, perhaps because the charge embraced a combination of crimes; the accused was to be found guilty of cowardice, and also at the same time was to be sentenced to punishment for exercising rights while *ἀτιμος*.

Antiph. vi, 35: *κατηγορεῖσιν ἔμελλον Ἀριστίωνος καὶ Φιλίονου καὶ Ἀμπελίνου καὶ τοῦ ὑπογραμματέως τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, μεθ' οὗπερ συνέκλεπτον, περὶ ὧν εἰσήγγειλα εἰς τὴν βουλὴν*. With

our imperfect acquaintance with this law-suit, I think it best to abstain from any conjecture. For the different processes which might be taken against thieves by the prosecutor, see Dem. xxii, 26.

We find Schoemann mentioning an *εἰσαγγελία φόνου* (p. 186), but the passage from which he draws his information is found to be spurious, viz. Dem. xxi, 121: *καθ' οὓς καιροὺς ἡ εἰσαγγελία ἐδόθη εἰς τὴν βουλὴν ὑπὲρ Ἀριστάρχου τοῦ Μόσχου, ὅτι εἶη Νικόδημον ἀπεκτονῶς*; besides the Scholiast understands *ἡ βουλή* as the Areopagus. He is also mistaken when he speaks about an *εἰσαγγελία ξενίας*, for the punctuation of the passage referred to by Schoemann is changed, Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 10: *κατ' Ἀγασικλέους εἰσαγγελία· Ξενίας οὐδένα πώποτε οἶμαι* (Baiter u. Sauppe O. A. II p. 322). Therefore the deduction made from these passages can no longer be maintained. In another passage from the same chapter of Dionysius the titles of two orations are mixed together and the words commencing the first oration of both of them have been omitted: *ἀπολογία διαμαρτυρίας πρὸς τὴν Χάρητος εἰσαγγελίαν κατὰ Φειδιάδου γραμματέως*. There is moreover some mistake in the title of the xxivth oration of Lysias; it is according to the ms. *πρὸς τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν περὶ τοῦ μὴ διδόνθαι τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ ἀργύριον*; in the oration itself the word *εἰσαγγέλλειν* does not occur. Suidas s.v. *ἀνάπηρον* gives as title: *Λυσίας ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ δεδομένου τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις ὀβολοῦ*, and Harpocration, who appears inclined to discredit Lysias' authorship of the oration, also differs: *ἔστι δὲ καὶ λόγος τις ὡς (some mss. λέγεται) Λυσίου περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου*. This speech is thought to be a *μελέτη* by Boeckh (Staatshaushalt. d. Ath. I p. 261); it is addressed to the senate, whose duty it was to examine the *ἀδύνατοι* supported by the state, hence perhaps came the mistake in the title. On the following cases we are not in possession of any information: Isaeus iv, 28: *πάλιν ἀπογραφεῖς εἰς τὴν βουλὴν κακουργῶν ὑποχωρῶν ὄχετο* (Meier Att. Proc. p. 254 understands *ἀπογραφεῖς* as *εἰσαγγελθεῖς*); [Dem.] xxv, 47 mentions two *eisangeliae* of Aristogiton against Hegemon and Democles; Dion. Hal. l. c. gives the titles of two last orations of Dinarchus: *κατ' Ἱμεραίου εἰσαγγελτικὸς· Οὐδένα νομίζω, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι* and *κατὰ Καλλισθέ-*

νοιας εἰσαγγελία. Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ, ἄνδρες. Harp. s. v. ἀρκυαρός. Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῇ κατὰ Μενεσαίχμου εἰσαγγελίᾳ (Kiessling *Lyc. deperd. oratt. fragm.* p. 50); Plut. de adul. et amic. discr. p. 63 E: Λακύνδης γοῦν ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου γνώριμος ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας φεύγοντι δίκην Κηφισοκράτει μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων παρειστῆκει; Aesch. III, 3:—ἀν δέ τις τῶν ἄλλων βουλευτῶν ὅπως λόχη [κληρούμενος προεδρεύειν] καὶ τὰς ὑμετέρας χειροτονίας ὀρθῶς ἀναγορεύῃ, τοῦτον οἱ τὴν πολιτείαν κοινὴν οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἰδίαν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἀπειλοῦσιν εἰσαγγέλλειν (the words placed in brackets seem to have been introduced into the oration at a later date); Schol. on Aesch. I, 1: ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ εἰσαγγελίας κατὰ τῶν εὐθυνομένων ὑπετίθετο.

I shall now speak shortly on the manner in which the *eisangelia* was conducted, regarding which we are indebted to Harpocration s. v. *εἰσαγγελία* for some observations¹. To begin with the informations laid before the senate: the prosecutor had to give his accusation in writing (about the form of which see Hyp. pro Eux. c. 39; Phot. λέξ. συναγ. 430, 4 and Thom. Mag. p. 314 ed. Ritschl). No summons was issued. The senate had a discretionary power to accept or reject, see *Lys. xxx, 32*. For the purpose of ascertaining whether the action would lie, the prytanes then appointed a day for the *anacrisis*, the proceedings of which we may learn from [Dem.] *xlvii, 41. 42*: ἐκέλευεν (ἡ βουλή) εἰσαγγέλλειν με καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις προγράφειν αὐτῷ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας—γενεομένης τοίνυν

¹ The usual phrases are: *εἰσαγγέλλειν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν* Antiph. vi, 35, Andoc. i, 87, Isocr. xvi, 6; *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι ἐν τῷ δήμῳ* Dem. xxxiv, 50. *εἰσαγγέλλαν εἶναι, ποιῆσθαι, ὑποτίθεσθαι κατὰ τινος* Hyp. pro Eux. c. 20, *Lyc. c. Leocr. 30*, Schol. on Aesch. I, 1; *εἰσαγγέλλω κατὰ Πιστίου* etc. Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 10. *εἰσαγγέλλω περὶ τινος* [Dem.] *xlix, 67*, Antiph. vi, 35; Schneidewin (Hyp. Oratt. duo, p. 42) conjectures ἡ εἰς Θεμιστοκλέα εἰσαγγέλλω (!); *εἰσαγγέλλειν τινά* *Lyc. c. Leocr. 1*. *εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι, εἰσαγγέλλαν εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, δίδοναι ὑπέρ τινος* Hyp. pro Eux. c. 19, c. 9, c. 22,

pro *Lyc. c. 10*. *εἰσαγγέλλαν ποιῆσθαι, δίδοναι, γράφειν*, *Lyc. c. Leocr. 5*, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 24, c. 40, c. 39, pro *Lyc. c. 3*; *κρίνεσθαι, φυγάδα γίγνεσθαι, φεύγειν ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας*, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 19, Aesch. iii, 52. 79, Plut. Mor. p. 63 E; *γράφειν, ἐγγράφειν τι εἰς τὴν εἰσαγγέλλαν, ἐπιγράφειν τι πρὸς τὴν εἰσαγγέλλαν*, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 40, *Lyc. c. Leocr. 137*, ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ, Hyp. pro *Lyc. c. 4*, c. 10, *Lyc. c. Leocr. 84*, τὰ εἰσαγγελμένα 29. 55 etc. *εἰσαγγέλλω* as well as *ἐνδείξει, φάσις* signifies also the bill.

τῆς κρίσεως τῷ Θεοφήμεν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατὰ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἦν ἐγὼ εἰσήγγειλα καὶ ἀποδοθέντος λόγου ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ κρύβδην διαψηφισαμένων τῶν βουλευτῶν, ἦλθον ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ ἔδοξεν ἀδικεῖν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ διαχειροτονεῖν ἦν ἡ βουλή πότερα δικαστηρίῳ παραδοῖν ἢ ζημιώσκει ταῖς πεντακοσίαις, ὅσων ἦν κυρία κατὰ τὸν νόμον, etc. The defendant could raise objections against the form in which the accusation was brought forward—as Euxenippus might have done in his *ἀντιγραφῇ* (see Harpocr. s. v. *ἀντιγραφῇ*)—or produce reasons for defence—as we learn from Lys. xxii, 11 where the accuser before the Heliastic court, to which the case was afterward referred, refused them as insufficient. After both parties had been heard, the senate gave their verdict by secret ballot and when the offence had been declared penal either they decided themselves, if the alleged offence did not require a higher penalty than it was competent for them to impose, viz. 500 drachmae, as in the case of Theophemus [Dem.] xlvii, 43, or they referred the case to one of the courts of the Heliaea. The latter we meet with in the case of the corn-dealers. Perhaps the sitophylaces, whose business it was to watch the import and sale of corn in the market, or any other officers, reported to the prytanes that some corn-dealers had bought up more than fifty *φορμολ*; the prytanes brought this matter before the senate who were so displeased that they were inclined to deliver the corn-dealers *ἀκρίτους* to the Eleven. In order to prevent this the person, for whom Lysias wrote his xxiiind oration, appeared as accuser both before the senate and before the court of the Heliaea to which the case had been submitted. When the alleged offence was evident and liable to no doubt, as Hyperides says of the *κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου*, and yet of such a nature as obviously to be beyond the competency of the senate, a decree was drawn up immediately, without previous inquiry, prescribing the time and forms of the trial, e.g. the decree against Antiphon and his colleagues. Craterus had both this decree and the sentence of the court in his *συναγωγῇ ψηφισμάτων*, see Harpocr. s. v. *Ἀνδρῶν* *Ἀνδρῶνά φησιν εἶναι Κράτερος ἐν θ' τῶν ψηφισμάτων τὸν γράψαντα τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ περὶ Ἀντιφώντος τοῦ ῥήτορος*. From this book Caecilius pro-

bably copied these passages into his biography of Antiphon, from which they have been transferred into "The lives of the x orators" believed to be written by Plutarchus p. 833 E—p. 834 B; it runs as follows: ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ, μᾶ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας, Δημόνικος Ἀλωπεκῆθεν ἐγραμμάτευε, Φιλόστρατος Παλληνεὺς ἐπεστάτει, Ἄνδρων εἶπε περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς ἀποφαίνουσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρεσβευομένους εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐπὶ κακῷ τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεῖν ἐπὶ πολεμίας νεῶς, καὶ πεζεῦσαι διὰ Δεκελείας, Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ὀνομακλέα καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα συλλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὅπως δώσι δίκην παρασχόντων δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς οὐστίνας ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς προσελομένοις μέχρι δέκα ὅπως ἂν περὶ παρόντων γένηται ἡ κρίσις προσκαλεσάσθωσαν δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ θεσμοθέται ἐν τῇ αὔριον ἡμέρᾳ καὶ εἰσαγόντων, ἐπειδὴ αἱ κλήσεις ἐξήκωσιν, εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον περὶ προδοσίας. κατηγορεῖν τοὺς ἡρημένους συνηγόρους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς καὶ ἄλλος ἂν τις βούληται ὅτου δ' ἂν καταψηφίσῃται τὸ δικαστήριον, ποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς κεῖται περὶ τῶν προδόντων. In the oath of the Senators was the phrase: οὐδὲ δῆσω Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα, ὃς ἂν ἐγγνητὰς τρεῖς καθιστῇ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος τελούντας, πλὴν εἴαν τις ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου συνιῶν ἀλῶ ἢ etc. Dem. XXIV, 144, compare the Schol. on Aristoph. Eccles. 1089: κατεχόμενον ἐκατέρωθεν ἀπολογεῖσθαι τὸν κατ' εἰσαγγελίαν κρινόμενον (see Xen. Hell. I, 7. 20) which must be understood in the meaning given by Thirlwall; compare K. Fr. Hermann l.c. § 130, 11. Grote differing from the explanation of Thirlwall maintains that if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial the dicastery divided itself into two halves or portions to try both the defendants at once, but he cannot cite a single example in support of such a hypothesis. In such a case the dicasts gave their decision successively on each suit δίχα ἕκαστον (not ἀθρόους κρίνειν Plat. Apol. Socr. 32 B or μᾶ ψήφῳ Lys XII, 52 Din. I, 112 ὑπὸ μᾶς ψήφῳ Aristoph. Lysistr. 270). In an εἰσαγγελία καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου an ὑπωμοσία was not allowed as we learn from Hyp. pro Eux. c. 22, and all persons accused under eisangelia were presented for trial as soon as possible. The thesmothetae who seem to have possessed the ἡγεμονία τοῦ

δικαστηρίου on such occasions had to bring the sentences (*καταγνώσεις*) of the senate into the courts of justice Poll. VIII, 88; according to a spurious passage of Demosthenes (XXIV, 36) the scribe of the prytanes had to deliver the sentence of the senate to them. *χίλιοι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸν Σόλωνα τὰς εἰσαγγελίας ἔκρινον κατὰ δὲ τὸν Φαληρέα καὶ πρὸς πεντακόσιοι* Poll. VIII, 53, see Lex. Rhet. Cant. s. v. *εἰσαγγελία*; in the case of Pistias there were 2500 judges (Din. I, 52); Strombichides and his companions were to be tried before a dicastery of 2000 in accordance with the decree of the people (Lys. XIII, 35). As on all criminal trials both parties were allowed to speak once only; the plaintiff began and his speech was followed immediately by those of his *συνήγοροι*. In the case of Antiphon the senate had associated with the Generals any ten Senators they might choose as auxiliaries, and also permission was given to any citizens who might desire to take part as accusers. Lycurgus was *συνήγορος* of Polyeuctus in his information against Euxenippus. As regards the latter law-suit, Polyeuctus and Lycurgus must have both spoken before the other party was allowed to do so. Because in the oration of Hyperides in favour of Euxenippus there is not a word directed against the speech of Lycurgus, Comparetti (Il discorso d'Iperide in favore d'Euxenippo p. 38, 39) says, this oration followed immediately that of Polyeuctus and was spoken before the speech of Lycurgus; it is accordingly no *δευτερολογία* but the first oration on the side of the defence. I can hardly think Comparetti is right; for according to the practice of the Athenian courts the plaintiff and his auxiliaries spoke first, and therefore Lycurgus must have spoken immediately after Polyeuctus; see Meier Att. Proc. p. 712. Besides there are other reasons from which we may conclude that Hyperides was not the first speaker on the side of the defendant on which we need not here enter.

Such may have been the regular proceedings of a trial. I shall add now two law-suits of an irregular nature, in which all usually observed maxims of Athenian criminal justice seem to have been violated. When the Generals gave their formal explanation respecting the battle at Arginusae and the violence of the storm, Timocrates proposed that these five Generals present

should be imprisoned and brought before the public assembly, together with Erasinides who, charged with general misconduct in his command and peculation of public money, had already been placed in custody. Theramenes and Thrasybulus came forward as accusers in the assembly before which the Generals were brought. These defended themselves successfully and it is very probable they would have been acquitted at that time. But the show of hands was no longer distinguishable on account of the darkness, and therefore the people decided to delay giving a verdict and to wait until another assembly, and ordered the senate to make a proposition for the trial of the Generals. In the meantime the public feeling was excited against the Generals, by the artifices of Theramenes and his friends, and instigated by Theramenes, Callixenus proposed an outrageous measure, which deprived the accused of any defence and ordered one single vote. This proposition runs as follows: *ἐπειδὴ τῶν τε κατηγορούντων κατὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐκείνων ἀπολογουμένων ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀκηκόασι, διαψηφίσασθαι Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας κατὰ φυλάς· θείναι δὲ εἰς τὴν φυλὴν ἐκάστην δύο ὕδρίας· ἐφ' ἐκάστη δὲ τῇ φυλῇ κήρυκα κηρύττειν, ὅτῳ δοκοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνελόμενοι τοὺς νικήσαντας ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, εἰς τὴν προτέραν ψηφίσασθαι, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ, εἰς τὴν ὑστέραν· ἂν δὲ δόξωσιν ἀδικεῖν, θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι καὶ τοῖς ἑνδεκα παραδοῦναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δημοσιεῦσαι, τὸ δ' ἐπιδέκατον τῆς θεοῦ εἶναι* (Xen. Hell. i, 7. 9. 10). It met with a vehement opposition; Euryptolemus and some others presented a *γραφὴ παρανόμων* against Callixenus in respect of his proposal, but were forced to withdraw it; some of the prytanes refused to put the question to the assembly, but intimidated through the menaces of Lyciscus all of them with exception of Socrates yielded to the threats; Euryptolemus delivered a long and clever speech; the majority, however, was in favour of the proposition of Callixenus and all the Generals were found guilty. It is easy to understand why the Generals were brought before a public assembly. The partisans and friends of Theramenes could never expect that with all their violence they would get a proposition of such an unlawful nature discussed and decided at their will in spite of all constitutional obstacles by sworn dicasts. In the case of Strombichides

and his companions the senate acting with absolute authority brought the accusation of Agoratus before the assembly, but the assembly was not summoned for this particular case and the senate only brought it under their cognizance in order to shift the responsibility of their proceedings from their own shoulders see *Lys.* XIII, 32. 55. The assembly was held *Μουνοχλασιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ* (*Thuc.* VIII, 93; *Xen. Hell.* II, 4. 32) a rather small place, in order to keep away the great bulk of the people and the senate did not carry out what the people had decreed, viz. that Strombichides and his companions should be tried before a dicastery of 2000 judges, but condemned them to death by open vote. The Senators as a rule as we may learn from [*Dem.*] XLVII, 42 (see also *Aesch.* I, 35) in giving their verdict voted by secret ballot and used the show of hands in voting whether or not the case was to be referred to one of the courts of the *Heliaea*. The Thirty had abolished the voting by secret ballot which was essential to the free expression of opinion, with the intention to intimidate the Senators voting, compare *Xen. Hell.* II, 4. 9; the Oligarchs at Megara did the same *Thuc.* IV, 74. The *φανερὰ ψήφος* introduced by the Thirty was no less unconstitutional than that of the popular assembly on the condemnation of the Generals. The decision of the people in the assemblies was given either by show of hands, and this was the more usual method, or by secret ballot in a few special cases determined by law. The way of deciding in the courts of the *Heliaea* was also secret voting see [*Lys.*] VI, 53; *Lyc. c. Leocr.* 146; *Dem.* XIX, 239—*Xen. Symp.* 5, 8; *Plat. Legg.* VIII p. 876 B. Schoemann maintains that if the matter were highly important the senate might submit the cause to the consideration of the public assembly. I cannot agree with him in this particular; for the last two law-suits in which it is evident that such a course of procedure was taken are so irregular that we cannot take them as examples of what would occur in the due course of law.

Before the people *eisangeliae* were laid at the first assembly of every prytany which was called *κυρία*, see *Poll.* VIII, 95 (*Harpocr.* and *Lex. Rhet. Cant.* s. v. *κυρία ἐκκλησία*, *Schol.* on *Aesch.* I, 104, *Phot.* λέξ. *συναγ.* p. 191, 4): τῶν δ' ἐκκλησιῶν ἡ μὲν *κυρία*

—ἐν ᾗ καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας ὁ βουλόμενος εἰσαγγέλλει. What Poll. VIII, 87 (Phot. λέξ. συναγ. p. 87, 6) mentions: οἱ θεσμοθέται τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἰσαγγέλλουσιν εἰς τὸν δῆμον is considered by Boeckh (Von den Zeitverhältnissen der Demosth. Rede gegen Mid. p. 11) to be wrong. The statement of the Scholiast on Aesch. I, 16 is perhaps more accurate about the duty of the thesmothetae regarding the eisangelia: οἱ θεσμοθέται ἄλλα μὲν ποιούσι κοινῇ, ἰδίᾳ δὲ, πότε δεῖ δικάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸν δῆμον. The assembly entertained the indictment and unless it chose to sit in judgement on the case itself, as in the suits of Ergocles, Cephisodotus (Schol. on Aesch. III, 51), Dem. XXXIV, 50, it appointed another tribunal, as in the case of Lycophron, see Hyp. pro Lyc. c. 3: ἄξιον ὃ ἐστίν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, κακεῖθεν ἐξετάσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀφ' ὧν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὶ εὐθὺς ἠτιάσαντο. No summons was issued; Lycophron was abroad when Ariston and Lycurgus accused him in the public assembly. Public prosecutors were chosen by the people in the law-suit of Ergocles; the person, for whom Lysias wrote his XXVIIIth oration, seems to have performed a subordinate part at the trial, his speech being called ἐπίλογος. Alcibiades was impeached before the assembly by Pithonius (Andoc. I, 11; Diod. Sic. XIII, 5; Corn. Nep. Alc. 4); this impeachment was afterwards renewed before the senate (Isocr. XVI, 6) who had been invested with absolute authority to investigate the outrages committed upon the Hermae (Andoc. I, 15).

Harpocr. s. vv. ἱπνός, ὀρκάνη mentions two orations of Lycurgus against Lycophron both of which Meier (l. c. p. CXXVII) thinks to have been delivered in the same case 'prior quidem in priore actione, cum de re, altera in secunda actione habita esse videtur, cum de poena sive litis aestimatione ageretur.' In his 'Attischer Process,' p. 190, he considers it probable that no penalty was written down in the bill of indictment by the plaintiff and that after the first vote the plaintiff was called upon to say what punishment he thought the case merited. From this opinion Comparetti l. c. p. 37 differs who concludes from the following passage that Polyeuctus in his indictment proposed a sentence of death to be inflicted on Euxenippus, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 27: νῆ Δία, τὰ γὰρ πεπραγμένα αὐτῷ δεινὰ

ἐστι καὶ ἄξια θανάτου, ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ. But I think he misinterprets this passage; the accuser probably excused himself in his speech delivered before the dicasts (so I understand ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ) for his accusation of Euxenippus under the *εἰσαγγελία* which was directed against orators, by exaggerating the crime he charged Euxenippus with, and pretending it was so heinous as to be attended with the severe penalty which was to be inflicted on any person convicted under *eisangelia*. Meier, in supposing that both of the orations mentioned by Harpocration as written by Lycurgus κατὰ Λυκόφρονος belonged to the same law-suit, considers Lycurgus to be the plaintiff; but, as it is most probable (Blass in his edition of Hyperides, p. xxxv and Jahn's n. Jahrb. 1870, p. 743), Ariston was the prosecutor and Lycurgus seconded his accusation as *συνήγορος* only and had therefore no business to address the dicasts twice. There is no trace of a second vote of the jury on the penalty (ἐὰν δ' ἄλφ τιμάτω ἡ ἡλιαία περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃ του [ms. ὃ τι, but see Dem. xxi, 47] ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιοι εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι is in a spurious law Dem. xxiv, 63); on the contrary, it seems to me necessary to conclude from the manner in which Lycophron speaks about the vote of the dicasts that a penalty fixed by law followed their verdict: ἀγωνιζομένῳ δὲ καὶ κινδυνεύοντι οὐ μόνον περὶ θανάτου—ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐξορισθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανόντα μηδὲ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ταφῆναι (c. 16), see pro Eux. c. 31: τὸν δὲ κατακλιθέντα εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ δήμου κελεύσαντος μηδ' ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ δεῖ τεθάφθαι, Aesch. III, 252: ἕτερος δ'—πρώην ποτ' εἰσηγγέλθη καὶ ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν ὑπερώριστ' ἂν, and the last paragraphs of Lycurgus' oration contra Leocratem. Therefore, I am inclined to think that the penalty was fixed by law (see Heraldus l. c. III, 8 § 9) and that a discretion was given only to the senate in this respect, that they could impose a fine of 500 drachmae, or if they thought the offence required a higher penalty they might refer the case to a Heliastic court. The decree of the senate directed that, if condemned, Archeptolemus, Onomacles and Antiphon were to be dealt with according to the penal law against traitors; the judgement of the court was Ps. Plut. p. 834 A: προδοσίας ὥφλον Ἀρχεπτόλεμος Ἰπποδάμου Ἀγρυ-

λήθην παρών, Ἀντιφῶν Σοφίλου Ῥαμνούσιος παρών. τούτοις ἐτιμήθη τοῖς ἑνδεκα παραδοθῆναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δημόσια εἶναι καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον καὶ τὰς οἰκίας κατασκάψαι αὐτῶν καὶ ὄρουσι θεῖναι τοῖς οἰκοπέδοις ἐπιγράφοντας Ἀρχεπτολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος τοῖς προδόταις τῷ δὲ δημάρχῳ ἀποφῆναι τὰς οὐσίας [msa. ἀποφῆναι τε οἰκίαν ἐς τὸν, see (Dem.) XLII, 1 τὴν ἀπόφασιν τῆς οὐσίας; XL, 22] αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι θάψαι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα Ἀθήνησι, μηδ' ὕψους Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι, καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ γένος τὸ ἐκ τούτοις καὶ νόθους καὶ γνησίους, καὶ ἐὰν ποιήσῃται τινα τῶν ἐξ Ἀρχεπτολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος, ἄτιμος ἔστω ὁ ποιησάμενος. ταῦτα δὲ γράψαι ἐν στήλῃ χαλκῇ, ἥπερ ἂν καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ περὶ Φρυνίχου, καὶ τοῦτο θέσθαι. Compare the last words of the proposition made by Callixenus, Xen. Hell. I, 7, 10; Dem. XX, 79: *μίαν μὲν πόλιν εἰ ἀπώλεσεν ἢ καὶς δέκα μόνας, περὶ προδοσίας ἂν αὐτὸν εἰσηγγέλλον οὗτοι καὶ εἰ ἐάλω, τὸν ἅπαντ' ἂν ἀπωλώλει χρόνον* and Lys. XXXI, 26; Dem. XIX, 125: *οὐθ' ὅτι πρεσβευτὴς ἄλλος ἦρητο ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ, οὐθ' ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ νόμος θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι κελεύει* and § 131, Aesch. II, 139; Diod. Sic. XV, 95: *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παροξυνθέντες τοῦ Λεωσθένους ὡς προδότου θάνατον κατέγνωσαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐδήμευσαν* and Thuc. VI, 61, Corn. Nep. Alc. 4; the friends of Themistocles are said to have brought his bones secretly into Attica, Thuc. I, 138 and Corn. Nep. Them. 2. It seems to me worth while to compare the decree proposed by Demophantes at the commencement of the archonship of Glaucippus prescribing the form of oath to be taken by all Athenians that they would stand by the democracy: *ἐὰν τις δημοκρατίαν καταλύῃ τὴν Ἀθήνησιν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινα ἀρχὴν καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας, πολέμιος ἔστω Ἀθηναίων καὶ νηποινὶ τεθνήτω, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον* Andoc. I, 96. Though it was virtually abrogated by the general resolution after the expulsion of the Thirty, the column on which it was engraved remained: see Lys. c. Leocr. 125. 126 and Dem. XX, 159. Yet there is a case in which a fine was inflicted on the defendant: Aesch. III, 52: *οὐκ ὤκνησεν* (Demosthenes) *ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας αὐτοῦ κρινομένου* (Cephisodotus) *περὶ θανάτου κατήγορος γενέσθαι* and the Scholiast on § 51: *καὶ κριθεὶς περὶ*

θανάτου τῆς μὲν θανατικῆς ζημίας ἀπελύθη, ἐξημώθη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ταλάντοις πέντε, see Dem. XXIII, 167: ἐφ' αἷς (ταῖς συνθήκαις) ὑμεῖς οὕτως ἡγανακτήσατε καὶ χαλεπῶς ἠνέγκατε ὥστε ἀποχειροτονήσατε μὲν τὸν στρατηγὸν, πέντε ταλάντοις δ' ἐξημώσατε, τρεῖς δὲ μόνοι ψῆφοι διήνεγκαν τὸ μὴ θανάτου τιμῆσαι and Harpocr. s.v. Κηφισόδοτος. It might appear by this that a certain number of votes against the defendant was required for a sentence of death, whilst a smaller number only resulted in a fine to the accused. But we find that with regard to the case of Leocrates Aeschines says: ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι αὐτῷ ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν, ὑπερώριστ' ἄν, which shows clearly that a single vote beyond the equal division of the votes would not have inflicted a fine, but caused the ὑπερώρισθαι of Leocrates. I am inclined to look on the case of Cephisodotus as one in which some irregularity caused, it may be, by peculiar circumstances, occurred which accounts for the fine imposed. I am led to this opinion by the exculpating tone adopted by Demosthenes in speaking of the offence of Cephisodotus: representing him as the victim of delusion, προσκαθήμενος (Charidemus) τὸν ὑμέτερον στρατηγὸν ἔπεισε καὶ ἠνάγκασε μὴ τὰ βέλτιστ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πράττειν § 167. If following the Scholiast we refer IV, 46 to this trial, it would appear as though Demosthenes thought the sentence passed too severe. But how are we to reconcile with this the statement of Aeschines that Demosthenes was *κατήγορος*? Hyp. pro Eux. c. 31 gives us an interesting example of the manner in which penalties were abated; Polyuctus was fined only 25 drachmae, while according to Dinarchus the penalty for one condemned under *γραφὴ παρανόμων* was 5 talents (II, 12 and [Dem.] XXV, 67). About the fine of Timotheus we have already spoken. Grote, whom A. Schaefer (l. c. I p. 240) follows, thinks that Aeschines (III, 171. 172) has probably exaggerated the gravity of the sentence against Gylon, and that he was only fined: 'the guardians of Demosthenes assert no more than that Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenes asserts that the fine was paid.' I agree with Thirlwall who points out as an incontrovertible fact Gylon's having been condemned for treason, and he thus explains the silence of Demosthenes on this subject. The

Scholiast on Dem. XXI, 64, in maintaining that only Philostratus wished for death whilst the other accusers proposed a fine, is most likely misled through the words *καὶ πάντων τῶν κατηγορῶν πικρότατον*; Demosthenes himself calls the law-suit *α κρίσις θανάτου*.

Bearing in mind the severity of the punishment it is easy to understand why people accused under *eisangelia* very seldom awaited the trial; see Hyp. pro Eux. c. 18: *καὶ οὔτε τούτων πέντε ὄντων οὐδεὶς ὑπέμεινε τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ὄχοντο φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, οὔτ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν εἰσαγγελημένων, ἀλλ' ἦν σπάνιον ἰδεῖν ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας τινὰ κρινόμενον ὑπακούσαντα εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον*: Timomachus (Schol. on Aesch. I, 56 τοῦ Τιμομάχου τούτου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι θάνατον κατέγνωσαν [*καὶ ἀνῆρέθη*] the last words placed in brackets are therefore wrong), Leosthenes (Schol. on Aesch. II, 21), Callistratus, Philon, Theotimus fled from Athens; also Alcibiades (Thuc. VI, 61), Gylon (Aesch. III, 171), Philocrates (Aesch. II, 6 III, 79. 81 Din. I, 28) avoided the trial. Dion. Hal. de Din. c. 3: *τῶν δὲ εἰσαγγελθέντων τοὺς μὲν οὐχ ὑπομείναντας τὴν κρίσιν ἐνεθανάτωσαν τῇ ψήφῳ, τοὺς δ' ὑπακούσαντας ἀπέλυσαν*; see Andoc. I, 15. 16. 18. 25. 34 and Thuc. VI, 60 etc. Amongst these were some of the most practised orators e.g. Leosthenes (Aesch. II, 124 Schol. on II, 21), Philocrates (Aristot. Rhet. II, 3 p. 1380 B), Dinarchus. When Callistratus together with Chabrias had been accused, both were acquitted; the speech of Callistratus was a masterly performance as we may judge from the powerful effect which it produced; see Plut. Dem. 5; Libanius vit. Dem. 3; Gellius III, 13; but he did not try a second time the power of his eloquence and avoided the trial by a voluntary exile (Dem. I, 48; Senec. de benef. VI, 37). When he returned to Athens afterwards the sentence of death was immediately executed, see Lyc. c. Leocr. 93. We meet seldom with an acquittal. Antiphon might be supposed to have awaited the trial confiding in the power of his eloquence; nevertheless, he was condemned to death, though Thucydides describes his defence of himself *περὶ μεταστάσεως* as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him (VIII, 68 Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. III, 5). Notwithstanding the enormous bribery (Lys.

xxix, 6. 12; xxviii, 9) and the strength and activity of his party Ergocles was sentenced to death. Theomnestus was acquitted (Lys. x, 22: *ἡλεήθη ὑφ' ὑμῶν*). In the battle of Corinth many Athenians behaved in a cowardly manner (Lys. x, 25 xvi, 15) and it was only after a good number of years that Theomnestus was brought to trial. The same thing occurred also in the case of Leocrates who had been seven years abroad; he managed to obtain through the influence of his friends an equal division of the votes of the dicasts and, therefore, was acquitted¹, see Antiph. v, 51, Anaxim. Rhet. c. 18 etc. Aristophon also *ὅς ἰσχυρότατος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγένηται* narrowly escaped punishment, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 39. He had been seventy-five times impeached in the course of his long political life and could boast of having been as often acquitted.

To speak at last about the plaintiff he became liable to a fine of 1000 drachmae if he dropped his accusation, [Dem.] xxv, 47, Libanius in the Argument p. 768: *ἔπειτα Ἡγήμονα γραψάμενος καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀποδόμενος ὥφλε χιλίας*, Harpocr. *χιλιωθέντα Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῷ κατ' Ἀριστογέιτονος ἀντὶ τοῦ χιλίας ὀφλόντα; εἰσαγγελίαν ἀναιρεῖσθαι* Din. i, 94. As to the penalty in the event of his not obtaining the votes of as many as a fifth of the judges the old grammarians disagree: Harpocr. *ὁ δὲ διώκων, εἰ μὴ ἔλη, οὐδὲν ζημιούται, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων μὴ μεταλάβῃ, τότε χιλίας ἐκτίνει· τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν καὶ οὗτοι μειζόνως ἐκολάζοντο*; Lex. Rhet. Cant. s. v. *πρόστιμον*—*περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας, εἰ μὴ μεταλάβῃ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οἱ δικάσται τιμῶσιν*; Poll. viii, 52. 53: *ὅτι δὲ ὁ εἰσαγγεῖλας καὶ οὐχ ἔλων ἀξήμιος ἦν, Ὑπερελθὺς ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Λυκόφρονος φησι. καίτοι γε ὁ Θεόφραστος τοὺς μὲν ἄλλας γραφὰς γραψαμένους χιλίας τ' ὀφλίσκάνειν, εἰ τοῦ πέμπτου τῶν ψήφων μὴ μεταλάβοιεν καὶ προσατιμούσθαι· τοὺς δὲ εἰσαγγέλλοντας μὴ ἀτιμούσθαι μὲν, ὀφλεῖν δὲ τὰς χιλίας. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς ῥαδίως εἰσαγγέλλοντας ὕστερον προσγεγράφθαι*. Meier, whom Boeckh (*Staatshaushalt d. Ath.* i p. 499 h) agrees with, remarks on the above passage from the Lex. Rhet. Cant. p. xxxiii: *'errasse Pollucem, qui subdiderit: ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς ῥαδίως*

¹ Therefore we have reason to doubt *γραψάμενος* (Lycurgus) *Ἀυτόλυκον*—*ἀλ-*
the statement of Ps. Plut. p. 843 d: *λους τε πολλοὺς πάντας εἶλε.*

εἰσαγγέλλοντας ὕστερον προσγεγράφθαι, jam dudum apparuit ex Harpocratiōe; ex hoc enim intelligebatur, plane ἀζημίους fuisse tantum *εἰσαγγελίας κακώσεως πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα* (see Isaeus III, 45, Dem. xxxvii, 46); ad eas igitur solas illum Hyperidis locum pertinuisse; contra ea in *εἰσαγγελίας πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἢ τὸν δῆμον* accusatorem, si ne quintam quidem suffragiorum partem tulisset, antiquitus quidem majore poena vindicatum, postea autem mille tantum drachmis mulctatum esse. Quenam vero major illa fuerit poena antiquitus, id nunc demum ex hoc grammatico discimus; etenim ex hoc constat olim remissum esse judicium arbitrio, ut si quis post institutam *εἰσαγγελίαν* quintam suffragiorum partem non tulisset, ipsi quam vellent vel poenam vel mulctam ei irrogarent; nam ad τιμῶσι aut addendum aut supplendum est: ὃ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι; compare Schoemann de com. Ath. p. 211 and K. Fr. Hermann l. c. i § 133, 7. Since the discovery of the fragments of the oration pro Lycophrone by Hyperides we are now able to speak more definitely regarding this matter. Two passages from this oration delivered in an *εἰσαγγελία καταλύσεως τοῦ δῆμου* as we have already seen corroborate the opinion of Pollux: οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀκίνδυνον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα ῥαδίως ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται λέγουσι c. 7 and ἕνα πρῶτον μὲν ἀκίνδυνος εἰσιῆς εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα c. 10, and there can be no doubt that at one time the informer was subjected to no penalty at all. Now it is a question if there any passages in the orators from which we can determine whether at all and if so about what time the impunity of the informer was discontinued. Schneidewin l. c. p. 58. 59 and Boehnecke l. c. p. 48 are of opinion that the law inflicting the fine must have been passed after the time of Hyperides, while Caffiaux (Plaidoyer pour Euxénippe contre Polyecte, Valenciennes p. 22) conjectures that it was passed during the lifetime of that orator: 'quelle est la date de cette répression salutaire? Il faut la placer du vivant d'Hypéride et même dans l'intervalle qui sépare les deux plaidoyers que nous avons de lui. En effet, quand il composa le discours que prononça Lycophron, l'accusateur de son client ne courait encore aucun péril, et il le lui reproche deux fois avec assez d'amertume; tandis que dans sa défense d'Euxénippe il nous parle d'une dénon-

ciation calomnieuse qui avait été flétrie par le peuple, dans la personne de Tisis d'Agrylète. Il ne paraît pas pourtant que ce dernier ait été condamné à une amende de mille drachmes, il semble plutôt avoir été noté d'infâmie, d'où il faut conclure qu'avant qu'on s'arrêtât à l'amende, il y eut quelques essais de châtimens plus ou moins sévères.' I incline to think that the latter opinion is the correct one, although the reason with which Caffiaux supports his conclusion is not satisfactory. The case of Tisis is no eisangelia; it is an apographe and can be of no use in deciding the question, Hyp. pro Eux. c. 43: *καὶ πρῶτον μὲν Τίσιδος τοῦ Ἀργυλλήθεν ἀπογράφαντος τὴν Εὐθυκράτους οὐσίαν ὡς δημοσίαν οὖσαν*. My opinion is formed from the following passages: Dem. xviii, 250: *οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν οἷς εἰσηγγελομένην, ὅτ' ἀπεψηφίζεσθέ μου καὶ τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων τοῖς δικαίουσιν οὐ μετεδίδοτε, τότε' ἐψηφίζεσθε τὰ ἄριστα με πράττειν*, Lyc. c. Leocr. 3: *νῦν δὲ περιέστηκεν εἰς τοῦτο, ὥστε τὸν ἰδίᾳ κινδυνεύοντα καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεχθανόμενον οὐ φιλόπολιν ἀλλὰ φιλοπράγμονα δοκεῖν εἶναι* (this speech was delivered Ol. 112, 2 331|0). Now the prominent mention by Demosthenes of the fact of his accusers having not received to *μέρος τῶν ψήφων* (i. e. τὸ πέμπτον μέρος) appears to me to leave no doubt that at the time he spoke, it was of importance to obtain the fifth part of the votes, that otherwise the accusers subjected themselves to a penalty and this penalty was most likely the one mentioned by Pollux and Harpocration, viz., 1000 drachmae. This statement of Demosthenes can have little significance unless we look upon it in this light. Demosthenes means by those words the numerous accusations made by his enemies after the peace of Demades ([Dem.] xxv, 36; Plut. Dem. 21). At the date of the case of Lycophron, the informer was subjected to no penalty; therefore we are left to conclude that during the period viz. from Ol. 107, at which time A. Schaefer (Jahn's n. Jahrb. 1853 p. 28) supposes that speech was delivered, to Ol. 110, 3 the impunity of the informer in the event of his not obtaining the fifth part of votes was discontinued. Therefore I do not find it strange as Schneidewin l. c. p. 59 and Compagretti l. c. p. 35 do, that Hyperides does not reproach Polyeuctus in his speech on behalf of Euxenippus with having accused

under *eisangelia*, because the accuser under *eisangelia* was *ἀκίνδυνος*, as he does in the speech written for Lycophron, because that speech was delivered at a time (about 330) when the impunity had been abolished.

I cannot flatter myself that I have in the above essay quite satisfactorily or definitively settled the interesting question of the *εἰσαγγελία*, for to use the words of Galen: *χαλεπὸν ἀνθρώπων ὄντα μὴ διαμαρτάνειν ἐν πολλοῖς τὰ μὲν ὅλως ἀγνοήσαντα, τὰ δὲ κακῶς κρίνοντα, τὰ δὲ ἀμελέστερον γράψαντα*. Still I trust that some of the ideas, which may be found in my essay, may perhaps suggest to my fellow-labourers in the same subject, whose judgement in these matters is more entitled to consideration than my own, some facts having an important bearing on the question at issue. If such should be the happy result of my work, I shall feel that I have not laboured in vain.

HERMAN HAGER.

MANCHESTER,
August, 1871.

ON THE PEDARII IN THE ROMAN SENATE.

THE debates of the Roman Senate differed from those of all modern deliberative assemblies in the stringency of the rules by which the succession of speakers was determined. No senator could ask for a hearing until he had been called upon (*rogatus sententiam*); and the order in which this was done was fixed by law or custom in such a manner as to permit little or no choice to the presiding magistrate. The principles by which this order was determined are approximately known.

(1) Senators were ranked according to the magistracies which they had held as *censorii*, *consulares*, *praetorii*, *aedilicii*, *tribunicii*, *quaestorii*, and lastly those who had held no magistracy. The *princeps senatus* was as a rule the eldest person who had held the censorship.

(2) Again, patrician and plebeian senators were distinguished as *patres* and *conscripti*. The form of summons to the senate contained the words *qui patres quique conscripti sunt* (Liv. 2, 1. Fest. p. 254), and the distinction was kept up by a difference in the shoes worn by the two orders. (Zonar. 7. 9. Fest. p. 142, 'mulleus'.) The fact of a distinction is of course quite independent of the tradition of the 164 senators added from the plebeians by Brutus (or by Servius Tullius, as others said).

Further, within the patricians themselves it seems that there was a distinction between *maiores* and *minores gentes*. Cicero (Rep. 2. 20) says that Tarquin consulted the *patres majorum gentium* first; from which it may be gathered that this order was customary in later times. The Papirii are the only known example of the *minores gentes*: and no *princeps*

senatus of this name is mentioned. Mommsen makes the same observation of the 'Alban families'—the Geganii, Cluili, Curiatii, Quinctilii, &c. These latter distinctions are, however, secondary; i. e. all *consulares*, patrician and plebeian, came before all *praetorii*, &c.; but within each class (*ordo* or *gradus*) there was a sub-division into *patres majorum gentium*, *patres minorum gentium*, and *conscripti*.

(3) Some further indications connect the distribution of the Senate with the ancient Tribes and Curies.

Fest. p. 246, 'praeteriti', says that by the Lex Ovinia (date unknown) the censors were to choose the Senate *ex optimo quoque ordine curiatim*.

According to Dionysius the election of the original Senate of Romulus was based on equal representation of the three Tribes and thirty Curies.

Modern writers have connected the number 300 (the Senate of the early Republic) with the 3 Tribes and 30 Curies, and treated as an error the statement of all the ancients, that the Tribes and Curies were instituted by Romulus. The Luceres, for instance, are conjectured to have been either Albans or Etruscans. On this point, however, the ancient writers are good evidence to the contrary. If the Luceres had been connected either with the Alban families or with the *minores gentes*, that fact must have been familiar to Roman antiquaries and would have appeared in their theories.

The word in Festus is *curiati*, corrected by Müller *curiatim*, but others have read *jurati*, understanding the Lex Ovinia to have provided that the censors should act on oath. (Meyer in Bekker-Marquardt, Röm. Alterth.][. 2. 390). Considering how unimportant the Curies were in the (probable) time of the Lex Ovinia, and how common it was to require magistrates, &c. to act on oath, the latter reading seems preferable.

It is evident that there was some connexion between this scale of precedence and the class of senators often spoken of as *pedarii*. They were so called, we are told, from the way in which they expressed their opinions, *pedibus in sententiam eundo*. Was this class separated by any legal boundary from

the senators who spoke as well as voted or was the distinction one of custom only? If the former, were the *pedarii* identical with any of the sub-divisions already described?

Mommsen finds the *pedarii* in the *conscripti*, or rather in the *conscripti* of the orders who had held no curule magistracy, a class which may have been considerable in the earlier period of the Republic. In support of this view he quotes a curious passage of Varro, preserved by Gellius, 3. 18. § 5. *M. autem Varro in Satira Menippea quae Ἰπποκρίων inscripta est equites quosdam dicit pedarios appellatos.* These *pedarii*, Gellius proceeds to say, were the *conscripti*, who according to the traditional account were enrolled from the equestrian order into the Senate. The passage of Varro, however, does not say that the *pedarii* were *equites*, but that certain *equites* were called *pedarii*. In this saying the embers of an extinct jest may still be traced, although Gellius has not perceived it. The satire seems (from the name Ἰπποκρίων) to have attacked the equestrian order; and the meaning of giving the name *pedarii* to *Equites* must have been that *Equites* who did not ride might be called *pedarii* with at least as much point as senators who did not speak. At the time when the *census equester* came to be a sufficient qualification for admission to the order the number of *equites pedarii* (in this sense) must have been very large, and the whole institution to an antiquarian like Varro doubtless appeared to be a proof of the great degeneracy of the national character.

On the other hand there is not only a complete absence of direct reference to any class of senators being incapable of speaking, but there are passages in which *pedarii* are represented as taking part in debate.

Tacitus, Ann. 3. 65, *multique etiam pedarii senatores certatim exsurgerent foedaque et nimia censerent* (where *pedarii* are expressly distinguished from the *consulares*, &c. who spoke first).

Lucilius as quoted by Fest. p. 210, *Agipes vocem mittere coepit*, where *agipes* is explained as = *pedarius*.

Gellius l.c. gives as one explanation of *pedarii* the distinc-

tion found in the technical words *Senatores quibusque in senatu sententiam dicere licet* (Liv. 36. 3, &c.). So far as this proves anything it proves that there was a class who could speak but were not properly senators. The class that is intended must be quite different from the *pedarii*, namely,

(1) Magistrates in office, who had the right of holding the Senate, including tribunes of the plebs, and also including *magistratus designati*.

(2) Magistrates who after leaving office were admitted provisionally until the next census. They cannot have been *pedarii* in Mommsen's sense, since they were at the least either *tribunicii* or *quaestorii*.

This theory of *pedarii*, if of little value in itself, shows at least that those who proposed it knew of no class debarred from speaking.

These passages tend to show that there was no hard and fast line separating *pedarii* from *principes*. The fixed order observed in the debates would lead to a much greater practical distinction than that which subsists in any modern assembly.

A still more complete answer to the supposition that the *pedarii* had the right of voting without that of speaking is suggested by Mommsen himself. In a note (*Röm. Forsch.* p. 264. n. 19) he has expressed the conjecture that in the earliest patrician Senate there was no such thing as voting distinct from the *sententia* or expression of opinion by each senator in his turn. It may be shown that this holds true in theory, if not in practice, for all periods: in other words, that *sententiam in senatu dicere* expresses the whole right and duty of a senator.

1. The technical language—always a good guide in Roman constitutional questions—is in favour of this view. The word *suffragium* is never applied to the Senate; only such phrases as *censere*, *sententiam dicere*, *in sententiam ire*, *senatum consulere*, &c.

2. Varro, who wrote a memoir for the use of Pompey 'on the manner of holding the Senate' (Gell. 14. 7 § 9), said

that a *Senatus consultum* might be made either *per discessionem*, if there was agreement (*si consentiretur*), or, in case of doubt, *per singulorum sententias exquisitas*. This shows that a *discessio* was something quite different from a modern 'division'. A resolution was agreed to *per discessionem* in the cases where a strict vote was unnecessary: in case of doubt the opinions must be collected separately from each senator. In other words, according to Varro, there was *no voting in important cases: only sententiae dictae*.

3. Cicero in a letter (Ep. ad Q. F. 2. 1) describes a day's debate in the Senate. At one point, after Antistius Vetus had spoken, '*ibatur in eam sententiam; tum Clodius rogatus diem dicendo eximere coepit*'. The *discessio* in this case is not a vote, but an incident in the middle of the debate. So, Ep. ad Att. I. 20, *raptim in eam sententiam pedarii cucurrerunt*.

In a debate described by Pliny, Ep. II. 12, senators who had spoken are led to change their minds by a subsequent speaker; they cross over to him. This, however, is quite distinct from a final *discessio* which takes place, and in which many appear to have returned to their original side of the house. From these and other instances which might be quoted, it appears that *discedere* or *pedibus ire in sententiam* means to show approval of a speaker by crossing to where he sits: that this was often done, certainly during the progress of a debate, apparently also at its close; usually, perhaps, by *pedarii*, i.e. senators who were too far down in the list to have an opportunity of speaking, but also by senators who had already spoken.

A senator who did not wish to take advantage of his turn to make a speech, might simply express his assent to a previous *sententia*: this was *verbo assentire*. If, however, he had expressed his assent by *discessio* the presiding magistrate would be saved the trouble of asking '*quid censes?*' Hence these two ways of giving a silent vote are spoken of as alternatives, Liv. 27. 34, *aut verbo assentire aut pedibus in sententiam ire*.

The doctrine that the proper way of consulting the Senate

was *per singulorum sententias exquisitas* perhaps explains a passage in Festus describing the different modes by which a senator might obstruct the proceedings (p. 170, '*numera senatum*'). 'He might demand that the questions brought before the Senate should be separated' (the object being, as appears, e.g. in the speech for Milo, c. 6, § 14, that a tribune might veto one part without obstructing the whole): 'or he might demand that the senators should be consulted singly, or (ask?) if there were enough senators present to make a *senatus consultum*'. Accordingly when Cicero refers (Ep. Fam. 1. 4) to the cry of '*consule*' or '*numera*' in the Senate we may infer that *consule* was the form of demanding that each senator should be consulted singly. The right to make this demand depends on the principle that *discessio* as a means of terminating a debate was not strictly constitutional, and was only permitted by unanimous concession, for the sake of shortening business. The rush of *pedarii* which Cicero describes as following on a speech is no more a legal vote than the cries of 'agreed' in the English House of Commons: but the practical effect might be the same in both cases.

The institution, as it may be called, of *discessio* is in several ways characteristic of Roman public life. It adhered in theory to the constitution of the primitive Senate, but adapted it perfectly to the wants of the later state of things. In Homer the *βουλή γερόντων* is summoned by the king, the chiefs give their opinions in order of age: no vote is taken; for they have no power to influence action except as the king adopts the advice given. If a Senate of three hundred were so consulted, either the deliberation would have reached to inordinate length, or the younger members would have been ciphers. The *discessio* supplied them with a means of making their opinions felt directly at any point in the debate.

As a device for arriving at the feeling and wishes of an assembly it combined the advantages of applause or the reverse following on a speech, with those of a division taken at the end. It was, in fact, or might be made, a running division, spread over the whole debate, and sensitive to every turn in the scale of opinion.

Moreover, by *discessio* the Roman Senate solved the problem of securing an orderly system of debate and yet giving the leading statesmen their legitimate prominence: objects sometimes aimed at by a tedious system of registering intending speakers, sometimes by tacit understanding with the president of the assembly. The *discessio* enabled the Romans to solve this problem: without it their fixed order of speakers would have been unworkable in practice.

D. B. MONRO.

ON SOME PASSAGES IN LUCRETIVS.

IN the first number of the present Journal I observed that 'if any one, an Editor of Lucretius ought to be in a position to judge how much has yet to be done for the text and illustration of his author'. It was therefore a great gratification to me then to be able to give to the world the learned, original and well-considered criticisms of Mr N. P. Howard. For the same reasons I turned with no small interest to Prof. Robinson Ellis' notes on some passages of the 6th book, published in the 4th number; but this interest was equalled by my disappointment on finding nothing in the whole paper, of which I could make any use. This disappointment I made known at some length in the following number of the Journal. Mr Ellis however returns to the charge, reiterating at greater length all that he had said before. He commences this answer by saying that most of his suggestions had been impugned by me. I did not mean so much to 'impugn' them, as to shew that they proceeded from a curious unconsciousness of the real points at issue. As I believe my former article to be nearly as complete an answer to this long reply of Mr Ellis, as it was to his first paper, and as the matters in dispute are much too trivial and uninteresting for further discussion, I decline to waste my own and my readers' patience by going over them again. Mr Ellis seems still to look upon Lucretius as so singular a writer of Latin that in v. 69 he can use *indigna* for *digna* and *aliena* for *non aliena*. In v. 237 he rejects my *pellens* which gives the exact meaning required for Wakefield's *cellens*, a non-existent word which, if it did exist, could hardly

have the sense wanted, to judge from *celsus*, *excellō* and *re-cello*. He still maintains the singular paradox that, because manuscripts sometimes have the familiar *et quis* and the like for *ecquis*, etc., *etfertus* could take the place of *ecfertus*, *etquis* of *ecquis*. In v. 573 he says I have not shewn *recipit sedes in pondere* to be as natural as *recipit sedes in pondera*: what I meant to prove, and I believe did prove, was that the latter could only mean 'brings back its state of stable equilibrium into its state of stable equilibrium'. Even his explanation of 716 he does not retract, but only allows it is 'perhaps wrong'; and he would seem to adhere to his curious translation of 743. If he will enquire, he will find himself I believe the sole scholar existing who would dispute Lachmann's brilliant emendation of Varro in reference to v. 954: I feel almost as little doubt of the truth of his correction of this verse itself. Nay, so cheaply does Mr Ellis hold Lucretius' Latin, he believes that in v. 956 (955) he can use *tempestate coorta* for *tempestates coortae*, an ablative singular for a feminine plural. Of his emendations in the Aetna that of v. 432, *pinguis catet* for *pinguescat et* is simple and convincing: the other two appear to me to be inconsistent with the context; *violensque agitata* indeed not to be Latin.

I am glad however to take this opportunity of discussing a few of the many difficult passages in Lucretius, which I am forced once again to consider while preparing for a new edition of the author:

II 342 Praeterea genus humanum mutaeque natantes
 squamigerum pecudes et laeta armenta feraeque
 et variae volucres...
 quorum unum quidvis generatim sumere perge,
 invenies tamen inter se differre figuris.

He begins here to illustrate according to his wont, by arguments taken from what goes on before our eyes, the proposition that his first-beginnings are of many different shapes. But the *praeterea* (or *praetere*) of MSS. has no sense and the leading sentence no verb: the latter defect Marullus

rudely remedied by reading in 347 *Horum* for *Quorum*, leaving untouched the meaningless *Praeterea*. Yet this became the vulgate. Lachmann's *Parturiunt*, adopted too by Bernays, I have never been able to see the point of. I have myself printed *Praestat rem*, which certainly gives a suitable enough sense. But now the passage seems to me to admit of a much simpler correction, which was first suggested to me by Horace sat. I 4 25 'quemvis media elige turba, Aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat'. I would therefore read *Praetereat genus humanum*, etc.: Let the race of man pass before you in review, fishes, fowls, etc. Then go and take out any one you like in any one kind, and you will find every one differ from every other. Perhaps it would be better for the sake of emphasis to write *Praeter eat* in two words; as Lucian Müller in Catullus writes *praeter ire* for the sake of the metre.

v 311 312: this difficult passage, of which so many emendations have been made, thus stands in the Mss. 'Denique non monimenta virum dilapsa videmus Quaerere proporro sibi cumque senescere credas'. My own correction, bold enough I grant, I attempted to account for, especially the expulsion of *credas*. But Mr A. Polle, in Jahn's Jahrb. vol. 93, p. 756, has argued with justice I think that no emendation can be accepted, which does not take into consideration the peculiar force of *proporro*. This word occurs in four other passages of Lucretius, II 979, III 275, 281, IV 890; also in II 137 there can be little doubt that Lachmann is right in substituting *proporro* for *porro*: it is found nowhere else, except in one passage of Lucilius, to whom it has been restored by a brilliant emendation of Lachmann in his note to Lucr. II 136. From Lucretius then its meaning must be sought, which is 'then further in turn', or the like: Et sibi proporro quae sint primordia quaerunt: 'such sensible first-beginnings go on to ask what next their own first-beginnings are': Atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa: Inde ea proporro corpus ferit ipsa: 'next the soul in its turn strikes the body'. Our passage then would seem to contain one of those sarcasms, so common in Lucretius; as in the passage just quoted, where these sense-endowed *pri-*

mordia are made to enquire about their own *primordia*; or in I 919, where they are supposed to laugh and cry. *Quaerere porro sibi* would appear then, as Polle assumes, to be quite genuine: for the latter part of the verse he makes what seems to me a very unlikely conjecture; that the words in the MSS. are a mere marginal gloss and that the poet wrote something like this *Q. pr. s. qui de se quoque dicat*, i.e. *qui sibi statuatur monumentum*. I would propose what seems to me a milder remedy and a better verse: I would alter one word only: *Denique non monimenta virum dilapsa videmus Quaerere porro sibi, sene senescere credas*: 'see we not the monuments of men, fallen into ruin, coming next to ask for themselves (as they had before asked other questions for those to whom they were erected) whether you thought that *they* too should perish with age?' The poet, observing what he would deem the many foolish inscriptions on these *monimenta*, as in 1220 of the Corp. inscr. vol. 1: 'Tu qui *secura spatiarus* [*sic*] *mente*, viator, Et nostri *vultus* derigis *inferieis*, *Si quæris quæ sim*, cinis, en, et *tosta favilla cet.*': sarcastically describes them as now asking sympathy for themselves. The *sēnē* would almost infallibly be left out, as a copyist would think it an accidental repetition of the first letters of *senescere*: *cumque* then would be a mere senseless interpolation to fill up the verse. Thus too in Horace, *carm.* I 32 15, the unmeaning *cumque* is in my opinion a mere insertion to complete the verse, the genuine word, as in some other passages, having dropped out; and the poet wrote *mihi amica salve*, or *mihi fausta salve*: I cannot accept Lachmann's much-praised *medicumque salve*; for the *mihi* is called for by the whole tenour of the context, and the *rite vocanti* seems to require such a word as *fausta* or *amica*. It is likewise possible that in *Lucr.* II 114 '*cum solis lumina cumque*' this *cumque* is an interpolation. But yet the precisely analogous *ubicumque* and *quandocumque* seem sufficient to justify *cum cumque*. Since too *ut* in the sense of 'where' is found in Cicero's *Aratea*, in Catullus, Virgil and others, I am now more inclined than ever to read in VI 550 '*Nec minus exultant ut scrupus cumque viai cet.*', for the *exultantes dupuis* of Mss.'

II 483 *Namque in eadem una cuiusvis in brevitate Corporis*

cet.: for this corrupt verse I now propose 'Namque eadem minima cuiusvis in b. C.': the first *m* of *minima* was lost in the *m* of *eadem*, and then *eadem in una* (ima) was changed to *in e. u.* in order to make a verse. Even if *eadem una* has any suitable sense with such a context, certainly *minima* is far more appropriate, as his argument requires him to begin with an atom of the smallest size in order gradually to advance to larger ones.

856 stands thus in the Mss.: Quod potuit nequeat possit quod non tulit ante. In order to connect it with what precedes Bentley proposed 'Quod tulit ut nequeat cet.': a rather violent correction. Lachmann, whom I followed, 'Quod pote, uti nequeat cet.': *pote* for *potuit* however is not quite satisfactory. I now correct it and connect it with the two preceding verses thus:

Sic igitur mundi naturam totius aetas
mutat et ex alio terram status excipit alter:
quod potuit nequit, ut possit quod non tulit ante.

It is thus in opposition with what precedes: 'it cannot now bear what once it could, *in order* to be able to bear what before it did not bear'. By comparing the context it will be seen that this is precisely the sense needed. The earth ceases to be fit for one function in order to be fit for another.

v 1012 1013 are thus given in the Mss.: Et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum Cognita sunt prolemque ex se videre creatam: Lachmann reads *Conubium* for *Cognita sunt*, and adds 'paene irascor Marullo, qui hoc non viderit ac maluerit totum versum inserere hoc modo, *Castaque privatae Veneris conubia laeta*'. I followed Lachmann with much misgiving, and said 'in truth a verse may have been lost'. Now I feel sure one has fallen out, which I would thus supply: [Hospitium, ac lecti socialia iura duobus] Cognita sunt. For Ovid frequently imitates Lucretius, especially in his best works, the *Ars*, the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*; and I fancy the *Cognita sunt* is alluded to in a passage of the *Ars*, II 473—478, in which are many imitations of this part of Lucretius: Tum genus humanum solis errabat in agris...Silva domus fuerat, cibus herba,

cubilia frondes, Iamque diu *nulli cognitus* alter erat. Blanda truces animos fertur mollesse voluptas: Constiterant uno femina virque loco: comp. Lucr. l. l. Et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum...Cognita sunt...Tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit: ib. 816 Terra cibum pueris, vestem vapor, herba cubile Praebeat.

Hiatus no doubt is a facile resource; but in a text like that of Lucretius, resting finally on a single manuscript, it is often the best and only resource. Perhaps we may thus best remedy the difficult passage, III 82 foll. which stands thus in the Mss.: Obliti fontem curarum hunc esse timorem Hunc vexare pudorem hunc vincula amicitiai Rumpere et in summa pietatem evertere suadet; by reading for instance: timorem, [Qui miseros homines cogens scelus omne patrare] Hunc—suadet. For both Prof. Conington and Mr Nettleship suggest that Virgil was thinking of Lucretius, when he wrote (Aen. x 9) 'quis metus aut hos Aut hos arma sequi ferrumque lacessere suasit'. If this be so, we can hardly expel *suadet* from Lucretius.

Again I 1083 foll.: Praeterea quoniam non omnia corpora fingunt In medium niti, sed terrarum atque liquoris, Et quasi terreno quae corpore contineantur, Umorem ponti magnasque e montibus undas: Mr Ussing suggests with great probability that a line is lost between *liquoris* and *Et quasi*. Comparing VI 495 'Nunc age quo pacto pluvius concrescat in altis Nubibus umor, et in terram demissus ut imber Decidat', I would propose '[Et quae de supero in terram mittuntur ut imber] Et quasi cet'. The limits allowed compel me here to stop.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

THE ROMAN CAPITOL

As Dr Dyer has done me the honour of criticising my account of the Capitoline controversy, in which I have expressed my dissent from his views as laid down in the article Roma in Dr Smith's Dictionary of Geography, I am anxious to remove some misapprehensions into which he has fallen, and to support the arguments used in my book on "Rome and the Campagna," by some additional remarks and explanations.

In his opening sentences, Dr Dyer regrets that I do not seem to have been aware of the discovery of the so-called Casa di Tiberio on the Palatine. If however he had looked at the map of that hill as given at the beginning of Chapter VIII. of "Rome and the Campagna," he would have seen that the position and ground plan of the house are plainly marked on it. The reason why no opinion was offered in the text as to the date or arrangement of the buildings, is, that having had no opportunity of a personal inspection, and therefore not being able to endorse the conjecture that it was of so early a date as that implied by the title given by Cav. Rosa, "*Maison paternelle di Tibère*," I had no information to give beyond that conveyed by the ground plan.

With regard to the *house* of Asinius Pollio, also referred to by Dr Dyer as an omission on my part, it has still to be shewn, that his house stood in the Vigna Guidi. The only passage, so far as I know, in which his name is mentioned in connection with this site is Frontin. de aq. XXI. and the expression there used is *horti Asiniani* and not *domus*. It is true that the Toro Farnese mentioned by Pliny, N. H. xxxvi. § 34 as having been among the treasures of art possessed by Asinius Pollio, was discovered in this neighbourhood, but that group of sculpture

might have stood as well in the Horti as in the Domus of Asinius. Donati gives an inscription found in the Vigna Guidi from which it appears that the ground was occupied in the year 115 A.D. at the time of Trajan's death by a certain Ninfeus. The date on the bricks found there corresponds to the reign of Hadrian, from which it may be inferred that the ruins in question are of a much later date than the time of Asinius Pollio (see Pellegrini in the *Bullettino dell' Istituto*, 1867, pp. 109—119). However this may be, the excavations did not seem to me to be of sufficient importance to require more than the passing notice given in the note on p. 213, which Dr Dyer has overlooked. (See the *Bullettino dell' Inst.* 1867, p. 109.)

Dr Dyer then passes on to examine my account of the Capitoline question, and appears to be annoyed at the statement that there are some few passages of ancient writers relating to this question which have never been "fairly discussed." In using this expression I referred to the spirit in which, as it seemed to me, many of the principal writers on the subject had approached it. The pamphlets of Becker and Urlichs, *Die Römische topographie in Rom*, and *Römische topographie in Leipzig*, are written with a bitterness of feeling which is hardly compatible with impartial judgment, and the mode in which Dr Dyer speaks of those who hold opinions contrary to his own, does not seem quite free from a tinge of the odium archæologicum, or calculated to encourage an opponent to expect from him the "greatest attention and impartiality" which he professes.

I. I must explain, in the first place, that in using the term "decisive" arguments, I could hardly have anticipated that it should be understood in any other sense than decisive as far as the nature of the discussion will allow, whereas Dr Dyer understands my meaning to be that the arguments I have called decisive exclude the conceivability of any other conclusion than that the temple was on the S. W. height. In such a case we may surely assume *ικανῶς λέγεσθαι εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη*. Dr Dyer however is willing to allow that it is "more probable" that the bridge of Caligula was thrown from the Palatine to the S. W. height, and perhaps this is as strong an expression as can well be looked for from the pen of a writer

who leans so much to the Italian view of the question. Allowing then that the bridge was probably thrown from the Palatine to the S. W. height, he still thinks that the temple might have been on the Araceli, and that either the bridge might have been continued across the back of the Capitoline hill to the Araceli summit, or that Caligula might have walked to that point. I confess that though I have traversed the bridge, to which he refers, across the Arno at Florence, leading from the Pitti Palace to the Uffizi, and am therefore prepared to admit the *possibility* of the former supposition, yet I think it must be regarded as *highly improbable*. It seems however more probable than the latter, for it is not very likely that Caligula, who lived in constant dread of assassination, would have consented to walk so far by himself, if a covered way could have been constructed. Nor do the words of Suetonius, "*Mox quo propior esset, in area Capitolina novæ domus fundamenta jecit,*" seem to me to tell in favour of Dr Dyer's view. For the Palatine palace was quite far *enough* off from the Caffarelli height to make Caligula discontented with the distance he had to travel, and he probably wished to be as near to Jupiter as he was to Castor, at the back of whose temple in the Forum he had a private entrance.

II. The statue of Jupiter alluded to by Cicero in the third oration against Catiline, and in the *De Divinatione*, can hardly be understood to be any other than the colossal statue first erected in B.C. 293 on the Capitol by Sp. Carvilius. Plin., N.H. xxx. § 43 (quoted by Weissenborn on Liv. x. 46), says of it, *Fecit et Sp. Carvilius Jovem qui est in Capitolio victis Samnitibus sacra lege pugnantibus e pectoralibus eorum ocreisque et galeis, amplitudo tanta est ut conspiciatur a Latiori Jove*. In the oration against Catiline Cicero's words are not, as Dr Dyer says, merely "*simulacrum Jovis,*" which might apply to any statue of Jupiter, but Cicero distinctly mentions Jupiter Optimus Maximus as the God whose statue had been moved, and by whose aid the Catilinarian conspiracy had been detected. And in the *De Divinatione* he probably refers to the statue of the same God, the Jupiter Optimus Maximus of the Capitol. For we first have the lines

“Nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo
 Ipse suos quondam tumulos et *templa* petivit
 Et *Capitolinis* iniecit *sedibus* ignes. * * *
 Et Divum simulacra peremit fulminis ardor:”

and then

“Atque hæc fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri;
 Ni post, excelsum ad columnen formata decore
 Sancta Jovis species claros spectaret ad ortus:
 Tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque Senatus
 Cernere conatus posset, si, solis ad ortum
 Conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret.
 * * * * *
 Et clades patriæ flamma ferroque parata
 Vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat.”

Now that Jupiter Capitolinus is meant by Cicero when he appeals to Jupiter Optimus Maximus is, I think, clearly shewn by another passage of Cicero, *pro Domo* 57. Quocirca te, Capitoline, quem propter beneficia populus Romanus Optimus, propter vim Maximus nominavit...precor et quæso; I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that Cicero is alluding both in the speech against Catiline and in the *De Divinatione* to the statue of Capitoline Jupiter. Dr Dyer however thinks that Jupiter is alluded to merely in his general character of best and greatest guardian of the city. Few scholars who will read the whole of the three passages quoted will I think be disposed to agree with him.

The exact position of the temple is then treated of by Dr Dyer, and from the configuration of the hill he concludes that the front of the temple may have inclined to the south-west, forgetting that the site was artificially prepared and therefore that in this particular case conclusions drawn from the exigencies of the site do not apply. He also objects that the south-east angle of the temple would have screened the statue from the Forum and Curia. But the supposition is that the statue was raised high enough to be seen above the surrounding buildings. The passage of Pliny above quoted certainly implies that it was very lofty and huge. Dr Dyer also complains that I have altered the position of the Capitoline temple in the *Ichnographia* at the end of my book so as to make it face the south-

east. This may be so, but from the very small scale of that map it is a matter of slight importance, and it certainly was not done, as he insinuates, in order to support the opinion advanced in the text, but was unintentionally transferred from Du Rieu's map, my obligations to which are duly acknowledged. If Dr Dyer had referred to the plan of the Capitoline hill at the beginning of Chapter VIII., which is intended to illustrate the text, he would have found no reason for such an insinuation, and by ignoring the plan on a large scale immediately annexed, and referring to the map at the end of book, which is on a small scale, he has laid himself open to the very charge which he tries to fix upon me, of misrepresentation in order to support a theory.

III. We then come to the temples of Mens and Fides, from the position of which upon the Capitol one of the most important arguments for the German view of this question is drawn. It is argued by Becker, Reber, and others, that sufficient space cannot be found upon the Araceli height for the numerous temples mentioned as situated on the Capitol. Among these temples two of the principal are the above-named, and therefore great efforts have been made by those who hold the Italian opinion to get rid of these temples. Canina transfers the Temple of Fides to the Palatine, and converts the temple of Mens into a small chapel, and Dr Dyer follows nearly the same line of argument, removing the temple of Fides from the Capitol, and ingeniously assigning to it a new Deity, *Fides privata*, which he adds to the Roman mythology. With regard to one point I feel obliged to him for correcting a mistake into which I had fallen. The temple of Mens is certainly nowhere mentioned, so far as I know, as having been used for meetings of the Senate, and in coupling it with that of Fides as used for such a purpose, I was in error. It is not however denied by any writer that the temple of Mens was on the Capitol, and as it is called an *ædes* by Livy and a *delubrum* by Ovid, and was built in fulfilment of a vow made at a most important crisis, we can hardly degrade it to the rank of a mere *sacellum*.

In the case of the temple of Fides, Dr Dyer has either

allowed his researches to stop short of a complete investigation or he has followed the example which Becker has unfortunately set in this instance, of quoting a passage in Cicero without ascertaining the true text of the passage. The passage is in the *De Natura Deorum*, II. 23. It is printed as follows in Orelli and Nobbe's texts. Ut Fides, ut Mens, quas in Capitolio dedicatas videmus proxime a M. Æmilio Scauro, ante autem ab Atilio Calatino erat *Spes consecrata. But the reading of the best MSS. is erat Fides consecrata, and Spes is a conjecture of Lambinus. Moser, the best editor, keeps Fides in his text and has the following note: "D. Lambinus rescribendum censuit 'erat Spes consecrata.' Hujus conjecturæ fundus videtur esse Lib. II de Legg. cap. XI. ubi ait noster: Recte etiam a Calatino Spes consecrata est. Sed nihil impedit quo minus templa diversis numinibus idem vir consecrarit. Præterea cum testetur Cicero Fidem et Mentem dedicatas fuisse proxime ab Æmilio Scauro, illud "ante" quod sequitur, opponi τῶ "proxime" manifestum est. Nullus igitur est mutationi locus¹." Hence it appears that in the passage in question, Fides is a more probable reading than Spes, and that my statement that Atilius Calatinus was the restorer of the temple of Fides was not made without sufficient authority.

Dr Dyer then proceeds to say, that the temple of Fides on the Capitol was not founded by Numa, for that Cicero would hardly have used the term majores nostri in speaking of Numa, and that Livy speaks of it as a *sacrarium* and not as a *templum*.

¹ There appear to have been two temples of Spes at Rome, one outside the Carmental Gate in the Forum Olitorium (Liv. xxi. 62, xxiv. 47, xxv. 7), which, as well as the temple of Fides, was built by M. Atilius Calatinus (Cic. de legg. ii. 11, 28), the other nearly a mile from the Porta Esquilina (Liv. ii. 51; Dionys. ix. 24). This latter temple acquired the name of the old temple, "Spes vetus," and gave its name to the district adjoining the Porta Esquilina. A passage has been pointed out by Mr Boase in the

Academy for Apr. 1, 1871, p. 202, which will, I hope, convince Mr Parker that his ingenious suggestion in the *Archæologia*, Vol. XLII. Part 1. p. 11 and *Arch. Journ.* xxiv. p. 345, to substitute *specus* and *specum* for *spes* and *spem*, where they occur in Frontinus, is untenable. The passage I refer to is in *Hist. Aug. Heliog. xiii.*, where some gardens are mentioned, called *Horti Spei Veteris*. Mr Parker will scarcely contend that *Spei* stands for *specus* in the MS. of the *Hist. Aug.*

Yet it is difficult to see why Cicero's expression *maiores nostri* should not apply to Numa, and Dr Dyer does not say what words in his opinion would be more appropriate. We may allow that Livy conceived of the building when first founded as a mere *sacrarium*, or place for keeping sacred utensils. But after the restorations by Atilius and Scaurus it would naturally become a regularly inaugurated *templum*. The passage of Plutarch in which he mentions Numa as being the reputed first founder of the temples of Fides and Terminus (the latter of which was certainly on the Capitol) is passed over by Dr Dyer without remark, and he then has recourse to one of the common methods adopted by archæologists for bridging over a difficulty, and suddenly adds a new deity to the Roman mythology. As it was Public Faith to whom Numa dedicated his shrine, so it may have been Private Faith, Dr Dyer thinks, whose temple stood on the Capitol. There is however no evidence whatever brought forward by Dr Dyer in support of this conjecture, and it seems to be needless therefore to consider it any further. *De non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio.*

I pass on to the interpretation he puts upon the account given by Appian of the disturbance in which Tib. Gracchus was killed. On this he remarks that it affords the most satisfactory negative evidence that the temple of Public Faith in which the senate was assembled could not have been on the Capitol, and he proceeds to argue that the expressions used by Appian, ἀνέσαν ἐς τὸ Καπιτώλιον—ἀνελθὼν εἰς τὸ ἱερόν and Plutarch's words—ἀναβὰς μολίς, must be understood of the ascent from the level of the Forum to the top of the Capitol. Now there is not the slightest occasion for putting this construction upon them; in fact Dr Dyer himself supplies an argument against it, when he says that the senators "could not have mounted to the Capitol already seized by the rioters without a fight." How did they contrive then to climb the Clivus, as they did according to Appian's account without apparent difficulty? The fight, Appian says, took place at the temple of Jupiter, and not on the Clivus. The reason is plain. The senators were already on the hill, assembled in the temple

of Fides, and had only to ascend the elevated platform and steps on which the temple of Jupiter stood.

In the same way the story of Flavius Flaccus must be explained. The temple of Jupiter was occupied and guarded by the rioters, and Flaccus naturally had some difficulty in approaching, since he would be regarded by them as an enemy. He therefore remained at the foot of the platform on which the temple stood, and made signs to Gracchus, since he could not make himself heard on account of the confusion. Vellius, as Dr Dyer allows, understood that Nasica and the senators were already upon the Capitol before the attack was made, though he does not mention the temple of Fides. There is in fact no evidence whatever to shew that any other temple of Fides existed in Rome, except that on the Capitol founded by Numa, and restored by Atilius and Scaurus, and that temple was large enough to accommodate the senate, and must therefore have occupied a considerable space of ground.

IV. The attack on the Capitol by the partisans of Vitellius, as related by Tacitus (Hist. III. 71), has been so often discussed that I forbear to make more than a very few remarks upon Dr Dyer's interpretations. "It is plain" he says "that the fire broke out near the *Lucus Asyli*." How does this appear? The words of Tacitus are: *Tum diversos Capitolii aditus invadunt, juxta lucum asyli et qua Tarpeia rupes centum gradibus æditur. Improvisa utraque vis: propior atque acrior per asylum ingruerat. Nec sisti poterant scandentes per conjuncta ædificia quæ ut in multa pace in altum edita solum Capitolii æquabant. Hic ambigitur, ignem tectis oppugnatores injecerint, an obsessi, quæ crebrior fama est, quo nitentes ac progressos depellerent. Inde lapsus ignis in porticus appositas ædibus, mox sustinentes fastigium aquilæ vetere ligno traxerunt flammam alueruntque.* The question to be decided is, whether the word *scandentes* applies to both or only to one of the parties into which the assailants divided themselves. Dr Dyer thinks, I suppose, that the word *scandentes* applies to those alone who ascended by the *Lucus Asyli*. But it is quite possible that both parties, if assailants, may be included, and if so why is it asserted that the fire began at the *Lucus Asyli*? Even if the

fire did begin there. It spread, according to Tacitus, along the porticoes before reaching the temple, and may thus have reached the front. And again, the expression *sustinentes fastigium aquilae* does not necessarily, as Dr Dyer assumes, refer to the front of the temple. Mr Rich in Dr Smith's *Dict. of Antiq.*, Art. 'Fastigium,' says correctly that Greek and Roman temples had a fastigium or pediment both in front and rear. Nor does the word *aquilae* refer to any ornamental work, as Dr Dyer seems to think, but to the ends of the beams of the roof which projected both in front and rear and formed the uppermost angle of the pediment. These beams if not protected by ornamental work in stone or pottery, would be very likely to catch fire. Thus the hopelessness of extracting any argument as to the situation of the temple, from the narrative of Tacitus, is sufficiently apparent. I pass on to the remainder of Dr Dyer's remarks.

V. I had purposely omitted all reference to the argument drawn from the trial of Manlius in the *Lucus Petelinus*, because it seems quite evident that the view of the Capitol and *Arx* from that spot may have been obscured by houses or trees or other intervening objects. (See the note on p. 45 of 'Rome and the Campagna'.)

VI. It is to be hoped that some method may be found of continuing the excavations on the Caffarelli height. Enough was certainly not discovered in January 1869, when I saw the place, to warrant any positive assertion as to the age, shape, or purpose of the buildings, the ruins of which have been discovered. Cav. Rosa's opinion then was that the ruins in question probably did not belong to the temple of Jupiter, but that there was no possibility of coming to a conclusion without further investigations. He also thought that it was very doubtful whether they belonged to a temple at all. I do not therefore attach any weight to Von Reumont's passing remark made in a note and possibly without any full investigation of the question, nor do I relinquish the opinion I have already expressed because Dr Dyer asserts that the more candid of a school (only mentioning Von Reumont) have

I will only say in answer to Dr Dyer's concluding paragraph that to assign to each writer on the "multitudinous questions" connected with the Forum and neighbouring buildings, the exact measure of credit he deserves, and to point out precisely which writer in England and which in Germany first advocated such or such a view on the much debated question as to the site of the Comitium, was no part of the plan of my work. I have acknowledged in general terms, in the preface, my obligations to Dr Dyer's work on the City of Rome, but by what instinct I could have divined that he had not seen Mommsen's article, anticipating his views on the position of the Comitium, before his own work was ready for the press, I am quite at a loss to conceive. In my account of the Curia Julia, I followed Prof. Reber's pamphlet, on the sites of the Curia Hostilia and Curia Julia, published at Munich in 1858, and I was not at all aware that he was indebted to Dr Dyer for any of his ideas.

R. BURN.

ON THE SITES OF SITTAKE AND OPIS, AS GIVEN IN
 HERODOTUS, LIVINGSTON'S HISTORY OF HERODO-
 TUS, VOL. I, p. 211, N. 1.

SITTAKE (we are told by Xenophon, Anab. II. iv. 13) was 'a city
 great and populous 17 parasangs from the right bank of the river
 Tigris, and 5 parasangs above 30 Geger. miles) from the Wall
 of Media.' The first point in The Retreat beyond the Tigris,
 whose position is known with surprising like certainty, is the
 first across the Tigris Zab (inf. p. 143), and to this the position of
 SITTAKE and the intermediate points Opis and Kene, must be
 referred. SITTAKE was 70 Parasangs (14 days' march) from that
 first. Mr W. F. Ainsworth places SITTAKE 'near Akbara, the
 summer residence of the Chaldees' on the Shat Eidha*, which
 both Gen. Chesney and Mr Ainsworth identify with the Tigris
 of Xenophon. Dr Ross, a member of the British Residency at
 Baghdad identifies SITTAKE with Sheriat El Beidha lower down
 the river, followed by Gen. Chesney, who reckons however the
 70 Parasangs 182 G. miles from the mouth of the Zab, where
 he conceives the Greeks crossed the river by boats (inf. pp.
 143-4). Keeping in view alike the Satrap's anxiety to with-
 draw the Greeks from the heart of Babylonia (Anab. II. iv. 22)
 and the necessity under which he lay of not arousing their sus-
 picions by taking them in any southerly direction, we cannot
 be far wrong in placing SITTAKE somewhere near Akbara.

There was indeed further south a province noticed by Post-
 Augustan writers, called *Sittakene*, of which Strabo (xvi. i. 17)
 says that the road between Susa and Babylon lay wholly
 through it, and its principal city *Sittake* is mentioned both by

¹ Commentary on the Anabasis of
 Xenophon (Bohn's Series), by W. F.
 Ainsworth, Esq., F.R.G.S., p. 299.
 In this work, and in his earlier one
 'Travels in the Track of the Ten
 Thousand' (Parker, 1844), Mr Ains-

worth has made a valuable contri-
 bution towards the elucidation of the
 Greek Route.

² Shat means 'large river,' and is
 applied only to this stream, to the Shat
 el Nil, the Shat el Arab, and Shat el Hai.

Pliny (N. H. vi. 27) and Ptolemy the Geographer (vi. i. 6). Sir H. Rawlinson identifying this with the Sittake of Xenophon places the latter some 50 miles below the Diyalah, at the point where the road from Babylon to Susa crossed the Tigris.

But the Sittake of Pliny and Ptolemy cannot be the same as the Sittake of Xenophon. They belonged to different epochs and stood on wholly different sites. The name that Pliny gives to his Sittake, "*Sittake Græcorum ab ortu*," indicates its origin as a Greek colony, one of those several garrison towns founded in the heart of Assyria by Alexander or his successors to secure or extend his conquests (see Arrian, *Anab.* vii. xxi. 7); it was no doubt one of that cordon of Greek colonies mentioned by Polyb. x. xxvii. 3; "*Media*," he says, "is encircled by Greek cities in accordance with Alexander's instructions, to keep in check the neighbouring barbarians." Ptolemy places¹ it at 2 degrees of longitude east of Ctesiphon, *i.e.* about 80 miles from the Tigris eastward, whereas the Sittake of the Anabasis stood on the western bank of the Tigris. That this difference is not due to any error in Ptolemy's text is plain; he gives us *Ctesiphon* in a list of places on the Tigris, *Sittake* of places in the interior of Assyria (vi. i. 3 and 6. See also Strabo xv. iii. 12). Two places having the same name need create no difficulty. Leaving out of sight names purely dynastic (The Seleucias, Apamæas, &c.), we have a case exactly parallel to this in the Assyrian *Dura*² on the Tigris, and the '*Dura of the Macedonians*' on the Euphrates (Isidore of Charax '*Parthian Stages*').—That a Greek colony should have a Persian name given it is intelligible enough as one of various expedients by which Alexander sought to give effect to his well-known policy of amalgamating Greek and Oriental—conquerors and conquered—in one, to form a new people for himself. He made his Macedonians dress like Persians, and the Persians wear Macedonian equipments, and planted or designed to plant colonies of Europeans in Asia, and of Asiatics in Europe.

The grounds on which Sir H. Rawlinson, identifying Xeno-

¹ He places Sittake in Long. 82°, Lat. 35½, vi. i. 6: Ctesiphon in Long. 80°, Lat. 35½, vi. i. 3.

² Both are mentioned by Polyb. v. 52 and 48, and by Ammianus Marcellinus, xxiv. i. 5, xxv. vi. 9.

phon's Sittake with that of Strabo, places it on the Tigris, 50 miles or more below the mouth of the Diyalah river, were given in a paper read by him before the Royal Geographical Society in 1851; this paper I cannot find in the annual Journal, nor in any printed record of the Society for that year. He gives however an outline of his argument in the following: "If we remember that Xenophon's Median Wall is the enceinte of Babylon, and that the Greeks crossed the Tigris at Sittake, which was on the road from Babylon to Susa, we can hardly fail of identifying the Diyalah with the Physcus of Xenophon (Anab. II. iv. 25) and thus recognizing Opis in the ruins of Khafaji near the confluence of the two rivers." (Herodotus, Vol. I. p. 261, note 5.) But this conclusion is wholly incompatible with Xenophon's distances: for the 70 parasangs between Sittake and the Zab yield only 182 G. miles (allowing Gen. Chesney's estimate of 2.6 G. miles to the Parasang), whereas if we place Sittake 20 parasangs below the Diyalah, it would be at least 220 G. miles, as the crow flies, from the nearest point of the Zab. The conclusion is in fact based upon an entire misrendering of Strabo's text. He does not say that 'Sittake was on the road from Babylon to Susa,' but that the *province* Sittakene, like Artemita, lay eastwards from Seleucia, and that the road between Babylon and Susa lay wholly through Sittakene. He does not mention Sittake (the city) at all, but what he does say is quite consistent with what Ptolemy and Pliny tell us, that it lay at some distance eastwards of Seleucia: his words are,—
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ Ἀρτέμιτα, πόλις ἀξιόλογος, διέχουσα πεντακοσίους τῆς Σελευκείας σταδίους πρὸς ἔω τὸ πλεόν. καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Σιττακηνή· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη, πολλή τε καὶ ἀγαθὴ μέση Βαβυλῶνος τέτακται καὶ τῆς Σουσίδος, ὥστε τοῖς ἐκ Βαβυλῶνος εἰς Σούσα βαδίζουσι διὰ τῆς Σιττακηνῆς ἡ ὁδὸς ἀπάσα.

But further, to place Sittake on the parallel of Babylon seems to me to be not more incompatible with Xenophon's distances than with the general tenour of his narrative. Such a position, when Cunaxa was at least 30 G. miles north of Babylon, gives a south-easterly direction to the Retreat between Cunaxa and where the Tigris was crossed, and this I take to be wholly at variance with the narrative. For we are told that

Tissaphernes started with the Greeks going homewards (ὡς εἰς οἶκον ἀπιών, II. iv. 8) to his satrapy in Asia Minor. Now it is to be noted, that the Greeks by this time had had their suspicions of the Satrap's good faith thoroughly roused, and had already loudly expressed their fears that he would never allow them to return home to tell the tale of their easy triumph over the hosts of Persia (II. iv. 3, 4). To suppose that under such circumstances the Greeks could be duped into the belief that they were "going homewards" by turning their backs upon home for five successive days' march, and this without one word of remonstrance from them, or of explanation or even of remark from the historian, appears to me improbable in the last degree.

After the Greeks crossed the Tigris at Sittake by a bridge of 37 boats (II. iv. 24), they "marched four stages (20 parasangs) from the Tigris to the river Physcus, which was a plethrum (101 feet) broad, and had a bridge over it. Here was a great inhabited city, *Opis* by name" (II. iv. 25). The remark that the route struck off from the Tigris has escaped notice, I believe; yet it is the more noteworthy here, that it does not occur elsewhere, even in cases where we know that the route did quit the river: see p. 145, on the Zab. It was not till after marching 4 stages to Opis, and 6 more through the Desert of Media to the villages of Parysatis, that we hear again of the Tigris (iv. 28). The question arises how did the two armies get their supply of water during these 10 stages of 130 G. miles, which were chiefly through a desert? There is no difficulty in answering the question if we suppose that Xenophon's river Physcus represents the upper portion of that magnificent canal¹, which under the names of *El Bureich* or *Hafu*, *Katur* or *Resas* Canal, and finally *Narwan*, is still traceable from the point where it leaves the Tigris at the Hamrin Hills, to where it rejoins the Tigris below² the Shat-el-Hai after running a course of at least two or three hundred miles. Its great antiquity is undoubted (see Rawlinson, *Journal of R. G. S.*, x. p. 97). The early Arabian Geogra-

¹ Compare Arrian, *Anab.* vii. xxi. 1, ἐπὶ τὸν Παλλακόπαν καλούμενον ποταμόν—ἐστὶ διώρυξ ὁ Παλλακόπας.

² Very possibly much lower down;

the Arabs say as low down as Hawiza, where it joins the R. Kerkhah, not far from the Persian Gulf. Chesney, *Vol. i.* pp. 27, 28.

phers, Abulfeda and Yakut, speak of it as even in their time a work of "*remote antiquity, subsequently repaired and enlarged*" at different periods. Though originally a mere derivative of the Tigris, yet by intercepting the western drainage of the Hamrin Hills and the Zagros range—the Adhem and the Diyalah—it must have swelled into a large deep river adapted alike for purposes of navigation and irrigation. Where Dr Ross traced it¹ (see Journal of Royal Geogr. Soc., XI. p. 21), he found the old bed varying from 100 to 130 long paces broad, with an embankment that carried it high above the bed of the Tigris. From all we know of the old dynasties of Assyria and Babylonia, their vast command of captive labour and unsparing employment of it in such constructions, the presumption is that the Nahr Wan belongs to that period of History two or more centuries before Xenophon's day, which alone can be said to be characterised by works of this description². If then the Katur or Nahr Wan existed in Xenophon's time, neither the modern *Adhem* nor the *Diyalah* can represent the *Physcus* of Xenophon. Dr Ross' description of the Adhem and the Nahr Wan is decisive as to the Adhem. "*The bed of the Nahr Wan,*" he says (p. 124), "*is as high above the Adhem as it is above that of the Tigris, and it is evident that when water flowed in the Nahr Wan none could have existed in the Adhem; in fact when the 'Band-el-Adhem'*"

¹ This was below the point where it received the waters of the Adhem by the Nahr Batt, and of the Kaim canal: higher up, nearer the point of derivation from the Tigris, it may very well have been narrower. The Physcus, where Xenophon crossed it, was only a plethrum (101 feet) broad, this being the regular breadth assigned to the canals of the Anabasis. See Anab. i. vii. 15, iv. 10.

² An undoubted and most enduring relic of the old Assyrian era is the great "dyke or dam of Nimrod," built across the Tigris, near Nineveh; a solid mass of masonry, constructed of huge stones, squared, and united by

iron cramps, often visible, and, except in flood, always an impediment to the navigation of the Tigris. "It is one of the monuments of a great people, to be found in all the rivers of Mesopotamia, which were undertaken to secure a constant supply of water to the numberless canals spreading like a network over the country, and which, even in Alexander's days, were looked on as the works of an ancient nation." Layard, Nineveh, p. 6, Ed. 1851.

³ An ancient dam, thrown across the stream of the Adhem below where it issues from the Hamrin Hills. "*The bed of the Adhem being much lower than the surrounding country, the*

existed, no water could have possibly got into its bed, all going into the Nahr Batt and Rathan, and by them into the Nahr Wan." The same applies to the Diyalah, of which the popular belief is that its waters were carried by the Nahr Wan into the Kerkhah and that "*the bed of the lower Diyala is of comparatively recent formation.*" (Chesney, Vol. I. p. 27.)

OPIS.—Herod. I. 189. Xen. Anab. II. iv. 25.

OPIS has long been known as the opprobrium of geography. The historical notices respecting it are neither few nor unimportant, sufficient one might suppose to indicate its position with tolerable precision. Herodotus classes it with Nineveh, as a principal city on the Tigris. According to Xenophon, it stood on the left bank of the Tigris, at the confluence of another river, the Physcus, at a point 50 parasangs distant from the ford across the Zab (see inf. p. 143, note 1).

In Alexander's time Opis was still the principal city on the Tigris; it had a royal palace (*Βασιλεια* Arrian, Anab. VII. vii. 6, 8), and when Alexander sailed up the Tigris from Susa destroying the dykes which impeded the navigation of the river, the work of destruction stopped at Opis,—so far and no farther was the river made navigable. At Opis broke out that general mutiny of his army which only yielded a signal triumph to his personal power, to the unquailing resolution and consummate tact with which he quelled it. Here he placed his disabled veterans in the hands of Cratinus to be conveyed home. The opening of the Tigris navigation does not seem to have added to the importance and prosperity of Opis, for we have no mention of it whatever in the wars, carried on in the neighbourhood, between Alexander's generals after his death. The subsequent foundation of Seleucia on the Tigris as the seat of empire, and great emporium of commerce between East and West, would prove a fatal blow to the prosperity of Opis. Strabo speaks of it as '*a village and mart for its neighbourhood* (*τῶν κύκλῳ*

'Band' was made to throw the water the right, and the Nahr Rathan on the for irrigation into the Nahr Batt on left." Dr Ross, l. c. p. 133.

τόπων),’ Strabo XVI. i. 9, and its name does not appear at all in Ptolemy’s list of places in Assyria.

The position of Opis is in close connexion with that of Sittake: both were on the Tigris 50 G. miles (20 parasangs) apart. Prof. Rawlinson having placed Sittake on the road between Babylon and Susa places Opis at the mouth of the Diyalah¹, the Gyndes of Herodotus, finding confirmation of his view in Hdt. i. 189 *ἐπεὶ τε δὲ ὁ Κύρος πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν Βαβυλῶνα ἐγένετο ἐπὶ Γύνδῃ ποταμῷ, τοῦ αἱ μὲν πηγαὶ ἐν Ματιηνοῖσι οὖρεσι ῥέει δὲ διὰ Δαρδανέων, ἐκδιδοὶ δὲ ἐς ἕτερον ποταμὸν Τίγριν· ὁ δὲ παρὰ Ὠπιν ῥέων ἐς τὴν Ἐρυθρὴν θάλασσαν ἐκδιδοί, &c.* This passage he renders thus; “Cyrus in his way to Babylon came to the banks of the Gyndes, which rising in the Matienian mountains runs through the country of the Dardanians, and empties itself into the Tigris. The Tigris, *after receiving the Gyndes*, flows on by the city of Opis, &c.”

There is nothing in the Greek for the words which I have put in italics, and their introduction is objectionable as giving arbitrarily a colour to the passage which Herodotus’ words do not warrant. His aim, I believe, is not at all to make any statement about the *relative position*² of Opis and the Gyndes, such as a man might make who had sailed down the Tigris, and knew all about its confluent streams and adjacent cities, of which knowledge in Herodotus’ case there is, I believe, no evidence whatever, but simply, as his manner is, to interweave into his narrative any geographical information that fell in his way, with a view here, it may be, of describing a river unknown to most of his readers by naming some principal city on its banks, like Opis, whose character as a great emporium city of Eastern

¹ The *Diyalah* would thus be at once the *Physcus* of Xenophon (see sup. p. 138) and the *Gyndes* of Herodotus. That the same river should, within the same half-century, have borne two different names is on the face of it an improbability.

² Had he meant to give the relative position of the points in question the proper rendering of *ῥέων* would be,

‘The Tigris as it flows past Opis enters the Red Sea (Persian Gulf);’ i. e. Opis would have to be placed at the mouth of the Tigris; and this in fact was Wesseling’s view of the passage; he supposing that Opis and Ampe both stood at the mouth of the river, but on opposite banks. See his note on Hdt. vi. 20, given by Schweighæuser, ad loc.

commerce might make it well known to some at least of his hearers. In the same cursory way he says a little further on when speaking of the Great Canal of Babylonia (I. 193), ἐσέχει δὲ ἐς ἄλλον ποταμὸν ἐκ τοῦ Εὐφράτew, ἐς τὸν Τίγριν, παρ' δὲ Νῖνος πόλις οἴκητο. It will not be maintained that the capital of Assyria was introduced here as having any connexion local or historical with the Babylonian Canal, but simply because, having mentioned Nineveh before (I. 185), it occurs to him here, when speaking of the Tigris, to inform his readers that the city stood upon this river. Geographical information is given by him less as ancillary to narrative, than as a constituent and independent part of his 'Researches.'

After all, the position of Opis is to be determined from the known position of the ford¹ over the Zab above Zeilan. From Opis to this ford were 10 ordinary marches, i.e. of 5 parasangs each. Taking Gen. Chesney's estimate of 13 G. miles of distance for each of these marches, and measuring back from the ford along the Zab and the Tigris, we are brought to Eski Baghdad, which we may approximately fix upon for the position of Opis, with as much certainty as the data of the problem allow.

It is however still within the limits of reasonable hope that the position of Opis may receive further light from further exploration of the Tigris and its banks. There ought surely to be some existing evidence of how far Alexander's desfruction of the dykes extended up the Tigris. At one point, I believe, we have such evidence. Dr Ross speaking of that branch of the Nahr Wan which left the Tigris at *Kaim*, says "*it is difficult to imagine how the water ever entered this Canal, its ancient bed being seen in section 15 feet above the surface of the Tigris,*

¹ "The ford by which the Greeks crossed the Zabatus may, I think, be accurately determined. It is still the principal ford in this part of the river, and must, from the nature of the bed of the stream, have been so from the earliest period. It is about 25 miles from the confluence of the Zab and Tigris. A march of 25 stad., or nearly 3 miles, in the direction of the Larissa

would bring them to the Ghazur or Bumadas; and this stream was, I have little doubt, the deep valley formed by the torrent where Mithridates, venturing to attack the retreating army, was signally defeated." Layard, p. 60, and see also p. 226. To this view Mr Ainsworth assents, *Commentary*, p. 304; and Chesney, *Narrative*, p. 508.

which, now¹ nearly at its highest level, sweeps along the high perpendicular banks." Journal of R. G. S. XI. p. 127. This account seems clearly to point to a dyke, once existing here, which has been removed; and if we assume that the age of this Canal, which is allowed to be "of remote antiquity," goes back as far as Alexander's age, then Opis could not have been lower than Kaim, and may have been higher. Gen. Chesney in fact places Opis at Kaim, and this would tally well with its distance from the Zab, if the Greeks forded it at its mouth; but it is not fordable at its mouth, the actual ford being 25 miles up the river, above Zeilan. It is true that Gen. Chesney supposes the Greeks to have crossed the river by pontoons. Of this however there is no intimation in the narrative; and the remark made (III. iv. 6) that "*they arrived at the Tigris*," after two days' march from the ford across the Zab, is decisive that they crossed considerably above its mouth.

The identifications which I have submitted above of the Phycus with the Katur or Resas Canal, and of Opis with Eski Baghdad, were originally suggested by Sir H. Rawlinson himself, till (misled apparently by the notion of Sittake being on the road between Babylon and Susa) he abandoned it. The error respecting Sittake appears to be a modern one: for Mr Ainsworth (New Monthly Mag. No. 573, p. 263) cites Cellarius (Notitiæ Orbis Antiqui) as suggesting that Xenophon's Sittake on the Tigris and the Sittake of Pliny, situated (?) between the Tigris and Tornadotus, were different places.

Kænæ.] There are no ruins on the right bank of the Tigris to represent Kænæ, except those at Kalah Sherkat, or (as Sir H. Rawlinson writes the name) *Kileh* Sherghat. If the latter be the right spelling (and there is no notice of any castle (Kalah) at this point), we may recognize² Xen.'s *Kænæ* phonetically in *Kileh*, the nasal liquid n being often replaced by l,

¹ This was in June.

² That is, if Xen. received the name (Kineh) orally (as under the circumstances of the Retreat at this point we may presume he did, see II. iv. 10), he might and naturally would give it in the form of a Greek word resembling

it, just as both Bochart and Layard conceive that he did in the case of the neighbouring city Nimrūd, which he calls *Larissa*, a name familiar to a Greek ear, supposed by Bochart to be a corruption of *Al Resen*, by Layard of *Al Assur*.

as it is in Bologna = Bononia; Labynetus = Nabonadius; and Zelebi = Zenobia &c. *Kileh Sherghat* was, under the name of Asshur, the original Assyrian Capital from 1273 B.C. to about 930 B.C., before the seat of government was transferred to Nineveh by Asshur-idannipal, the warlike Sardanapalus of the Greeks. See Rawlinson Hdt. i. pp. 373—377. *Kæncæ* was passed somewhere "in the course of the first march"¹ from the villages of Parysatis, i.e. on the 4th day before reaching the ford over the Zab (II. iv. 28). Reckoning back from this ford as a point pretty well ascertained (the first that is so in the route beyond the Tigris), we are brought opposite *Kileh Sherghat* in the course of the 4th march from the ford.

The fact of their leaving the Tigris and marching up the Zab before crossing it, though not expressly stated, is sufficiently indicated by the remark that "they arrived at the Tigris" near *Larissa* (III. iv. 6) after two marches from the ford. Nor is this the only instance in the narrative of mention of a river being reserved for the point where it was crossed. The Phrat, for instance, is first mentioned at *Thapsacus*, though both Gen. Chesney and Mr Ainsworth are convinced that the three previous marches must have been along its banks (cf. 'Travels in the Track &c.' p. 66). The same remark may be applicable to the march along the Physcus before crossing it, and also to the marches between the Phasis and Harpasus (IV. vi. 4 and 5; vii. 1 and 15), some of which lay along the banks probably of both rivers up to the points where they were found to be fordable.

¹ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ σταθμῇ may mean either 'in the course of the first march,' cf. ἐν τοῖς τοῖς σταθμοῖς (I. v. 5), or 'at the first station' ('ad castra prima,' Dindorf); but ἐν, I think, does

not apply well to a place beyond the river; they did not even cross over to it, so that in no way could it be conceived or spoken of as being 'in the first station.'

J. F. MAC MICHAEL.

The Editors are indebted for the accompanying map to the kindness of Messrs Bell and Daldy, and Messrs Whitaker, the publishers of an edition of Xenophon's *Anabasis* by Mr Mac Michael now in the Press.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF PLATO.

Phaedr. 235 D. ἀλλ', ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἴρηκας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὦν τινῶν μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἤκουσας, μηδ' ἂν κελεύω εἶπης, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις ποιήσον· τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπόσχεσ [εἰπεῖν,] τούτων ἀπεχόμενος. καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ὑπισχνούμαι χρυσὴν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν, οὐ μόνον ἐμαντοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν. (Dr Thompson's edition.)

In the sentence τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ, κ.τ.λ. the Bodl. gives ἐτέρα ὑποσχεσει εἰπεῖν, where the vulg. has ἕτερα ὑποσχήθητι εἰπεῖν. Dr Badham reads ἕτερα ὑπόσχεσ ('submit to me,' 'produce'), regarding εἰπεῖν as an interpolation; and his correction is accepted by the Master of Trinity. Professor Madvig on the other hand omits ὑποσχεσει and reads εἶπον or εἰπέ in place of εἰπεῖν. I conjecture that the reading of the Bodleian is a corruption of ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι εἰπεῖν. The text will then run: τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεις ποιήσον. τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπέσχησαι εἰπεῖν τούτων ἀπεχόμενος, καὶ σοι ἐγώ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ὑπισχνούμαι, κ.τ.λ. The sentence τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ, κ.τ.λ. is thus a formal statement of the bargain into which Phaedrus proposes to enter with Socrates. It is true that Socrates has not made a distinct promise: he has however implied his intention of delivering a rival ῥήσις: πλήρῃ πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χεῖρω. Indeed Phaedrus can hardly be said to misrepresent Socrates's declaration, when he calls it a promise in order to bind him down to the delivery of a speech. So in the Philebus, 20 A, Protarchus says ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστήον· ὑπέσχου γάρ.

Republic, 360 B. *εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὥς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὅς ἂν μένειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, ἔξδὸν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ.*

“ὥς δόξειεν.” Astius in *tertia* ed. ἂν addendum conicit, quod ne aptum quidem esset. Optativus eandem vim habet, quam solet in oratione obliqua habere, efficitque ut verba *οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο οὕτως* etc. ex aliorum ore missa videantur. Aliter hoc intellexit Matthiæ gramm. p. 982, proximum ἂν hunc quoque optativum afficere statuens.” Schneider. I am not satisfied with either of these explanations of the omission of ἂν with *δόξειεν*. Schneider’s justification is the more plausible of the two, but the introduction of a quasi oblique oration does not appear very appropriate. The omission of ἂν with *δόξειεν* however is not the only peculiarity of the sentence, its insertion with *μένειεν* being at least as remarkable. See Goodwin’s *Greek Moods and Tenses*, p. 139, where Aristoph. *Ran.* 96, 97, *γόνιμον δὲ ποιητὴν ἂν οὐχ εὐροις ἔτι ζητῶν ἂν ὅστις ῥῆμα γενναῖον λάκοι*, and, Dem. *Phil.* II. 67, 20, *τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει—οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο τοσοῦτον οὐδὲ ποιήσειεν, ὑφ’ οὗ πεισθέντες ὑμεῖς—τῶν ἄλλων τινος Ἑλλήνων ἐκείνῳ προεῖσθε*, are cited as examples of the correct construction. I conclude therefore that the particle ἂν has been transferred by the scribe from its proper place after *δόξειεν* to its present position before *μένειεν*.

390 B, C. *ἡ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὥς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς ἂ ἐβουλεύσατο, τούτων πάντων ῥαδίως ἐπιλανθανόμενον διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, κ.τ.λ.*

ὥς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς (‘ut solus vigil,’ Stallb.) seems a very strange phrase. On the other hand it is clear that it cannot be construed with *ἐπιλανθανόμενον*. The relative clause appears to mean—“the plans which he formed when all other gods and men were sleeping and he alone awake.” Here “alone” is emphatic, more emphatic, I think, than the *μόνος* of the text. I therefore conjecture for *ὥς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς*, *εἰς μόνος ἐγρηγορῶς*. For the phrase *εἰς μόνος*, cf. *Gorg.* 475 E, *ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρ-*

κεῖς εἰς ὧν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. Alc. I. 131 E, οὐτ' ἐγένετο, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὐτ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἢ εἰς μόνος. Hipp. Min. 372 B, κινδυνεύω ἐν μόνον ἔχειν τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, τᾶλλα ἔχων πάνυ φαῦλα. Soph. O. T. 63, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῶν ἄλγος εἰς ἐν' ἔρχεται μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν κοῦδέν' ἄλλον.

429 C. διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασώζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μῆε' κβάλλειν.

Socrates is explaining the phrase *δύναμιν τοιαύτην ἥ διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν*. He has in the preceding sentence explained the word *σώσει*, and now proceeds to volunteer an explanation of the phrase *διὰ παντὸς*. It has been thought that the words *αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν* should be expunged. Would it not be better to read *διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἔλεγον αὐτὴν σωτηρίαν*, the meaning being "and when I added the epithet perpetual I meant," &c.? The meaning of the word *σωτηρία* having been already explained, it is natural that Socrates should say "and I meant by calling the safety perpetual," &c., not, "and I called it perpetual safety." The *αὐ* marks a new point in the explanation, and would not have been required had Glaucon interposed the question, "And what do you mean by the epithet perpetual?"

465 C. τά γε μὴν σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὀκνῶ καὶ λέγειν, ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πένητες, ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὄσας ἐν παιδοτροφίᾳ καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, κ.τ.λ.

Ast thinks that *πένητες* should be expunged or placed after *εἴεν*. Schneider supplies with it *αἷς ἔνοχοι ἂν εἴεν* from *ὧν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴεν*. Stallbaum remarks—"omnia forent perspicua, si legeretur *πενίας*, i.e. *πενήτων*." Is it possible that Plato wrote *πένητος*, using the singular in consequence of the close proximity of the objective genitive plural *πλουσίων*? For an example of objective and subjective genitives dependent on the same word, cf. p. 329 B, *ἐνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσσεις τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται*.

615 D. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ἦκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἦξει δεῦρο. Why should we not read *ἀνήξει*? Cf.

ἀνιέναι, ἀναβήσασθαι in the sequel. The verb *ἀνήκω* occurs in a kindred sense in the Theaetetus, p. 196 B, οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; Madvig conjectures οὐδ' αὖ ἤξει δεῦρο: but how does he understand αὖ?

Phileb. 48 c. κακὸν μὲν ἄγνοια καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν ἔξιν.

Why should we not read *ἀβελτερίαν*? ἦν δὴ, κ.τ.λ. will then mean "the habit which we call fatuity." It seems strange that *ἀβέλτερος* should have three terminations, and that *ἀβελτέρα ἔξις* should be used as a mere circumlocution for *ἀβελτερία*, which word occurs Theaet. 174 c, Symp. 198 d.

HENRY JACKSON.

NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

I.

Ar. Eth. v. 5. 12. *Εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀμφοτέρως ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον.*

ANYONE unfamiliar with the difficulty of these words might estimate it by the desperate proposal to omit *οὐ*, which some have taken to be the only means of making sense. But if the passage be no true Gordian knot, we may forego this use of the sword, and I think it may be shown to admit a gentler mode of treatment.

Aristotle, if the author of this Book be really he, is stating the theory of barter and sale, and showing how the institution of some proportion between commodities is necessary to their exchange. 'But,' he says, 'they must not be brought into proportion when once the parties have exchanged: otherwise one extreme will have both the excesses.' The difficulty is to understand what bringing into proportion after the exchange he had in his mind, and what he meant by one extreme having both the excesses.

Let me state first why the current explanation, given by Sir Alexander Grant, seems unsatisfactory. Without going the length of Lambinus (quoted by Michelet) who treats the past as convertible with the future and stoutly translates *ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται* 'cum permutaturi sunt,' he seems to think that this was what the author meant to say, and of the words as they stand he has no account to give. Again, he supposes

it to be meant that quality is somehow reckoned twice. Now in the first place it is not easy to see what improved scheme of proportion either party could in this way desire. The quality of the goods must determine their first quantitative exchange, a certain amount of the one being given for a larger amount of the other, because the latter is inferior in point of quality. This being so, I do not see what consideration of quality can be brought in later to reform the rate of exchange. It is not as if the parties exchanged looking only to quantity and considered quality afterwards. They consider it from the beginning and can want no warning not to consider it twice. In the second place there is a difficulty about the language of the last words of the sentence, if Sir A. Grant takes them to mean the same superiority reckoned twice over. With all due deference to him, I have grave doubts whether the Greek can mean this. It might mean superiority in both quality and quantity, or in two distinct factors of qualitative value, but the same superiority reckoned twice does not appear to me a legitimate translation. Lastly, his rendering does not make clear the aptness of the word *ἄκρον*, since he does not indicate by it any definite middle term.

Michelet's view of the passage is still less free from objections. According to him the two parties are warned against making over to each other all that they have and instituting a proportion afterwards: because, he says, when the proportion 'ut agricola ad sutorem, ita frumentum ad calceum' is only made after the 'simple' exchange is over, 'alterum extremum.....utramque exsuperantiam habebit, i. e., ut dicit Muretus, et plus et minus. Alter enim plus dabit, minus accipiet; (agricola,) alter plus accipiet, minus dabit, (sutor,) quippe cum agricola qui sutorem excedit dignitate minus opus accipiat et majus opus sutori det, qui ab ipso superatur.' This explanation of *ὅταν ἀλλάζονται* may be grammatically feasible, but it does not seem very felicitous. The parties to such a transaction either intend from the first to settle a proper rate of exchange later, or they do not intend it. If they do not, we find two tradesmen content to exchange wares without any regard to their value. If this

be condemned, the alternative is even more extraordinary. Two men meet, of whom one says to the other, 'See now, I have wares to dispose of and so have you. I'll give you my wares, if you will give me yours, and we will see whether they are worth one another afterwards.' It would seem too that when they give over playing at exchange, and begin to effect one in earnest, they must either begin by restoring each other's goods or barter back to each other at the right rate the goods they wanted to get rid of; one of them being perhaps left better off than before, but not in any condition answering to the words of the text.

But though Michelet's general theory of this passage is very far from satisfactory, he has arrived, if I may venture to say so, by a wholly erroneous road at what seems to me the right rendering of ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς. It does mean 'plus et minus,' though not in the way he and Muretus fancy. The key to the whole passage may be found in these words, and if we turn to the preceding chapter of this Book we can have no doubt of their meaning. It is explained there (v. 4. 8—12) that if we take two lines *A* and *B* of equal length and cut off from *A* as much as we add on to *B*, the latter will exceed *A* by twice the part added. If *A* had been shortened without *B* being lengthened, *B* would have exceeded *A* by that part taken once only, but when *B* receives an addition at the same time, it must exceed *A* by twice the part in question. Cut off *C* from *A* and add it to *B*: then *B* is longer than *A* by twice *C*. In Aristotle's own words, ἐπὰν δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῆρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ δὲ, ἐνὶ αὐτῷ μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν· τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνὶ, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῆρέθη, ἐνὶ. It must surely be this to which our passage refers, and we have only to ask what proportion instituted after the exchange would give to one party a double superiority of this kind.

Let us suppose the two parties to be a tailor with two coats for barter and a hatter with four hats, and a tailor's wares to be worth double a hatter's (ὑπερ τις πρὸς τινά). Having made the exchange, the hatter becomes possessed of

two coats and the tailor of four hats. But the tailor, being a good man of business and having his own opinion of the matter, does not rest content with this. 'I have here some hats,' he says, 'and you have some coats. Now my wares are worth double yours: what if I give you a hat and you give me two coats for it?' This I think is the snare against which Aristotle would warn the honest hatter. At any rate the words describe just such an exchange. One coat being worth two hats, if the tailor gave one hat for one coat, he would have one excess only (*εἰ ἀφῆρέθη μὲν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ, οὐκ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν*), but in giving one hat for two coats, he seems to get both the excesses, *ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς*, that is, to give less and receive more than he should in just the same proportion. The rate of exchange remains the same, but the terms are inverted.

Of course this involves as well the minor fallacy of making the addition of a coat equivalent to the subtraction of a hat, which by the supposition it is not. If therefore anyone thinks such an exchange as this too absurd to be alluded to, I will not undertake to show that it is not. But at least this explanation gives an exact meaning not only to the whole passage but also to each part of it: *ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται* enjoys in full its only possible meaning: *τὸ ἄκρον* and *ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς* are explained by what has gone before, and we are presented with a scheme of proportion, which, if monstrous, is not impossible.

II.

Ar. Eth. v. 8. 10. 'Ο δ' ἐπιβουλεύτας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ. ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ, ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ.

When an act is done in anger, a question arises concerning the justice or injustice of the act which prompted it. If that were just, this is unjust: but if that were unjust, this is just. The former action is not in dispute as a matter of fact. The only question is as to its justice. 'Now,' say the

translators in continuation, 'the man that has plotted against another cannot be ignorant of it, and the consequence is that one man thinks himself injured, the other does not.' But who is the plotter here? and how are we to distribute what follows?

According to Sir Alexander Grant the plotter is ὁ ὀργισθείς, the man provoked by anger to retaliation. But it is hard to see how ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας can thus apply to a man expressly said to act οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας (9), especially if we compare VII. 6. 3, ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος. If he nurses his anger and plots vengeance at his leisure, he must lose his character of ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν (9). Then οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ is pointless in reference to him, and either the words following must refer to the angry instead of the provocative act, which is the one under discussion, or we have to translate, 'the man who from anger has plotted against another is well aware of what he has done, so that he thinks himself injured and the other does not:' the whole of which makes but poor sense.

The idea that ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ is put in parenthetically seems to me quite inadmissible, as it would be at best a tasteless anticipation of ἀν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ. We are therefore thrown on the competing supposition that ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας is the author of the provocative act. The sense will then vary according as we take ὁ δ' οὐ to mean that he does not think himself injured or does not think the angry man injured. In the former case we get for meaning 'the man who has plotted against another is well aware of it, so that he does not think himself injured, while the other does,' which is hardly to the point: while in the second case we should only have his consciousness of having plotted against the other given as a reason for his not thinking the other an injured man.

In this conflict of impossible translations I would suggest that οὐκ in οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ negatives what follows, ὥστε κ.τ.λ. expressing what would be the results of ἄγνοια, and they being negated along with it. This appears to give a very simple sense. When a man has plotted against another, he cannot remain in such ignorance of what he has done as to think

the other's complaints of injustice unfounded, but having injured him deliberately (*ἀν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ*) he acted unjustly and knows it. This sense is manifestly contained in *ἀν δ' ἐκ π. β.*, and I see no reason why it should not begin to be expressed at *ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας*.

III.

Ar. Eth. VII. 8. 4. Τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλήσιους, Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσιν, δρῶσι δ' οἷάπερ οἱ ἀξύνετοι.

There seems no sufficient authority for the γὰρ sometimes found after *Μιλήσιοι*. Since then Demodocus was a writer in verse and has some epigrams in the Anthology, we might read

*Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
Οὐκ εἰσιν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι.*

HERBERT RICHARDS.

NOTE ON EXODUS, XX. 4, 5.

IN the A. V. the second commandment stands thus :

"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth : thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them, &c."

With regard to this translation it is to be observed, first, that according to it the worship of images only is prohibited, and not the worship of external objects, such as the sun, the moon, and the like ; and secondly, that in order to justify it grammatically the reading of the text should have been תְּמוּנָה instead of תְּמוּנָה. The translation is further unfortunate in rendering תְּמוּנָה by 'likeness,' as if it were merely a synonym for פֶּסֶל 'a graven image.' Upon examining all the passages in which תְּמוּנָה occurs, it will be found, I think, that it is an abstract term, signifying 'shape, form, figure,' and therefore is not something of which it could be said 'Thou shalt not make.' It is that in an object which may be imitated, but it is not the figure made in imitation. In every case in which it occurs it may be adequately rendered by 'form,' as in Num. xii. 8 ; Deut. iv. 12, 15 ; Job iv. 16 (of the figure seen by Eliphaz) ; and Ps. xvii. 15 (where תְּמוּנַתְּךָ stands in parallelism with פְּנִיֶךָ). The only passages which remain are those closely connected with Ex. xx. 4, 5 : they are Deut. iv. 16, 23, 25, v. 8. In all these I regard פֶּסֶל as in construction with and not in apposition to תְּמוּנָה, and would render the two words, 'a graven image of (i.e. representing) any form.' In fact פֶּסֶל is analogous to צֶלֶם, and תְּמוּנָה to תְּבִנִית, צוּרָה, and תֵּאֵר.

I would therefore translate the second commandment literally thus: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image; and (as to) any form that is in the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth, thou shalt not bow thyself down to them, nor be made to serve them, &c."

WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.

ON GLOSSOLOGY.

(Continued from p. 66.)

III.

I HAVE said that by a *phone* I mean any sound (linguistically) significant: and I think it is best to leave the word with a degree of generality and looseness in the use of it, because the true nature of phonism is not a thing which we can at all as yet define, but is one of the principal things which it is the object of our glossological researches to determine. If we use the term 'phone,' in the first instance, of the primary significant sounds of a language, those which, if we could conceive the language in process of formation, would be the first formed, and which in a process of decomposition inversely similar to that of formation would remain, like the skeleton, longest, then such phones may be schematized into every variety of phonoschematism which forms the phonal language. Or if we use the term of these later schematisms, phones (in this sense) may be analysed, compounded, modified, into other phones, and to those which are not soluble we may give the appellations of roots, bases, &c. It is very important in settling the nomenclature we are to use not to prejudge the results of operations it is to help us in, and for that purpose it must be left general.

The primary phones are analysable into various sounds and articulations: and if it is desired to exhibit them to the eye (that part of language which we call writing) such analysis is of course the most natural preparation for it. Hence we are led to other important investigations subordinate to the general distinction of phonism and noematism. Speaking generally, a complete examination of the human vocal organism will exhibit the whole amount of phonic power, or sum of vocal elements, possible, and the relation of these to each other: and by a converse process each actually existing utterance may be methodically analyzed, and its mechanical conditions, and the relations of its parts, determined. I am accustomed to use the term 'stomatism' in regard to investigations of this kind, for some confusion has arisen, in a way which we shall see presently, from an idea of their having a more close and necessary relation to language and linguistic writing than they really have: but many names might possibly be better.

The main importance of stomatistic investigations is with reference to writing, or the exhibition of phones to the eye: the science of writing is the second important subject subordinate to true glossology.

Any visual percept might, speaking generally, be one way or another pictorially represented to the eye, and *any* thing might be so represented conventionally, if the convention could be set on foot. Hence, independent of the phonism of a language, the noematism of it might be represented to the eye, or written, if we like so to call it, by symbols naturally suggesting themselves for the visual percepts, and by others agreed upon for abstract terms and those related to other senses than the eye. It might be well to call such quasi-writing or exhibition to the eye by other than vocal elements, *sematism*, and the symbols *semes*.

In the same manner of course the phonism of a language might be exhibited conventionally to the eye just like the abstract terms above, without the phones undergoing any resolution for the purpose into their vocal elements. This would be *phonosematism*.

But practically, writing has always been by the vocal ele-

ments of the phones, represented by *phonograms* or letters, and arranged in what we call an alphabet. It is not however alphabetic letters only which constitute phonograms: a phonogram is any representation to the eye of a supposed or assumed vocal element, insignificant itself; any exhibition on paper of any abstracted part or element of that complicated whole which makes up the phonism of language.

The natural illustration of *noematography* is that solitary instance in which we all use it, the case of *numerals*. The Arabic numeral signs (as were the Greek) are *noematosemes*, i.e. they have no relation to the phonal names of the numbers in any language. The Roman numeral signs were however probably all, with the exception of that for unity and the repetitions of it, *phonosemes* or modifications of such.

We all run into petty *noematosematism* when we express anything by an abbreviation of a symbolic character, and into *phonosematism* when we express words by the initial letter of them. The complication of the hieroglyphic writing I suppose arises from the undistinguished mixture of these two processes (not however perhaps for abbreviation) with common phonogrammatism. A hieroglyphic symbol may be a simple phonogram or letter, united with others to represent a phone: or it may be a phonoseme (probably in this case the initial phonogram representing the whole phone, as with us): or it may be a regular hieroglyphic sign or noematoseme.

The two instances which I have cited of partial noematography, the numeral signs and the hieroglyphic quasi-pictures, show the two opposite directions from which the tendency to such representation arises, and it is the inconsistency and irreconcilability of these which makes such a process unfit for general language. Mathematical relations of every kind, and all abstract relations connected with them, may very well be represented in their noematism without the intervention of phonism: and so on the other hand may perceptual relations, and concrete ones connected with them (for the exceptions, with reference to senses other than sight, would be inconsiderable).

In a general way, the Chinese written language has been

assumed to be a true noematography, and much ingenuity has been exercised in tracing visual dianoematism in some of its complicated semes, and even moral and historical conclusions have been thus drawn. At present more doubt seems to be entertained as to the extent or reality of this noematography. At least a great number of semes have been analysed into two parts, the one part a phonoseme (giving the pronunciation), the other a noematoseme as regards that word, but what may be the farther nature of it, I suppose, being doubtful.

Practically however writing, as I have said, has always been phonogrammatic, or by vocal elements. About this it is important to consider for a moment how much the writing has to express and how much it *does* express.

The phonism and the noematism, we must conclude, exactly correspond or coincide, or at least, if there is anything in the noematism which is incommunicable by the phonism, it does not properly belong to language. On the other hand, if the phonogrammatism fails to express a part of the phonism, such phonism does not therefore cease to belong to language. But phonism thus understood is an exceedingly complicated thing, involving articulation, tone, pitch, accent, and, it may be, other things, all of which go to the expression, and each one of which is susceptible of an almost infinite variety. Under these circumstances the phonogrammatism in various languages has been very various in attempt and extent.

The articulations or movements of the mouth are of course the most roughly distinguishable among the particulars mentioned above, and the most natural phonograms, or perhaps we may say the most natural alphabet or syllabarium, would consist of what we call consonants. The question whether we are to consider such phonograms as syllables including the vowels rather than as what we call letters, does not seem one of great consequence, being the same sort of question as whether we are to consider them to include the tone, the accent, &c. It is in fact the question how much of the word we are to consider as actually *written* in the phonograms, and how much understood.

It is evident that when a phone containing all we have mentioned above is represented by phonograms, these put together,

whatever we may define to be their individual power, cannot make up the whole expression needed, but there must be much unexpressed or understood. This great amount of *hypophonism* which goes along with phonogrammatism is a most important thing for us to take into account when we talk of language as being ambiguous. Written language has been understood with a most limited amount of phonograms; but it usually happens that, as writing becomes more common, new phonograms are introduced to represent something which was phonally expressed, though not written, before. The Greek alphabet certainly grew, whatever were the steps of its growth, and a small set of phonograms of a different and most refined order were as we know added to it, the accents, the representatives of a particular phonal delicacy which we can hardly recover. In the same way the Hebrew had a new system of phonograms added, we may say, to its alphabet, the points: and so perhaps for other languages. Punctuation again is phonogrammatism of a more refined order still: a note of interrogation is a most important phonogram, representing on paper that particular tone of voice which is understood by the hearer as marking *interrogation*; such a tone is in fact the phonal sign of the (noematic) interrogative mood, and answers to the special schematism of the phone by which other moods are distinguished.

Now it is important to trace the way in which, and the purpose for which, phonogrammatism has thus extended itself. Phonograms are representations of stomatism; but their excellence consists in their representing clearly and without ambiguity the phone to which the stomatism goes: purely stomatistic accuracy is subordinate to this. Phonogrammatism prefers in all cases what helps the distinctness of the phone to an over-refinement or scrupulosity in the representation of the stomatism. This may be seen in reference to our own language. If we were to think it necessary that our writing should exhibit the phonal sounds with exact stomatistic accuracy, we should have to do a vast deal more than what is now commonly called 'phonography,' and should have to make an analysis of the most alarming character, which would well-nigh make all writing impossible. A very small part of such an analysis has

been made, I suppose, by Sanscrit grammarians, and the result has been to create difficulties of writing in their language which, one would think, must have interfered much with the practical use of it. And in the same manner, if we were to write accurately as we speak, we should find that a letter is not unfrequently stomatized differently according to the letter which it adjoins, and therefore ought to have more than one sign: we should find that in most cases one word would not pass into another without one or both of the letters thus brought into contact becoming modified in their pronunciation, and not unfrequently a transitional letter pronounced between them. In regard of all this we naturally conclude that it is beyond the purpose of writing, writing being with us for the purpose of phonal comprehension, and any accuracy of it which goes beyond this being misplaced.

I would say one word on what is now called phonography, to which I have made allusion. Historically, writing is naturally more stable than speech, and the phonogrammatism usually, to a certain degree, gets left behind by the stomatism, words being spelt as they were pronounced long ago, not as they are pronounced now. Sometimes too the language may have been badly written, and the phonogrammatism may represent the stomatism not only imperfectly, but inaccurately. Now in these respects steady and continual reform, so to call it, is most desirable and necessary, and is what, when the language is healthy, does go on. The desirableness or not of *revolution* depends on the manner in which it is likely to be carried out, and the *a priori* probability being at any time strong against its being carried out well, it may be considered generally as undesirable. In fact what man in England, or what hundred men, are to be entrusted with the rewriting of our own or any old language? For the very reason that the letters express the actual phonism fifty times more incompletely than the spelling-revolutionists assert, I should be disposed to say, we had better leave things as they are. It is a question whether, as a curiosity, the minute determination of the actual stomatism of the English language in its different dialectic pronunciations at this moment is possible, and were it so, and

could it on scientific principles be determined how much of this should be exhibited in writing for common use, there would be little advantage in fixing what would speedily get loose again, and in making a disturbance through the whole of literature for a very temporary purpose.

It may be seen that I do not quite agree either with the phonographers or with their opponents in the way in which this question is usually treated. I do not think with the one that antiquarians are the people whose wish is to be consulted, but neither do I think with the other that foreigners are. Language is neither for the one nor for the other of these, but for the people who use it, whose language it is. What is important to them about the writing, is that it should be such as most to subserve clearness or distinctness of meaning in the phones or words, the difficulty of learning being in their case not very different whatever the writing is. It is only people of some education and thought who can write sounds by hearing them, however accurately they may be phonogrammatized; and the process of learning to read or write in one's own language is the becoming familiar with the word as written and spoken. Bad spelling arises from having mislearned the elements of the word, and this from many other causes besides imperfectness in the phonogrammatism of it.

One reason why I have wished, at the risk I fear perhaps of some confusion in language, to appropriate the word *phone* as I have, is to help us to keep in mind the cardinal principle that the historical elements or units of significant sound are significant, and that their significance is the reason of their individuality and their existence. It is for the purposes of writing only that we analyse this significant sound into non-significant elements or units, which we represent by phonograms. There is danger lest we should be led to think that significant sound is really put together, for the utterance of it, in the same way that, after we have analysed it, we put together in writing the phonograms representing its various parts: and perhaps this may be united with ideas about the origin of language, and of the most rudimentary vowel sounds being

used to express the simplest things, &c. But the real relation of language to reason appears to be, that, as a part of man's constitution, there is a primary impulse to vocal sound, on the occasion of the observation of anything or the consciousness of another's presence, in the same way as there is to corporeal motion, every organ being associated with an impulse to its use. Practically, this impulse receives direction, form, character, from the surrounding circumstances, from imitation, society, instruction: so far as these are absent, the development is not a normal human one. But though thus, for the carrying it out, the phonal impulse requires an arbitrary element to be super-added, yet still, as impulses, it and the noematic impulse go hand-in-hand; and without the feeling of something to express, we should feel no *nisus* after expression. The forming of an idea in our mind and the forming of a phonal sound are two things entirely different in themselves, but towards which nature has given us a single or united impulse, so that under normal human circumstances language and sensation or observation go on in conjunction. And they both actually proceed, not by way of synthesis from the element to the compound, from the abstractly simple to the concretely complicated, but from one compound or complication to another according to the laws of perception and phonal impulse, a certain degree of analysis and distinction necessarily accompanying this succession and comparison. There is an exact analogy between the noem and the expressing phone: each is highly complicated and compound, but to the mind, previous to scientific analysis, it is one and simple, its essence being in this oneness: and it is because of this unity of effort, sum, and result, in a complicated phonal sound, that such sound so fitly expresses noematism. A child is in very much the same circumstances of passive knowledge in regard of the *idea* 'father' that he is of knowledge connected with action in regard of the *sound* 'father.' Each of them is highly complicated, but not so to him, to whom they are probably respectively units of knowledge and of speech: the sound is not consciously uttered by its elements any more than the perceptual idea is formed by a synthesis or induction of sensations.

The scientific analyst may proceed for his own purposes to analyse noematism and phonism into their respective elements, and may then represent these elements and their composition as he will: the elements of noematism, however, must of course always be significant. Symbols representing these elements, as elements, are what I have called *noematograms* and *phonograms* respectively, as distinguished from *semes*, which represent the wholes or compounds. Both of these analyses have been abundantly laboured at, though of course that of noematism is so vast that what has been done has been but of a partial kind; but the attempts at establishment of categories, &c., have all been of this character. The most consistent attempt, I suppose, at the whole analysis, noematism and phonism in conjunction, has been that of Bishop Wilkins, in his "Essay towards a Philosophical Language and Real Character." He has in this attempted, first, a complete *noematology*, or analysis of ideas and of thought in general into its elements, finding the number of these elements not to be considerable: for each of these elements he has proposed a symbol or noematogram, making a noematogrammatic alphabet analogous to the phonogrammatic ones; he has then written various things, the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, &c., in the noematogrammatic manner, which is of course independent of any phonal or particular language, and is, or ought to be, intelligible to any one understanding the philosophy and elements of noematism. He goes on indeed to do something which is superfluous, considering this language is only for the eye, by assigning phonal or rather vocal elements to the noematograms in a perfectly arbitrary manner; in fact, any association of sound with noems or noematic elements must be, except in a very few exceptional cases, entirely arbitrary.

Wilkins also gives a very elaborate phonal analysis, and phonogrammatic system, so that his book is at least, whatever else may be said of it, exceedingly complete.

There are two points in which the analogy fails between noematic and phonal analysis. Phonal possibility, so to call it (*i. e.* the sum of possible articulate sound), may perhaps be as vast in extent as noematic possibility (*i. e.* the sum of what

can be expressed), or even more so, since it has to suffice for a vast variety of languages; but phonism is all by means of a limited number of definite organs which at once lay down boundaries for the determination and description of it, whereas the elementary principles of noematism lie, not on the nearer, but on the farther side, of the great field of investigation and science in which we want language to aid us. To whatever extent and perfection then phonal analysis may ultimately be carried, there is a rough and immediate analysis of it always ready at hand, sufficient for the common purposes of language and its phonogrammatism: to this there is no analogy in the vast analytic processes of noematism: each one attempt at these must be a sort of struggle to map out the whole of knowledge, and may therefore, in respect of the progress of knowledge, be as likely a hindrance as a help.

The second point is this: in knowledge, what we want first is a help against the despotism of the eye, and it is the ear and phonism which give us this; we want phonism to help our abstractive power: and whereas phonism, for analysis, is a simple action, a uniform thing, noematism is a vast mass of different sorts of being, which it is doubtful whether we should ever have had the idea of analysing, had it not been for a covert phonism. Bishop Wilkins puts an odd hieroglyphic, or noematogram, for the abstraction "magnitude," we will say, or "power," but it is exceedingly doubtful whether the abstraction could have been made at all without the help of phonism, without the ear helping us against the eye: and the noematograms which represent abstraction, are then really phonosemes of an implied phone. In this I only mean nomination to this extent, that so far as we conceive abstractions representable to the eye as things or by symbols, so far we assume them to have an existence which can only be a phonal one: as noems they are cognisable in connexion with other noems in context or train of thought, but they do not constitute separate objects for mental contemplation; if they are to be made such, it can only be by means of phonism. This, however, is rather abstruse, and the point of it for the present purpose is only this, that attempts at noematic analysis *imply*

phonism, and are not true analyses of a thing separate from and independent of it.

There is a remarkable analogy both for goodness and badness, which may be mentioned here, between the effect of phonal language on imagination and observation, and that of writing on phonal language. The former is in each case to a certain extent, and when the mind is active, a help to the latter, and to a certain extent, and when the mind is inactive, a hindrance. In passing within sight of a group of mountains, or through a new country, it is hardly possible to imprint what is seen upon the memory, or to enter into the significance of the detail, without a certain degree of unification and naming of the parts, that is, without the association of the imagination with phonal language: in this respect the latter is a great help. On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive, till we see it, the extent to which, if the mind is inactive and incurious, phonal language, or the knowing the name of a thing, damps and deadens interest in the looking at it. With such minds, the only apparent object in looking at a thing is to classify it in their language: anything known to be a church or a castle, whatever its peculiarity or beauty, excites no interest; while the most insignificant phenomenon not readily nameable draws attention. This subserviency of observation to language is a fact of great consequence; a fact not blameable or contemptible in so far as it is natural. I only make reference here to a bad result of it.

So much for the effect of phonal language on imaginative interest in things: the effect of writing on phonal language is analogous. All reasoning involves an abstract element, and this abstraction is helped, as I have mentioned, by writing, in the same way that imagination is helped by language. That is, in default of anything representable, or visibly conceivable, in the abstraction itself, the written phone expressing it takes a sort of reality in the representing imagination, and becomes invested with a sort of character, and associated with some of the feelings and thoughts which belong to the abstraction which we cannot represent. True *nominalism*, as a metaphysical theory, could hardly, I should think, have arisen without

the fact of writing, without, that is, the quasi-visible reality given to the sound or phone by the expression of it in writing, by the writing, in fact, becoming a sort of substratum or centre for the imagination to associate the qualities or accidents of the abstraction with: so closely was the idea of existent reality, upon which all that discussion turned, associated with visibility. Of course this helps to show the baselessness of such theories, writing being, in comparison with other parts of language, quite an accident of it.

But just as phonal language gives people a sort of abstract knowledge of things which, in the case of inactive minds, supersedes the imaginative and observing powers, so that, if they know the name of a thing, they see only the general abstraction, and do not *look*, or give any attention to the particular characters: so writing, in giving people a sort of power of *representing* abstractions, diminished the imaginative interest and vigour of phonal language. Independent of writing, phonal language has to try to master the abstraction by varied and energetic presentation of what it is involved in, by more active schematism, more emphatic dianoematism: these powers to a certain degree fade with the fixing of the abstraction in letters.

IV.

I will now briefly indicate what seem to me to be the main lines of research in the philosophy of language.

§ I. In respect of noematism, I suppose there are three main things to be done, (1) to determine the centres of the noems, (2) to fix their boundaries, and (3) to enumerate or classify them.

(1) By determining the centres of the noems, I mean the ascertaining the relation of what we may call the main or cardinal meaning of a phone to the sub-meanings, of the *protonoem* to the *paranoems*, or whatever we may call them. This is what is now pretty thoroughly done for the particular cases in good dictionaries, as in Liddell and Scott: the question is whether it is not possible, systematically and generally, to fix the laws according to which such paranoems become formed, to distinguish, name, and arrange these, to a certain

degree like species under the general noem as genus. In fact, in ascertaining the laws of deflection from the type-meaning, of sub-formation of secondary meanings, we can go much farther than such an analogy would suggest.

Of course in looking into an old dictionary, or some dictionaries at present (take, as a mere instance, Richardson's Arabic and Persian dictionary as formed a good deal on Oriental plans), one is inclined to draw the conclusion that words have no definite meaning at all; so multifarious, arbitrary, and unconnected appears the catalogue of possible renderings for each one of them. Lexicography has now, I suppose, in most cases of the comparison of one language with another, grouped these lists into proper order and subordination, so that we are able to understand the possibility of such variety of meaning, and the different degrees, so to call it, and relations of meaning: this might probably now, by the putting together of particular cases, be converted into definite theory and law.

(2) By fixing the boundaries of noems, I mean the accurate discrimination between noems or words bordering on or resembling each other (what I should call *homœonoems*), that important part of the philosophy of language which has been very extensively cultivated under the name of the investigation of synonyms. This latter has generally gone upon a double method, making it very interesting, but in some respects likely to lead to error, in a manner which we have rather need now to guard against. It has been in fact an investigation of dianoematism as well as of homœonoematism; and very often the dianoematism, rather than the distinction in use, the real test and essence of noematism, has been made, to a great extent, the means and instrument of distinguishing the homœonoems. I shall say a word or two on dianoematism presently, and in regard of synonyms need not now say more.

(3) The enumeration or classification of noems, which is in fact the same thing as the analysis of noematism attempted by Bishop Wilkins, though neither possible nor desirable as a basis for or instrument of language, as he intended it, yet as a result of an investigation and comparison of actual language, is a great thing to look forward to. We do not so

much need to mend language as to learn from it, and this latter is one of the best roads open to philosophy now. Philosophers having exhausted their lungs for many generations in denouncing the hindrance which actual language has been to them in their researches, through its incompleteness and its mistakes, will probably now, in the revolutions of human affairs, go upon the other tack, and accept the noematism of language as giving them, so far as it goes, a photograph of reality and existence, from the study of which they may make out and exhibit the main features of them with better success than has attended their study of the originals. Reality and man's mind are made for each other, and man's systematic way of viewing things, setting aside the possible deceptions of the senses, is sure to be, to the depth to which it goes, a true representation of them: and language will show us this.

A complete *noematicon* would be a catalogue of words in all languages, according to their difference of meaning; that is, words of identical signification would be considered as identical. Such a catalogue would be in fact a new language, containing, or able to express, every possible variety of meaning which any actual language has expressed, or can express. All noematism must be expressed by phonism, for noematogrammatism like Wilkins's is, as I have said, chimerical, and really involves phonism; and therefore we must call the noems by phonal names, it being understood that these are absolutely arbitrary or indifferent, and that whether I say *κύων*, or say "dog," the noem is the same.

A language involving in itself all the noematism of particular languages is perfectly conceivable, and must of course be a more complete and full view of the universe than the partial noematism of any particular language can be. Large portions of the several partial noematisms will coincide, certain portions will be inconsistent, or have to coexist side by side as alternative views or processes; but each partial noematism will probably exhibit portions of reality which others do not, and the sum of truth and knowledge in the whole will be greater than exists in any of the partial constituents.

§ II. But leaving noematism, to proceed to the other parts

of the philosophy of language: the next is noematoschematism, on which only one word needs saying.

The subject is one which, under the names of philosophical, general, universal, or natural, grammar, has been very extensively treated, and with abundant ability. It is very closely connected with logic, in fact is probably the truest form of logic, and is more likely to be productive of valuable results than the formal or quantitative logic of the schools. It is a subject which, as it seems to me, is rendered easier by our definitely putting before ourselves the relation to each other of noematism and phonism as I have described them. The difficulty in philosophical grammar is the keeping it quite clear of the individualities of any particular language: a thing which some will say is not possible. The fact is, that all noematism must be treated through phonism, and all phonism is arbitrary and particular; and there is a second difficulty also, that of the dianoematism, which is itself to a great extent arbitrary and particular, or at least must be supposed possibly so, it being an important linguistic problem whether any dianoematism, and what, can be considered natural and universal. Under these circumstances, the only thing to be done is to express the noematism boldly by any particular dianoematism and phonism we like to adopt for the purpose, keeping in mind that these latter are for the purposes of expression only. We may compare "I have done" and "feci," in respect to their noematism, their dianoematism, or their phonism, but whichever way we compare them, we must still describe or express them somehow. The comparison of them as noems is the ascertaining how far they express the same or different *times*, momentary or continuous, of action: the dianoematic comparison is the comparison of the expression by means of the participle, and the new possessional noem "have," with the expression by means of a simple schematism (possibly itself involving a defaced dianoematism) like "feci:" the phonal comparison is the seeing whether there is any phonal relation between the two, whether any parts of each represent the same roots, &c. But of this enough.

§ III. We next come to phonism, the problem of which in

its entirety I suppose may be said to be the construction of a complete *phonarium*, or catalogue of human significant sound. I use the word *phone* in a general sense here, because, as I have said before, the relation between *phone* and *phonoschematism* is part of the linguistic problem, and no premature assumptions must be made about it. Using the word 'roots,' such a catalogue would be a catalogue of roots and a system of the laws of schematism of roots in all its existing variety; subordinate to which would be two other systems of laws, the one embracing the laws of vocal or stomatic deflection or variation of the phones, that is, a system of the different stomatisms of the same phone in different languages; the other embracing the laws of noematic deflection and variation of the phones, that is, a system of the different distribution of the phones in different languages, among the noems. I do not however wish to use the word *root* more than necessary, lest one should get into the error of supposing roots like the Sanscrit ones (which I conclude are grammatical abstractions from actual phonism) to be the real elements of phonal language in the sense that they are to be considered as actual language and significant sound themselves: it is important not to prejudge what linguistic research may show to be their nature.

The extent of common phonism in different languages (in order to the discovery of which we have to eliminate the three divergences, (1) that of different schematism, (2) that of different stomatism, (3) that of different noematic application), is a problem of so much interest in regard of the history of the human race, that we cannot wonder at its being one to which a very large part of linguistic research has been directed. Phonism being (as I have said before, and as I suppose there is no occasion to try to prove) in all its main features arbitrary, common phonism indicates communication, and common phonism in regard of the simpler and more elementary parts of language indicates common parentage and original unity. The extent to which the same thing is indicated by common noematism and common dianoematism is perhaps hardly to be ascertained; in respect of these it may be doubted whether we shall ever succeed in drawing with accuracy the line between the arbitrary

and the natural, and distinguishing the results of similarity of nature and circumstances from those of historical communication: but phonism is essentially historical.

Those who are interested morally and historically in this problem will be wise not to trouble themselves much at the dicta of philologists on the subject, in respect of *want* of such phonal correspondence, till linguistic research has been carried much further than it has as yet. The disguise, transmutation, and displacement, which the deflections mentioned above will make among the phones, may of course be so great that not only the minutest knowledge of the several languages, but a certain degree of positive knowledge of the deflectional laws, may be required for the recognition of them. A very little experience of common conversation will convince any one who has given a thought to etymology that there is no more dangerous negative than to lay down, from superficial unlikeness, that a given word in one language can have nothing to do with a certain one in another, and though the laugh at fanciful etymologists may be the louder, the laugh at their off-hand contradictors is often the more reasonable.

Popular etymology, which is so interesting, is the stripping phones thus of their disguise, and recognizing them perhaps in another language, with different schematism, stomatism and noematism, for the same. The difference of schematism is that part of the grammar of the languages, which is often comprehended in books under the head of etymology. In regard to the difference of stomatism, single etymologies (except as connected with historical researches) ought not now to be attended to unless supported by analogy. The investigation is one for which no absolute method can be laid down, and the only test of the trustworthiness of any results which may be arrived at is their harmony together and the consistency of the analogies which they involve. Sometimes it is similarity of meaning which will lead us to infer correspondence of phonism, sometimes it is the stomatic similarity itself: but whatever result we come to must be such as to satisfy an analogy and fall into a system, and it is only in a certain degree of completeness there can be any presumption of truth.

Systematic comparison of this kind is to a certain degree prejudiced by the somewhat random manner in which moral or general conclusions are sometimes drawn from correspondences too rapidly assumed: this applies however more to dianoematism, of which I shall speak presently.

What degree of actual stomatic difference is really represented by the difference as it appears in writing between a given phone in one language and its *antallel* or correspondent in another, is a thing that is very difficult to say. The most direct and immediate *antallelisms* are very often cases in which, to the superficial concluder from the writing, no kind of resemblance between the two phonal forms is traceable. The *stomatism* of a dead language is to a great degree irrecoverable, because we often find it difficult to discover even the normal value of a phonogram or letter in it, and of the degree of consistency and accuracy with which the language was written, the accuracy, that is, with which the writing expressed the stomatism, we can form still less idea. It may therefore and, I believe, does very constantly happen, that the stomatic or real difference between the forms of a phone in two languages is not near so great as the written or apparent one.

It may then I conclude be taken as a linguistic axiom that between any two given languages there is a definite stomatic relation, the laws of which being given, if the form of a phone is given in one language, we can find the form of it, provided it exists *in situ* and at home, in the other. This stomatic relation is complicated with the writing, and the difficulty which this complication introduces is one great obstacle to the discovery of it: for the writing in the two cases has also its history, its laws and its deflection, and both historical knowledge and theoretic knowledge of the relations of different elements of vocal sound are necessary. When the laws of phonal correspondence between two languages are found, then the closest resemblance between two phones in the several languages which does not accord with this analogy, if it is not historically accountable for as an introduction, must be but chance and coincidence.

Whether however any scheme or system can be found out,

according to which phones in two different given languages have a different noematic application, is a doubtful question, and probably so far as the matter separates itself in practice from the attempt to trace the same phone in different languages, the consideration of it belongs to perinoematism, which we shall speak of in a moment. It is to be observed with reference to the phonal correspondence that we may trace definite laws of *periphonism*, or a regular course and progression in the phonal deflection; and many laws of this have been discovered: stomatism is very shifting and unfixed, but it apparently changes, when undisturbed, according to perfectly general laws. Supposing them known, of course the applying them to the observed amount of stomatic difference of a phone in two languages would lead to historical results, possibly of the greatest value.

§ IV. The next important line of linguistic research I will speak of is that into the nature of dianoematism, by which name, it may be remembered, I ventured to designate the expression of one idea or noem by means of another or of others. Since all abstract ideas, or noems other than percepts, are of necessity expressed in this manner, dianoematism or *physicalizing* is as necessary a step of language in their case as phonizing and writing. Dianoematism however is much more extensive than this, the actual noematic elements of language being limited in number, and everything having one way or other to be expressed dianoematically through these.

Dianoematism is a thing which has always abundantly interested people and been abundantly attended to, so much so, that care is needed to use rightly the interest which it excites, and keep it to its proper objects. By means of its dianoematism, language is itself the most perfect poetry, and the imaginative dwelling upon individual words will sometimes open out views and glimpses wider and brighter, we may say, than poetic literature has ever been able to express: with this feeling for us in addition, that the universal poetry of the human race embodied in language carries with it a necessary truth and reality above what can come from the authority of individual genius, be it what it may. The worn image and superscription of current lan-

guage, to the eye which can trace its lines, is a more faithful record of the true poetry of the universe than the best poetry made on purpose.

It is a logical question to which I suppose there is no exact answer, to what extent in our imagination words ought habitually to preserve their dianoematism and to continue *living* in this manner. The simplest answer of course is, that their doing so helps poetry, and hinders logic; for logical purposes, as soon as a word has taken its new unity, characterized by the accent and exhibitable by a definition, its dianoematism is gone, and it is no longer the sum of its dianoematic parts, but its essence and individuality consists in something which does not reside in them, something superadded to them. The dianoematism becomes history, which for the *business* of language, that is, for hard stiff logic, must retire into the background, only to be looked at so far as the everyday work of reasoning will allow us sometimes to gaze at the byepaths, hedgebanks, and fair surrounding prospects of language, of which logic is the dull highroad. Not but that after all, the secondary value of language, the value *i.e.* of what it teaches us when contemplated in itself, may be greater than anything which it can do for us in its straightforward use as an instrument of logic—on this I give no opinion.

However, it is to be considered that, logically and straightforwardly, a word does not mean its dianoematism, but means its definition, a very different thing, and a thing too, in words of common use, continually shifting according to the laws of perinoematism, the definition not being any authoritative verbal one, but such a true account as can be given of the use of the word at any given time. I have said that in distinguishing homœonoems or synonyms, and in some similar investigations, too much use may be made of the dianoematism or historical derivation: the determination of the *noem*, or accurate meaning, must be from the close examination of the word as it occurs in use.

A comparative examination of the dianoematism of different languages, would be, and has been so far as it has been effected, an investigation of the very greatest value. It is not safe I suppose

to lay down any axiom about it. What dianoematisms may be called *natural*, and what are simply historical or accidental; in what instances, and how far, they have continued living in the noematism—these questions, and many like them, remain to be answered. The tendency, which I have described above, to keep up the livingness of the dianoematism is, I suppose, associated generally with a tendency to consider dianoematisms as commonly *natural*, that is, as used for the expression of the noematism because they are the *best* way of doing it, not as having arisen accidentally. Whether they are really natural, and the best, can only be found out by an examination of various languages, to ascertain what others there are, or whether there are any. But speaking generally, we may say that they are at any rate so far accidental, that the process of *trans-dianoematism*, if we may so call it, is not one which we should commonly think reasonable. I mean when one language wanting a word from another, it does not incorporate the actual phone, the idea of which it does not possess, but translates the phones of which the other is compounded, or (which is the same thing) forms a word with its own phones of similar dianoematism or composition. This is a process which seems to have been very frequent in German. It is one which of course complicates the problem of the investigation of the naturalness of dianoematism very greatly, and involves it with historical considerations perhaps of great difficulty. It is, speaking generally, an *unnatural* process of language, and shews the language to have been at this time, and in these respects, what practical language should be as little as possible, under the control of students and learned men. Borrowing from another language is a most perfectly natural process, but the covert borrowing which consists in similar metaphor or dianoematism for the forming of words is a learned refinement, inconsistent with the freedom and richness of invention which characterizes language in its *natural* course.

Transdianoematism of course becomes still worse, and productive as we may say of positive logical error when, as is often the case, the dianoematic conditions of the two languages are different, and a dianoematism which in the one

language is rigid and with but little of separate life in it is represented in the other by one much more flexible, living and energetic. In this case it is hardly possible but that logical injury must arise, and the force of the noem yield to that of the dianoematism, which takes in the new language an appearance of more importance than it had in the old. Reasoning, however, altogether upon this matter is very difficult.

In fact the question of the relation to each other of dianoematism and noematism historically and in the mind, is about the hardest in the whole range of logical philosophy. Is it to be considered historically that all that is now dianoematism was once *bonâ fide* noematism—that as in architecture a large part of decoration represents former construction, so those who first used *explicare*, e.g. and *exponere* in the sense of ‘to explain’ had, till time wore out the image, the idea of the *explicand* definitely in their mind as something carefully wrapped up, and so for the other? But in reality, in these cases, the noem is as simple to the conception as the dianoematism, though it wants this latter to express it: the noem ‘making a thing intelligible to another,’ is not helped for conception by the dianoematism ‘laying the parts out or apart for clearer view,’ *exponere* elaborately transdianoematized into *auseinandersetzen*. The historical nature and reason of the metaphors of language is thus difficult; and their nature in the mind not less so. The question is analogous to, and in fact complicated with, some others, as with that of the nature of the unity of words and sentences. That is to say, the more the dianoematism is kept living in a language as against the noematism, the less do the words tend to cohere, and the language is more polyphonous and monosyllabic: and, the analogy running throughout all parts, as there is less *wortbildung* or cohesion of the smaller phones or phonules into elaborately formed larger ones, so there is less compactness, construction and elaboration in the sentences; less both of true verbal accent and of sentential emphasis, or of a pointedness which might be described as a sort of confusion between the two. There seems to be a difference in languages in this respect in the degree of fusion of their elements together, or (to use

another metaphor), in the degree of absoluteness and despotism with which the logic and noematism govern the subordinate relations and the dianoematism. I say nothing as to relative superiority of the two kinds of language, for there may well be certain advantages in the less degree of coherence of which I have spoken. There is doubtless more apparent *life* then in all the separate members and parts; the larger number and more elementary character of the phones gives more power of combination of them and allows more variation of the phonism to the occasion. A ready instance of the difference which I mean is furnished by a comparison of the coherence of compounded words in German with that in English, or still more in Latin. And it is evident that there must be, correspondent with this, a certain degree of difference of mental conception in regard of the dianoematism. In regard, for instance, of the great variety of noematism which a word like *schlagen* is made to express, by association with various prepositions, it is evident that the idea of *schlagen* itself must exist in some respects in the mind in a living state, and must then be felt to be modified by the preposition, not however according to the direct meaning of the preposition, but according to an association to a considerable extent accidental and arbitrary. As is the case with dianoematism in all languages, there is no sort of *natural* reason why many of the compounds of *schlagen* should mean what they do. The mental process is not easy to follow, especially when the word has to wait a long time for its prepositional or other modification, which perhaps for many seconds or lines we know is coming, though we do not know what it will be. In this case the livingness of the dianoematism, or non-coherence of the phone, acts to bind the sentence together, so far as the two extremities are concerned, inclosing it as it were in one word, but without sufficient provision (as it would appear to a spectator from another language) for the nutriment of the mind during the state of suspense which occurs while the sentence is imperfect. It is conceivable in Latin that the sentence may be representative and significant, offering a definite picture to the imagination from the beginning, each successive word adding to the idea, and the place of

the emphasis or accent being given by the construction: in this case there need be no suspense. It is possible however there may be something worse than suspense, and that is failure of sufficient marking of the unity of the sentence, which at least the suspense provides for. In fact it is an example of the manner in which language, when left to itself, will always correct its own possibilities of deficiency and provide against the evil which might arise from its own non-coherence.

I suppose then, subject to a variety of qualifications, it may be said in *general*, that the difference of phonal formative power, or if we so prefer to express it, the less cohesional attraction among phones, which makes languages rather what some have called *analytic* than *synthetic*, rather *polyphonulous* than *phonoschematic*, is analogous to, and in some respects connected with, a difference of logical characters of mind, a less boldness or willingness to sacrifice the smaller features to the main end, a greater carefulness of the materials, a wish rather to secure more ends than to be sure at all events of the one. Thus language becoming formatively less vigorous might seem to be connected with the world's becoming more cautious and older. The qualifications, however, are so numerous as perhaps to eat up the principle. History, for instance, has to be taken into account, and mixture of languages is a great agent of formative impotence: *writing* is another great agent of the same, reacting upon speech, and embalming the phones unnaturally against *periphonism*, or their natural course of change: literature multiplies the effect of writing, giving change the appearance of barbarism and vulgarity; and education in general, teaching greater facility in the use of phones as they exist, represses tendencies to the alteration of them. Besides that civilization increases the mixture of languages to an extent far more than the idea of quite distinct language represents to us: mutual communication destroys the independence of dialects, and, amongst them, of that other description of dialect to which I have already alluded, the different vocabularies in the same language of different ranks and differently employed people. Many of these historical causes will however come into con-

nexion with the character of mind I have described above : but I must not dwell on this.

On *Perinoematism* I will not say anything here, leaving this for a review of Mr Trench's books on the subject.

The last great branch of linguistic research is *Phonogrammatism*, the study of pronunciation, alphabets and writing: of the able manner in which it is now being pursued by Lepsius and others, most of my readers are probably aware.

(*To be continued.*)

VINDICIAE SOPHOCLEAE.

SOPHOCLES, Edited by LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D.,
Professor of Greek in the University of St Andrew's.
1871.

As a learner and as a teacher of Greek, from boyhood to the present time, I have owed so much to the careful and constant study of Sophocles, that I regard the interpretation of that admirable poet with a fond and somewhat jealous interest. Hence it was with a mixture of hope and anxiety that I sat down to read the three plays of the Theban Cycle, edited by Professor Lewis Campbell. The perusal of these, so far as I have carried it, has left upon my mind a strong feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction, for which I propose to account in this review of the work. I have no wish to withhold from Prof. Campbell the credit of being an elegant Greek scholar, with knowledge and taste enough to be oftener right than not, even in explaining so hard an author as Sophocles. But when I add that his insight into Sophoclean thought is not so keen, his grasp of Sophoclean style not so strong, as to save him from falling into much error, I say no more than I am prepared to establish by competent proofs to competent judges (*φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι*). I wish therefore he had taken more time for study and thought before he ventured on an enterprise so bold and difficult.

I have no taste for literary warfare: but, so far as I have to wage it here, it is forced upon me by Prof. Campbell himself. His editorial plan, not to be commended as worthy of imitation, is to ignore as much as he can the notes of previous editors and commentators, even when he avails himself of their views, even when he carries on against them a covert warfare in which

good scholars will not often award to him the palm of victory. In the first play (*Oedipus Rex*) he has only two or three times cited, very curtly, Elmsley, Hermann or Dindorf. In the *Antigone*, I perceive that he is a little more generous in his references, for besides Elmsley, he sometimes cites Donaldson, both of them scholars 'quos Libitina sacravit.' But a previous and living editor, Mr Linwood, one of the very best Greek scholars, linguistically considered, who have graduated at Oxford in the present century, is passed over altogether by Prof. Campbell both in his preface and in his notes, though certainly not unconsulted by him. When an editor is thus treated, it is not for me to complain of similar treatment, who am only a cursory annotator.

It is, however, necessary to my present purpose that I should refer to those annotations of mine. They appeared as far back as the year 1854, in Nos. II. and III. of 'the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,' as Notes on Schneidewin's edition of the *Oedipus Rex*. Their main design was to show the possibility of solving many difficulties of ancient literature, by applying to them a logical method of criticism: that is, by first observing what the nexus of thought in the place requires, and then carefully considering whether from the existing text the sense so required can be reasonably drawn. The manner in which I had been led to the discovery of the proposed meaning in most of these places, itself affords some little presumption of that meaning being true. In the work of teaching, I had always deemed it a pleasure and a duty to make myself master of an author's train of thought, and, in expounding at the close of each lesson, to place this before the class in the clearest and most forcible language at my command. Hence it came that from time to time I found myself confronted by passages of which the received and *prima facie* interpretation was, in a logical point of view, very unsatisfactory to my judgment. For some time, I suppose, I got over them as well as I could; and occasionally, I dare say, I suppressed a difficulty which presented itself to me because I was not prepared with a solution. But such passages, as often as they occurred, left their sting behind: they worried me; they were

revolved, brooded over: and the consequence was that, in many instances, the right solution came in upon my mind, like a lightning flash, when least expected. The first place of which I remember to have thus discovered the true sense by a sudden intuition, was Antig. 31, 2. The perception of Oed. T. 44, 5, came afterwards: later again that of Oed. T. 1085, 6, and yet later that of Oed. C. 308, 9, which I was extremely glad to have found out. With regard to all the interpretations here specified, having had more than twenty years in which to reconsider them, I am bound to say that my opinion remains unchanged: I have the fullest and firmest conviction that they are true, necessary, and unassailable by sound argument. Prof. Campbell has in some places (as Oed. T. 1085, 6) simply appropriated my explanation without acknowledgment; one (Oed. C. 308, 9) he has adopted at the same time that he does his utmost to spoil it: elsewhere he contends in a covert manner against me; but in no instance has he mentioned my name as a commentator on Sophocles. Such conduct, though I regard it with indifference personally, releases me from any unwillingness I might otherwise have felt to undertake the task of pointing out his many mistakes. The only regret I feel is on his account, and for the honour of literature itself, which ought to promote in its students a more generous spirit.

Before entering on a detailed examination of Prof. Campbell's commentary, I shall review the interpretation of three passages; so contrasting his method with mine, and enabling critical scholars to form their own judgment concerning them. I cannot however invite that judgment, without first placing my readers under a kind of mental engagement to disencumber themselves of all prejudice, especially of that subtle and prevailing prejudice against the New, so obstructive to all truth, which Horace bravely reprobates, Epist. II. 1. 75,

Indignor quicquam reprehendi non quia crasse
Compositum illepideve putetur, sed quia nuper,

and which Bacon has placed second among his 'Idols of the Tribe:' Nov. Org. I. 46.

'Intellectus humanus in iis quae semel placuerunt (aut quia

recepta sunt et credita aut quia delectant) alia etiam omnia trahit ad suffragationem et consensum cum illis: et licet maior sit instantiarum vis et copia, quae concurrunt in contrarium, tamen eas aut non observat aut contemnit aut distinguendo summovet et reicit, non sine magno et pernicioso praeiudicio, quo prioribus illis syllepsibus auctoritas maneat inviolata.'

'In regard to decisions once adopted, the human understanding (either because they are received and believed, or because they are pleasant) is apt to draw everything else into unison and agreement with them: and although the weight and number of the arguments on the opposite side be greater, yet it either does not observe these, or disdains them, or by some distinction sets them aside and rejects them, not without great and mischievous prejudice, in order that those former conclusions may keep their authority unimpaired.'

If this prejudice, as Bacon thinks, has so much influence in the sciences, where reasonings have generally the cogency which belongs either to experiment or to mathematical demonstration, much more must it operate in the interpretation of the ancient languages, which depends on a combination of linguistic skill, logic, and taste. Scholars are tempted to consider a new explanation of a well-known passage as a kind of personal affront. Why had it never occurred to themselves? Why, in the course of two thousand years, had it never been advanced by any commentator of any country? Why had it been left to a scholar of small note in the 19th century to detect what so many superior minds in so many successive generations had failed to see? And as no answer can be given to these really irrelevant, but eminently natural questions, judgment is likely to go against a novel interpretation (*non quia crasse, sed quia nuper*) by virtue of the law which Bacon notes, because it threatens to break a Dagon or a Bel, before which a long line of commentators and translators have been content to bow.

I. The first passage of which I shall examine Prof. Campbell's version in comparison with mine, is *Soph. Oed. R. 44, 5.*

ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι καὶ τὰς ξυμφορὰς
ζώσας ὁρῶ μάλιστα τῶν βουλευμάτων.

The view which I acquired of the true meaning of these lines grew, as I have intimated, out of a prior conviction that the ordinary rendering was logically poor and grammatically false.

The logical poverty must be shewn by observing the context; the grammatical falsity by contending that the uses of *καί*, *ζώσας*, and *ξυμφοράς* in the usual version are unsatisfactory.

In the first place then I will state the substance of the Priest's speech up to these lines; adding, side by side, the two rival interpretations of them (C. and K.), with a few remarks; that the reader may thus discern to which side the balance of logical truth and poetic feeling inclines.

After describing the misery of the Thebans under the visitation of pestilence, the Priest goes on to say: 'We come as suppliants to your altars, Oedipus, not because we deem you a god; but considering you the first of men in all affairs human or divine. For you came to Thebes, a stranger, and relieved us from the sway of the Sphinx, by solving her riddle: this you did without any aid from us: you are believed to have saved us by divine inspiration. So now, most excellent Oedipus, we beseech you to find some help for us, whether suggested to you by the voice of a god, or, it may be (*του*), by a man: since...

C.

"I see that where men have experience, their counsels live and have a prosperous end."

K.

"I see that men of experience are also most accustomed to compare their counsels together."

Prof. Campbell adds: 'Oedipus had been tried in difficulty, and his advice, resting on experience, was the more likely to succeed. The simplicity of such a maxim is no objection to this rendering.' Such is his covert polemic against me here.

The simplicity of a maxim is no objection to it, where it suits the context. Simple or not simple, it becomes objectionable where it produces disjointed thought, halting logic, and poetic bathos. Consider its effect more curtly thus:

Prof. Campbell's rendering gives this context:

'Help us, Oedipus, thou that hast shewn superhuman skill.

Find us help again now, whether shewn to you by a god, or perhaps by some man: since advice resting on experience is likely to succeed.'

How does he account for the bathos of this descent from a god to a man, from superhuman skill to experience? And if the 'advice resting on experience,' is that of Oedipus himself, as Prof. Campbell thinks, is not the disparaging suggestion (εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθά πού) worse than superfluous?

My view gives:

'Help us, Oedipus, thou that hast shewn superhuman skill: find us help again now, whether shewn to you by a god, or, perhaps (πού) by some man: since men of experience are those whom I see most in the habit of also comparing counsels with each other.'

The last clause conveys to Oedipus an excuse for the suggestion that such as he might possibly have learnt a mode of help from some man: and *ξυμφοραὶ βουλευμάτων* is the substantial form of *ξυμφέρειν βουλεύματα*, which occurs in Aesch. Pers. 534.

Here the logical nexus is close and consistent: and quite in the manner of Sophocles.

Prof. Campbell says in a note: 'it is not consistent with the laudatory tone of the address to Oedipus, who is the first of men, to advise him to take counsel with others.' This is a very shallow remark, and somewhat surprising from an editor who has written a prefatory essay on 'the Irony of Sophocles.' In the first place, the priest gives no formal advice: he suggests the possibility that Oedipus may have profited by (*οἰσθά πού*) the advice of another man: and apologizes for this suggestion by a compliment to the eminent *ἐμπειρία* which would lead him to consult others. But why the digression at all? Why the alternative between *του θεῶν* and *ἀπ' ἀνδρός* which follows the request for help (*ἀλκήν τινα*)? The insight of Prof. Campbell has not been keen enough to raise this question, much less to answer it. And yet he is not wrong in suggesting that advice is implied in the priest's words, though certainly not formally offered. All this belongs to the consummate skill with which the great dramatist has worked out his conception of the plot and of its central person. Oedipus is shewn in the first

half of the play as a man of eminent abilities and noble aspirations, but of overweening self-confidence and fierce selfwill. These merits and these faults would be no secret to any of the Thebans, least of all to the chief minister of their religion, the priest of their chief god. From his mouth therefore, the suggestion that Oedipus might already have profited by the counsel of another man (a suggestion for which the great poet makes the priest apologize by a graceful compliment) does in fact become a delicate admonition—an admonition not otherwise than 'consistent with the laudatory tone of the address,' but rather admirably supplementing and qualifying it. For if there is one virtue more than another recommended by the religious poets Aeschylus Sophocles and Pindar and by the religious historian Herodotus, that virtue is modesty, the violation of which draws down on the offender the *φθόνος θεῶν*, and thereby destruction. By whom was such a lesson more needed than by Oedipus? From whom could it come more fitly than from the priest of Zeus? How could it be conveyed more courteously than it is conveyed here? But while this is sufficient to account for the three digressive lines, I think still further reason of them can be rendered. The priest supposes a possible *θεοῦ φήμη* given to help the sufferers. 'Yes,' says Oedipus in his reply (v. 65—72), 'I have sought such aid: I have sent Creon to consult the Pythian oracle.' The oracle is brought, is reported: the suppliants quit the stage: the Theban Chorus enter the orchestra, and their first song is addressed to that oracle from which so much is expected. But has the priest's delicate admonition borne no fruit? It has not been unnoted by Oedipus. The oracle wants explanation. He has consulted his brother-in-law Creon, another *ἔμπειρος*, on this difficulty: and by his advice he has sent for the seer Teiresias. See v. 288:

ἔπεμψα γὰρ Κρέοντος εἰπόντος διπλοῦς πομπούς...

How this momentary condescension of the arrogant prince leads to a new outbreak of selfwill, and brings him to the edge of the precipice, we all know. Thus then it appears that these three lines, so grievously misunderstood by Prof. Campbell, are

nothing less than a studied and contrived link in the plot of this drama.

Having thus disposed of the logic of the passage, I go on to shew that the use of words is altogether on my side.

Prof. Campbell (still covertly polemical) says: *καί* expresses "not only are the counsels good, but their issues are also good (!)." The case is desperate, which is driven to such a shift. For the question here is not between the morally good and the useful, but of the useful only; and good counsels are those and those alone of which the issues are good: so that the emphatically situated *καί*, from Prof. Campbell's point of view, loses all emphasis, and in fact he does omit it in his own translation.

Now for *ζώσας*. The verb *ζῆν* (see Liddell and Scott's Lexicon) is (1) 'to live;' (2) in a derived sense 'to be vigorous,' 'to abide;' whence it obviously may mean 'to be in lively operation' or 'use;' and this is the sense I give to it here. So once in Aeschylus, Ag. 793 *ἄτης θύελλαι ζῶσι*. In Sophocles, Antig. 457 *οὐ γάρ τι νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε ζῆ ταῦτα*. Oed. T. 482 *τὰ δ' αἰεὶ ζῶντα περιποτᾶται*. But while even this derived sense is rare, I venture to say (until I am corrected by examples) that the sense of 'being successful,' as applied to men and their acts or counsels, never belongs to *ζῆν* in Greek literature. So that, instead of my interpretation 'increasing the difficulty of *ζώσας*,' as Prof. Campbell strangely says in his note, it retains on the contrary the derived use of *ζώσας*, as shewn above, while his sense of 'prospering' or 'being successful' is unsupported by instances. And when he renders 'live and have a prosperous issue,' he ought to be conscious that such rendering is merely delusive, seeing that, while 'live' is the literal representative of *ζώσας*, the words 'and have a prosperous issue' are gratuitously added, just to shew how *he* wishes the word 'live' to be understood. In all the places he cites, *ζῆν* is 'to abide,' 'to be in force' or 'operation,' not 'to be successful.'

Finally, as matter of opinion, I do not believe that *συμφοραὶ βουλευμάτων* is a phrase which any Greek writer would have used to signify 'issues of counsels.' We find *συμφοραὶ κακῶν*, 'events consisting of evils' = 'evil issues:' *συμφοραὶ βίου*, 'events of life,' and once in Thucydides (I. 111) we have

τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων, but how? in antithesis to τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: πραγμάτων being added to συμφορὰς (which a few lines before stands alone) to contrast 'actual events' with 'human feelings.' On this last passage I now cite Mr Shilleto's note. 'Interpreting here (see § 1) "events, issues, results," I disagree with such rendering of Soph. Oed. T. 44 ὡς τοῖσιν..... I have long thought that "comparisons of counsels" was there meant and have compared Aesch. Pers. 528. (I am rejoiced to find that Prof. Kennedy and I have independently arrived at the same conclusion...); καί seems thus to have more significance. Men of experience may receive suggestions not only from gods but from other men (εἴτ' ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς οἰσθή πον). Collations also of counsels are most effective.'

I too am glad that so great a scholar as my old friend should have reached independently the same conclusion as myself. But his last sentence I regret, as it seems to recognize that sense of ζώσας which I strenuously deprecate, and which, if admitted, would seriously interfere with the logic of the place. For it is not the *success* of compared counsels (except by implication), but the *practice* of comparing counsels which the priest ascribes to men of experience.

II. The next passage I refer to is Oed. C. 308, 9.

Oedipus, with his daughter Antigone, has taken refuge at Colonus, near Athens, within the grove of the Furies. Discovered there by the men of Colonus, of whom the Chorus consist, they are warned to depart, but appeal against the warning to the prince of the land, Theseus. The Chorus say he has been sent for, and will soon arrive. Then Oedipus speaks the two lines which will be found below.

As my controversy with Prof. Campbell on this passage involves a grave imputation, I shall cite at full (1) my remarks in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, II. p. 133, and (2) his note on this passage, so far as it bears on the question at issue.

(1) I say:

'Sophocles especially delights in that σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαίνον which consists in adapting the tenour of his thoughts and language to suppressed clauses, which the mind must

supply from the context. All poets claim this licence more or less: but none, I believe, has used it so largely and boldly as Sophocles. A striking instance is found in the following passage of the Oedipus Coloneus, which scholiasts and editors have hitherto failed to understand:

ἀλλ' εὐτυχὴς ἔκοιτο τῇ θ' αὐτοῦ πόλει
ἐμοί τε. τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος;

'Hermann, Wunder, Schneidewin and others have committed the aesthetical sin of referring the latter clause to ἐμοί, and thus putting in the mouth of the Sophoclean Oedipus a maxim more fit for the Bagstocks and Bounderbys of Mr C. Dickens, that "every good man studies his own interest." By referring the latter words to a suppressed clause, which the context suggests, we obtain the just and beautiful sentiment embodied in the following interpretation: "May he come fraught with blessing to his own city and to me:—to himself I need not say:—for what good man is not a blessing to himself?"

(2) Prof. Campbell writes as follows:

'Well, may he come, and in his coming bless his own city as well as me; for what good man is not a friend to himself, i.e. who does not befriend himself in doing good?.....For αὐτῷ referring to αὐτοῦ the more remote antecedent.....see p. 71.'—That is to say, Prof. Campbell has taken without the smallest acknowledgment the *general* explanation given first and exclusively by me 18 years ago, making only an attempt, which I shall soon examine, to draw some distinction between his view and mine by identifying αὐτῷ with τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, because, in benefiting his own city, Theseus benefits himself. It will be seen that I can accept Prof. Campbell's *translation* almost as readily as my own, for in general drift it is really the same. Therefore Prof. Campbell was not in the slightest degree released from the duty of acknowledging my interpretation because he gives a somewhat different turn to it by the manner in which he would explain the reference of αὐτῷ. I was the first to explode, and to shew how by giving to φίλος the sense of 'beneficial' we *could* explode, that old and hateful version which in the close of his note Prof. Campbell rightly

condemns as I have done. And yet he has persuaded himself that he can, without discredit, withhold from me the acknowledgment of the service thus rendered to Sophoclean interpretation and to the honour of the poet himself. And what has *he* done for either by his attempt to fritter away the signal beauty which belongs to the passage as explained above by me? In failing to recognize and to rejoice in that beauty, he has only shewn his aesthetical 'colour-blindness.' In not seeing the clumsy confusion of language and thought which his reference of *αὐτῷ* to *τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει* involves, he has only shewn again that defect of logical precision which was found in his notes on Oed. T. 45. I feel that the truth of my view might well be left to rest on the strength of its inherent merit alone: the more so, as Prof. Campbell has not attempted to offer any objection to it: and I am unable to see any which can be offered. The use of *γάρ* renders *some* mental supplement *inevitable*; and none is simpler and easier than what I have given. Let us see.—

If Sophocles meant to express by *αὐτῷ* nothing more than is contained in *τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει*, why did he make the reference so much more difficult by writing the lines as they stand, when he could so easily have written

ἀλλ' εὐτυχῆς ἐμοί τε τῇ θ' αὐτοῦ πόλει
ἔκκειτο. τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος?

For the sake of emphasis, as Prof. Campbell seems to suggest in p. 71. It is impossible to perceive any gain of emphasis from such inversion. Prof. Campbell cites other passages in which, he says, the order of natural sequence is inverted. Not one of these supports his argument: they only shew *b + a* where (perhaps) *a + b* might be expected: but none *b + a + b'* where *a + b + b'* might be expected. But, waiving this point, or rather supposing even that Sophocles had written in the order last suggested, Prof. Campbell's case breaks down for a reason which he has quite overlooked. The first clause is a *wish* or *prayer*, 'may he come.' And the next begins with *for*. It is not, then, the ground of a fact which the second clause gives; as if the proposition were 'he *will* come with good fortune to his own city; *for* what good man is not a blessing to himself?' Such a meaning

Prof. Campbell can obtain only by referring γάρ to a suppressed clause (καὶ εὐτυχὴς ἀφίξεται). 'May he come with blessing...and he will so come:—for &c.' Thus he cannot escape from the necessity of a mental supplement: but this he has failed to perceive. The supplement given above is the very least required for the mere purpose of explaining γάρ on Prof. Campbell's hypothesis. But in truth something more must be mentally supplied to complete the sense: namely, that being a friend to his own city is the same thing as being a friend to himself.

To sum up: Prof. Campbell's bare exegesis comes to this:

'I wish that Theseus may come with good fortune to his city and to me; and the reason why I express that wish is, that every good man is a blessing to himself.'

Such is the logic imputed to Sophocles by his latest editor!

My version is:

'I wish that Theseus may come with good fortune to his city and to me, (then instead of adding αὐτῷ τε, "and to himself," he substitutes an exquisite compliment)...for what good man is not a blessing to *himself*?'

'Look upon this presentment and on that.'

III. The third passage on which I have to compare the views of Prof. Campbell and myself is Antig. 31, 2.

On this I wrote (Journal of Cl. and S. Philol. II. 232):

'In his collocation of words or (as old grammarians would say) in his use of the figure Hyperbaton, Sophocles is more audacious than any other poet, especially where such freedom is in some degree licenced by the mysterious or impassioned tone of the speaker...In the Classical Museum (Vol. VI. p. 6) appeared a new interpretation of Soph. Antig. 31, 32

τοιαῦτά φασι τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντά σοι
κάμοί, λέγω γὰρ καμέ, κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν.

"Such is the proclamation which they say has been published by your good Creon, aye and mine, for I own I too thought him so."

As in other instances, so in this, I was led to the new explanation by a strong feeling that any version, which should

make σοί and ἐμοί dependent on κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν, is intolerable in more respects than one. I have not changed my opinion after reading Prof. Campbell's note, chiefly borrowed from Schneidewin's, though surpassing it in the wildness of its fancies, and, as usual, omitting to notice the source from which it is derived.

Schneidewin's note, translated from the German, is :

'Antigone adds quietly the *dativus ethicus*; but, as soon as she has said σοί, she is then reminded that the command applies to herself also. Hence the καί μοί, to which she joins with special emphasis λέγω γὰρ καί μέ, *observe, even to me too*, whose character he little knows....Antigone with bitterness puts forward herself and Ismene, although the command of Creon is addressed to everybody.'

Prof. Campbell's note is :

'These words have not been understood. Antigone first says, "There is Creon's proclamation for you" (σοί unemphatic), then, going off upon the word, For *you*, did I say? ay, and for me too, for I count myself also among those forbidden. This is said with bitter emphasis, shewing that she has fully counted the cost of the act she meditates. "The proclamation extends to me—I accept the consequences."'

If all this does not ring false to the mental ear of any scholar who looks at the Greek, the context, the characters and the circumstances, I cannot feel assured that my observations will convince him. Nevertheless I must try their effect.

In the first place then, I say that an unemphatic σοί here, such as Prof. Campbell (after Schneidewin) suggests, related to τοιαῦτα and to κηρύξαντ' ἔχειν, is impossible. It is too far from the τοιαῦτα, which goes before it; and from the κηρύξαντα, which comes after it; above all, the presence of φασί forbids the very idea of any such dative. Compare the true unemphatic dative below v. 37, οὕτως ἔχει σοί ταῦτα, where no Greek author would have written οὕτω φασὶν ἔχειν σοί ταῦτα.

Further I say (and this applies to the whole question of the governance of these datives) that, if Sophocles had meant to connect σοί and what follows with τοιαῦτα κηρύξαντα, he had it in his power to write, and surely he would have written,

Κρέοντά φασι τὸν ἀγαθὸν τοιαῦτα σοὶ
 κάμοι

or (avoiding all possible non-emphasis)

τοιαῦτα σοί θ', ὥς φασιν, ἀγαθὸς Κρέων
 κάμοι, λέγω γὰρ καμέ, κηρύξας ἔχει.

Either of these (in point of Greek) unobjectionable combinations would have left no doubt that the datives were connected with *τοιαῦτα κηρύξαντα*. But, as the lines stand, I contend, and ever must contend, that they are shut out from both, and shut up to connexion with *τὸν ἀγαθὸν Κρέοντα*, if for no other reason, yet on account of the verb *φασί*, for (dismissing the impossible notion of an unemphatic *σοι* in this position) it is palpably absurd to place in Antigone's mouth the language: 'such are the things which *they say* that the good Creon to you (or for you) and to me, yes, to me also, has proclaimed.'

Now let these lines be viewed by the light of their context.

Antigone (v. 19) has brought her sister Ismene out of the palace to talk with her. 'They report' (*ὡς λέγουσι*), she says (that is, a report has reached her from some attendant), 'that Creon has buried with due honours the corpse of Eteocles, but that *all the citizens* have been forbidden by proclamation (*ἀποτοῖσι φασιν ἐκκεκηρύχθαι*) to bury Polynices... (Then follow the two lines). Such proclamation *they say* (*φασί*) that Creon has made... and that he is coming hither to publish it in plain terms to *such as know it not* (*τοῖσι μὴ εἰδόσι*).' What then is the position of the sisters? Antigone has heard a thing *reported*; Ismene had not heard it, but only learns it from her sister's mouth. *The report* is of a proclamation made—to whom? Not to them, but to *the citizens*. They are women dwelling in the gynaeceum of the palace, who, in Creon's opinion, as in that of many modern Creons, have no right to meddle with public matters. He is coming, *the report* continues, to publish the proclamation again in front of the palace to *such as know it not* (this of course is the dramatist's device to bring Creon and his proclamation before the spectators in the second scene): but are the sisters of this number? Not at all. They have quitted the stage when Creon appears (v. 163), and before he has

repeated his proclamation, Antigone has performed her brother's funeral rites (v. 223 &c.). In that proclamation he makes no allusion to the sisters, and, when he hears of the burial, instead of suspecting them, his suspicion is that the watchers had been bribed by some disaffected citizens to do the act (v. 290 &c.). With what shadow of propriety then can the proclamation be said to have been made *to* the sisters or *for* the sisters in any way? A fortiori; how can it be put in the form of a *report*: '*they say* that this proclamation has been made *to* (or *for*) you and me'? If ever sheer nonsense was suggested as the utterance of an ancient author, it is here. My own strong sense of this it was, as I before intimated, that led me to look for and discover the true meaning of the poet.

Finally, the explanation of *κάμοι, λέγω γὰρ καμέ*, by Schneidewin and Prof. Campbell, is in violation of dramatic taste and propriety. While my version 'the Creon who was called good by you and by me, for I include myself also' (i.e. I too called him so)—contains a modest acknowledgment of error: the rendering—'the proclamation was made to you, ay, and to me, I say to me also'—which, so far as it has any meaning, must mean, that on one so sisterly, so devoted, so brave as Antigone, such a proclamation could have no deterring effect—this rendering contains an arrogant assumption of superior character, offensive in every way, and most so, when she would win Ismene to share her purpose: at the very least, it conveys an assumption of more intense feeling on her own part, which would be quite out of keeping at this point. If these considerations are not strong enough to induce scholars to disconnect these datives from *κηρύξαντα* and to subordinate them to *ἀγαθόν*, I can urge none stronger. To me they are conclusive. The slight trajection by which *σοι* is separated from *ἀγαθόν* (*Κρέοντα* being between them), presents no real difficulty. Herein my opinion is confirmed by other scholars; for instance, by Prof. Evans of Durham, than whom none is more competent to decide such a point. The strictest grammatical position would be *τόν σοι ἀγαθόν* (*ὁ πᾶσι κλεινός*), but this may become *τόν ἀγαθόν σοί*, as witness Trach. 541, *ὁ πιστὸς ἡμῖν καγαθὸς καλούμενος*, and here, where the words which follow *σοι*, namely

καμοί, λέγω γὰρ καμέ, hang on to it of necessity, the further trajection of the pronoun beyond Κρέοντα, being unavoidable, becomes justifiable. Such trajections are found even in prose: as Herod. III. 88, γάμους τε τοὺς πρώτους ἐγάμει Πέρσῃσι ὁ Δαρεῖος for τοὺς Πέρσῃσι πρώτους. So Aesch. Prom. 939 θῶπτε τὸν κρατοῦντ' αἰεί, for τὸν αἰεὶ κρατοῦντα.

Should any of my readers be disposed to charge me with dogmatism, because my opinion on these three passages is expressed with such unhesitating confidence, I can only say, that I see nothing wrong in avowing the degree of strength with which belief is held on any subject whatsoever. If, after considering them for many years, and reading all I could find concerning them, I see certain interpretations to be in harmony, certain others at variance, with the laws of language, logic and taste, as I understand these, so as to leave in my mind no doubt that the former are right, the latter wrong, it is a duty rather than a fault to avow the fulness of my conviction. If I am asked: Do you deny that you may be wrong, and other scholars (more numerous and perhaps superior) may be right? I decline to answer. I do not presume to say what is or is not possible: I only know what is my own opinion, and with what strength it is entertained; and this, *with its grounds*, I venture to state. It is not my wont to dogmatize on doubtful points in literature. On some passages I have never formed a definite opinion; on others I may have an opinion, but one which I regard as always open to discussion. Thus, for instance, in Oed. T. v. 99 I am disposed to think that

τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ξυμφορᾶς;

means 'what is the mode of dealing with it?' (τῆς ξυμφορᾶς = τοῦ ξυμφέρεσθαι). Cp. Oed. Col. 641

τῇδε γὰρ ξυνοίσομαι.

Yet, since the other interpretation, 'what is the nature of the mishap?' is quite possible, and cannot be disproved, I should never assert my suggestion with any approach to positiveness.

But, as to the explanations which I have here repeated and defended of the three passages (Oed. T. 44, 45; Oed. Col.

308, 9; Ant. 31, 32), upon the correctness of these I do not hesitate to stake any title I may have to the character of a Greek scholar. It is for Professor Lewis Campbell to consider whether he will offer the same 'sponsio' on the contrary side. I must warn him, before he answers, that several of the best Greek scholars in England, were I at liberty to name them, are altogether in my favour. And I have spoken to few who do not reprobate in decided terms his suppression of my name and of other names in his notes on Sophocles.

B. H. KENNEDY.

(To be continued.)

ON TWO PASSAGES IN ÆSCHYLUS AND A NOTE OF LOBECK.

1. In Lobeck's Ajax (v. 224), there is a note on the occasional treatment by the Tragedians of verbals in *-τος* as adjectives of two terminations. Hermann had ascribed it merely to love of variety, Lobeck seeks a stricter rule. All his instances except two he explains as arising *hiatus effugiendi causa*. They are, Æsch. Choeph. 233; Soph. O. C. 1460, O. T. 384, Trach. 446; Eur. Med. 1035, Hel. 825, And. 5, Iph. A. 901, 1394, Hipp. (dub.) 442, Suppl. (dub.) 924. The two exceptions are Æsch. Ag. 294 (*ἰσχύς πορευτοῦ λαμπάδος πρὸς ἡδονήν*), which he explains as *fortasse sigmatismi causa*, and Prom. 592 (*Ἥρα στυγητὸς πρὸς βίαν γυμνάζεται*, said of Io), which he leaves without explanation.

On referring to these passages we find in O. T. 384, and Med. 1035, not (as Lobeck quotes them) *δωρητὸς οὐκ αἰτητός* and *ζηλωτός*, but *δωρητὸν οὐκ αἰτητόν* and *ζηλωτόν*. This apparently trifling difference necessitates a restatement of the rule; for, as to restore here the feminine form would produce not an hiatus but a spondee where the metre requires an iambus, the explanation "*hiatus effugiendi causa*" is too narrow, and to include all the instances to which Lobeck applied it we must substitute the more general term "*metri gratia*." Still, however, the Agamemnon and Prometheus passages remain exceptions; these we have now to consider separately.

2. Let us first examine Lobeck's theory as to the Agamemnon passage. Would the line if altered exhibit undue *sigmatismus*? We can only answer by comparing it with other lines of Æschylus. Here are some instances, a few out of many, which seem to point to the contrary.

Sept. 20, 62, 820, sigma occurs six times in each.

Prom. 348 seven times (last letter in every word of the line), 269, 374, 458, six times each (besides ζ twice in 374, and ξ in 458).

Pers. 322 seven times, 312 (a line composed of imaginary proper names which Æsch. might have altered ad libitum), 797, 816, six times each.

Supp. 323, 496, seven times each, 251, 724, six times each (—could Æschylus object to sigmatismus and yet coin such a word as σεσωφρονισμένος?).

Agam. 289, 298 (last letter in every word), 540, 628 (besides a ξ), 966, six times each, 33, five times (besides a ξ).

Choeph. 243, 264, 678 (besides a ξ), six times each.

Eum. 124, 440, seven times each, 10, 67, 648 (besides a ξ), six times each. Now every one of these lines is more open to the charge of sigmatismus than that to which Lobeck objects. Surely Æschylus would hardly have altered his grammar to avoid a fault of which he is so little sensible. Some other explanation of the change must be sought, since neither metre nor euphony requires it.

If πορευτοῦ be the genitive of πορευτός, this word will here have a meaning elsewhere unknown to it, and one also contrary to analogy. Πορευτός ought to mean, and does elsewhere mean, 'traversed' or 'fit for traversing.' But side by side with *passive* verbals in -εutos we find perpetually *actives* in -ευτής (sometimes used adjectivally). Thus ἀγρευτής (adjective Anth. P. 7, 171), θηρευτής (always adjective in Homer, and frequently so elsewhere), παιδευτής, μαντευτής, τοξευτής, τορευτής, φυτευτής (Gloss.), and χαλκευτής are all *active*, with corresponding *passive* forms in -τος. Surely too βραβευτής, δισκευτής, διφρευτής, ἐρμηνευτής, εἰρηνευτής, θριαμβευτής, ἡπεροπευτής, ἰχνευτής, κηδευτής, κινδυνευτής, κυβευτής, νυκτερευτής, νυμφευτής, πομπευτής, πορθμευτής, etc., supply abundant analogies for an active πορευτής, whose genitive would be (as here) πορευτοῦ.

3. The Prometheus passage still requires examination. Besides the difficulty as to gender, the word στυγητός is a very strange one. It never occurs in Greek before or since this passage until quite late writers. The following* are ap-

* See the Thesaurus.

parently the only authorities for it—Hesych., Xiph. in C., p. 125, Heliod. Æth. v. 29, Philo de Sac. p. 202, 20, Ep. ad Tit. iii. 3, Epiphanius, Vol. II., p. 105, Greg. Nyss. I., p. 679, Eustath., p. 1650, 60. It will hardly be believed that all the great editors of Æschylus—Hermann, Blomfield, Butler, Dindorf, Paley, etc.—omit all mention of this most remarkable fact. But, though the simple *στυγητός* is in classical Greek as much a *vox nihili* as **στυγής*, it is found as the termination of a compound in Choeph. 635 *θεοστύγητος*. Some such *βόειον ῥήμα*, I suspect, underlies this passage.

My first idea was then to read *Ἡραστήγητος*, treating it as a compound formed on a false analogy from *Ἀρείφαιτος*, *Ἀρητίφαιλος*, *Ἀρηϊκτάμενος*, *Ἀρηϊθόος*, Æschylus' own strange coinage *Ἀρηϊθύσανος*, *Διϊπέτης*, *ναυσίπορος*, *ναυσίκλυτος*, *κηρεσσιφορήτος*, *Ἀργειφόντης*, *ἀνδρειφόντης*, etc. Harsh as this would be, it yet seems better than to retain the common reading.

But what was my astonishment on consulting the new reprint of the Medicean Codex, the parent of all Æschylean MSS., to discover there a reading to which none of the Editors so much as alludes in passing.

The passage stands there—*ἦι ρ α στυγητός*, etc. And, though this cannot of course be right, to assume that it represents *Ἡρα στυγητός* is a mere guess, and one which (as we have seen) is open to many objections. How *Ἡρα* should become *ἦι ρ α* is indeed hard to understand.

On the other hand had the original been *ΗΡΑΣΤΥΓΗΤΟΣ* the genesis of the Medicean reading is obvious. The late Greek word *στυγητός* would be familiar to the copyist. The rest of the word he would pick to pieces in his own crude way; the Homeric formula *ἦ ῥα* might occur to him; the inserted *ι* looks as if this had been confused with the adverb *ἦ*.

But is *Ἡραστήγητος* a possible word? Its length is no objection to it; *θεοστύγητος*, *ναρθηκοπήρωτος* are quite as clumsy, and these amazing compounds are quite in Æschylus' manner. A more important objection can be made by contrasting it with *Ἡρ-ο-δοτος*, *Ἡρ-ο-φίλος*, etc. No doubt the reading *Ἡροστήγητος* would commend itself more if we could

find any MS. traces of it. In the meantime, however, the objection does not seem fatal.

In Donaldson's Gr. Gr. § 372 (bb) (γ), I find the rule "Nouns of the 1 decl. in \bar{a} and η retain this vowel in the compound; thus we have *ἀγορανόμος*, *γενεαλογία*, *νικηφόρος*, *χορηφόρος*, *σκιαγραφία*;" he mentions also (Obs. 2) *ἐλαφηβόλος*, *θανατηφόρος*, etc., as probably referring to obsolete forms of the included noun.

It is true that some of these also compound from a stem in $-o$, and it is strange that Donaldson says so little of this. But if so it makes it only the more possible that *Ἡραστύγητος* and *Ἡρίφιλος* should exist side by side.

We may notice in addition to Donaldson's instances that this \bar{a} or η occurs regularly before the termination $-φορος$, and often before $-γενής$, $-πολος$, etc., e.g. *βουλευφόρος*, *σειραφόρος* (as well as *σειροφόρος*), *παρδαλήφορος*, *μελαιηφόρος* (or according to Hermann's emendation *μεγαλήφατος*), *πελεκηφόρος*, *σκυληφόρος*; *Μοιρηγένης*, *Ἀρχηγένης*, *Θηβαγένης*, *Τιμαγένης*; *θαλαμηπόλος*, etc.; *δύηπαθος* and $-θης$, with several others.

4. To sum up then it would seem that this licence is never found without some metrical exigency to justify it; that for *πορευτός* in the Lexicon *Æschyleum* *πορευτής* must be substituted; and that in the Prometheus "*Ἡρα στύγητος*" should give place to some "*ῥῆμα γομφοπαγές*,"* which at present seems probably to have been *Ἡραστύγητος*. Such a word would of course be of two terminations.

FRANCIS DAVID MORICE.

* Aristoph. *Ranæ*, 824.

CRITICAL NOTES ON CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

WHEN we remember the historical importance of Clement's writings and, above all, their extreme value to scholars owing to the precious remains of ancient literature which this most erudite of the Fathers has preserved for us, it is difficult to see why he should have been so singularly unfortunate in the matter of Editors. The vulgate text is due principally to Sylburg, whose practised hand cleared away a large number of the errors of the traditional text as represented by the Editio Princeps: our gratitude for this service, however, is modified in some degree by the fact that he introduced corruptions of his own, the consequence, I imagine, of haste and defective acquaintance with the older literature from which Clement confessedly borrowed so much of his materials. Potter did very little indeed for the emendation of the text, although some of his coadjutors seem to have been fairly equipped with the subsidiary knowledge requisite to this end. As for the third edition of any considerable pretensions, one recently published at Oxford with 'ex recensione Gulielmi Dindorfii,' on the title-page—I forbear to speak a second time (see *Academy*, No. 13) about a book, the appearance of which can only be regarded in the light of a grave literary scandal. If one wishes to see how Clement should be criticized, the model is to be found, not in anything the modern editors have done, but in the occasional remarks of scholars like Bernays, or in the admirable series of suggestions which Cobet has given us in the *Mnemosyne* and *Λόγιος Ἑρμῆς*. By way of preface to the following marginalia I may perhaps state a general impression that the main difficulties connected with the critical study of Clement arise from three sources; (1) besides the

recognized paleographical causes of corruption the text seems to have suffered from the transposition and repetition of words occurring in lines immediately above or below that on which the copyist was engaged: (2) words and sometimes whole lines have dropped out; (3) the codex Laurentianus, which is our sole authority for the *Stromateis*, must be the descendant of a MS. which frequently exhibited words in a mutilated form through contraction and possibly also through injury similar to that sustained by the Bodleian Plato, where the ends of lines are frequently illegible through damp. That this was really the case with some early MS. of Clement may be inferred from the following circumstance. There is a passage in *Strom.* 438 in which the true reading, ὅτω δὲ ἀκούσιον ἄνους ὦν οὐδέτερον ζηλωτόν, is established beyond the possibility of doubt by the fact that Clement is quoting directly from Plato's *Laws* (p. 730). But the MS. gives us the last part of the citation in the astonishing form: ἄνους ὦν οὐ ζωῶν οὐθ' ἕτερον οὖν ζηλωτόν—a phenomenon which may be accounted for by supposing first of all a damaged MS. in which the words appeared thus: ANOT-ΣΩNOT.....Z...ΩION: secondly, a transcript in which the scribe sought to conceal the gap by the artless but not unusual expedient of writing all he saw before him consecutively, the entire reading however being preserved, probably as a *varia lectio* in the margin: the third stage in the process of corruption is represented by the Laurentianus, in which an attempt has been made to combine the two readings into one, with the grotesque result which I have mentioned. The hypothesis of an occasional hiatus will, I hope, receive further confirmation in the next few pages.

p. 131 (ed. Potter). In Clement's shorter treatises, the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, much remains to be done even after the careful revision which the text has received from Cobet. In p. 131, for instance, three verses from the song of Moses in Deut. xxxii. 10—12 are introduced in the following unintelligible fashion: λέγει δέ που διὰ τῆς φῶδης τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἰς αὐτόν, "αὐτάρκησεν τὸν λαόν" κ.τ.λ. If αὐτόν is to have any meaning, a proper name must precede: I would suggest, therefore, λέγει δὲ Μωυσῆς, μᾶλλον δέ που διὰ τῆς φῶδης, κ.τ.λ.

p. 201. The conditions under which women may be allowed to appear in the presence of men are discussed by Clement in language which is an indirect attack on Plato's remarks in *Rep.* v.: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη τις περιτύχοι παριέναι κελεύουσα, αἱ μὲν κεκαλύφθων ἄγαν ἀμπεχόνῃ ἔκτοσθεν, ἔνδοθεν δὲ αἰδοῖ. Plato's *συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα* (p. 452 D) makes it probable that Clement wrote *κεκαλύφθων ἅπαν*.

p. 254. Our author thus describes the elaborate toilet of a lady of the period who ruins her health by the use of cosmetics: ἄμα γοῦν ἡμέρᾳ σπαρασσόμεναι καὶ ἀποτεινόμεναι καὶ φυράμασί τισι καταπλαττόμεναι ψήχουσι μὲν τὸν χρῶτα ὀρύττουσι δὲ τὴν σάρκα τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ περιεργίᾳ τῶν ῥυμμάτων τὸ οἰκεῖον μαραινουσαι ἄνθος. The consequence of this being that their flesh loses its firmness (*τακερὸν ἤδη τὴν σάρκα ἔχουσαι*), it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that Clement wrote *θρύπτουσι* and not *ὀρύττουσι*. I will not deny that *ἀποτεινόμεναι* may possibly be defended and explained to mean 'straining themselves,' but I prefer to think it a blunder for *ἀποκτεινόμεναι* ('tearing and torturing themselves to death'), more especially as the two words would be very easily confused through the similarity of their sound. A parallel instance of such confusion I find in a passage in Plutarch's *Morals* (p. 554), where the pangs of conscience after crime are likened to the agonies of a fish which has swallowed the hook along with the bait. The words, which have sorely perplexed Reiske, may be made sense by a trifling alteration: ἔχεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀδικήσας τῇ δίκῃ, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εἰθὺς ἐξεδήδωκε· τὸ δὲ συννεῖδος ἐγκείμενον ἔχων καὶ ἀποκτεῖνον [*vulg.* ἀποτῖνον], "θύννος βολαῖος πέλαγος ὡς διαστροβεῖ."

p. 328. The Sophists of the time, who 'tickle the ears of the foolish,' are characterized as being *ποταμὸς ἀτέχνων ῥημάτων νοῦ δὲ σταλαγμός*. Read *ἀτεχνῶς* [*anticipated by Cobet*].

p. 367. τὸ αἴτιον πρὸς τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ, καθάπερ ὁ μὲν ναυπηγὸς πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ σκάφος. Read *τὴν ἐνέργειαν*.

p. 377. ὁ σφετερισάμενος τὰ βαρβάρων καὶ ὡς ἰδίαν αὐχῶν, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν αὖξων. For *ἰδίαν* Sylburg proposed *ἰδία* or *ιδίους*, but the true reading seems to be *ἴδια*: comp. *Strom.* p. 349: ἐκάστη (*sc.* αἵρεσις) ὅπερ ἔλαχεν ὥσπερ πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

p. 402. The long chronological chapter at the end of *Strom.* I. abounds in textual blunders of which some idea may be formed from the following specimen. After speaking of the foundation of Rome twenty-four years after Ol. I., Clement proceeds: ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Βαβυλῶνος ἀναίρεσιν ὑπατοὶ ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ ἔτη διακόσια τεσσαράκοντα τρία, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Βαβυλῶνος ἀλώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἔτη ἑκατὸν ὀγδοήκοντα ζξ. Here Scaliger saw the absurdity of the mention of Babylon and proposed to read βασιλέων, a masterly conjecture which renders the complete restoration of the passage very easy work. All we have to do is to insert ὅτε or some such word before ὑπατοὶ (as the elder Lowth did before ὑπάτευεν a few lines further on), to erase the ἐπὶ before ἔτη as arising from an obvious dittographia (ΕΠΙ = ETH) and substitute βασιλέων ἐλάσεως for Βαβυλῶνος ἀλώσεως: this last seems simpler than the older suggestion ἀναιρέσεως, which I find that Cobet has adopted, and possibly expresses the 'post exactos reges' of some Roman chronologist.

p. 409. The interval between Moses and the death of Commodus is said to be, according to some authorities, ἔτη βωμβ', according to others, ἔτη βλκα' (sic ed. Oxon.). As Clement has abundantly shewn his familiarity with the conventional chronology, we cannot suppose him to have ante-dated Moses by 1000 years. Read therefore αωμβ' and αλκα'. I need not repeat Bast's remarks (*Com. Palaeogr.* p. 707) on the interchange of α and β when used as numerals.

p. 425. ἡ ἀληθὴς διαλεκτικὴ... ὑπεξαναβαίνει περὶ τὴν πάντων κρατίστην οὐσίαν... ἐπιστήμην τῶν θείων καὶ οὐρανίων ἐπαγγελλομένη, ἣ συνέπεται καὶ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων... οἰκεία χρήσις. The first περὶ is surely a mere blunder for ἐπὶ; the second looks like an intruder, as the symmetry of the sentence requires the contrast of ἐπιστήμη τῶν θείων and χρήσις τῶν ἀνθρωπείων. Dr Thompson, in an instructive note on *Gorg.* 490 D, has collected a number of instances of a similar interpolation of περὶ in the MSS. of Plato.

p. 435. Θαλῇ ὕδωρ ἐπισταμένῳ τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν. Here I would read ὑφισταμένῳ, not merely on general grounds of sense, but also because a confusion between κ, π, τ, and χ,

ϕ , θ , is one of the commonest blunders in the Laurentianus. A little further on Clement says of Anaxagoras: οὐδὲ οὗτος ἐτήρησε τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν ποιητικὴν, where the correction τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ποιητικὴν (coll. Aristot. *Metaph.* I. 4) is too obvious to require any defence.

p. 436. Our author is so zealous a student of Plato that his very illustrations are frequently borrowed or, as he would say in the case of others, stolen from the Dialogues. The remark in *Rep.* v. (p. 467) that the children of artisans begin their apprenticeship by watching their elders at work is thus introduced into an argument to prove the necessity of Faith as the condition of spiritual progress: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁρῶν ὁ τέκτων ὅτι μαθὼν τινα τεχνίτης γίνεται καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης παιδευθεὶς τὴν τέχνην κυβερνᾶν δυνήσεται...ἀνάγκη δὲ ἄρα πειθόμενον μαθεῖν. Here it seems necessary to expunge ὅτι μαθὼν as a marginal gloss, and to read ἀνάγκη δὴ. The illustration is then applied to shew that knowledge implies faith or submission to the Word: αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ πιστεῦσαι κατ' οὐδὲν ἀντιβαίνοντα. πῶς γὰρ ὁλόν τε ἀντεπίστασθαι τῷ θεῷ; Even were it possible for ἀντεπίστασθαι to mean *scire contra* as the Paris 'Stephanus' asserts, it would be inappropriate here, as the clause is nothing more than an explanation of the κατ' οὐδὲν ἀντιβαίνοντα just before it. We must extirpate the monster, and read, ἀντεφίστασθαι τῷ θεῷ, 'to set oneself up against God.'

p. 437. A fixed idea that Greek philosophy was one great plagiarism from the Bible leads Clement to see in Isaiah's ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνήτε (vii. 9: LXX.) the ultimate source of the Heraclitean aphorism: ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται, ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεύνητον ἐὼν καὶ ἄπορον. If one may infer from the form of the supposed parallel in Isaiah and from that of the second-hand quotation in Theodoret (ἐὰν μὴ ἐλπίζετε, *Therap.* 15, 51), the verb in the Heraclitean fragment must have been in the second person; and that it was in the singular is rendered possible by the analogy of other Heraclitean fragments. I would therefore write, ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται, ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσεις, although we may perhaps defend ἐξευρήσει by explaining it as a middle.

p. 448. In a discussion on the Scriptural words 'the fear

of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge,' which Valentinus had interpreted to mean that the Creator was seized with dismay at the sight of his own handiwork, Clement introduces the following string of scholastic definitions:—*ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μὲν ἐκπληξίς φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους, ἡ ἐπ' ἀπροσδοκῆτῳ φαντασίᾳ, ἅτε καὶ ἀγγελίας, φόβος δὲ ὡς γεγονότι ἡ ὄντι, ἡ θαυμασιότης ὑπερβάλλουσα.* As *θαυμασιότης ὑπερβάλλουσα* was one of the current definitions of *ἐκπληξίς* (Aristot. *Top.* iv. 5), it must surely be out of place where it stands, and, if so, the formula descriptive of *φόβος* must have dropped out. If we may borrow a definition which occurs a little earlier in the argument (*ναὶ, φασὶν, ἄλογος ἔκκλισις ὁ φόβος*, p. 446; comp. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 6, p. 48 Mein.), the following may perhaps serve as a hypothetical reconstruction of the passage:—

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μὲν ἐκπληξίς φόβος ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους, ἡ ἐπ' ἀπροσδοκῆτῳ φαντασίᾳ (ἔτι καὶ ἀγγελίᾳ), ἡ θαυμασιότης ὑπερβάλλουσα· φόβος δέ, ὡς φασιν, ἄλογος ἔκκλισις, ἐπὶ γεγονότι ἡ ὄντι.

p. 449. In the course of this same discussion an attempt is made to involve the Marcionites also in difficulties connected with the 'fear' spoken of in the Old Testament: *τί τοίνυν τὸν νόμον βούλονται; κακὸν μὲν οὖν οὐ φήσουσι, δίκαιον δὲ, διαστέλλοντες τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δικαίου.* Restore, *βούλεσθαι οἴονται*—an expression which we get a little further on (p. 451), when the Jews are censured because *ὃ ὑπέλαβον αὐτοὶ τοῦτο καὶ βούλεσθαι τὸν νόμον ᾤθησαν.*

p. 467. The discourse of Christ in S. Matth. xxv. 35—40 is briefly indicated by the citation of the first and last words in it ('I was an hungred and ye gave me meat...Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me') and then referred to as follows: *ὁ θεὸς σώζων καὶ ἐλεῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, τοὺς ἡλεημένους.* Read:—*ἐλεήμονας.*

p. 478. The results of the curtailment of words in some MS. earlier than the Laurentianus may be seen in a passage transcribed by Clement from Philo, ii. p. 399. The injunction, 'Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk,' is made to signify: *μὴ γὰρ γινέσθαι ἡ τοῦ ζῶντος τροφὴ ἡδυσμα τοῦ ἀναιρε-*

θέντος ζφου, φησιν, ἡ σάρξ, κ.τ.λ., where the parallel in Philo has, ἡδυσμα γενέσθαι καὶ παράρτυσιν ἀναιρεθέντος. Instead of following the Oxford Editor in his clumsy expedient of expunging ἡ σάρξ, it seems more reasonable to suppose it to represent ἡ ἄρτυσις, curtailed and then doctored up by some bungling copyist. We may perhaps attribute its origin to a misunderstanding of a common abbreviation (ἡ ἄρτ').

p. 486. ἀνδρὲς δὴ χρεία ὅστις θαυμαστῶς καὶ ἀσυγχύτως τοῖς πράγμασι χρήσεται. Read ἀθαυμαστῶς, so as to make the words an assertion of the 'nil admirari' principle in matters worldly. The next sentence, ἵνα γὰρ ἀδιαφόρως τοῖς διαφόροις χρήσωμαι, will become selse as soon as we substitute τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις for τοῖς διαφόροις.

p. 489. The important extract which Clement has preserved from the heresiarch Valentinus, is in a state which seems to defy improvement. The opening sentence, however, may be thus restored: εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς οὐ παρουσία (vulg. παρρησία) ἡ διὰ τοῦ νιοῦ φανέρωσις: after which Valentinus proceeds in somewhat coarse language to describe the unregenerate heart as the abode of unclean spirits who abuse it with the recklessness with which travellers treat an inn: καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τι πάσχειν τῷ πανδοχείῳ ἡ καρδιά. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κατατιτράται τε καὶ ὀρύττεται καὶ πολλάκις κόπρου πίμπλεται ἀνθρώπων ἀσελγῶς ἐμμενόντων καὶ μηδεμίαν πρόνοιαν ποιουμένων τοῦ χωρίου.....τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ καρδιά μέχρι μὴ προνοίας τυγχάνει ἀκάθαρτος οὕσα.....ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐπισκέψῃται αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. The reading κατατιτράται τε καὶ ὀρύττεται seems due to a scribe who regarded the guests in the inn as 'thieves who break through and steal,' but as the idea is manifestly inappropriate, I venture, though not without hesitation, to suggest καταφρονεῖται τε καὶ φορύττεται. The next sentence also, in which Valentinus applies his illustration to the case of the unregenerate heart, is nonsense in its present shape, since it lacks a main verb, and also some such word as οὐδεμιᾶς before προνοίας to correspond with the μηδεμίαν πρόνοιαν which goes before. Read, therefore, καὶ ἡ καρδιά μέχρι μὲν τινος οὐδεμιᾶς προνοίας τυγχάνει.

p. 497. Clement's summary of opinions as to the nature of

the supreme good concludes as follows:—τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας νεωτέρους ἀξιούσι τινες τέλος ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ πρὸς τὰς φαντασίας ἀποχήν. ναὶ μὲν Λύκος ὁ περιπατητικὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὡς Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς. Κριτόλαος δὲ ὁ καὶ αὐτὸς περιπατητικὸς τελειότητα ἔλεγε κατὰ φύσιν εὐροοῦντος βίου, τὴν ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν συμπληρουμένην προγονικὴν τελειότητα μηνύων. The initial difficulties in this passage may be easily removed: ἀποχήν is a mere copyist's blunder for ἐποχήν, 'suspension of judgment,' the watchword of the New Academy, and Λύκος for Λύκων—both of which suggestions have been anticipated by Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* II. 2, 749). Instead of adopting Sylburg's Λεύκιππος (for the absurd Λεύκιμος), it would surely be better to write Λύκισκος, the name of one who was at any rate a Peripatetic and one of the leaders of the School, according to the anonymous Life of Aristotle printed by Menage in his note on Diog. Laert. v. 35. But I incline to think that we are on the wrong scent in endeavouring to find a proper name to fit into the place. Clement, in fact, seems to pass directly from one Peripatetic, Lycon, to another, Critolaus; and we naturally look for something to explain Lycon's obscure formula ἀληθινὴ χαρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, corresponding to the clause appended by Clement to elucidate the philosophical formula of Critolaus. The original form at any rate of the sentence under discussion may have been something like, ὡς ἀνακειμένην ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς. Zeller's ἀνθρωπικὴν for προγονικὴν does not strike me as being particularly happy. I imagine that ΠΠΟ is a corruption of ΓΝΩ and that the error was corrected by the superscription of γνω-, so that the original reading was γνωστικὴν τελειότητα, 'the perfection of the philosophically enlightened man'—an expression which Clement uses more than once elsewhere. Comp. p. 792: ὁ τοίνυν μετριοπαθῆσας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ εἰς ἀπάθειαν μελετήσας αὐξήσας τε εἰς εὐποιάν, γνωστικῆς τελειότητος....., where we must add ἀψάμενος or some similar word.

p 516. ὦ πόποι, ὦ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὦ δυσάνολβον,
οὔων ἐξ ἐρίδων ἔκ τε στοναχῶν ἐγένεσθε.

These two lines are a fragment of Empedocles (400 Stein;

14 Karsten). Scaliger is responsible for the reading ὦ δειλόν, a correction of the ἦ (i.e. ῆ) δειλόν of the MS.; in the next line Stein prints τοίων on the strength of a supposed parody of Timon the Sillograph (fr. 33 Wachsmuth), where, however, the reading is very uncertain. But Empedocles seems to be following Homeric precedents, and Homer presents us with a number of analogous instances of οἶος; e.g. ὦ πόποι, οἶον δὴ νυ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται in *Od.* I. 32, and ὦ πόποι, οἶον ἔειπε κῶων in *Od.* XVII. 248. Moreover, the fact of so many of Homer's lines beginning with ἄ δειλέ or ἄ δειλοί leads me to think that his imitator wrote, ὦ πόποι, ἄ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ἄ δυσάνολβον, and it will hardly be denied that this sounds better than what we have in the common text. La Roche's apparatus criticus shews how very liable the rare interjection ἄ is to ill-usage at the hands of scribes.

p. 539. In an account of the Brahmins borrowed from the *Indica* of Alexander Polyhistor Clement tells us: κατὰφρονούσι δὲ θανάτου καὶ παρ' οὐδὲν ἡγούνται τὸ ζῆν· πείθονται γὰρ εἶναι παλιγγενεσίαν, ἃ δὲ σέβουσιν Ἑρακλέα καὶ Πάνα. Sylburg's οἱ δὲ (instead of which I prefer ἄλλοι δὲ) is a real though slight contribution to the improvement of the passage. The parallel in Hippolytus (*Ref.* I. 24) shews that a whole line must have dropped out, and that the subject of the lost line was, that the stricter sect of the Brahmins worship light (Hippol.: οὗτοι τὸν θεὸν φῶς εἶναι λέγουσιν).

p. 586. From Plato's paradox that the just man will be happy even when he is tortured or has his eyes put out, Clement draws the inference: οὐκουν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τέλος ἔξει ποτὲ ὁ γνωστικὸς κείμενον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ μακαρίον εἶναι—where the MS. has ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν. The sense which Clement intends to convey must be that happiness does not depend on externals, but on character, that is, on a man's self. As the natural antithesis of τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ κείμενον (which occurs again in *Strom.* p. 632) is τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ κείμενον, we need not scruple about restoring the passage thus: οὐκουν ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ τὸ τέλος ἔξει ποτὲ ὁ γνωστικὸς κείμενον, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μακάριον εἶναι.

p. 590. μεστή μὲν οὖν πᾶσα ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν μελετησάντων

τὸν ζώπυρον θάνατον εἰς Χριστίν. I suspect we should read τὸν ζωοποιὸν θάνατον, especially as we have a little further on (p. 594) the very similar expression, διὰ θανάτου ζωοποιηθῆναι.

p. 628. The analogy between sleep and death Clement finds involved in a Heraclitean dictum which runs thus in the Oxford text: ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ φάος ἄπτεται ἑαυτῷ ἀποθανὼν ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις, ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὔδων ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις, ἐγρηγορῶς ἄπτεται εὔδοντος. This desperate passage has greatly exercised Potter, Wytténbach, and Lassalle, with no result worth mentioning; Sylburg's εὐφρόνη, on the contrary, is one of those convincing suggestions which require neither defence nor discussion. One of the most obvious difficulties in the passage, the double sense of ἄπτεσθαι (= accendi and attingere), can hardly be considered a Heraclitean play upon words: it indicates rather that the latter part of the fragment is a paraphrase of Clement's and not a literal citation; a confirmation of this view being perhaps to be found in the use of ὄψεις for ὀφθαλμοί, which is common enough in Clement: comp. p. 211, ἀναδούμενοι τὸν στέφανον ὑπὲρ τὰς ὄψεις. The remaining difficulties I would remove by supposing the copyist to have lost his head (as he frequently does), and thus repeated words which occurred immediately above or below the line on which he happened to be engaged. I expunge, therefore, (1) ἑαυτῷ as a dittographia of the last letters of τεθνεώτος; (2) ὄψεις before ζῶν; (3) ἀποσβεσθεὶς after εὔδων. If we now insert ὅπως, which would easily slip out after ἄνθρωπος, the final result will be intelligible enough:—

ἄνθρωπος, ὅπως ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος, ἄπτεται, ἀποθανὼν ἀποσβεσθεὶς· ζῶν δὲ ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὔδων, ὄψεις ἐγρηγορῶς ἄπτεται εὔδοντος.

I need hardly observe that Heraclitus must have written ὅκως or ὅκωσπερ, that he would, in all probability, have omitted the explanatory ἐπιθανών, and said ἀποσβέννεται in lieu of the participial ἀποσβεσθεὶς, which comes trailing in after a fashion more worthy of Clement himself than of one who was a master of nervous and idiomatic Greek. The fragment thus reconstituted is the exact counterpart of a remark in Seneca, a Stoic,

and therefore most likely to reproduce a Heraclitean dictum which had become a commonplace:—'Rogo, non stultissimum dicas, si quis existimet lucernae peius esse cum extincta est quam antequam accenditur? nos quoque et exstinguimur et accendimur' (*Epist.* 54). The last part of the fragment is a paraphrase of a saying of which we have another vestige preserved in Plutarch's *Cons. ad Apoll.*, p. 106:—*πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καὶ, ἥ φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ταῦτό τ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῖδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν*—where I would read, *ἥ καὶ φησιν Ἡ., ταῦτό εἶναι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς κ.τ.λ.*, in preference to Bernays' *ταῦτῳ τ' ἐνὶ*, which seems to me a little artificial, and moreover retains the τ' to which Zeller justly takes exception. I imagine the τ' to have been originally superscribed and due to a copyist who wished to elide the last vowel in *ταῦτό*.

p. 629. ὁ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἀδικεῖν ἐπὶ κέρδει τιμὴν βούλεσθαι φησὶ τὸν κατ' αὐτὸν σοφὸν· πίστιν γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν οὐ δύνασθαι ὥστε εἰ πιστήσεται [so MS.] λήσειν, ἀδικήσει κατ' αὐτόν. Epicurus, as quoted by Plutarch (II. 1090), advances a sort of Paleian argument in favour of morality, namely, that the unjust live a miserable life because, even supposing them to escape detection, they cannot be sure of doing so in the long run (*ἔτι, κὰν λαθεῖν δύνωνται, πίστιν περὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν λαβεῖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστι*). It is pretty clear, then, that Clement must have written *βούλεσθαι οὐ φησὶ* in the first clause; and in the second, *πεισθήσεται*, to correspond with the *πίστιν λαβεῖν* of the previous line, and the *εἰ καὶ λήσεσθαι τὴν θεὸν ἐφ' οἷς πράττει πεισθεῖη*, on the next page. The Oxford editor with his usual infelicity adopts Potter's *ἐπιστήσεται*, and forgets to consult Sylburg's valuable index where my correction is anticipated.

p. 632. αἰτία δὲ ἐλομένου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ κωλυθὲν ἐλομένου. The parallel in p. 367: *ῥ' κωλύσαι δύναμις ἦν, τούτῳ καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ συμβαίνοντος προσάπτεται*, will relieve us from any misgivings about correcting *κωλυθὲν* into *κωλύειν*.

p. 633. After speaking of God's exemption from passion Clement adds a general reflection: *καθόλου γὰρ τὸ παθητικὸν παντὶ γένει ἐπιθυμίας, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀπάθειαν θεούμειος ἀνθρωπος*

ἀχράντως μοναδικὸς γίνεται. For παντὶ γένοι read, παντοίας γέμει. A little further on we have a passage which runs thus in the new Oxford Edition:—ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη ἐν παραστάσει γενομένη ἐαυτὴν ἐπισκοποῦσα καὶ θεωροῦσα ἀδιαλείπτως ἐξομιοῦται κατὰ δύναμιν θεῷ: a note informing us that γενομένη is due to Sylburg, that the Ed. Prin. has γενομένη and the MS. γενομένη. It must therefore have been a judicial blindness which prevented the editor from seeing that Clement wrote ἐν παραστάσει γε νοομένη: comp. p. 367: τὸ αἴτιον ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ δρᾶν νοεῖσθαι.

p. 638. ὁ θεὸς δὲ ἀναρχὸς ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων παντελὴς ἀρχῆς ποιητικὸς ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἀρχὴ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ τόπου, καθίσουν ἐστὶν τὰγαθὸν, τοῦ ἠθικοῦ κ.τ.λ. The word ποιητικὸς is apparently due to the misleading influence of ποιητικός in the previous line. Read, therefore, φυσικοῦ, as Clement immediately after proceeds to speak of the ἠθικὸς and λογικὸς τόπος, thus reproducing the famous division of knowledge into physics, ethics, and logic.

p. 639. αἱ ἀγαθαὶ πράξεις ὡς ἀμείνους τῷ κρείττονι τῷ πνεύματι κυρίως προσάπτονται, αἱ δὲ.....ἀμαρτητικαὶ τῷ ἥττονι τῷ ἀμαρτητικῷ περιτίθενται. Restore, τῷ πνευματικῷ κυρίως προσάπτονται.

p. 690. εἰὰν ἐπιχειρῇ τις.....ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὁρμῶν καὶ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν τῶν ὄντων πρὶν ἐπαναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὰ ὑπερκεείμενα αὐτῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λαβῇ κ.τ.λ. Clement is here quoting Plato, *Rep.* VII. 553, with a few additions of his own. If we suppose τῶν ὄντων to be out of place, we may perhaps divine why Plato's ἀποστῇ would be altered into ἀποστατεῖν, and then further corrupted into ἀποστατεῖν, through a desire to connect it in construction with the infinitive ὁρμᾶν. It is probable, then, that Clement does not diverge from the Platonic text so materially as he seems, and that the true reading of the passage is: εἰὰν ἐπιχειρῇ τις.....ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν (ἐπαναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὰ ὑπερκεείμενα τῶν ὄντων) αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λαβῇ.

p. 747. One of the most perplexing passages in our author is the citation from the pseudo-Orpheus:—

ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή.
 ἐκ δ' ὕδατος μὲν γαῖα, τὸ δ' ἐκ γαίης πάλιν ὕδωρ,
 ἐκ τοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ ὕλον αἰθέρα ἀλλάσσουσα.

The citation is introduced to expose the plagiarism of Heraclitus in saying, ψυχῇσι θάνατον ὕδωρ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. In the first line Hermann expunges θάνατος (inserting ψυχῇ instead) and thus no doubt makes very fair sense of the passage. But I am inclined to think that it is the common word ἀμοιβή that is the intruder, and that it is a gloss explanatory of θάνατος, used in this non-natural and Heraclitean acceptation; in which case the original form of the line may have been: ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ θάνατος, ψυχῇ δ' ὑδάτεσσιν.

In the third line, instead of Hermann's reading (ὁδὸν αἰθέρος ἀλλάσσουσα), which seems to be pretty generally approved, I propose ὕλον αἰθέρ' ἀνατssουσα, and imagine the Orphic falsifier to have been consciously imitating the words of Empedocles (351 Stein): φρὴν ἱερὴ φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα κατὰτssουσα θοῇσιν. The word ἀνατssειν, as a poetical equivalent of διήκειν, 'to pervade,' need not surprise us in a writer of this base stamp.

p. 749. Εὐριπίδης ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ χρήσει φησὶν κ.τ.λ. This is the correction of Hemsterhuis for the τηρήσει of the MS. I prefer: ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ ΤΙΝΙ ῥήσει.

p. 769. εἰ γοῦν τις τοῖς μερικοῖς ὡς τοῖς καθολικοῖς χράμενος τύχῃ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον ὡς κύριον καὶ ἡγεμονεῖται, σφάλλεται τῆς ἀληθείας κ.τ.λ. As the man's state is immediately described as one of οἴησις, it is possible that Clement wrote, τὸ δοῦλον κύριον καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν οἴηται, which comes pretty close to the traditional reading, if we may assume ἡγεμονικὸν to have been curtailed in some MS. as πνευματικῶ was in p. 639. εἰ γοῦν is an error of the most ordinary kind for ἂν οὖν.

p. 771. Readers of the *Symposium* of Plato will remember the argument that Philosophy implies a sense of want, and that the gods have no need to philosophize, inasmuch as they possess wisdom from the beginning: θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ· οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος σοφὸς, οὐ φιλοσοφεῖ (p. 203 E). A reminiscence of these words is traceable in the following passage: καὶ δι' καὶ εἰ ἔστι τέλος τοῦ

σοφοῦ ἡ θεωρία, ὀρέγεται μὲν ἡ μὲν ἔτι φιλοσόφων τῆς θείας ἐπιστήμης, οὐδέπω δὲ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ. The subject of ὀρέγεται being clearly ὁ σοφός, we must strike out ἡ μὲν, and by the change of an accent restore the true reading, ὀρέγεται μὲν ἔτι φιλοσοφῶν.

p. 780. οὐδὲ τοὺς πανούργους δεδείξεται λόγους ὁ διαγῶναι τούτους δυνάμενος ἢ πρὸς τε τὸ ἐρωτᾶν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι. Sylburg's δεδίξεται is a signal proof of his defective acquaintance with Platonic phraseology. Read: οὐδὲ τοὺς πανούργους δέξεται [or rather προσδέξεται] λόγους ὁ διαγῶναι τούτους δυνάμενος, ἥτοι τὸ ἐρωτᾶν κ.τ.λ., and compare Clement's language in the next chapter: κὰν τῷ διαστέλλειν τὰ τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια προσήσεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

p. 798. The notion that the perfect man's likeness to God is a physical one is thus dismissed: ἡ ἰμοιώσις οὐχ, ὥς τινες, ἡ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον ἄθεος γὰρ ἦδε ἐφορία. Until the editors inform us what ἐφορία means, we may perhaps suppose Clement to have written, ἄθεος γὰρ ἦδε ἡ ἐπιφορά, to correspond with what we have in the next line, ἀσεβῆς γὰρ καὶ ἦδε ἡ ἔκδοσις.

p. 821. ἡ γοῦν περὶ τῶν νοηθέντων λογικὴ διέξοδος μετὰ αἰρέσεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως διαλεκτικῇ λέγεται. What a definition of Dialectic to come from one who repeatedly shews his familiarity with the well-known Platonic formula, διαίρεσις καὶ συναγωγή, in the *Phaedrus* (266 B)! Read: μετὰ διαιρέσεως καὶ συνθέσεως, and compare the description of Dialectic in the previous page (820): δύναμις διακριτικὴ τε καὶ συνθετική.

p. 840. In his anxiety to emphasize the doctrine of human responsibility our author is never weary of recalling the solemn words of the *Republic* (617 E), αἰτία ἐλομένων θεὸς ἀναίτιος, either in the form of direct quotation or paraphrased and accommodated to his own context. If we bear this fact in mind, we need no further discussion of the following passages, which I accordingly append as restored:—p. 840: πᾶσι γὰρ πάντα ἴσα κεῖται παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὸς ἀμεμφής. ἐλεῖται [ἐλεεῖται Ed. Oxon.] ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ ὁ βουλευθεὶς ἰσχύει—p. 318: ἡ δὲ αἰτία [τῇ δὲ αἰτίᾳ Ed. Oxon.] τοῦ μὴ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐλομένου. θεὸς ἀναίτιος.

p. 896. The neglect of the traditional interpretation of Scripture on the part of certain heretics Clement somewhat uncharitably attributes to a vainglorious eagerness to advance new views of their own: *δόξης ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ὅσοι τὰ προσφνῇ τοῖς θεοπνεύστοις λόγοις ὑπὸ τῶν μακαρίων ἀποστόλων τε καὶ διδασκάλων παραδιδόμενα ἐκόντες εἶναι σοφίζονται δι' ἐτέρων παρεγγειρήσεων κ.τ.λ.* We must read *παραδεδομένα ἔχοντες εἰδέναι*, as is shown by the rebuke with which the Ch. concludes: *ἀγαπητὸν ἦν αὐτοῖς εἰ τὰ προπαραδεδομένα μαθεῖν ἡδυνήθησαν.*

p. 931. *πᾶν αἷτιον . . . ἐπὶ τινος καὶ πρὸς τι νοεῖται, τινὸς μὲν ἀποτελέσματος, καθάπερ ἡ μάχαιρα τοῦ τέμνειν, πρὸς τινι δέ, καθάπερ τῷ ἐπιτηδειῶς ἔχοντι.* Here *ἐπὶ* (from its position between *τυγχάνει* and *τινός*) is probably to be expunged as a dittographia [*τυγχάνΕΙΤΙ*ινός = *τυγχάνει* ΕΠΙ *τινός*]. The word *πρὸς* before *τινι* looks very like an interpolation, for although it may be possible to say *πρὸς τι* or *τινι*, to denote the object in which the cause produces the effect, it is hard to conceive how a Greek could use *πρὸς τινι* in the same sense.

p. 932. The discussion of the various ways in which a man may be pronounced to be a 'cause' or blameable for a thing, is complicated enough to make us sympathize with a scribe who lost himself occasionally in this jungle of logical or legal subtleties. The Ch. opens with a statement that, although two things cannot be at once cause and effect of each other, they may nevertheless each be the occasion of some effect to the other. Thus two traders may benefit each other by some transaction in which they are both parties (*ἀλλήλοις εἰσὶν αἷτιοι τοῦ κερδαίνειν*). The point is further illustrated by means of a legal instance:—*ὁ μὲν πλήξας τινὰ θανασίμῳς αἷτιός ἐστιν αὐτῷ τοῦ θανάτου ἢ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὸν θάνατον· ἀντιπληγείς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ θανασίμῳς ἔσχειν αὐτὸν ἀνταίτιον, οὐ καθὼ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ αἷτιος, καθ' ἕτερον δέ*—where we must surely read, *ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι* and *καθὼ ἕτερος*, the sense being apparently that A is an *αἷτιος*, if he causes B's death, and B an *ἀνταίτιος*, if before dying he returns the blow and thus causes his opponent's death. The result of the Ch. is summed up in the concluding words: *ὥστε οὐκ ἀλλήλων τὰ αἷτια ὡς αἷτια, ἀ δέ ἐστιν αἷτια.* Here Clement must have written, *ἀλλήλοις δέ ἐστιν αἷτια*—a repetition of the formu-

la with which the Ch. opened [*ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ αἷτια, ἀλλήλοις δὲ αἷτια*]. After this a question is started as to the nature of a joint or concurrent cause:—*ἔτι ζητεῖται εἰ πολλά κατὰ σύνοδον ἐνὸς αἷτια γίνεται πολλά. οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι συνελόντες αἷτιοί εἰσι τοῦ καθέλκεσθαι τὴν ναῦν κ.τ.λ.*—where the second *πολλά* seems to be a mere dittographia of the first, and *συνελόντες* is probably a blunder for *συνελθόντες*: *κατὰ σύνοδον* in the previous line appears to make this change a more plausible one than Sylburg's *συνέλκοντες*.

I. BYWATER.

ON A PASSAGE IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

Eth. N. VII. 8—*ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.* Here, I believe, *καθ' ὑπερβολὰς* is commonly taken as = *καθ' ὑπερβολήν*—a view which seems to me open to most serious objections on grounds of sense as well as of grammar. As the obvious intention of the passage is to affirm that with the *ἀκόλαστος* the pursuit of excess has become habitual, we might borrow the parallel language used elsewhere (*Eth. N. II. 3*), and say that he follows his vicious course *εἰδώς, προαιρούμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*. For the disturbing *καθ' ὑπερβολὰς*, therefore, I would write *καθὸ ὑπερβολαί*. It is possible that the *ἢ* which precedes represents another reading, *ῆ*, in which case *καθὸ* would be a gloss, which has found its way into the text by accident.

I. BYWATER.

FRAGMENTS OF AN OLD LATIN APOCALYPSE.

REVISITING Paris in the autumn of 1871 I rejoiced to find all the MSS which I had occasion to consult quite uninjured: among them Lat. 6400 G, containing some palimpsest fragments of an Old Latin version of the Acts and the Apocalypse, on which a brief article¹ may be found in the fourth number of this journal.

Of the two leaves of the Apocalypse which the MS contains three pages are here printed: the fourth seemed hopeless: at least it must be left for sharper eyes, assisted it may be by photography.

The words or parts of words printed in italic letters have been supplied partly from indistinct traces, partly from considerations of space and context. All the rest I have to the best of my belief actually seen: though some words or letters are generally invisible, so that I could only catch sight of them when the light in which I was holding the MS happened once out of twenty times to be exactly suitable. It seemed more prudent not to supply the cut-off beginnings or ends of lines.

fol. 118 b. Right edge clipt.

Apocalypsisihuxpiquamdeditillids....
uissuisquaeoportetfieriinbreui etsigni
tiandaperangelumsumseruosuoioanniqu
cauituerbumdiettestimoniumihuxpieaq

¹ In this article I found fault with the text of Acts iv. 6 as given by Sabatier from this MS: let me now own that I was wrong: on renewed inspection it is pontifical. In the

first verse of the same chapter I now see that *σπαρηνδσ* is translated *praetor*; in agreement with the MSS approved by Bede as quoted by Sabatier.

- 5 Felix qui legit et qui audit uerba prophetiae hu
 ea quae scriptae sunt quia tempus iam in pro
 iohanne septem ecclesiarum quae sunt in Asia gra
 et parabae qui est et qui erat et qui uenturu
 tem spiritibus et quae in conspectu throni
 10 et ab iuxta poqui est testis fidelis primogeni
 orum et imperator regum terrae ei
 nos et solui nos a peccatis nostris sanguin
 cit regnum nostrum sacerdos do et patr
 ritas et potestas in seculum saeculorum a
 15 ecce uenit cum nubibus et uidebit eum omni
 et qui eum confiterunt et uidebunt eum omni
 terrae ego autem dicit dominus deus
 erat et qui uenturus est omnipotens e
 frater uester et participes in tribulatione
 et patientia in xpo iuxta huiusmodi in insula quae a
 20 pathmos propter uerbum dicit propter testi
 iuxta huiusmodi in insula quae a
 uocem ut tubam dicentem mihi quod u

At the end of line 1 the traces of the last word are puzzling: the letter after $\bar{d}s$ does not look as if it could have been p.—In line 5 what seems the t of audit might possibly be an abbreviation for unt.—8 The space favours ab eo rather than a $\bar{d}o$.—16 Et videbunt ($\chi \psi\phi\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$) instead of et plangent se ($\chi \kappa\phi\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$) deserves notice. Comparing this verse and viii. 13, (where the reading seems to have been audiui unius aquilae volantis, without the addition of uocem for which there is no room), and some other passages with Primasius this seems to be an earlier text.—17 In the middle of the space between terrae and ego is something—apparently a short word—which I cannot at all make out.—23 Either ut with an accidental dot over the t or $\psi\tau$ as an abbreviation for uti.

fol. 118 a. Left edge clipt.

et mittes septem ecclesias ephesus et smyr
 ergamum et tyatram et sardis et filadelfi

5 *eametconuersusrespexituideremuocem
 cumloquaebaturtuidiseptemcandelabra
 nmediocandelaborumsimilemfiliohomi
 tumpodereeteratpraecinctussupramami
 naaurea caputautemeiusetcapilli...
 aaunrixetoculieiusutflammaignisetped
 esauricalcosicutdefornaceigneo etuox
 10 uoraquarummultarumethabebatindeste
 temstellasetexoreeiussgladiusutrimqua
 sexiebatetfacieseiusplendebatutsolin
 suaetcumuidisseineumcaaciditadpedeseius
 mmortuusetinposuitsupermedesteram
 15 ensnolitimereregosumprimusetnouissimus
 uifuimortuuseteccesumuiuensinsecu
 ulorum ethabeoclauesmortisetinfe
 cribergoquaæuidistietquaesuntetquae
 haecoportet sacramentumseptemstel
 20 æuidistiinderameaetseptemcandel
 aureamseptestellaeangelisuntseptemecl
 edetcandelabrasetpemecclesiasunt
 clisiaeephesiorumscribehaecdicitequit*

In line 3 *respexit viderem* may be a mere mistake for *respexi videre*: as we find *caecidit* line 13, *auream* 21, *arborem* viii. 7: or what seems t might be an abbreviation for *ut*.—7 After *capilli* I cannot make out any traces of the next word: but there is only space for a short reading such as *capilli albi* *ut lana alba aut nix*.—9 *igneo* may be taken with either *auricalco* or *fornace*: in ix. 2 we find *de magno fornace*.

fol. 115 b. Right edge clipt. Cap. viii. 7.

5 tiam partem terrae uisserunt et tertiā par
rem cremauerunt et omne faenum uiride
et secundus angelus tuba cecinit et ut
ignis ardens missus esset in mare et facta est
pars maris sanguis et mortua est tertiā par
animalium quae erant in mari et tertiā par

- interitettertiusangelustubacaecinite*
decaelostellamagnaardensutfaculasup
partemfluminumetsuperfontesaquarum
10 *stellaediciturabsentium etfactae*
parsaquarumquasiabsentiumetmulti
mortuisuntamaritudineaquarum
angelustubaececinitetpercussaestterti
ettertiaparsstellarumitaутtertiaparseo
15 *rareturedieseandempartemamittere*
militer etuidietaudiiniuniusaquilae
permediumcaelumuoce magnadicensua
habitantibussuperterramaceterisuocib
umangelorumquitubacaniturisuntet
20 *angelustubaececinitetuidistellamdeca*
seinterrametdataesteiclauiputeiaby
itputeumabyssietascenditfumusdepute
demagnofornacequisolemetaeremte

In line 6 it may have been either *erat* or *erāt*. 13 There is not room for all the words *pars solis et tertia pars lunae*: probably some were omitted by homœoteleuton. 17 *Dicens* suits the space; but perhaps it might be *dicentis* abbreviated. 23 I suppose this line ended with *tenebravit*.

A. A. VANSITTART.

LATIN METRES IN ENGLISH,
AFTER SIDNEY, TENNYSON, AND MR ELLIS.

ACCORDING to the highest authority—and it is wonderful that the thing should require any authority at all—pronunciation reform ought to take accent and quantity into account, and not quality only. On the relations of accent and quantity it is peculiarly difficult, as experience shows, for even good scholars to avoid mistakes: these matters therefore need all the light that can be thrown upon them. Mr Ellis's *English Catullus* would have thrown a good deal of light upon them if it had fulfilled the promise of its title-page. It has gained credit for doing this from reviewers who ought to have known better: an opposite judgment has been passed by a writer in the *Spectator* (Sept. 26, 1871); but I venture to think the subject demands a minuter discussion. In the following remarks I have taken care to keep philological criticism separate from æsthetic.

Mr Ellis undertakes to translate Catullus "in the metres of the original." And sure enough, if a good reciter could say or sing the following lines (lxxvi. 9—10) to Quintilian for instance, I suppose Quintilian would recognise them for an elegiac couplet:

Waste on a traitorous heart, nor finding kindly requital.
Therefore cease, nor still bleed agoniz'd any more.

But try him with this (lxv. 13—14);

Closely as under boughs of dimmest shadow the pensive
Daulian ever moans Itys in agony slain.

and I suppose he would be quite unable to guess what metre it was meant for. Tell him that it too was an elegiac couplet, and he would admit (if proper precautions had been taken with the

termination of *shadow*) that the short syllables were short, but would object that five of the long syllables were short too¹.

Quintilian was ignorant of our accentual metres. Try the same experiment then on a modern reader unacquainted with quantity metres; and he would recognise at once the modern accentual hexameter and pentameter; unusually smooth and flowing specimens indeed, only with something wrong about the first pentameter, which Quintilian, I imagine, would have found the best in the book.

If then Mr Ellis had not given us his views in a preface, I should have regarded his translation as one of the various compromises founded essentially on accent, and liable to no metrical criticism other than æsthetic. It would only have seemed to carry further what Mr Tennyson did long ago in the metre of *Locksley Hall*: for though it must be only by accident that that metre is the accentual analogue of the ancient trochaic, the poem contains not a few lines which are trochaics in point of quantity, like

Dreary gleams across the moorland flying over Locksley Hall,
or only require such modifications as *o'* for *of* to make them so.

But Mr Ellis does give his views in a preface; and they are fully collected in the following extracts.

1. Tennyson's Alcaics and Hendecasyllables...suggested to me the principle on which I was to go to work. It was not sufficient to reproduce the ancient metres, unless the ancient quantity was reproduced also. Almost all the modern writers of classical metre had contented themselves with making an accented syllable long, an unaccented short...They almost invariably disregarded position, perhaps the most important element of quantity (pp. vii. viii.).

2. The experiments of the Elizabethan writers, Sir Philip Sidney and others,...were as decidedly unsuccessful from an accentual, as the modern experiments from a quantitative point of view (p. ix.).

¹ *Dimmest, shădow, ēver, ŷtys, āgony*. That there should be only five, it would be necessary to give unusual force to the 'glide' represented by *r* in *under, ever*. The accent of *agony* (if he recognised an accent in the stress) would suggest to Quintilian that the *sl* was initial, and thereby save the short *y*.

On the other hand, the stress which our reciter would be obliged to lay on *heart, still, boughs, moans*, would to Quintilian's ear, I presume, deprive all four lines of their cæsura. Yet the modern reader imagines he marks the cæsura by this very stress, and would certainly miss it if it was often absent.

In Sidney's verse we find that

Syllables made long by the accent falling upon them are in some cases shortened, as *rūine*, *pērished*, *crūel*; syllables which the absence of the accent only allows to be long *in thesi* are, in virtue of the classical laws of position, permitted to rank as long elsewhere—*moment of his*, *of this epistle* (pp. ix. x.).

3. Neither he nor his contemporaries were permitted to grasp as a principle a regularity which they sometimes secured by chance; nor, so far as I am aware, have the various revivals of ancient metre in this country or Germany in any case consistently carried out the whole theory without which the reproduction is partial and cannot look for more than partial success (pp. xiii. xiv.).

4. He speaks (p. xiv.), of verses

combining legitimate quantity (in which accent and position are alike observed) with illegitimate (in which position is observed but accent disregarded);

and it seems that such verses

cannot be considered as more than imperfect realizations of the true positional principle (p. xiv.).

5. The question is now asked and answered

What then are the rules on which such rhythms become possible? They are briefly these:—(1) accented syllables, *as a general rule*, are long, though some syllables which count as long need not be accented; as, in

All that in earth's leas blooms, what blossoms Thessaly nursing, blossoms, though only accented on the first syllable, counts for a spondee¹, the shortness of the second *o* being partly helped out by the two consonants which follow it²; partly by the fact that the syllable is *in thesi* (pp. xiv. xv.).

The other rules, two in number, are simply the usual classical ones.

The results, then, are—first, that there is, according to Mr Ellis, a *true, consistent, legitimate*, English system of quantity versification, consisting in the application of the classical rules, *plus* two other rules, namely (by extracts 2 and 5) that

¹ I should have thought *blossoms* was as palpable an iambus as it was possible to pronounce. However, the writer in the *Spectator* above referred to makes the first two syllables of *pro-*

cession long. I should say *procession* was sometimes a dactyl, but generally a tribach.

² Why not *three*!

- (1) syllables otherwise short are admissible in *arsis* as long, if accented;
- (2) long syllables are only by way of exception admissible in *arsis* at all, unless accented:

secondly, that the two additional rules are necessary to make the reproduction of the ancient metres complete: thirdly, that this system is that observed by Mr Tennyson in his *Alcaics* and *Hendecasyllables*.

By the first additional rule I at first understood Mr Ellis to mean that syllables otherwise short *are* long if accented. But it was difficult to suppose that a man who appeals to the "too limited number of readers who can really hear with their ears" should hear as long the first syllables of *visit*, *quality*, *profit*, *money*, *very*, *atom*, *body*, *other*, *any*, *ready*, *thoroughly*, *province*, *ever*¹, or of *merry*, *fatter*, *litter*, *scrubby*, *batter'd*, *summary*, *napping*; or the second syllables of *possession* and *unmannerly* (these 22 cases come out of the 34 lines of *Varus me meus*); or above all the accented syllables of *Septimi-us* and *Cornifici-us*. Nor could a scholar, who hears the first syllable of *ágere* short, well hear the first syllable of *ágoný* long². On the other hand, returning to *Varus*, I do not believe that anybody who hears with his ears hears the termination of the English genitive *Cinna's* short³.

¹ I omit such questionable cases as *then I*, *then our*, *had a*, *get erected*; because in the first two at least there is a sensible hiatus, or even a duplication of the consonant.

² Here I find myself in apparent contradiction with an observation of Mr Clark's (above, Vol. i. page 105), but I believe only apparent. Mr Clark does no doubt imply that in pronouncing, for instance, *óros* as *áros* the Greeks follow the same rule as we do in our own language. But it cannot be meant that we feel obliged to make a vowel long in order to lay a stress upon it. There is as much stress on the first syllable of *honour* as on the

first syllable of *owner* or *awning*, yet the former is quite short in comparison with either of the latter, if slightly longer than the second syllable of *commoner*.

³ *Cinna's* or *Cinnas* (plural) differs from *Cinna* not only by the addition of *s* but by the addition before the *s* of one of the sounds represented by Mr Bell and Mr Alexander Ellis by an *r* upside down. I do not find this fact noticed either in *Visible Speech* or in *Early English Pronunciation* (indeed, it is incidentally ignored in E. E. P., Part I. page 275, line 5); but anybody may verify it by comparing *Cinnas* with *inasmuch*, and it explains the *e* which was written before the *s* in times

Considering this, and considering the arbitrary and quasi-legal sound of such expressions as *count as long, permitted to rank as long, allows to be long, adjustment of accent and quantity*, considering also the paradox (the second of our three 'results') that the two additional rules serve to complete the reproduction of the ancient metres, I infer that when Mr Ellis says (extract 5) "accented syllables *are* long" he means that for metrical purposes they may be deemed and taken to be long: and I do not know how to distinguish the theory in principle from the schoolboy notion that syllables are long and short, not because during a certain period of history people pronounced them so, but because—well I suppose because the *Gradus* made them so. *Long by authority* they used to say.

If authority can make a short syllable long, perhaps Mr Tennyson's authority will do so. Does Mr Tennyson then (as Mr Ellis must mean to say he does) observe the two additional rules? The first rule is certainly not applied in *Milton* or the *Indolent reviewers*: short syllables are not lengthened by accent¹. The reader (mine that is—none of Mr Ellis's) may say this might be accidental in a couple of poems only 37 lines long together. But if he does not think that hypothesis refuted by my list of false quantities out of *Varus me meus*, I would ask him to produce from the whole of Mr Ellis's English Catullus one complete passage of as much as eight lines in which no such case occurs.

Mr Tennyson does observe the second rule; there is nearly always an accent *in arsi*. But this means that he has accom-

when people heard with their ears. Sidney, if I remember right, makes *ruby* a trochee, but *ruby's* a spondee.

¹ Some phonologists may consider *rich* made long a doubtful case, but Mr Alexander Ellis says that at the end of a word the sound of *ch* is "generally recognised" to be compound. E. E. P., Part I. p. 54. I should have thought *sing* a doubtful case myself, but Mr Robinson Ellis seems to pronounce final *ng* compound as in *linger*, not simple as in *singer* (see pages xv.

xvi.); and I suppose Mr Tennyson considers this admissible. I used to imagine it a Bromwichism: and Mr Alexander Ellis does not acknowledge it as belonging to the "present usage"; nay, he holds the simple pronunciation to have been the normal one ever since the sixteenth century at least (E. E. P., Part I. p. 192). But Sidney made even the first syllable of *singer* long, and Mr Max Müller treats the compound pronunciation as normal English in his *Survey*.

plished the feat of writing each piece in two metres at once, the quantity metre and its accentual analogue; for the observance of the second rule, which is really restrictive, is what constitutes an accentual metre. The first rule, as I have called it, is not a rule; it is simply a licence; and its adoption is enough to render a metre not perfectly "quantitative." What then Mr Ellis does is to write not indeed in two metres at once, but in a metre and a half; partly in the metre of the original, and wholly in its accentual analogue.

Hitherto I have kept to philological questions. I shall not attempt poetical criticism in the higher sense. It will be more respectful to the translator of *Miser Catulle* for instance and *Siqua recordanti* to say nothing on this head than to make the few remarks I could venture on here. The principal object of this paper is to call attention to a very effective presentation of the insidious fallacy, as it seems to me, that quantity is a sort of legal fiction. But supposing Mr Ellis mistaken about the relation of his system to the metres of the original, the system might still be aesthetically the best applicable to the problem of poetical translation. This is not the place to discuss even that question. I will only express the opinion that the smoothness and regularity which Mr Ellis's system introduces into accentual verse, by the due avoidance of long syllables, tends to aggravate a sort of monotonous heaviness without solidity which seems to me the great defect of accentual heroics or elegiacs. It is a positive relief to come upon such accentually irregular lines as lxxvi. 10 above quoted. But, no doubt from the same cause, no imitation known to me of classical metres in English (always excepting the *Indolent reviewers*, and I am not bound to account for the exception) pleases my ear so much as those very elegiacs of Sidney's, which Mr Ellis (p. ix.) pronounces so "decidedly unsuccessful." But even Sidney's quantity verses are to a great extent accentual, and soon grow monotonous.

To return to philological matters, Mr Ellis is surely unjust to Sidney about his short *I, thy, so*. *So* when unemphatic is often actually pronounced short. *I* and *thy*, of course, cannot be short with the quality we give them. That quality was already given them in Sidney's time, but not always; some

persons, it seems probable (E. E. P., Part I. p. 109—116) still pronounced them with the long sound corresponding to *i* in *fit*. Sidney may have followed this usage¹, and considered himself at liberty to pronounce the vowel short in recitation. However this may be, his practice is to make such words "common." He even begins a hexameter *pīne* *is* *hīgh*, *hōpe* *is* *ās* *hīgh*. But they are oftener short than long.

With respect to syllables containing a short vowel before a double-written consonant, Sidney's practice is remarkable. He lengthens them *in arsi*, like Mr Ellis, but avoids them *in thesi*. Six of the seven exceptions I have observed to the latter rule are before imperfectly "shut" consonants (or "Dauerlaute"), which are then made to lengthen the syllable². I suppose that, after arsis or in the case of these consonants, he thought it admissible to pronounce double in recitation³. There are not a few cases like *konour*, *shadow*, long *in arsi*, which look as if Sidney observed Mr Ellis's first additional rule: but, since (with one exception, *planets*) they do not occur, short or long, *in thesi*, I presume they ought in most instances to be spelt and pronounced with double consonants⁴. Some are doubtless instances of long vowels shortened since Sidney's time. Thus in words like

¹ Be it observed that he omits the pronoun *I* from his version of the famous comparison of *aye* and *eye*. This is from the dialogue of Philisides and Echo (*Arcadia*, Book II. ending):

Can then a cause be so light that
foreeth a man to go dye? Aye.

Yet tell what light thing I had in
me to draw me to dye? Eye.

It is unlikely that the pronoun *I* in the second line could have been pronounced like *eye*. The copy I quote from (1725) has *yea*, not *aye*: but it is otherwise an incorrect one.

² Message, affection, full oft, senseless, sorrows, allure, and appear. These seven examples are spread over nearly 600 lines; hexameters, pentameters, sapphics, and asclepiads; not

counting hendecasyllables and anacreontics.

³ With Mr Tennyson *irresponsible* is ambiguous, and *little* is actually counted as a pyrrhic before a consonant. Those who could hear with their ears probably acquiesced at once in the short *l*. A language which allows a liquid to dispense with the aid of a true vowel will naturally give it quantity like a vowel.

⁴ *Pitie* may be one of these cases. But, considering the French form, it is just possible that it rhymed to *sit ye*. *Tyger* is "common:" this may be like *high* mentioned above; but I am afraid it may also be an imitation of Horace's *rapidus Tigris*; if so the pedantry is atrocious.

pleasant, the apparent diphthong is long *in arsi* and *in thesi*, agreeably to what Mr Alexander Ellis tells us of the use of the symbol *ea* in the sixteenth century.

The "too limited number of readers who can really hear with their ears" seems at first sight to be accounted for by the difficulty of accurately observing in oneself or in others so habitual and evanescent a phenomenon as pronunciation. But ancient systems of spelling bear traces of a nicety of discrimination which suggests the idea that "readers" fail in hearing with their ears just because they are readers: that in short the inconsistencies of modern spelling have wrought in us an acquired incapacity for phonetic observation. From the perfection of Sidney's quantity, contrasted with the confusion of thought conspicuous in the more recent history of our attempts at classical metre, it would appear as if this acquired incapacity had made considerable progress in the last three hundred years.

C. J. MONRO.

CATULLUS' 4th POEM.

THIS poem is a fascinating example of the gentler manner of Catullus. Though it will not bear comparison with some of his more impassioned pieces, it has an exquisite beauty and finish in its own style which will not be readily matched in Latin or any other language. Fortunately too the blunders of the manuscripts are so plain and have been corrected with such success by the older critics that there are only two words in the whole poem about which there is any difference of opinion: *vocaret* in l. 20, for which Lachmann, followed by Haupt, reads *vagaret*, and *novissime* in l. 24 for which many editors, old and recent, read *novissimo*. In both cases I keep the manuscript reading, in the former with a good deal of hesitation, in the latter with an absolute conviction that the change adopted by so many seriously interferes with the right understanding of the poem. Clear and limpid however as the language may appear at first sight, when it is more carefully examined, its right interpretation is found to be by no means so simple, and seems to have been often missed; for Catullus here, as in his other pure iambic poem, owing perhaps to the restrictions of the metre, is very abrupt and allusive and requires much expansion in order to be fully apprehended. Believing that a minute dissection of the poem and a careful comparison of it and the tenth elegy of the first book of the *Tristia*, which Ovid has written with Catullus in his mind, probably in his hands, will clear up much that is obscure, I offer the following remarks, first printing the Latin, as precision is needed and careful punctuation is of importance.

- Phaselus ille quem videtis, hospites,
ait fuisse navium celerrimus,
neque ullius natantis impetum trabis
nequisse praeter ire, sive palmulis
5 opus foret volare sive linteo.
et hoc negat minacis Hadriatici
negare litus, insulasve Cycladas
Rhodumque nobilem horridamque Thraciam
Propontida, trucemve Ponticum sinum,
10 ubi iste post phaselus antea fuit
comata silva: nam Cytorio in iugo
loquente saepe sibilum edidit coma.
Amastri Pontica et Cytore buxifer,
tibi haec fuisse et esse cognitissima
15 ait phaselus; ultima ex origine
tuo stetisse dicit in cacumine,
tuo imbuisse palmulas in aequore;
et inde tot per impotentia freta
erum tulisse, laeva sive dextera
20 vocaret aura, sive utrumque Iuppiter
simul secundus incidisset in pedem;
neque ulla vota litoralibus deis
sibi esse facta, cum veniret a mari
novissime hunc ad usque limpidum lacum.
25 sed haec prius fuere: nunc recondita
senet quiete seque dedicat tibi,
gemelle Castor et gemelle Castoris.

In these verses Catullus represents himself as pointing out and praising to some guests, who were with him at his villa in Sirmio, the phaselus, now laid up beside the Benacus or Lago di Garda, which had carried him from Bithynia to Italy. This at least is the sense in which Catullus' words have been almost universally understood. But one of his latest expositors Westphal in his translation and commentary, pp. 170—174, says that the poem contains much that is obscure (viel Dunkles), and proceeds to explain it very differently. The ship had to cross the sea; it was not therefore a mere 'barke'; it could

hardly then have come up the Po and Mincio to the Lago di Garda; Catullus too seems first to have gone on board at Rhodes, and to have performed the first part of the journey by land; the ship therefore was not his own; he only hired a passage on it from Rhodes; the *erum* of v. 19 was the owner or master of the ship; the *limpidus lacus* was not the Benacus, but a saltwater bay of the Adriatic, perhaps on the Grecian shore; the *hospites* were not Catullus' guests, but the hosts who entertained him on his landing on the coast. This explanation gives a very lame and impotent meaning to the piece, the 'viel Dunkles' of which we will endeavour to clear up in a different way, partly by the assistance of Ovid. The phaselus was unquestionably built for Catullus or purchased by him in Bithynia, and must have been a light galley constructed for great speed and provided with both sails and oars. It need not have been of any great size: a friend of mine during the war with Russia went to the Baltic, cruised there for some time and returned to England in a yacht of seven tons; and we know from a late memorable trial that the 'Osprey' of 66 tons, built for mere trading purposes, could circumnavigate more than half the globe, whether or not it bore in addition the weight and fortunes of Sir Roger. And what feats of discovery were performed of old by heroes like Baffin in their craft of 40 tons! We shall probably not be wrong in assuming that our phaselus was of a burden somewhere between 20 and 50 tons and that this would be the size of Ovid's ship too, of which we are now going to speak.

Ovid on his sad journey to Tomoe had come by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth; he there quitted the ship, crossed the Isthmus and purchased a vessel at Cenchreae, which was to convey him and all his property to his final destination. He sailed in it as far as the entrance of the Hellespont, where he seems to have encountered contrary winds and been obliged to beat about, and to have been carried back first to Imbros and then to Samothrace, where he made up his mind to send on his own vessel, doubtless with all his *impedimenta* and most of his servants, through the Hellespont, the Propontis, the Bosporus, and along the left shore of the Euxine to Tomoe; while he

himself, weary of the sea, crossed over to Thrace and performed the rest of his journey by land. All this he tells us in the elegy already spoken of, which was written while he was staying in Samothrace. It is the most cheerful in the whole series of the 'Tristia' and the 'Ex Ponto.' The poet finds himself in a cultivated place after the dangers and discomforts of the sea and before he had learnt what Tomoe really was, or rather the aspect it assumed to his diseased imagination which succeeded in persuading him, though fresh from the astronomical studies of the Fasti, that a town, in the latitude of Florence, lay far within the Arctic circle. Were it not for Ovid's minute diffuseness, his meaning would perhaps have been more obscure to us than the curt and allusive language of Catullus, which we will now endeavour to illustrate, partly from this elegy.

The first five lines of our poem we will thus translate: 'That yacht, my friends, which you see, claims to have been the fastest of ships; no spurt of aught which swims of timber built but she could pass, she says, whether need were to fly with blades of oars or under canvas.' These verses are thus imitated by Ovid, who shews himself here too 'nimium amator ingenii sui' and pushes to hyperbole the simple thought of Catullus:

Est mihi sitque precor, flavae tutela Minervae,
 navis, et a picta casside nomen habet.
 sive opus est velis, minimam bene currit ad auram,
 sive opus est remo, remige carpit iter.
 nec comites volucris contenta est vincere cursu,
 occupat egressas quamlibet ante rates.

We will next take vv. 6—21 of Catullus: 'And this the shore of the blustering Adriatic will not, she says, gainsay; no nor the Cyclad isles and Rhodes renowned and the rough Thracian Propontis; no nor the surly Pontic gulf, where, afterwards a yacht, she was before a leafy wood; for often on Cytorus' ridge with her talking leaves she gave a whispering forth. To you, Amastris-upon-Pontus, and to you, box-clad Cytorus, these facts, the yacht declares, were and are known right well: from her earliest birthtime on your top she stood, she says, in your waters handselled her blades; and next she

carried her master over so many raging seas, whether on her left the breeze invited or on her right, or Jupiter propitious had fallen at once on both her sheets.' In these lines Catullus twice over in his very rapid manner, with the simplest copulae, indicates the voyage of his yacht from the time it was launched in the Pontus, probably at Amastris or perhaps at Cytorus, till it reached the shores of Italy: first in 6—9, and again in 17—21. In the former verses the voyage, as the commentators have observed, is described in reversed order by one looking back on it from Italy. It is divided into three main sections by the particle *ve*, as I have tried to indicate by the punctuation of both my text and my translation. The yacht was built in Amastris or in Cytorus, the town and hill having both the same name. These two great emporia for the box and other woods of the Cytorian mount are mentioned together in the *Iliad* (B 853) *Οἱ ῥα Κύτωρον ἔχον καὶ Σήσαμον* (old name of Amastris) *ἀμφενέμοντο*. This part of Paphlagonia, of which Amastris was the capital, now belonged to the province of Bithynia, and it was natural that Catullus should get his yacht there. But when he left Bithynia in the year B.C. 58, he was in Nicaea far down to the south-west and not far from the Propontis: comp. 46 4 'Linquantur Phrygii, Catulle, campi Nicaeaeque ager uber aestuosae: Ad claras Asiae volemus urbes.' It is pretty certain then in itself that Catullus would not make the long and almost impracticable hill-journey from Nicaea to Amastris or Cytorus; and this will appear more clearly from what will be said presently. He would order his yacht to be brought round along the 'surly' Pontus, through the Bosphorus into the Propontis, and would embark with all his belongings either at Cios, which Mela (1 100) calls 'Phrygiae opportunissimum emporium,' or at Myrlea (Apamea), to both of which there was a short and easy road from Nicaea.

Then in 7—9 'insulasve—Propontida,' Catullus briefly indicates the second division of the yacht's voyage, he himself being now on board. It coasted along the Propontis, then through the Hellespont, and along the shore of Mysia, Lydia, etc., or the islands Lesbos, Chios, etc. to Rhodes, which the poem intimates to have been the most eastern point to which

he went. He would thus probably visit the most famous towns of the province of Asia: 'Ad claras Asiae volemus urbes': so Ovid 'Te duce magnificas Asiae perspeximus urbes.' The yacht of course with his property and servants would be coasting along all the time. It is likely enough that he himself would sometimes travel by land: it was probably on this occasion that he visited his brother's tomb in the Troad, and doubtless cities like Ephesus and Halicarnassus were not passed over. But Rhodes would seem to be specially designated not only on account of its celebrity, but also because it was the farthest point in his voyage homewards. He would then make straight for the 'insulas Cycladas,' visiting perhaps Delos; for they lay directly between Rhodes and the Isthmus of Corinth, over which Catullus no doubt had his yacht transported. It would be carried across by the Diolcos in a few hours; and it is almost certain that he would not make the long and dangerous voyage round Cape Malea. In fact his words, as we have said, short and allusive here as elsewhere, seem to point out his course. We now come to the last part of the sea-voyage, denoted by the 'minacis Hadriatici litus,' which indicates briefly his coasting along the Grecian shore, crossing over the Hadriatic, and then running along the Italian shore. What we have said of his joining his yacht in the Propontis seems implied not only in the nature of the case, but also in the poet's own words (v. 18) 'inde tot per impotentia freta *Erum tulisse*'; and that he did not personally know the first part of the yacht's voyage might appear from his appeal to Amastris and Cytorus: all this, the growth of the wood, the first launching of the ship, you, Amastris and Cytorus, know, it says, and know full well, even if I do not. That the *erum tulisse* is emphatic, I will try to shew from Ovid too; but first I will speak of the concluding lines of the poem (22—27), as Ovid will perhaps illustrate them also.

'And not a vow had been offered for her to the guardian gods of the shore, when last of all she came from the sea as far as this limpid lake. But this is past and done: now she ages in tranquil retirement and dedicates herself to you, twin-brother Castor and Castor's brother twin.' The yacht at v. 22 had

reached the mouth of the Po, its sailing qualities being such that it had never been in danger enough for a single vow to be offered up, until it was quite clear of the sea. The *oratio obliqua* renders this sentence a little obscure, as it does not shew whether 'esse facta' is the perfect or the pluperfect: the *oratio recta* would be plain enough: 'neque ulla vota dis litoribus mihi facta erant tum, cum novissime, mari relicto, veni ad hunc usque lacum': *ultima ex origine* of 15, *et inde* of 18, and *cum novissime* of 23 and 24, answer to each other just as in Plancus' letter to Cicero (ad fam. x 42 2), we have *primum—deinde—novissime*, as well as in Seneca de ira III 5 2: Quintilian has *primum—post haec—novissime*; *prius—tum—novissime*; *maxime—tum—novissime*. Cicero, a purist in such matters, admonished doubtless by Aelius Stilo, as Gellius tells us (x 21), seems never to use the adverb *novissime*, and once only in a somewhat early oration the adjective *novissimus*, though his correspondent Plancus twice uses the former and Cassius and Galba both employ the second word in letters to him; and Gellius says that Cato, Sallust and others of that age 'verbo isto promisce usitati sint': the adverb occurs three times in Sallust's Catiline and Iugurtha. Those editors therefore, old and recent, who change the manuscript reading to *novissimo*, in my judgment spoil Catullus. He is injured too by those who put a comma after *Thraciam* in v. 8; for though I would not assert with Lachmann that Catullus or Lucretius could not have used *Thraciam* as a substitute for *Thracam* or *Thracen*, the poem as I have explained it seems to require *Thraciam* to be an epithet of *Propontida*. The yacht too must have hugged the Asiatic coast and quite avoided Thrace, and finally 'horridam Thraciam Propontida' is symmetrical with 'truce Ponticum sinum'. As for *vocaret* in v. 20, when Lachmann (Lucret. p. 178) says he does not understand it, he knew of course such passages as Klotz and Ellis cite from Virgil and Statius, or such a one as I have noted down from Ovid (Heroid. 13 9) 'et qui tua vela vocaret, Quem cuperent nautae, non ego, ventus erat': a favourable breeze springs up and invites the ship or the sails to come out of port and take advantage of it. In the passage from Ovid's Remedium

quoted by Ellis, you are told to let the oar follow the current, 'qua fluctus vocant'. It is not easy then to see the appropriateness of the word here, where, as Lachmann observes, a shifting wind is spoken of. I sometimes picture to myself the poet thinking of the yacht as becalmed or using its oars, and then of a wind suddenly springing up and inviting it to spread its sails; but that hardly agrees with the 'raging seas' of the preceding line. Lachmann (Lucret. p. 178) then may perhaps be right in reading 'vagaret', which well suits the context.

The *erum tulisse* of v. 19 seems, as I have shewn above, to be emphatic and to imply that Catullus did not himself make the voyage from the Pontus round to the Propontis: these words have a bearing too on 22—24, if I am not mistaken, and indicate that Catullus, when he had safely reached the Italian coast, did not accompany his yacht in the very tedious voyage up the Po and then the Mincio into the Lago di Garda, which would have been made for the most part against a very powerful stream partly by sailing, partly by rowing, but mainly I presume by towing from the bank. Of course this would be the most convenient way for his heavy effects and part of his attendants to go. If the Mincio in Catullus' time, as is said to be the case now, was not navigable where it joins the Po, the yacht must have been transported there, as at the Isthmus. But great changes may have taken place between those days and ours in the river's course. He himself in all probability started by some quicker and more convenient route for Sirmio, to which the 31st poem shews that he hastened, as soon as he returned from Bithynia. He may indeed have quitted his ship at Brundisium, and not been in it during its coasting voyage from thence to the mouth of the Po.

Now this and much else that I have said above seem to be confirmed by Ovid in the elegy spoken of: comp. v. 9 foll.

illa Corinthiacis primum mihi cognita Cenchreis
fida manet trepidae duxque comesque viae,
perque tot eventus et iniquis concita ventis
aequora Palladio numine tuta fuit.

In the first two of these verses there appears to be an allusion to vv. 14—16 of our poem: Ovid's ship was 'primum cognita' to him at Cenchreae, where he purchased it, while Catullus traces his back to its origin on Cytorus; and in the last two lines Ovid manifestly refers to the 'tot per impotentia freta' of Catullus. Ovid then continues

nunc quoque tuta, precor, vasti secet ostia Ponti,
quasque petit, Getici litoris intret aquas:

and he goes on to describe how the ship had got into the Hellespont and then was forced back to Imbros, until in v. 20

Threiciam tetigit fessa carina Samon.
saltus ab hac terra brevis est Tempyra petenti:
hac dominum tenuis est illa secuta suum.
nam mihi Bistonios placuit pede carpere campos:
Hellespontiacas illa relegit aquas:

and then he proceeds tediously to describe in 18 lines the ship's voyage to Tomoe, through the Hellespont, Propontis, Bosphorus and along the left shore of the Euxine, enumerating nine or ten towns which it would have to pass; while he tells us nothing further of his own journey by land, after he has said that he would cross over to Tempyra on the mainland and then travel through Thrace. He manifestly felt that the ship was carrying his property and household-gods; it was therefore the main object of his solicitude. Now in the line printed in *Italics* there is a clear reference to Catullus' *erum tulisse*; and from this I should infer that Ovid understood the other poet's meaning to be that he too only accompanied his yacht on this part of the voyage. Ovid, anxious for the safety of his vessel, says (v. 43) that if the ship reaches Tomoe,

hanc si contigerit, merita cadet agna Minervae:
non facit ad nostras hostia maior opes:

this too looks like an allusion to the 'neque ulla vota litoralibus deis cet.' of Catullus. Ovid not knowing the issue of the voyage makes this vow: Catullus had been with his yacht while it was crossing the sea, and would have been able at any

moment to offer up vows if necessary. When the ship reached land, all cause for anxiety was now over. The next verses of Ovid also

vos quoque, Tyndaridae, quos haec colit insula fratres,
 mite, precor, duplici numen adeste viae:
 altera namque parat Symplegadas ire per artas,
 scindere Bistonias altera puppis aquas

appear to be suggested by Catullus' three last verses: Catullus says that all is now over and the yacht is laid up and dedicated to Castor and Pollux: Ovid begs their protection chiefly for his own ship which has yet to make its voyage, but also for the ship which has to carry him in person from Samothrace over to the mainland.

As the manuscripts of Catullus uniformly give *phāsellus*, it is not improbable that this spelling is his own, on the analogy perhaps of *quērella*, *lōquilla*, *lūella*, *mēdella*: thus Cicero and some others seem to have written *cāmellus*. Something in the pronunciation of the words led it may be to this. In v. 4 L. Müller rightly prints *praeter ire*, which is required by the metre: in 29 22 Catullus no doubt wrote 'Nisi uncta de vorare patrimonia': in his day this separation of the monosyllabic preposition from its verb was common enough, as we see from inscriptions. In Catullus' iambics and scazons, which have the hephthemimeral caesura, the end of the second foot must coincide with the end of a word, as in 'Neque ullius | natantis | impetum trabis'. The same law is observed in the Virgilian catalecta and by Martial in his many hundred iambic lines, chiefly scazons, except that in catal. 3 and 4 we find 'Generque Noctuine', and 'Superbe Noctuine', and once in Martial (vi 74 4), 'Mentitur, Aefulane: non habet dentes': a proper name forming the sole exception in so many hundred verses would seem to confirm the rule.

Catullus' 2nd poem.

- Passer, deliciae meae puellae,
 quicum ludere, quem in sinu tenere,
 quoi primum digitum dare adpetenti
 et acris solet incitare morsus,
 5 cum desiderio meo nitenti
 carum nescio quid libet iocari,
 et solaciolum sui doloris
 credo ut cum gravis acquiescet ardor:
 tecum ludere sicut ipsa possem
 10 et tristis animi levare curas!

This delightful little poem would seem to have been written while the love of Catullus and Lesbia was yet according to the notions of the time comparatively innocent. All is clear except in vss. 7 and 8 which are manifestly corrupt. The latter has been altered in various ways: Credo ut tum (ut iam, uti) gravis acquiescat ardor. A change would seem to be required in v. 7 as well, and very old critics have suggested *in* or *ut* for *et*; *ad* too might be proposed. Lachmann indeed, followed by Haupt, Schwabe and others, keeps *et* and refers us to 38 7 'Paulum quid lubet allocutionis'. But in this he is quite mistaken: it may be seen from the very large number of instances collected by Neue (II pp. 485 486), that the best writers continually use *libere*, *licere* and *oportere* as personal verbs, but in a very peculiar way, with the neuters of pronouns such as *id*, *ea*, *ista*, *quid*, *quod*, *quae*, *quidquid*, and of certain kinds of adjectives; *omnia*, *quantum*, *multum*, *multa*; and so Catullus in 61 42 has *quae licent*, as well as *paulum quid lubet*, quoted above. But, as Neue observes, in the whole of classical Latinity these verbs never have a substantive for their subject; and *solaciolum libet* is quite solecistic. Ellis keeps *et* and reads in 8 'Credo, et cum gravis acquiescit'.

But though Editors alter three or at least two words, none of their readings appears to me to give a suitable sense: they seem all to take *dolor* and *gravis ardor* to be synonymous or nearly so, while I believe them to be used in decided opposition to each other: *dolor* denotes the grief and aching void

which the heart feels in the absence of a loved object, which it desires to have with it: comp. Propert. i 20 32 'A, dolor ibat Hylas ibat Hamadryasin': which is imitated by Ovid in Heroid. 13 104 'Tu mihi luce dolor, tu mihi nocte venis', by which Laodamia expresses her ever-present yearning for Protesilaus. Then see Catullus himself, 50 16, 'Hoc, iucunde, tibi poema feci, Ex quo perspiceres meum dolorem'; by which he denotes his longing desire for the company of his friend Calvus, whose wit and conversation he so regretted that he could not sleep or rest. Whereas *gravis ardor* expresses that furious storm of passion which could not last long at one time without destroying its possessor, but which while it did last would put any other gratification, except that of the passion itself, out of the question. This *ardor* a Medea could feel in the presence of Iason: 'Et iam fortis erat, pulsusque recesserat *ardor*; Cum videt Aesoniden, extinctaque flamma revixit: Erubuere genae totoque recanduit ore (Ovid Metam. vii 76): Catullus too felt it himself often enough: 'Cum tantum arderem quantum Trinacria rupes Lymphaque in Oetaeis Malia Thermopylis' (68 53). As well attempt to quench a conflagration with a squirt, as allay the *gravis ardor*, the Aetna-like fire, of a Medea, a Lesbia, a Catullus by the antics of a bird. The *gravis ardor* must destroy itself for the time by its own intensity before the *dolor* remaining behind could find relief in playing with a sparrow. I feel convinced therefore that these two verses are to be transposed, transposition being one of the simplest remedies in the case of a text resting finally on a single manuscript; and that we are to read

credo ut, cum gravis acquiescet ardor,
sit solacium sui doloris:

'when the bright lady of my longing love is minded to try some charming play, for a sweet solace of her heartache, I trow, whenever the fierce storm of passion shall be laid.'

'Cum acquiescet' is in Catullus' manner: 5 13 'Cum sciet,' another *cum* preceding in v. 10, as here in v. 5; 13 13; 64 344, 346, 350, 351; esp. 236 'ut...Agnoscam, cum te reducem aetas prospera sistet.'

H. A. J. MUNRO.

LUCRETIANA.

FROM the nature of the materials out of which his text has to be constructed, there are so many doubtful and corrupt passages in Lucretius, that repeated study can hardly fail to give an Editor new lights on some of these. I have taken several occasions of late years to declare my views on many points where I seem to myself now to see more clearly what is right, than I did at the time when my last edition was published. As circumstances have prevented me as yet from bringing out a new edition, though the last one has been for some time exhausted, I will seize this opportunity of discussing a few passages. And first some examples of hiatus.

No careful reader of Lucretius will deny that his meaning has again and again been made clear and placed beyond all cavil by assuming the loss of one verse or more. In some respects, with a text like his this is one of the simplest of remedies; but then to render it convincing or even specious one should be able to point out precisely the nature of the words lost, or else it is a mere beating of the air; and the passage should then be clear without the need of any further correction, or at all events correction should be of the simplest kind.

I will take first II 680 foll. which stand thus in the manuscripts:

Denique multa vides quibus et color et sapor una
reddita sunt cum odore in primis pleraque dona
haec igitur variis debent constare figuris
nidor enim penetrat cet.

I have long been thoroughly dissatisfied with Lachmann's, with my own, and with every other reading known to me; and I now feel assured that the passage is to be set right, without the alteration of a single letter, by assuming a verse to be lost, the exact nature of which I think I can point out: this is what I propose:

Denique multa vides quibus et color et sapor una
reddita sunt cum odore: in primis pleraque dona
[quis accensa solent fumare altaria divom].
haec igitur variis debent constare figuris;
nidor enim penetrat cet.

The plural of *donum* is found in three other passages of Lucretius: two of the three are as follows: IV 1237 'adulentque altaria donis'; VI 752 'non cum fumant altaria donis'. Then observe the context: for the *odor* of 681 he substitutes in 683 *nidor*, a word which specially designates the smell of burnt animal matter or other greasy substances, that is to say precisely burnt sacrifices. Then compare III 266 'Quod genus in quovis animantum viscere volgo Est odor et quidam color et sapor cet.' which looks almost like a reference back to our passage; for I have now no doubt that Lambinus is right in suggesting there *color* for *calor*, which two words the mss. of Lucretius interchange almost indiscriminately; and 269 shews the origin of the mistake and the necessity for its correction.

II 902 foll.: here too I assume a hiatus: Christ I now see also suggests one: but I think I can shew how this difficult passage may assume its right shape and get a suitable sense without the change of a single letter: Lachmann alters four words and then obtains no satisfactory result:

Deinde ex sensilibus qui sensile posse creari
constituunt, porro ex aliis sentire sueti
[ipsi sensilibus, mortalia semina reddunt,]
mollia cum faciunt. nam sensus cet.

III 657 foll.: this disputed passage too I believe is to be set right by assuming a hiatus such as this:

Quin etiam tibi si lingua vibrante, micanti
serpentis cauda e procero corpore, utrumque
[et caudam et molem totius corporis omnem]
sit libitum in multas partis discidere ferro:

utrumque is the Greek ἀμφοτέρων, as in VI 499 'pariterque ita crescere utrumque Et nubis et aquam quaecumque in nubibus extat': in my note on this passage I have illustrated copiously this usage in Latin. I am not sure that in our passage it is necessary to alter *minanti* of mss. in the first line, as it may mean 'protruding from', something like Virgil's 'scopuli-que minantur In caelum'. No change in the text would then be needed; for Lachmann's *cauda e* for *caude*, i. e. *caudae*, can scarcely be called a departure from the manuscripts.

1 599 foll.: my elucidation of this very abstruse passage is now I believe generally accepted. At the same time the beginning of it is very abrupt; and I have long been disposed to assume that there is a hiatus such as the following, which would bring it into fuller harmony with the other passages with which I have compared it:

Tum porro quoniam est extremum quodque cacumen
[corporibus, quod iam nobis minimum esse videtur,
debet item ratione pari minimum esse cacumen]
corporis illius quod nostri cernere sensus
iam nequeunt: id cet.

The same word occurring at the end or beginning of two verses might easily have occasioned the omission.

But, as I have said, the nature of the hiatus should be clearly set forth, to make it probable or even specious. Thus, 1 391 following, Creech has a long note to prove that some verses have fallen out. Now again and again I have endeavoured to realise to myself how he intended the hiatus to be supplied; and I can form no clear conception of what he meant; nor do I think he had such a conception of it himself. Therefore, although Susemihl has recently maintained Creech's view, I believe the passage, though somewhat elliptical, to be as Lucretius wrote, and that 395 'Nec tali ratione potest densari aer' puts Creech's reasoning quite out of court. So

lieve that nothing is lost after III 456, 759, and IV 508, in all which passages Susemihl or Brieger in the *Philologus* supposes there is a hiatus: what is or appears to be elliptical can be mentally supplied from the context.

In a text like that of Lucretius another error, as common as the omission, is the transposition of verses; and from the earliest days of criticism many passages have been thus corrected with absolute certainty. But here too, as in the case of hiatus, for a transposition to be admitted, its appropriateness and necessity ought to be clear, as soon as it is made. For years I have been convinced that IV 195 'Quod superest ubi tam volucris levitate ferantur' has its proper place in the manuscripts and that Lachmann was wrong in transposing it and I was wrong in following him. The whole of that paragraph teems with difficulty: many, I find, object to the *Quone* of 206, and support the old correction *Nonne*. But the latter appears to me very weak: the sense you want is not simply 'don't you see they ought to travel faster?'; but 'don't you see they ought to travel immensely faster?'; and one does not understand how the very common formula *nonne vides?* should have been altered. *Quo* I feel convinced is for *quanto*, as so often in the best writers; and the *ne* must have the same force, whatever that be, (for I have never seen a satisfactory explanation of it) which it has for instance in Horace, sat. II 3 316, 'illa rogare, Quantane?'; *ibid.* 295 'Quone malo mentem concussa?'; 2 107 'uterne?'; I 10 21 'o seri studiorum, quine putetis Difficile et mirum, Rhodio quod Pitholeonti Contigit?': Bentley's quotations here from Terence and Plautus seem quite uncertain.

Much has been said of IV 42—53, a passage where there is such great confusion in the manuscripts. I still think that Marullus, whom Lachmann and I have followed, is right in his general arrangement of these verses; but, unless I am greatly mistaken, I think I can remove its chief difficulty, and that by following the manuscripts more closely than has hitherto been done. Assuming then Marullus' arrangement, I give the verses essentially as they are found in A and Niccoli:

Dico igitur rerum effigias tenuisque figuras
mittier ab rebus summo de corpore rerum,
qui quasi membranae, vel cortex nominitandast,
quod speciem ac formam similem gerit eius imago,
cuiuscumque cluet de corpore fusa vagari.
id licet hinc quamvis hebeti cognoscere corde.

For the *Qui* of mss. (B omits the word) in the 3rd verse all editors read *Quae*: the construction is then most awkward, if not solecistic: *quae* (*figurae*) quasi membranae sunt, vel quae cortex nominitanda est. The fact is the *Qui* of mss. is the dative; and it is probable that in Lucretius' time this was a variation in use for *quoi* or *cui*, just like *gum* and *gur* for *quom* or *cum*, and *quor* or *cur*: this *qui*, for *quoi* or *cui*, the mss. of Catullus have in 1 1; 2 3; 23 5: in 107 1 *quicquid* apparently for *quoi quid*; and in Virgil, ecl. 4 62, either Quintilian has mistaken Virgil's dative for a nomin. *qui*, or, if Quintilian is right, Virgil's mss. have wrongly taken his nomin. *qui* for the dative. *Quoi* (*Qui*) and *membranae* are both then datives, and we have here another instance of that construction which is so common in Lucretius as to amount almost to a trick of style, and which I have illustrated by numerous examples in my note on I 15: a word (*imago* in this case) which belongs both to a leading and to a dependent clause, is put in the dependent clause: '*quoi corpori quasi membranae est imago*'; and then being unable to employ the dat. *cortici*, he varies the phrase, '*vel cortex nominitanda est, quod cet*': 'I say that pictures and thin shapes are emitted from things off their surface; to which surface each image forms as it were a film, or if you like you may name it a rind, because it bears etc.'

Attention to this peculiarity of Lucretius enabled Mr N. P. Howard in the first number of this Journal to explain and punctuate rightly VI 896, and shew the needlessness of any change in the text. And I have for some time past seen that it also explains III 391 foll. and shews that the transposition, made there by Marullus and followed in all editions from b' time, is uncalled for and wrong:

Usque adeo prius est in nobis multa ciendum,
 quam primordia sentiscant concussa animai
 semina corporibus nostris inmixta per artus:

i.e. usque adeo in nobis primordia multa cienda sunt prius-
 quam ea concussa sentiscant animai semina, corporibus nostris
 inmixta.

In Lucretius this question of transposition is still further complicated by the fact that very many passages, some of greater, some of less extent, were never incorporated by the poet in his text. For many of these no proper place is to be found; but many other passages the very first editors, Cicero and his associates, have clearly misplaced. Lachmann, as is well known, has done much here; and, if I do not greatly err, I have myself added something to this portion of Lucretian criticism. But there is still room for further discoveries: W. Christ, in a tract published in 1855, which I have only become acquainted with of late years, points out that the 15 lines, III 592 — 606, are clearly out of place; as 607 is a manifest continuation of the argument of 591. This, as soon it is pointed out, is quite evident. These 15 vss. however should come, not after 579 where he places them, but after 575; as 576 *Quare etiam atque etiam* etc. is a summing up of their contents as well as of what precedes.

There is another passage, v 168 foll., which Lambinus first corrected by the transposition of two verses, misplaced perhaps by the original Editors. Lachmann gave the two verses a different place. I followed him with much hesitation; but am now convinced that Lambinus was right, though the passage still requires correction: it stands thus in Lambinus' and subsequent editions before Lachmann:

Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
 illicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?

- 170 nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
 cui veteres obsunt; sed cui nil accidit aegri
 tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret aevom,
 quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?
 175 an, credo, in tenebris vita ac maerore iacebat,

- 176 donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?
 174 quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis?
 natus enim debet quicumque est cet.

Lambinus, seeing that 175 176 clearly referred to the gods, placed them before 174 which with what follows as clearly refers to men. Lachmann praises him for seeing this; but adds that, by the position which Lambinus gives them, the argument contained in them is not refuted, and therefore he himself places them before 170 'Nam gaudere cet.' I followed Lachmann with reluctance, because I always felt that these verses interrupted the strict connexion which ought to exist between *nam* of 170 and what precedes, and I said in my edition '*nam* refers to the two preceding sentences: 170 171 (i.e. 175 176 of mss) may well be one of the poet's subsequent additions, spoken of in introduction p. 31.' But I now follow Lambinus, as the passage requires a further correction. Lachmann says of *An credo* 'hic Lambinum, hominem linguae Latinae peritissimum, non offendisse miror: nam *an credo* dici non potest, debet esse *At, credo*. neque idem Lambinus in Servii Sulpicii ad Ciceronem epistula libri iv, 5, 3 tulit *An illius vicem, credo, doles?* sed fecit *At*.' It is perfectly true that Lambinus prints in his Cicero *At*, and says 'sic est legendum, vel omnibus libris adversantibus, in quo Manutio assentior.' But Lachmann's wonder that he did not make the same change in Lucretius would have ceased, had he taken the trouble to look to Lambinus' *Omissa ex annotationibus* p. 505 a: 'immo a Manutio dissentio et codices antiquos sequor omnesque vulgatos, qui habent *an illius vicem, credo, doles?* est enim ironia, atque ita saepe loquebantur veteres. Lucretius libro 5 *An, credo, in tenebris cet.*' At the same time I agree with Lachmann that *an credo* is a solecism, but both in Sulpicius' letter and in Lucretius the *an* appears to me eminently in place, taking up and qualifying preceding questions; and in Sulpicius' mouth the ironical *at credo* would have been very ill suited to the occasion, the death of Tullia. Sulpicius I believe wrote '*an illius vicem, Cicero, doles*': perhaps the *do doles* got attached to an abbreviation of *Cicero*. For *cr*'

in Lucretius I read *crepera*: if CREPERA became CREPA or CRERA, it would pass into CREDO as readily as in v 782 CRERINT has been supplanted in mss. by the commoner word CRE-DUNT: *crepera* suits well the metaphor of the next v. *Donec diluxit* etc.: 'or did their life lie darkling in gloom and sorrow?' Lucretius, v 1296, has 'creperi certamina belli': the word is common enough with the older writers, especially in the phrase 'in re crepera': Varro has in his *Mysteria* 'prisca horrida Silent oracla crepera in nemoribus'.

And this conjecture seems to me to be confirmed by a passage of Lucilius found in Nonius, p. 13, and corrected by Lachmann (Lucr. p. 67): 'Nam tu solu' mihi in magno maerore, Tristitia in summa et crepera re inventu' saluti 's.' For in our passage, and vi 1183 'Perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque,' and iii 903 'Dissoluant animi magno se angore metuque,' Lucretius may have had in mind Lucilius, whose first verse might well be completed by *iacenti*, or else *metuque*.

To conclude, I have long seen that, though I was indisputably right in assuming a hiatus at 188—190, I did not arrange it quite as it should be. I believe we shall not be far from the poet's *ipsissima verba* in writing:

Quorum nil fieri manifestum est, omnia quando
paulatim crescunt, ut par est, [tempore certo,
res quoniam crescunt omnes de] semine certo
crescentesque genus servant.

The reason of the omission is plain. It is to me incomprehensible that any critics should now maintain, as Wakefield maintained, that the passage is complete as it stands, and that *crescentes* = *res crescentes*.

H. A. J. MUNRO.

ON THE FRAGMENTS OF SOPHOCLES AND EURIPIDES.

A FORMER paper of mine on the fragments of Aeschylus will be found in the first No. of the Journal of Philology: I have since gone carefully through those of Sophocles, Euripides and some others, and from a variety of remarks which the abundant materials supplied by M. Nauck's work can hardly fail to suggest, select the following:

Soph. Aegeus, fr. 23.

πᾶς δῆθ' ὁδοῦρον ὅμοιος ἐξέβης λαθών;

perhaps ὁμορος.

Soph. Aleadae, fr. 85.

ὁ δ' εἰ νόθος τις γνησίῳις ἴσον σθένει,
ἅπαν τὸ χρηστὸν γνησίαν ἔχει φύσιν.

For ὁ δ' εἰ read οὐδ' εἰ. The meaning seems to be, 'bastards and the children of true marriage have sometimes equal authority;' the conventionally inferior with the conventionally superior: but goodness is not therefore to be tested by its possessing the marks conventionally assigned to this superior nature. Do not suppose that what has this stamp of conventional genuineness is the only truly good. A fragment of Euripides illustrates the sentiment, *Andromeda*, 142:

ἐγὼ δὲ παῖδας οὐκ ἐρῶ νόθους λαβεῖν.
τῶν γνησίων γὰρ οὐδὲν ὄντες ἐνδεεῖς
νόμφη νοσοῦσιν· ὃ σε φυλάξασθαι χρεών.

Soph. Danae, 170.

γόνοιον μύλων κάφροδισίαν ἔγραν.

Perhaps γονεῖα.

Soph. Ἑλένης Ἀπαίτησις, 150.

For γραφίους read γραφίδιους.

Soph. Eumelus, 203.

ἄσση γὰρ ἡ ῥυπαρία, ὅθεν καὶ ἀσίμινθος (ἀσάμεθα cod.) ἐν ᾗ
τὴν ἄσσην μινύθοντε ἐνεορεῖ.

Read μινύθων τις ἀναιρεῖ.

Soph. Thyestes, 235.

δείλη δὲ πῦσα τέμνεται βλαστουμένη
ὅπώρα καλαῶς κἀνακίρνεται ποτόν.

Perhaps ὀπωριαῖος.

Soph. Inachus, 251.

γυνὴ τίς ἦδε συλήνας Ἀρκάδος κυνῇ.

Perhaps,

γυνὴ τίς; ἡ Κυλληνίς Ἀρκάδος κυνῇ;

Soph. Ion, 297.

ἐν Διὶς κήποις ἀρούσθαι μόνον εὐδαίμονας ὄλβους.

Read

ἐν Διὶς κήποις ἀρούται μούνον εὐδαίμων λοβός.

Soph. Colchides, 312.

For ἀπῆξε πέμφιξιν οὐ πέλας φόρου Hermann conjectured ἀπῆξε
πέμφιξ ὥς ἱπνοῦ σελασφόρου; possibly for ὥς we should read ἐξ.

Soph. Larisaei, 351.

ὥς καὶ τύραννον πᾶς ἐγγίξεται φυγεῖν.

Nauck, ἐπεύξεται: perhaps ἐπιζητεῖ.

Soph. Lemniae, 355.

ταχὺ δ' αὐτὸ δείξει τοῦργον ὥς ἐγὼ σαφῶς.

This has been variously altered: Meineke is probably right in reading τάχ' αὐτό; for ὡς ἐγώ he reads ὡς δοκῶ; Bergk, οἷδ' ἐγώ; Hense ὡς λέγω; may it not be right as it is? 'the fact shall soon shew clearly of itself in accordance with me.'

Soph. Nauplius, 396.

ἐφεῦρε δ' ἄστρων μέτρα καὶ περιστροφὰς
ὑπνου φυλάξεις στιθῶα σηµαντηρία.

Perhaps στιλπνά, an Homeric word, *Il.* xiv. 351.

Soph. Nauplius, 398.

τῷ γὰρ κακῶς πράσσοντι μυρία μία
νύξ ἐστίν εὐ παθόντα θ' ἡτέρα θανεῖν.

This is what the MS. reading εἰθ' ἑτέρα points to: the meaning is obscure, but not hopeless: 'to a man in misfortune one night is enough: if he has been fortunate, death is not removed by more than two nights.' It is a reflexion on the valuelessness of life; it is either unhappy, and then the smallest amount of it is enough: or happy, and even then death is not more than two steps removed. The construction is κατὰ σύνεσιν; and out of μυρία in the second clause this general idea of *enough* is supplied; the participle assumes the accusative form before the infinitive.

Soph. Ποιμένες, 458.

καὶ μὴ ὑβρίζων αὐτίκ' ἐκ βάθρων ἔλω
ῥυτῆρι κρούων γλουτὸν ὑπτίου ποδός.

Perhaps μή σ'.

Soph. Scythae, 501.

Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 223: ἐν δὲ τοῖς Σκίθαις ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἑτερομήτορα τῆς Μηδείας τὸν Ἀψυρτον λέγει,

οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μιᾶς
κοίτης ἔβλαστον, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Νηρηίδος
τέκνον ἄρτι βλάστεσκεν ἦν Εἰδυῖα πρὶν
ποτ' Ὀκεανοῦ κόρη τέκεν.

Merkel, who seems right in supposing these lines to be iambic,

not, as Valckenaer, trochaic, reads in 3, βλάστεσκειν ἄρτι τέκνον.
I would propose,

ἦν ἄρτι βλαστή, τὴν δ' Ἰδυῖα πρὶν ποτε
᾽Ωκεανὶς οὐς' ἔτικτεν.

Ἰδυῖα is Valckenaer's, and is proved to have been an existing form by the lines of Hesiod quoted by the Scholiast on Apoll. R. III. 242:

Αἰήτης δ' υἱὸς φαεσιμβρότου Ἡελίοιο
γῆμε θεῶν βουλήσιν Ἰδυῖαν καλλιπάρηον.

Soph. Tereus, 528.

Read,

θνητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φύσαν

for φύσιν.

Tyro Fr. 593.

σπασθεῖσ': the MSS. reading is surely right: it is the natural sequence of θέρος θερίσθη ξανθὸν ἀνχένων ἄπο, 'and then when she has thus had her hair torn away.' The genitive ποταμίων ποτῶν is either dependent on λειμῶνι, or more probably perhaps on σκιᾶς εἰδωλον.

Phaëdra Fr. 614.

σύγγνωτε κἀνάσχεσθε σιγῶσαι τὸ γὰρ
γυναιξὶν αἰσχρὸν ἐν γυναικὶ δεῖ στέγειν.

So the MSS., I think, rightly: ἐν γυναικί = 'where a woman is concerned.'

Ib. Fr. 616.

τὸ δ' εὐτυχοῦν πάντ' ἀριθμῆσαι βροτῶν
οὐκ ἐστὶν οὗτος ὄντιν' εὐρήσεις ἓνα.

So the MSS. Perhaps εὐτυχοῦντα: the construction would seem to be, τὸ δ' ἀριθμῆσαι εὐτυχοῦντα πάντα οὐκ ἐστὶν οὗτος ὄντιν' ἓνα βροτῶν εὐρήσεις, 'that a man should reckon up all prosperity—there is no one mortal thou wilt find to do this.'

Fr. 644.

Hesychius, II. p. 250: κηρίωμα δμίλημα· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ κηρίον ϕ προσεικάζει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῶν Φινειδῶν. Perhaps

for *δμίλημα*, for which Dindorf proposes *λήμη*, we should read *ὀφθαλμολήμη*.

Incert. Fr. 875.

For *ἡελίοιο κτείρειε ἐμέ* it seems likely that we should read *ἦλι' οἰκτείροις ἐμέ*.

Eurip. *Aeolus*, 21.

On the last line, *τοῖσιν πένησιν χρώμενοι πειθόμεθα*, Nauck conjectures *πεπώμεθα*: rather *πεπάμεθα*.

'Αλέξανδρος, 53.

For *νόμφ δὲ γαῦρον αὐτὸ κραίνει χρόνος*, perhaps *νόμφ δὲ γαῦρον τὸ κραίνει χρίνος*, 'what time ratifies is conventionally proud,' i. e. has a conventional right or title to be proud.

Alope, 112.

τί δῆτα μοχθεῖν δεῖ γυναικεῖον γάμον
φρουροῦντας; αἱ γὰρ εὖ τεθραμμέναι πλέον
σφάλλουσιν ἡμᾶς τῶν παρημελημένων.

Meineke changed *γάμον φρουροῦντας* to *γένος φρενοῦντας*. I think *γάμον φρουροῦντας* need not be altered, 'what need to waste time in keeping a guard on women's marriages?' i. e. in watching to prevent their unfortunate or pernicious attachments.

Andromeda, 151.

τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐχ ὄρᾱς
ὅπη μοῖρα διεξέρχεται;
στρέφει δ' ἄλλους ἄλλως εἰς ἀμέραν.

In the second line read, *μοῖρ' αἰεί*; in the third, *ἄλλος' ἄλλους* seems metrically preferable to *ἄλλους ἄλλος'*, as Hermann and Fritzsche propose.

Antiope, 200.

καὶ μὲν ὅσοι μὲν σαρκὸς εἰς εὐεξίαν
ἀσκούσι βίοντον, ἣν σφαλῶσι χρημάτων,

Archelaus, 253.

κρεῖσσον γὰρ οὐτε δοῦλον οὐτ' ἐλεύθερον
τρέφειν ἐν οἴκοις ἀσφαλὲς τοῖς σῶφροσιν.

Nauck reads *κρείσσω* after Pflugk. May not *κρείσσον* be right? 'A stronger thing whether slave or free.'

Archelaus, 264.

πάλαι σκοποῦμαι τὰς τύχας τῶν βροτῶν
ὥς εὖ μεταλλάσσουν· ὅς γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλῶς
οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῶς
εἰς ὀρθὸν ἔστη χά' πρὶν εὐτυχῶν πίτνει.

In v. 1, τὰς τῶν βροτῶν seems to me more probable than Nauck's ἐγὼ β., or Hense's τὰς ἐφημέρων τύχας, and is actually read by one MS. In v. 2 I would propose ὡς σφαλῶσι γάρ, 'for according as they fail;' the singulars ἔστη, πίντει are the separate individuals which make up the general number implied in σφαλῶσι.

Auge, 268.

σκῦλα μὲν βροτοφθόρα
χαίρεις ὀρώσ' ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἐρείπια.

Heath, ὁρῶσα καί; I should prefer τῶ(ν).

Auge, 273.

For οὐχ ἡ τύχη γε, read σὺ χῆ τύχη γε.

Bellerophontes, 288.

οἶμαι δ' ἂν ὑμᾶς εἴ τις ἄργος ὦν θεοῖς
εὐχοίτο καὶ μὴ χειρὶ συλλέγοι βίον
τὰ θεῖα πυρογούσιν αἱ κακαὶ τε συμφοραί.

For αἱ κακά τε συμφοραὶ read εἰκάσαι τε συμφορᾶ: πυργούσι is possibly ἀμαυροῦν.

Bellerophontes, 307.

καὶ ξεστὸν ὄχθον Δαναϊδῶν ἐδρασμάτων
στάς ἐν μέσοισιν εἶπε κηρύκων.

For *καί* read *κᾶς*.

Bellerophontes, 311.

ἔπτηξ' ὑπείκων μᾶλλον ἢ μᾶλλον θέλοι.

Madvig proposes *καλὸν πέλοι*. May not the MSS. reading be right, 'more than he wished of more,' a colloquial and nervous expression?

Erechtheus, 362.

52. οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ὑμῶν τήνδ' ἐγὼ οὐ σώσω πόλιν.

Perhaps οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅθ'.

Ino, 414.

τοιάνδε χρὴ γυναικὶ πρόσπολον ἔᾶν
ἥτις τὸ μὴ δίκαιον οὐ συγῆσεται.

Read *πρόσπολεῖν*.

Cadmus, 451.

οὐρανὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς καινῶς φωτῶν ἔδος δαιμόνιον
τόδ' ἐν μέσφ' τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ χθονὸς
οἱ μὲν ὀνομάζουσι χάος.

The metre is, I think, trochaic; the first line is too corrupt to be certainly restored; the second may have been

φωτῶν ἔδος
δαιμόνων θ' ὃ δ' ἐν μέσφ' τοῦτ' οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ χθονὸς
οἱ μὲν ὀνομάζουσι χάος.

Cresphontes, 462.

In v. 6, which has been probably emended into *πρὶν σὰν χαρίεσσαν ὦραν προσιδεῖν*, the MS. and the metre alike point to *προσιδεῖν ὦραν*) --- --- ---).

Κρήσσαι, 470.

πλήρης μὲν ὕψων ποντίων, πάρεισι δὲ
μόσχων τέρεναι σάρκες χηνεῖα τε δαῖς.

χηνεῖα is not likely to be wrong: cf. Herod. II. 37, *κρεῶν βοέων καὶ χηνέων πλήθος τι ἐκάστω γίγνεται πολλόν*. For

τέρειναι σάρκες read *τερεῖνα σάρκε*: the dual is corrupted into the plural as in fr. 848, ὅστις δὲ τοὺς φύσαντας μὴ τιμᾶν θέλῃ.

Melanippe.

In the epigram quoted by Nauck from the Palatine Anthology, III. 16, τοῦνεκα γὰρ καὶ πεφήνατε ἄλκιμοι ἄνδρες, Nauck proposes *καλοὶ τε*; I think *κλεινοὶ τε*, or *κλειτοὶ τε π.*: Nauck seems right in restoring *καλκιμοι*.

Oenomaus, 576.

ἔν ἐστι πάντων πρῶτον εἰδέναι τουτί.

Perhaps σοφῶ.

Palamedes, 582.

παισὶν τ' ἀποθνήσκοντα γραμμάτων μέτρον
γράφαντας εἰπεῖν.

'To write down and so declare to our children the otherwise decaying standard, letters.' *γραμμαμάτων* is not to be altered to *χρημάτων*, as Scaliger; letters, like other devices for preserving the recollections of things, might perish: by writing them down this is prevented: they become an imperishable standard.

Peleus, 620.

ἔνθα τὴν φύσιν
ὁ δυσγενὴς κρύψας ἂν εἴη σοφός.

Read ἐξίοι.

Polyidus, 644.

βαρὺ τὸ φρόνημ' οἷσις ἀνθρώπου κακοῦ.
ὅστις γὰρ ἀστῶν πλέον ἔχειν πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ
φίλοις τ' ἄμικτός ἐστι καὶ πάσῃ πόλει.

There is no reason to dissociate the two last lines from the first. But *οἷσις* is a word of a doubtful kind, and is probably an error for *οἰκησις*. *φύρημ'* (Salmasius) for *φρόνημ'* is ingenious, if not necessary.

Rhadamanthus, 660.

τῷ δ' οὐχὶ τούτου φροντίς, ἀλλὰ χρημάτων
πολλῶν κεκλήσθαι βούλεται πατήρ δόμοις.

The MSS. of Stobaeus, who quotes this passage twice, Ecl. II. 7. 12, p. 342, Flor. 64. 24, in both places give πατήρ; and the scholiast on Eur. Orest. 1197, πεπᾶσθαι . . . ἔνθεν καὶ τὸ πολυπάμονος. ἡτυμολόγησε δὲ τὸ πατήρ παρὰ τὸ πεπᾶσθαι. καὶ ἀλαχοῦ 'πολλῶν καλεῖσθαι βούλομαι πατήρ δόμων' ἀντὶ τοῦ δεσπότης, has πατήρ also. I do not think that any one who read any of these passages would conclude that any word but πατήρ was either written by Euripides or known to the Scholiast. But Photius, p. 402. 4, has πάτορες· κτήτορες, and if this is genuine, it would appear that an old word πάτωρ, meaning 'acquirer' or 'possessor,' was found by him either in some actual writer, or more probably in some lexicographical work. Possibly it may have been used by one of the Alexandrian writers; Callimachus has words not dissimilar. But I cannot think it safe to introduce it into Euripides, as Dindorf and Nauck have done in this fragment; nor can any real authority for doing so be got from Hesychius' gloss πατέρες πλούσιοι ἢ πρόγονοι. Nauck indeed goes farther and writes ὦ πάτωρ, ἔστρεψ' ἐκ δόμων ταχὺν πόδα, in Phaethont. fr. 781. 39, merely on the ground that the Codex Claromontanus has a. m. pr. ὦ πάτερ, with δέσποτα written above it; as well as Soph. Inach. fr. 249:

Ἰναχε πάτωρ, παῖ τοῦ κρηνῶν
πατρὸς Ὀκεανοῦ,

where the MSS. have γεννᾶτωρ, and in Lycoph. Al. 512

οὐς μήποτ' ὦ Ζεῦ πάτωρ ἐς πάτραν ἐμήν
στεῖλαις ἀρωγούς τῇ δυσαρπάγῃ κρεκί,

where the MSS. vary between πάτερ and σῶτερ. Differing here from Dindorf, I think πάτωρ not improbable, as it is at least possible that πάτερ represents a reading as old as σῶτερ, and granting the existence of the word, Lycophron is a writer where it might be expected to occur. If the reading of the fr. of the Rhadamanthus were not proved by the scholion; μαστήρ might

be the right word; as it is, *πατήρ* seems to mean 'founder,' 'beginner;' not unlike is Orest. 986, *Ταντάλῳ* | ὃς ἔτεκεν ἔτεκε γενέτορας ἐμέθεν δόμων.

Scyriæ, 683.

μῶν κρυμὸς αὐτῆς πλευρὰ γυμνάζει χολῆς;

χολαῖς seems a probable emendation of *χολῆς*.

Telephus, 725.

The words *αὐτὸς ὁ τρώσας λόγος ἴσται* must surely be a quotation. If so, from Euripides? The same sentiment is expressed in the well-known lines quoted by Valckenaer (Brunck, *Analecta*, III. p. 76):

Τήλεφον ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἀκέσσατο· μὴ σύ γε κούρη
εἰς ἐμὲ δυσμενέων γίνεο πικροτέρη.

Temenidae, 739.

I see no reason for suspecting the genuineness of the last words of this fragment. The meaning seems to be, 'A poor man if virtuous has some honour, but only swells the much higher merit of noble birth by his good character, when the two standards are put side by side.'

740.

κατ' ἔναυλ' ὀρέων ἀβάτους ἐπὶ τε
λειμῶνας ποιμνιά τ' ἄλση.

For *ἐπὶ τε* read *τ' εἴ πη*.

Hypsipyle, 754.

ἕτερον ἐφ' ἑτέρῳ αἰρόμενος
ἄγρευμ' ἀνθέων ἡδομένα ψυχῇ
τὸ νήπιον ἀπληστον ἔχων.

For *αἰρόμενος*, which the MSS. of Plut. Mor. p. 93 D give, *ιώμενος* is found in Mor. 661 F. The probable word is *μώμενος*.

757.

ἄνθρωποι τε γένος χυδαίου κτῆται νέα,
 αἰετὶς τε λυγρῆς καὶ τὰδ' ἀχθονται βροτοὶ
 ἐν γῆν φθαρτὸς γῆν.

Si Bryant:

Earth's children cleave to earth, her frail
 Decaying children dread decay.

The Berlin MS. which I have before quoted of the Tusc. Descriptio has in the lines translated by Cicero the following variations from Nauck: 2 *multa*, 3 *maius*, 4 *est terra terrae*.

Phaethon, 773.

οὐδ' ἄλως αἰτῶς ἐπὶ τυφλὸς συνηρημῆ
 τυφλὸς ἔχει τὸς φρένας καὶ τῆς τύχης;

Passive ἐπὶ τῆς τύχης, 'does the mere accident of fortune make them blind'; but *κατὰ* τύχη is neater and not far from the MSS.

781. 50.

ἄπαντα ταῦτ' ἤθρησε καὶ πωτούσε χειρὶ.

Bothe conj. ἤθρησε καὶ πωτήθησ' ὁδοῖ. Possibly ἤθρησε καὶ πωτῶσ' αὐτὸς ὁδοῖ.

784.

Seems to refer to the poplars into which Phaeton's sisters were changed: the cool boughs, *δέξεται*, shall receive or welcome him. Catullus could speak without impropriety of an oak tossing its arms, LXIV. 105; but *ωλέναισι* is said of the human arms now changed into boughs.

Philoctetes, 793.

τί δῆτα θάκοις ἀργικοῖς ἐνήμενοι
 σαφὲς διόμνυσθ' εἶδέναι τὰ δαιμόνων;

ἀρχικοῖς is an old conjecture, but hardly a probable one; Nauck's *μαντικοῖς* is not like the original. Possibly *ἀργυροῖς*;

that seers were not only fond of money (*φιλάργυροι*, Antig. 1055) but also acquired great wealth, is shown by Isocr. Aegin. 385, quoted by Dindorf on Antig. 1055, where Thrasyllus, a traveling seer, *οὐσίαν πολλὴν ἐκτήσατο*, and returning to settle at Siphnos, is described as *πλούτῳ πρῶτος τῶν πολιτῶν*. To sit on seats of silver would be well suited to the character of these ancient Cagliostro.

795.

πατρίς καλῶς πράσσουσα τὸν εὐτυχοῦντ' αἰεὶ
μείζω τίθησι, δυστυχοῦσα δ' ἀσθενή.

Perhaps *τὸν ἀτυχοῦντ'*; for when a country is collectively prosperous, a poor man's particular weakness, his want of money, is easily relieved, and his class being strong he is himself strong; where all the community is in distress, the poor is doubly poor.

Phoenix, 801.

μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτῃ τέκνα.
δίδωσιν ὅστις οὐκέθ' ὠραίος γαμεῖ.
δέσποινα γὰρ γέροντι νυμφίῳ γυνή.

For *δίδωσιν* read *οἰδᾶσιν*, *tument liberi*, the children are elated. Cf. fr. 803.

Phrixus, 818.

In the Ciceronian translation of these lines contained in Tusc. Disp. III. 28. 67, the Balliol MS. gives the following variations: 2 *erupnoso legauisset solo*, 3 *tractu*, 4 *subiectus*: *solo* is a manifest error; but *legauisset* may I think be right, *me* having dropt out; in 3 *tractu* agrees very well with the Greek words *χαλινὸν ἀρτίως δεδεγμένον*; the horse pulls away from the still strange bit, and is goaded on (*exagitatur*) by the actual struggle to get rid of it.

Fr. 858.

For *ἦδε μοι τροφός* it would seem probable that *ἦν δέ μοι τροφός* should be read.

Fr. 911.

κορυφή δὲ θεῶν ὁ πέριξ χθόν' ἔχων
 φαεινὸς αἰθήρ.

Perhaps φαῖνός, a word which Schmidt, after Buhnken, conjectures to be the right reading in Hesych. φαῖνόν· φωτεινόν. The first syllable of φάεα is regularly long in Homer.

Fr. 971.

ἂ δ' Ἑλλάς Ἀσία τ' ἐκτρέφει κάλλιστα γῆν
 δέλεαρ ἔχοντες τήνδε συνθηρεύομεν.

So Lobeck for the MS. reading τε τρέφει κ. τῆς γε δέλεαρ ἔχοντες συνθηρεύομεν. I should prefer γῆς δ. ε. τῇσδε, 'whatever Greece and Asia has of fairest we hunt in quest of it, possessing in it a new attraction for this land.'

Fr. 986.

ἄειπρυσίμοχοι κοῦποθ' ἥσυχαι δορί
 Meineke conj. αἰετρυσίμοχοι. Perhaps ἀτρυσίμοχοι.

Fr. 1064.

ὅστις δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ νόσῳ συνὼν ἀνὴρ
 μέθης ταράσσει καὶ γαληνίζει φρένα,
 παραυτὰ δ' ἥσθεις ὕστερον στένει διπλᾶ.

Possibly μέθῃ σπαράσσει, a word used by medical writers of convulsing the stomach by sickness. σπαράσσει καὶ γαληνίζει = σπαράσσων γαληνίζει.

Fr. 1075.

ἀνάσχου πάσχω· δρῶν γὰρ ἔχαιρες.
 ἀνσχοῦ is more likely than ἀνέχου.

fr. 1076.

νόμου τὸν ἐχθρὸν δρᾶν, ὅπου λάβῃ κακῶν.
 Read ὁμοῦ, to requite evenly.

Fr. 1099.

For *κακᾶν βίων διαγωγὴν* read *καλχᾶν*.

Ion, 18.

Εὐβοῖδα μὲν γῆν λεπτὸς Εὐρίπου κλύδων
Βοιωτίας ἀκτῆς ἐχώρισεν ἐκτέμνων
πρὸς Κρήτα πορθμόν.

Perhaps Βοιωτίας γῆς ἐκτεμῶν ἐχώρισεν.

Achaeus, 4.

γυμνοὶ γὰρ ὄθουν παιδίμους βραχίονας
ἦβη σφρυγῶντες ἐμπορεύονται, νέφ
στίλβοντες ἄνθει καρτερὰς ἐπωμίδας.

For ὄθουν read ὄρθου. A law of Solon's enacted that gymnasia should be opened at sunrise and closed at sunset, Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 38. Catull. LXIII. 64—67.

Achaeus, 35.

προσβαλλέτω τις χεῖρα φασγάνου λαβῆς.

Nauck after Grotius, λαβῆ: rather λαβαῖς.

Astymadantes, 8.

ἔνεκα τῶν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἄνδρ' ἓνα. MS. ἐν ἑκατὸν (Porson)
is not doubtful: perhaps the rest of the line was εὐρεῖν ἔργον
ἐστὶν ἄνδρ' ἓνα.

Chaeremon, 1.

καὶ σώματος μὲν ὄφεις κατειργάζετο
στίλβοντα λευκῷ χρώματι διαπρεπῇ.

Perhaps ὄφεις ἀντηνιάζετο (Hermann) στ. λ. χρώματ' ἡδὲ
διαπρεπῇ. 'The aspect of their body reflected colours glistening
with white and well-marked to the view.' In the last three
lines,

κόμαι δὲ κηροχρῶτες ὡς ἀγάλματος
αὐτοῖσι βοστρύχοισι ἐκπεπλασμένοι
ξουθοῖσιν ἀνέμοις ἐνετρύφων φορούμενοι,

Μαρκία τὴν Νικίαν δούνα proposed εἰ πεπλασμένον, unfortunately I think, as it is nothing against the use of a word in a new manner like *Chamaeum* that it is not found in other tragic writers: the negative seems to be right, but it is noticeable that in the following line the MSS. have *φορούμενοι*, not *φορούμενα*, and it seems possible that the poet preferred the masc. in both cases, a change like Aeschylus's *λειμάναι δρόσοι ἀπὸν ἄλυσον ἑσπέρων τρίχα*. The winds seem to be called *πύρρα* as taking an imaginary colour from the air: so in fr. 14-15, the words *ῥίπες* *ῥῶ* a sun-coloured reflexion upon the robes of the woman lying on it. In my Catullus I have shared my belief that the same sort of idea is conveyed by the MSS. reading of LXIV. 309. *At roseo nireae. residebant vertice* *rimae*, where the rose colour of the fillets and the white colour of the hair blend into each other so that the fillets are called snowy, the hair rose-red. The notion is connected with the idea of a light colour discharging acutely penetrative rays of light, *ῥοῶ ἀξίφεγγῇ*, fr. 8.

Theodectes, 6.

ἔπειτα εἰς οἱ καρίνες ἰσόμετροι πάνυ.

εἰς οἱ is rather, I think, *δοιοί* than *δισσοί*.

13.

ὁμοῦ δὲ τῇδε τ' εἰσκομίζεται λαβὼν
καὶ δαίμον' ἦτοι χρηστὸν ἢ τοῦναντίον.

Perhaps *τῇδε τ'*, 'both her and fortune,' i. e. with her, fortune.

I add some passages from the Scholia on the Aratea of Germanicus.

p. 77. 7, ed. Breysig. Ut Euripides dicit, huc Aethiopum rex pater Andromedae, cuius filia obiecta ceto a Perseo servata eiusque causa et ipse pater sit astris inlatus beneficio Mineruae. Cf. 137. 13, fuit ergo, sicut Euripides dicit, Aethiopum rex, Andromedae pater.

p. 138. 13. Fuit ergo, sicut Euripides ait, Aethiopum rex, Andromedae pater, qui filiam suam ad cetum dicitur adposuisse, quam Perseus saluauit, per quem et ipse inter astra collocatus est.

p. 139. 22. Andromedam namque Euripides dicit inter astra conlocatam esse propter aeternam Persei certaminis memoriam quae cetui adposita et a Perseo saluata contempsit habitare cum parentibus, sed sponte cum eo in templo abiit.

ib. 140. 4. Euripides namque dicit inter astra collocatam esse ut labor Persei aeternus pareret, manibusque eius expansis, quem ad modum cetui opposita est, quae cum a Perseo esset liberata, neque patri neque matri uoluit commorari, sed continuo cum Perseo est Argis profecta.

p. 78. 9. Haec (Andromeda) quoque in sideribus recepta dicitur beneficio Mineruae, ut labor Persei aeternus pareret, manibus eius passis quem ad modum ceto fuit proposita, quae cum a Perseo esset liberata neque patri neque matri uoluit commorari, sed continuo cum Perseo Argis est profecta. Ita autem Euripides profert.

p. 79. 3. Euripides Melanippen Chironis filiam esse astris inlatam, cum esset interfecta in Pelio monte eamque naturalem speciem conseruasse. Namque ab Aeolo [cum] compressa grauida profugit ob pudorem Pelio monte. quam cum pater requireret, ne ei se offerret aduenienti, deorum misericordia uersa in equum puerum genuit. Quam ob eius patrisque pietatem Diana astris intulit, unde Centauro non appareat. Chiron autem dicitur is esse ideoque auersa caeli parte ab eo positam filiae effigiem, ut non agnosceretur. cf. 141. 6.

Addenda to Sophocles.

Schol. Arat. p. 138. 9. Cassiepia †in terra, ut refert Sophocles, carminum vates, dicitur praeposuisse formam suam Nereidibus ob quod ira Neptuni ceto transmissa vastabatur eorum terra. expostulatamque Andromedam et ceto propositam.

ib. 138. 21. Cassiepia interea, ut ait Sophocles carminum uates, propter inuidiam Andromedae seu Nereidis et earum pulchritudinem dicitur peruenisse ad ruinam, et pro ea fertur Neptunus omnem regionem cetu transmissio uastasse. quam ob causam inter astra collocata est.

From Miller's *Mélanges de Littérature Grecque*.

Etym. M. 42. 40. ὥστε ἀμάρτημα τὸ παρὰ τῇ Σαπφοῖ πολυῖδριδι καὶ παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ ἰδριδα. The Florence MS. has παρὰ Σοφ. πολυῖδριδα. 'Peut-être confondu avec πολυῖδριδι de la citation précédente.' Miller. Cf. Nauck, 948.

Etym. M. 97. 56. Instead of σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸν θεόν, the Flor. MS. has σημαίνει καὶ τὸν φύλακα, ὡς παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ, οἶον πύλης ἀναξ θυρωρέ.

Etym. M. p. 200. 34. The Flor. MS. adds Ἀριστοφάνης ἱππῶνακτι

ἀλλὰ καθεύξας αὐτὸν βλῖττεις.

καὶ Σοφοκλῆς

ἡ σφηκιᾶν βλῖττουσιν εὐρόντες τινά. (Nauck, 705.)

Etym. M. 207. 3. The Flor. MS. has Βούθιοι πόλεις τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος. Σοφοκλῆς οἶον Ὀνομακλεῖ. Gaisford's MSS. omit οἶον.

Etym. M. 299. 1. After κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ | the Flor. MS. adds ἡ δὲ χρήσις εὔρηται παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ,

καὶ τῶν πρὸς εἴλην ἰχθύων ὠπτημένων,

a repetition of 298. 55, where the line is attributed to Aristophanes. At 449. 15, the Flor. MS. s.u. θειλόπεδον again quotes this line as taken from Sophocles.

Etym. M. 344. 37. The Flor. MS. instead of ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς Ἐνὸλμιον has ὁ δὲ Σοφοκλῆς Ἐνολμῖν τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα λέγει. (Nauck, 937.)

Etym. M. 382. 5. In the fragment of Sophocles, ἐστ' ἐγὼ μολὼν Τάφου μεληθῶ, the Flor. MS. has μεληθείς.

Etym. M. 395. 11. The quotation from Sophocles' Triptolemus (536 Nauck) is omitted by the Flor. MS.

Etym. M. 470. 101. The Flor. MS. has ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἱκτινος ὡς παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ, οἶον,

ἱκτινος ἐκλαγξε παρασύρας κρέας (Nauck, 696)

(Gaisf. ἐκ τοῦ ἱκτινος. Σοφοκλῆς, κ.τ.λ.).

Etym. M. 541. 30. The Flor. MS. gives the extract which Gaisford's MS. V. ascribes to Sophocles as παρ' Αἰσχύλῳ.

Mélanges, p. 563 :

καὶ γὰρ Ἀργείους ὀρώ· καὶ αὕτη Σοφοκλείου ἐστὶν ἱαμβεῖον μέρος· πεποίηται γὰρ ἐκεῖ περιφυλῇ (sic) πρὸς Ἀλκμαίωνα λέγουσα “καὶ γὰρ Ἀργείους ὀρώ.” Μέννηται ταύτης Ἀλεξίς ἐν Μυλόθρῳ. (Nauck, 200.)

ib. p. 417 :

Λήθαργος· λαθροδίκτης κύων. Σοφοκλῆς· σαίνουσα δάκνειν (l. δάκνεις, Miller) καὶ κύων λήθαργος εἶ. (Nauck, 800.)

Addenda to Euripides.

Etym. M. 931. 38. ἦδεισθα δὲ κατὰ συγκοπὴν ἦσθα γράφεται μετὰ τοῦ ι. Εὐριπίδης πηλεῖ,

πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσθ' ἂν οὐ παρόντα με.

Ὡρος ὁ Μιλήσιος.

So the Flor. MS. : the line is now added by Nauck in the small Teubner edition of the fragments, 625^b.

Etym. M. 563. 47. After λημῶ, the Flor. MS. has, besides other articles not in Gaisford, the following : Λῶς σὺν τῷ ι δευτέρας συζυγίας, ἀντὶ τοῦ θέλης. Εὐριπίδης Πλεισθένεια.

καὶ κάταιθ' (sic, Miller) ἔχ' ὠτειλῆς ποίει. (Nauck, Eur. Frag. ed. 2^{da}. 627^b.)

Miller, Mélanges, p. 397. In an excerpt from a work entitled τὰ Κλαυδίου Κασίλωνος παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ῥήτορσι ζητούμενα, is the following : Σαγγάνδαι δὲ οἱ ὑποστελλόμενοι καλοῦνται· Σοφοκλῆς δὲ ἐν ποιμέσι καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν Σκυρίαῖς παρα-

σάγγρα 1 παρασάγγρα, Miller) αὐτοὺς κεκλήμασιν. (Nauck, Eurip. Fragm. ed. 2^a. 687.)

Eurym. M. 568. 42 After this the Flor. MS. adds two quotations to the article on Δοῖσθος: then follows, Λόχαιον τὸν (l. τὰ Miller) κεκλιμένον, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ λοχήσαι. Εὐριπίδης Τηλέφῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀλκίονιδι

καὶ περ λόχαια σαιτὸν ἐξέδρας. (Alc. 846.) See Nauck, Eurip. Fragm. ed. 2^a. 727^b.

Eurym. M. 714. 19. εὐρίσκεται δὲ καὶ βραχύ, ὡς Εὐριπίδης Φριξῷ,

ἀποῖται μὲν σιροῖς οὐκ ἤξιον.

The Flor. MS. has Φριξῷ δευτέρῳ; prefixes χρήζων to ἀνοῖξαι, and reads ἡξιὸν for ἤξιον; instead of σιροῖς the first hand has τυροῖς. (Nauck, 824.)

Eurym. M. 737. 18. After Εὐριπίδης the Flor. MS. has:

εἰ μὲν τοῦ ἡμαρ πρῶτον ἦν κακουμένῳ
εἰκὸς σφαδάζειν ἄν. (Nauck, 818.)

Miller, Mélanges, p. 363. βέβληκ' Ἀχιλλεὺς δύν (sic) κύβω καὶ τέτταρα· τοῦτ' Εὐριπίδου. (Nauck, 880.)

ib. p. 402. Φαῖλον· ἡ συνήθεια ἐπὶ τοῦ καλοῦ τάττει, παρὰ δὲ Πλάτωνι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ τίθεται, ὡς παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ, ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑρακλέος· φαῖλον ἄκομψον τὰ μέγιστ' ἀγαθόν.

Journal of Philology, III. p. 66. Iamblichus in Protreptico, p. 138: οἷτως ὠκονόμηται χαριέντως (ὁ βίος) ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, εἴτε Ἑρμώτιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο. Mr Bywater, following Wyttenbach, considers the words ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός to be a fragment of Euripides.

Hermes, v. p. 356. Commentarius codicis 240 Coll. Novi collatus ab I. Bywater in Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. v. 2: καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος: τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς μελανίππη. λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνας τὸ χρύσειον πρόσωπον. (Nauck, Eurip. Fragm. ed. 2^a. 490.)

ib. p. 358. καὶ τὰ τοῦ εὐριπίδου περιτίθεται ἱαμβεῖα. ἐκ τοῦ βελεροφόντου μαρτυρίαν. ὁ μὴ ἀποδεχόμενος προσέθηκε τὸ, ἀτόπως. παράλογον γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον καὶ ἄτοπον. The lines are:

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμὴν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν:

Nauck, following Welcker, assigns them to the Alcmaeon, fr. 69, but changes κατέκτα to κατέκταν, and inserts οὐ before θέλουσαν. It seems safer in any case to refer them to the story of Bellerophon, which was the subject also of Euripides' Sthenobœa. Bellerophon, according to one account, actually killed Sthenobœa, the wife of Proetus, by throwing her into the sea: according to another, caused her to commit suicide. If μητέρα is Sthenobœa, the speaker may be her son, Megapenthes. The words of the New College MS. seem identical with those quoted by Nauck from Michael Ephesius, fol. 74 b: παρατίθεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἱαμβεῖα ἐκ τοῦ Βελλεροφώντος εἰς πίστῳσιν τοῦ ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

R. ELLIS.

ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF CONSUL, EXSUL, INSULA, AND PRAESUL.

MOMMSEN in his *Römische Geschichte*, Vol. I. p. 242, Anm. 3, refers all these words to *salio*: "*Consules* sind die Zusammenspringenden oder Tanzenden, wie *praesul* der Vorspringer, *exsul* der Ausspringer (ὁ ἐκπρεσών), *insula* der Einsprung, zunächst der in das Meer gefallene Felsblock." Corssen (*Nachträge zur Lateinischen Formenlehre*, p. 280, foll., and again in the second edition of his *Aussprache, Vokalismus, &c.*) connects them all with the Sanskrit root *sar* = *ire, fluere*: thus making *consul*, *praesul*, *exsul* = *one who goes together, goes before, goes out*: *insula* = *a place in running water*. G. Curtius, in the third edition of his *Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie*, apparently endorses the latter derivation of *insula* but does not commit himself to any of these supposed etymologies of *consul*. Eschmann, quoted by Corssen (*Nachträge*, p. 282), refers *consul*, *praesul* and *exsul* to *sedeo*. Pott, *Etymologische Forschungen*, II.¹ p. 558 foll., refers *consul* to the above-mentioned root *sar*, and *praesul* to *praesilio*, while he inclines to derive *exsul* from *ex solo*, and *insula* (returning to the etymology given by Festus, p. 111) from *in salo*.

The similarity of these words rather inclines us to refer them, if possible, to one root, than to divide them, as Pott has done, among several. The root *sed-* appears at first sight to have fairly plausible claims, especially as it is possible that the words *sella* (= *sel-ia* *), *sol-ium* and *sel-iquastra* (Varro, *L. L.*

* A more natural transition than *sed-ia*, the one usually assumed by modern scholars.

v. 128) point to a collateral form *sel-* or *sol-*. Compare the collateral forms *olor* and *odor*, *Novensiles* and *Novensides*, &c.

The meaning of *consul*, *consilium*, *exsul*, *exsilium* would be fairly satisfied by referring them to *consideo* and a supposed *exsideo*: though it must be added that according to Latin analogy we should expect, in this case, to find actual pairs of forms in use, *consilium considium* and so on*. *Praesul* however is so closely connected in Latin usage with the *Salii* (compare Catullus' comical *salisubsuli*) that it seems unnatural to refer it to *sedes* and make it equivalent to *praeses*; and *insula* it would be still more difficult to bring into connection with this verb.

The sense which best suits the words *consules* is undoubtedly that of *colleagues*; and hence Niebuhr's attempt to derive it from *con-*, *es* the root of *sum*, and the suffix *-ilis*. This strained etymology is now generally given up: but is it not possible to find some root ending in *l* to serve as a basis, in form and meaning, for the words under discussion?

Sal-jan is the Gothic equivalent in Ulfilas for μένειν, καταλύειν, and *sali-thvos* in John xiv. 2 = μοναί, *mansions*, and ib. 23, *stay*, or *abode*. Connected with this word are the German *saal*, old German *gasello*, and modern German *gesell* = *comrade*. Pott, though he mentions these words (*E. F.* II.¹ p. 262) does not apparently incline to bring them into connection with the Latin words which we are now considering. But the stem of this word *sal-jan* serves quite satisfactorily as a basis for *con-sul* and *ex-sul*: *con-sules* = *Gesellen*, *colleagues* or *comrades*: *exsul* one who lives or lodges away: *con-sil-ium* a lodging or remaining together, a meeting. Most, if not all, of the meanings of *consulere* can, I think, be easily reconciled with this derivation.

The derivation of *insula* from *in salo*, or from *in* and *sar-* (= *flow*) would not be in accordance with the common usage of Latin in the case of words compounded with *in*. This

* In most cases in Latin where *r* and *l* are interchanged both forms are actually found. Thus *dacruma* and *lacruma* and others given by Corssen, *Aussprache*, &c., Ed. 2, i. p. 224.

preposition is never employed in composition as if governing the word with which it is compounded, though this is sometimes the case (as Corssen justly observes) with *pro*, *ex*, *inter* and one or two others (*proavus*, *exlex*, *Interamna*, &c.). Moreover it is strange that no one should have brought into the discussion the use of *insula* as = a lodging-house: all inquirers apparently acquiescing in the explanation given by Festus (p. 111) that the *insulae* were so called because they were not joined to any other houses: as if lodging-houses were the only houses in Rome so situated. But if the root *sal-* above-mentioned be assumed as the basis of *in-sula*, as well as of *consul*, *in-sula* will = a lodging, place to stay in, from a mariner's point of view no unmeaning name for an island¹. In form, should this assumption be correct, *in-sula* would stand to a supposed *in-sulere* as *prae-fica* to *prae-ficere*, *suada* to *suadere*: compare also such words as *sub-lica*, *in-stita*, and perhaps *in-fula*.

The root of *sal-io*, to leap, though it cannot apparently without violence be brought into connection with *consul*, *exsul*, or *insula*, must on the other hand be evidently taken as the basis of *prae-sul* and *salisub-suli*. The formal similarity of these words to *consul* and *exsul* may be perhaps accounted for by the consideration that similar roots in Latin are sometimes confused and coalesce into one, as seems to have been the case with *macte* and *macto*.

H. NETTLESHIP.

¹ We may be reminded of the use of *statio* for a harbour. Curtius compares Lithuanian *sala* = an island (which he connects with *salum*) with *insula*: is it possible that *sala* too may be connected with the Gothic *sal-jan*?

EMENDATIONS OF CERTAIN PASSAGES OF EUSEBII
ECLOGÆ PROPHETICÆ.

IN the year 1842, Thomas Gaisford, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford, edited the 'Εκλογαὶ Προφητικαὶ of Eusebius, from a transcript sent to him of the unique Manuscript found in the Imperial Library of Vienna. A small number of copies was printed at the Clarendon Press, all which are now disposed of.

I hoped ere now to have had an opportunity of collating the original MS., and to have prepared for the Clarendon Press a new Edition, with some corrections of the text, and some filling up of *lacunæ*. But having hitherto failed in obtaining a sight of the MS., I am induced to publish some of the corrections and supplements (a few of which have been communicated to me by friends) in order that such as are found worthy may be preserved for future use; and that the rest, which I hope will be few, may be replaced by better emendations.

The several passages, with Gaisford's suggestions, as printed in his edition, words to be omitted being marked thus [], words to be added or substituted thus (), are here reprinted, followed by the proposed readings.

Many corrections and supplements are here omitted, either because some words are still doubtful, and the passages in which they occur could not be given in a complete form; or because the filling up of *lacunæ* is effected at once, by simple reference to the Septuagint Version, from which Eusebius gives his citations of the prophecies.

I shall be thankful for any criticisms on the following suggestions and for any further corrections which may occur to those who possess a copy of the *Εκλογαί*.

N.B. The numbers of the dots, as given by Gaisford, indicate the spaces present in the MS.

p. 1. l. 6. ἔτα δὲ ἄλλος ἔχει λόγος . . .

For δὲ ἄλλος read *μηκέτι*, and in p. 79, 17, for *μὴ ἄλλος* read *καίτοι*. See p. 123, 25.

p. 1. l. 12. συντηρῆν τεμένηντα συλλήβδην περὶ τῆς Διουσι καὶ Σατύρου ἑμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ προφητείαν, ὥς ἐστὶ τ. τ. α. ταλαία. διαβίτης ὑφ' ἐν συνάγειν ἔδοξεν.

Read *ἐκ συλλήβδην τῶν σαφεστάτων περὶ τ. Κ. κ. Σ. ἢ Ἰ. Χ. ταύτων*. ὥς ἀπὸ τῶν βιβλίων τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης κ. ε. ε.

p. 2. l. 5. ἔταδὶν τῷ λογισμῷ τοῖς δι' ἀποδείξεως προεγκαταβῶν τις ἐμελέων τὴν ἀκριβὴ τῶν πεπιστευμένων κατὰ ὑψὺ τε καὶ γῆσιν προῖ ἐκτετῆ ν γοῦν ἔνεκεν φημί ὅτι τῶν ἐπὶ ταχέως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παρέστη καὶ τὴν ἐκείνης προ ν, ὥς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ τρὶς ἐπηρῶν βραχὺ ἐπὶ μάλιστα συντομωτάτην παραθέσει τε

Read *προσεκτεταῖται τοῖς τῶν γοῦν ε. φ. δ. τ. ἐπὶ στοιχειώσεως δευτέρῳ α. ε. π. μ. τ. ἐ. προφητείας ῥῆσιν ὡ. ε. ε. τ. δ. βραχυτάτω καὶ ὥς ἐπὶ μάλιστα σ. π. π. περὶ αὐτῆς*.

p. 9. l. 27. For οἱ λοιποὶ. read οἱ λόγοι.

p. 16. l. 6. For τοῖτα. read τοῖτω (in transcript *τούτο*).

p. 47. l. 9. For εἰς τὰ σπέρματα τῆς οἰκουμένης, read εἰς τὰ τέρατα. See Ps. xix. 5, and p. 49, l. 26, p. 81, l. 15, 17.

p. 48. l. 14. For ἐχιτρίων, read ἐχισχρίων.

p. 50. l. 14. καὶ τί μᾶλλον ἔχει τις—ἐπιδείξαι, read τιν' ἄλλοι.—See p. 51. l. 25, p. 53, l. 5.

p. 57. l. 3. εἰδῶλοις διὰ γυναικῶν ἐπιθυμίας προσκεκνηκέναι, read *προσκεκνηκέναι* (so in transcript). See p. 55, l. 4.

p. 67, l. 13. καὶ τίνα ἂν τις ἔχει ἀποδεικνύναι εἰς τοσαύτην

¹ See p. 45, l. 8, *ἐδάτω γὰρ οὗτοι στοιχειώδεις εἰσαγωγῆς*.

² See p. 210, l. 15, *ὡς ἐν μάλιστα συντόμῳ*.

ἐξέσω (ἐξαΐσιον?) ἀρετὴν ἐλληλακότα ὡς ἐν μηδένι τρόπῳ ἢς δήποτ' οὖν περιπεσεῖν ἀμαρτίας;

ἐξαΐσιον is Gaisford's conjecture. Better ἔξεως, see p. 3, l. 1.

p. 77, l. 13. ἐξετάζομεν μὴ περὶ Χριστοῦ προσώπῳ—καὶ ταῦτα ἂν ἀρμόζοι.

Read ἐξετάζωμεν μήποτε.

p. 100, l. 19. ἀρδεύσαντες τῷ πνευματικῷ τῆς εὐσεβοῦς διδασκαλίας αὐτῷ ἱετῷ.

For αὐτῷ read αὐτοῦ.

p. 107, l. 14. χωρούσης αὐτοῦ τὸ τοσοῦ (?) μέγεθος.

Mr C. Edmunds, of Jesus College, suggests τοσοῦτο.

p. 111, l. 15. βαδίζει μόνον, read μόνος.

p. 118, l. 7. νόμος ἕτερος παρὰ τοῦ Μωσέως ἐξ ὅρους Χωρὴβ δεδομένος.

Read παρὰ τὸν (so in transcript) and δεδομένον.

p. 118, l. 16. ὡς τῆς προτέρας μεταβαλόντας ἀγίας καὶ πολεμικῆς καταστάσεως τὸν ἡρεμον καὶ εἰρηνικὸν ἐπ.

For ἀγίας read ἀγρίας. The lacuna may be supplied by ἐπαινεῖν βίον.

For the last two emendations I am indebted to the Master of Trinity.

p. 119, l. 1. τοῖς εἰς τὸν..... Θεὸν διὰ Χριστοῦ προσεληλυθόσι.

Insert τῶν ὅλων; see p. 52, l. 15. 131, 17. 133, 28. 137, 4.

p. 119, l. 7. In the following passage such of the supplements to the printed text as could be inserted at once are placed between parallel lines.

... | Δύο | Διὰ τούτων δείγματα περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρίσταται· ἐν μὲν τῆς (κα)τὰ Μαρκίωνα καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς αἵρεσιώτας πλάνης ἐ|λεγκτικόν· | θάτερον δὲ τῆς κατὰ Ἀρτέμωνα καὶ τὸν Σαμοσατέ|α Παῦλον· | Ἐβιωναίων τε ἔσοι μὴ προεῖναι τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως | τὸν Χριστὸν | ὑπειλήφασιν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντας αὐτὸν | ἀληθῶς εἶναι | Θεὸν σαφῶς ὁ προφητικὸς διελέγχει λόγος τε|λευταῖος λέγων | ὡς ἄρα αἱ ἐξόδοι αὐτοῦ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξ ἡμερῶν αἰώνων προβα|νουσι· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Μαρκίωνα καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς | τοιαύτας αἰρε|σεις πεπλανημένοις καὶ μὴ ὁμολογοῦσιν αὐτ' ρ' καγένεσιν, μὴδ' ὅτι ἔγνωστο ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ δημοῦ ν παραθετόν τὸν προφητευόμε-

νον τῆς γενέσεως σαφῶς εἰς δεῦρο καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων μολαγο υ ὡς ἂν ἐκ παραδόσεως τοῦ ἐν Βηθ-λεὲμ τόπου ἐνθά | ὁ Χριστὸς | γεγέννηται· καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν | διαμαρ|τυρουμένου· καὶ Ἰουδαίοις δὲ προσ-ακτέον τὸ ῥητὸν | τοῖς ἀποροῦσιν ὅς τις ποτ' εἴη παραστήσαι τὸν προφητευόμενον ὡς ἀτελῆ κατ' αὐτούς· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ ψευδῇ διελέγχεσθαι τὴν θείαν | Μειχαία | προῤῥησιν.

The other lacunæ may be filled up by reading αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα γένεσιν¹—τοῦ δήμου πολιτῶν—τόπον, καὶ σαφῶς—ὁμολογουμένου—ὡς ἀτελές ἐστι.

p. 121, l. 15. καὶ τίς ὁ ταῦτα φάσκων.

Insert ἄλλος ἂν εἴη.

p. 122, l. 26. τοῦτον δὴ οὖν ὁ Κύριος ἔδειξεν τῷ προφήτῳ τιρυπώσῃ περιβεβλημένον.

Read τῷ προφήτῳ ἐσθῆτι ῥυπώσῃ.

p. 124, l. 11. ᾧ καὶ ἀναμφιλόγως ἀνάγοιτ' ἂν.

For ᾧ read ὃ (ὦ in transcript).

p. 124, l. 15. καλεῖ διὰ τὴν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀνατείλασαν αὐ διδασκαλίαν.

Supply καὶ Ἀνατολὴν αὐτὸν, and αὐτοῦ ἀληθίνην.

p. 127, l. 16. καὶ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ συν... των προέγνωστο τε καὶ προ-εἶρητο τοῖς ἱεροῖς τοῦ Θεοῦ προφήταις γὰρ ἐκ παρθένου γένεσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ τῆς γενέσεως λῆ καὶ ἡ ρίζα ἐξ ἧς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται.

Supply συμβάντων, ... and read προφήταις; ἡ θαυμαστή γὰρ ε. π. γ. α. κ. ὁ. τ. γενέσεως τόπος, καὶ ἡ φυλὴ ... See p. 23, l. 13.

p. 127, l. 25. οὐ παραλιπόντε read οὐ παραλιπόντες οὐ-δέν.

p. 143, l. 8. ὃς καὶ λαβὼν τὴν τοῦ Ἀγίου Πνεύματος δωρεὰν κατεβίβασέ τε καὶ ἐξέχεεν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν παραδεξαμένων αὐτῶν (ἡν) ψυχάς.

For αὐτῶν read αὐτὸν (i.e. τὸν Χριστὸν). Gaisford conjectures αὐτήν.

p. 148, l. 10. καθελόντα καὶ συντρίβοντα.

Read συντρίβαντα.

¹ See p. 23, 12, p. 24, 3, p. 127, 19.

p. 169, l. 23. μέλλων τε κρίνειν ἀνὰ μέσον τούτων, καὶ λαὸν ἐλέγχει (ξει) πολὺν.

Rather, ἐλέγχειν.

p. 170, l. 24. Isaiah ii. 1—4, ἐπεὶ καὶ προηγουμένως καὶ μᾶλλον κατὰ ταύτην πεπεῖσθαι χρὴ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους ἀπὸ τῶν (sic) ἀποπληροῦσθαι.

Read ἀπότομα πεπληρώσθαι. See above, l. 3, πᾶσαν ἐξομαλίσαι τὴν προφητείαν. (ἀπότομοι πέτραι, Lucian: ἔλεγχε ἀποτόμως, St Paul, Tit. i. 13.)

p. 180, l. 5, Isaiah viii. 1—4. ποία δὲ κἂν πιθανότης τολμάτω προσελθεῖν αὐτὸν συνειληφέναι καὶ τετοκέναι αὐτὴν υἱόν;

For τολμάτω, read τὸ ἅμα τῷ (TOAMATΩ). See p. 181, l. 7, and Just. Mart. *Dial.* CLXXVII., ἅμα τῷ γεννηθῆναι αὐτόν.

p. 184, l. 3, Isaiah ix. 5—7. ἐκάστην λέξιν διασαφῆσαι τῆς προφητείας παραστήσεται (sic) ὅπως εἴρηται τὸ.

For παραστήσεται, read παραστήσαί τε. See p. 119, l. 27, p. 181, l. 22.

p. 202, l. 6. τοὺς τῆς διανοίας ὀφθαλμοὺς τῶν πάλαι τούτοις πεπληρωμένων.

Read πεπηρωμένων.

p. 214, l. 5, καὶ αὖθις ἐπάγει [νετὰ] τὰ λοιπὰ φάσκων.

Gaisford marks the letters in brackets for omission. Read rather μετὰ.

p. 223, l. 22, Isaiah lii. 10 ; liii. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὄντα φησὶν ἀνεῖλον τούτου χάριν τὰ τοιαδὶ πείσουντα.

Punctuate and read ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὄντα, φησὶν, ἀνεῖλον, τούτου χάριν τὰ τοιαδὶ πείσονται.

p. 224, l. 15, Isaiah lv. 2—5. Τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα συνήσιν ὑποδεχόμενος ὁ λόγος πνευματικᾶς τροφᾶς, θείαν τε καὶ οὐράνιον τρυφήν, ἔτι τε ζωὴν οὐ τῆς σάρκος ἀδιάφορον, ἀλλὰ τὴν αἰδίου τῆς ψυχῆς. Προσυπισχνεῖται τοῖς αὐτοῖς διαθήκην αἰώνιον διαθήσεσθαι.

For συνήσιν, read συνιῇσιν. And τῆς ψυχῆς, προσυπισχνεῖται (so in transcript).

p. 229, l. 22. θάρρων ἔλεγε τῷ παραλυτικῷ (θαρρῖν in transcript).

Read θαρρεῖν. Matth. ix. 2, θάρσει, τέκνον.

p. 231, l. 21, Isaiah lxi. 10, 11. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ (ὁ) μὲν νύμφιος ὑπῆρχεν τῆς μὴ ἐχούσης σπῖλον ἢ ῥυτίδα νύμφης ἐκκλησίας, ὡς νυμφίῳ μίτραν αὐτῇ (ῥ) περιέθηκεν, ἡ δὲ νύμφη τῆς ἀνωτάτω τοῦ ψόγου θεότητος, ἣν ὡς νύμφην αὐτὴν κατεκόσμησε τῷ πρέποντι πνεύματι Κυρίου (ου) κόσμου.

Read the whole passage thus: ἀλλὰ γὰρ¹ ἡ μὲν νύμφιος ὑπῆρχεν τῆς μὴ ἐχούσης σπῖλον ἢ ῥυτίδα νύμφης ἐκκλησίας, ὡς νυμφίῳ μίτραν αὐτῷ περιέθηκεν ἡ δὲ νύμφη τῆς ἀνωτάτω τοῦ ψόγου θεότητος ἣν, ὡς νύμφην αὐτὴν κατεκόσμησε τῷ πρέποντι πνεύματι Κυρίου κόσμου.

¹ So in transcript.

WILLIAM SELWYN.

P.S. Since the above was in type, Dr Gaisford's son has kindly sent me, "Apographum Cod. MS. Vindob. Eclogarum Propheticarum Eusebii. Editum Oxonii, 1842."

This transcript occupies 120½ folio pages, from which I extract the following notes of the transcriber, Jos. Schreyer, as throwing some light on the foregoing emendations.

"Primo singulas paginas singulosque manuscripti versus strictissime retinui; veterum autem scribendi rationi nostram hodiernam supposui; et quum scriptum typis excudendo destinatum dicatur, scripturæ compendia in manuscripto obvia, pro viribus resolvere conatus sum.

Sigma nostrum finale (ς) in omni manuscripto nusquam reperi; ejus loco semper σ (see note on p. 67, l. 13).

Verba præpositione quadam composita ut plurimum sejuncta, v. c. ἐξ ἡλθον reperiuntur (see note on p. 3, l. 8)."

VERSE EPITAPHS ON ROMAN MONUMENTS.

IN Brambach's "Corpus Inscriptionum Rhenanarum" (4to. 1867), there are a few inscriptions which appear of sufficient interest to be presented to the reader in ordinary type, and with such punctuation as the sense seemed to require. Perhaps but few of the readers of this Journal have the leisure to go through nearly 400 quarto pages; and the inscriptions themselves in the original capitals, and with many abbreviations, require some little pains and thought for the right understanding of them. The few comments I have added are intended rather to draw out discussion, than as determining the sense or reading in not a few doubtful passages. I hope, at a future time, to add a few more epitaphs of the same kind. Any opinions that can be given as to the *date* of those printed below, would be an acceptable contribution to Latin scholarship.

F. A. PALEY.

I.

Hoc, hoc sepulchrum respice,
Qui carmen et Musas amas,
Et nostra communi lege
Lachrimanda titulo nomina.
Nam nobis pueris simul
Ars varia, par aetas erat;
Ego consonanti fistula
Sidonius aera perstrepens

On another part of the stone—

Hoc armen. haec ara. hic cinis	
Patri sepulchrum est Xanthias.	10
Qui morte acerba raptus est.	
Jam doctus in compendia	
Tot literarum et nominum	
Notare currenti scilo,	
Quot lingua currentis ficeret.	15
Jam nemo superaret legens;	
Jam voce herili coeperat	
Ad omne dictarum volans	
Aurem vocari ad proximam.	
Heu morte prope concidit.	20
Arcana qui solus sui	
Sciturus domini fuit.	

Compare the last epigram of Ausonius (No. 146), and Meyer's *Anthol. Lat.* n. 1268.

I. No. 323. p. 92. This inscription is said to have been dug up in the Basilica of St Ursula, Cologne, in the year 1643, and to have been again buried. If genuine, it is an interesting monument, apparently to two brothers, one of whom was a *tibicen*, the other a short-hand writer, *notarius*.

4. Notice the orthography of *luchrima*, and in v. 10 of *sepulchrum*, with the *h*, if the correctness of the transcript can be trusted, which Brambach thinks doubtful.

5. The quantity of the *u* in *pūeris* (as a trisyllable) is remarkable. If my memory serves me, *pueri* is a spondee in Lucretius.

8. *Sidonius* seems of three syllables, the last *i* having the sound of *y*. On the other side of the stone commenced the account of the other brother, Xanthias. In this name the *th* is hardened to *t*, as in *tus* = *thus*.

12. *Jam doctus*, and *coeperat* in v. 17, seem to show that the boy was quite young, and had only lately begun to act as a writer and a reader, *lector* or *anagnostes*. The syntax seems to be, *doctus notare tot literas et nomina in compendia literarum*, &c. Or is *tot* here constructed with a genitive?

16. *superaret*, 'no one could surpass him as a reader.'

22. The word *hic* may have dropped out, or been illegible on the stone; 'he was the only one here who would have become the confidential slave of his master.'

II.

Optaeis nomen sis natum carmine tristi;
Nomen dulce suis et lamentabile semper
Optatus genitor et mater Nemesia deflet.
Iniqua o miseri fatorum sorte parentes
Parvula quis rapta est atque unica! heu male mensis
Post decimum nonas clausit properantia fata. 6

II. No. 350, p. 86. Copied by the editor from the stone at Cologne.

1. *Optaeis* is written OPTAEI with a final letter resembling V partly erased. It has been thought to represent 'Οπητής. I think it is a *ὑποκόπισμα*, an endearing name invented by the poet in reference to the father's name *Optatus*. Hence, he says, 'may you be a name born of doleful verse.'

3. *genitor* is written *genitur*. Perhaps *pater et mater* should have been written, or (2) *genitor materque Nemesia*, or (3) the *et* omitted. *deflet* is written *adeflet*, but the A is partly erased. This shows the carelessness of the engraver.

4. The false quantity in *iniqua* is the more remarkable, as *injuncta* or *immerita* was an obvious synonym.

5. *atque* is written AIQ; another example of carelessness.

III.

Blandam te pietas mors inopia funere tristi
Abstulit, et dulcis rupit nova gaudia vitae.
Non licuit cupidos longum gaudere parentis.
Lupassius puer vixit An. I. 5 III.

III. No. 412, p. 96. In the Cologne Museum.

1. The meaning of the first verse is obscure. Is *pietas* a vocative, 'object of our affection,' as the poets often call a wife

or mistress *vita*; or is there a harsh ellipse of some verb, *pietas te (extulit or servavit), mors abstulit?*

4. I do not know what S^{III} means, unless perhaps "dies XVIII", i.e. 6×3 .

IV.

Qui dolet interitum, mentem soletur amore;
 Tollere mors vitam potuit; post fata superstes
 Fama viget. Perit corpus, sed nomen in ore est.
 Vivit, laudatur, legitur, celebratur, amatur
 Nuntius Augusti velox pede cursor ut aura, 5
 Cui Latiae gentis nomen patriaeque Sabinus.
 O crudele nefas! tulit hic sine crimine mortem.
 Damnatus perit deceptus fraude latronum.
 Nil scelus egisti; fama est quae nescit obire.
 Posuit Furius. 10

IV. No. 780, p. 159. This stone is said to have been dug up in the cemetery of St Eucharis, Treves, in 1522, but is now lost.

5. What emperor is meant by *Augustus* is, I suppose, uncertain. The man seems to have been a confidential messenger, like the *nuntii* and *cursores* mentioned in Tac. *Agric.* 43.

6. The exact sense of this line is not clear. The first part may refer to a *praenomen* not plainly expressed, but antithetical to the *gentile nomen*, '*Sabinus*.' It is hard to see how *Sabinus* can be 'nomen Latiae gentis patriaeque.'

7. *sine crimine*. The notion was, that early death was due to some crime committed. So Cornelia says (Propert. v. 11, 17), 'immatura licet, tamen huc non noxia veni.'

8. *damnatus*, supply *fatis*, probably; unless *damnatus sine crimine* was meant.

9. *Nil*, an accusative of reference, 'in nothing.' The Latinity *agere scelus* seems remarkable. This verse, it may be observed, only repeats the sentiments in vv. 2 and 7. But perhaps the sense is, 'Nil, Scelus, egisti,' 'Wretch! you have effected nothing,' addressed to the brigand who killed him.

V.

Hospes, ades, paucis et perlege versibus acta ;
 Aeternum patriae hic erit ipsa domus.
 Hic erit inclusus tumulo, hic Iulius ipse,
 Hic cinis et caro corpore factus erit.
 Cum mea jucunde aetas florebat ab annis 5
 Advenit fatis terminus ipse meis.
 Ultimus ipse fuit quintus quadragesimus annus,
 Cum mihi fatalis venit acerba dies.
 Hic ego nunc cogor Stygias transire paludes ;
 Sedibus aeternis me mea fata tenent. 10
 Me memini callir natum Caroque parenti,
 Et miles collo fortiter arma tuli.
 ...nita crudelis tribuit mihi fune[r]is horam ;
 Incultos artus terra cinisque [tenent].

V. No. 946, p. 186. Copied from two paper impressions in the Museum of Mayence.

2. *patriae domus* seems to mean 'a home in his own country,' viz. in the grave. Perhaps *haec*, not *hic*, was intended.

3. *Iulius ipse*, the man himself, his *genius*, opposed to the ashes, which are also buried there, 'factus caro corpore,' i.e. made from a body once so dear.

5. One would think *jucundis* must have been intended.

7. Note the false quantity in *quadragesimus*. This word was certainly intended by the numeral XXXXV ANNUS.

8. *acerba, praematura*, as in the first inscription, v. 11.

11. *callir* is very clearly written, and must stand for the place of birth. Qu. *Gallis*? It is remarkable that the C is used for the G throughout, as *perlece, eco, cocor, stycias*. And the inscription is very carelessly cut ; thus, *fata tenent* is written *futi tenint*, and *parenti* in v. 11 is more like IARELIS. Can this be an ablative agreeing with *Gallis*?

13. A letter is wanting. The name of a place may have been expressed ; but the mutilated words at the end make the

~~nonne~~ ~~ut~~ ~~indignum~~. *Gaudia crudelis tribuit mihi nulla*
~~ut~~ ~~indignum~~ has been suggested: but it hardly seems probable.
 In the last verse ~~nonne~~ is supplied on conjecture.

VI

Cum mihi prima natos spargebat flore juvenus,
 Eri miser, actus praemia nulla tuli.
 Bis deus mihi mors annis accessit iniqua,
 Insuper et damno Soccus ille gravi.
 Et medica precor pro nostro munera casu
 Senectae et patres possit habere suos.
 Et tantum utrumque mihi donavit honori,
 Et proterit nomen destinat in lacrimas.
 Bene merenti.

VI. No. 1243. p. 232. Preserved in the Mayence Museum.

I am not quite sure of the meaning of the words preceding
 the verses C. Servius. C. 13. *Lesbius. an. ++ hic. s. est.* Per-
 haps *Lesbius Servius Gaii Libertus, Lesbius, Anno XX, hic situs est.*
 In several inscriptions three and four upright lines diagonally
 crossed represent XXX and XXXX.)

1. *nonne* ~~ut~~ an ellipse of *crimes*, as in the more common
 use of *nonne*. *juvenis* is spelt IVENTVS, the *v* doing duty
 for *ut*.

2. *nulla praemia* perhaps means that he died unmarried
 at 20.

4. *Servius*. The master, *dominus* or *patronus*, seems to
 have given his own name to the Libertus, like the *Marcus*
Pamphili in Persius, v. 79 (where, however, the *praenomen* was
 alone taken).

6. *habere*, to keep and have the benefit of more *liberti* of
 his own.

8. *destinat*, i.e. by weeping for me he intends or designs
 that his own name shall some day be bewailed.

VII.

Cum bis duodenos aetas to * * * *
 Tum rapuit fatis mors inimica suis.
 Ut rescit mater, planxit, flevere sodales;
 Flevisset genitor; occidit ipse prior.
 Cognati proprii longa regione relict; 5
 Ii pompam ornassent funeris usque mei.
 Qui posuit Proculus, titulum nomenque sodalis
 Inscrisit maerens; hic pietatis honos.
 Sis felix, valeas, et te tua servet origo,
 Et dicas Claro, sit tibi terra levis.

VII. No. 1364, p. 250. This inscription, the top line of which is partly lost, is described as copied from a 'squeeze' (ectypus) taken in paper, and preserved in the Museum at Mayence.

1. *duodenos* preserves the old digamma-sound, *dwodenos*. If the first two letters of the missing words are rightly given, *toleraverat annos* may have been used in the sense of *absolverat*, *aegre tulerat*.

3. *rescit*, *resciit*, from *rescisco*.

4. *occidit*, i.e. *nisi occidisset*; or *verum occiderat*.

5. *relict*, supply *erant*.

6. It is rather doubtful whether *ii* or *hi* is written. *usque* seems here to mean *continuo*.

8. *hic honos*, this was the compliment paid to my affection; or perhaps, the tribute of his affection for me.

9. *Sis felix*. The deceased says this to the surviving friend, Proculus. His own name would seem to be *Clarus*, and he asks Proculus to pray that the earth may lie on him lightly.

The inscription concludes *L. Valerius Proculus commanipularis* D. S. P. C. (de suo ponendum curavit). The rare compound adjective occurs in Tac. *Hist.* IV. 46, 'Prensare commanipularium pectora, cervicibus innecti.'

THE SOPHISTS.

GROTE's account of the Sophists, in the 67th chapter of his History, seems to me to have the merit—in so far as it was not anticipated by Welcker—of a historical discovery of the highest order. Before it was written the facts were all there, but the learned world could not draw the right inference: but after the point of view has once been suggested, the main substance of Grote's conclusions appears to me as clear and certain as anything of the kind can possibly be. I am therefore surprised that it has not been more generally accepted. As far as I am aware, it has not had the slightest influence on German erudition. Certainly the view of the Sophists presented in Curtius' popular history of Greece (which is likely to become a manual in our schools and colleges) is altogether prae-Grotian. The state of opinion among English scholars is more difficult to ascertain precisely. Much of my present paper has been suggested or confirmed by passages in the essays of Dr Thompson and Professor Campbell: and I should be glad to find that their general views agree more nearly with my own than I now suppose. But Professor Campbell seems, though with much moderation, to sum up substantially against Grote: and through Dr Thompson's remarks are scattered satirical references to the language of the famous chapter which seem to indicate considerable disagreement. At any rate Mr Cope, in the *Journal of Philology*, directly attacked the new theory: and Sir A. Grant (in his edition of Aristotle) substantially rejected it. Lastly, Mr Jowett, in his recent translation of Plato, has emphasized in his preface his disagreement with Grote on this point, and

argued the question forcibly, though briefly, in his introduction to the Sophistes. I cannot help thinking that Grote, if he had lived, would have made some sort of rejoinder to the last-mentioned elaborate and influential work. And since the master's hand is still, and this reply can never be, it may seem not untimely that a disciple should attempt βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ὀρφάνῳ οὖντι. Εἴπερ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἔζη, πολλὰ γ' αὖ ἤμυνε.

The line marked out for such a rejoinder will appear more clearly from a brief notice of the steps of the controversy. The old view of the Sophists was that they were a set of charlatans who appeared in Greece in the fifth century, and earned an ample livelihood by imposing on public credulity: professing to teach virtue, they really taught the art of fallacious discourse, and meanwhile propagated immoral practical doctrines. That gravitating to Athens as the Πρυτανεῖον of Greece, they were there met and overthrown by Socrates, who exposed the hollowness of their rhetoric, turned their quibbles inside out, and triumphantly defended sound ethical principles against their plausible pernicious sophistries. That they thus, after a brief success, fell into well-merited contempt, so that their name became a byword for succeeding generations.

Against this Grote argues: (1) that the Sophists were not a sect but a profession: and that there is no ground for attributing to them any agreement as to doctrines. That, in fact, the word Sophist was applied in Plato's time in a more extensive sense than that in which he uses it: so as to include Socrates and his disciples, as well as Protagoras and his congeners. So that, as far as the term carried with it a certain invidious sense, this must be attributed to the vague dislike felt by people generally ignorant towards those who profess wisdom above the common: a dislike which would fall on Plato and the Philosophers as well as on the paid teachers whom he called Sophists: though no doubt the fact of taking pay would draw on the latter a double measure of the invidious sentiment. ~~That as regards the teaching of immoral doctrines, even~~
 must take cum grano)
 principal Sophists, Protago-
 it is a priori improbable

that any public teachers should propound doctrines so offensive to the common sentiments of mankind: that therefore we can scarcely suppose that Thrasymachus so propounded the anti-social theory of justice attributed to him by Plato in the Republic; and that even if he did, we cannot infer from this anything as to the other Sophists.

On this second point Grote is chiefly at issue with the German writers (with whom Sir A. Grant substantially agrees). It is on the first head that Mr Jowett joins issue, and to this I shall at present restrict myself. Mr Jowett urges that though the meaning of the word Sophist has no doubt varied and has been successively contracted and enlarged, yet that there is a specific bad sense in which any intelligent Athenian would have applied the term to certain contemporaries of Socrates, and not to Socrates himself, nor to Plato. Wherever the word is applied to these latter, "the application is made by an enemy of Socrates and Plato, or in a neutral sense." In support of this he points out that "Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle," all give a bad import to the word: and the Sophists are "regarded as a separate class in all of them."

Now first I should have thought that we might say of any term denoting a man's walk in life and connoting doubtfully an invidious sentiment, that it is either applied in a neutral sense or by an enemy, i.e. with polemical intent. Even the slightest flavour of dislike is enough to make the man himself, and his friends, avoid such a word: as we see in the common use of the terms "attorney" and "solicitor." Therefore, that disciples of the martyred sage, and those who learnt from them, never called Socrates a Sophist is very certain. But that the Athenian public considered him as such, whether intelligently or not, is surely undeniable. Mr Jowett says that Aristophanes may have identified Socrates with the Sophists "for the purposes of comedy." But the purposes of comedy are surely not served by satire that does not fall in with common conceptions. The Athenians looked on Socrates as the most popular and remarkable of the teachers to whom young men resorted with the avowed object of learning virtue or the art of conduct, and the

more evident result of learning a dangerous dexterity in discourse; and as such they called him a Sophist. The differences between him and such men as Protagoras would appear to them less important than the resemblances. The charges brought against him by his accusers express just the general grounds of suspicion felt against both alike. Whether a man corrupted youth rhetorically or dialectically, whether he made the worse case appear the better by Declamation or Disputation, would seem to them quite a secondary matter. That this view involved a profound misapprehension, I do not of course deny: but all evidence seems to me to show that the misapprehension was wide-spread and permanent. More than half a century afterwards, Æschines (who can scarcely be regarded as "an enemy"), when pleading for another example of salutary severity, reminds the Athenians how they had put to death the Sophist Socrates. Again, Xenophon tells us that when the Thirty Tyrants wished to silence Socrates, they ordained that no one was to teach *λόγων τέχνη*: Xenophon says, of course, that they did it to bring him into disfavour with the multitude: but the whole proceeding implies that this was the popular view of his function. And Xenophon's comment on the transaction is expressed in a way to confirm this. "They thus," he says, "brought to bear against him τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον—φιλοσόφοις, observe, not σοφισταῖς.

Mr Jowett, however, appeals to the evidence of Isocrates, who clearly, he says, regarded the Sophists as a separate class, and at the same time used the term in a bad sense. And other writers on the same side have laid much stress on the testimony of Isocrates, as standing outside the Socratic tradition, and so free from any suspicion that may be raised as to the impartiality of Plato or Aristotle.

It is therefore very important to ascertain accurately what this testimony is. It is to be found in three orations, the *Encomium* of Helen, the oration entitled *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, and the speech *περὶ Ἀντιδόσεως* in which the old man
into an elaborate defence of his own career. All
the kind of notion of a species of public

teacher who was generally viewed with suspicion: and whom he certainly calls Sophist. At the same time the points of view of the two most important of these speeches, the *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν* and the *περὶ Ἀντιδόσεως*, are to some extent opposed. In the former he is censuring these public teachers: in the latter he is to some extent defending them, in so far as he is forced to class himself with them, as he does indirectly, though he never applies to himself the term *Σοφιστής*. When we look closer at the account he gives of them in the oration which is most directly concerned with them, we find that he distinguishes three classes, against each of which he brings a different kind of complaint. (1) Against the earlier rhetoricians who had composed treatises he makes the same objections as Aristotle, that they laid too much stress on the forensic application of rhetoric. From these he seems to distinguish (2) those who profess *πολιτικοὶ λόγοι*, among whom it is evident that he is himself to be ranked: though he expresses great contempt for the charlatanism of many of them, and is careful to guard himself from the charge (which he enforces with some severity against them) of claiming too great efficacy for professional teaching in the making of an orator, and attributing too little to practice and natural faculty. The passage, however, which reminds us most forcibly of the attacks of Plato and Xenophon (and to which Grote's opponents especially appeal) is directed against (3) another class, quite different from the last two. These Sophists attempt to persuade young men, that if they associate with them they will learn the true art of life—*ἃ τε πρακτέον ἐστὶν εἶσονται καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης εὐδαίμονες ἔσονται*. So far they resemble the Protagoras of Plato. But when we find them called "people whose business is disputation," and "who profess to search after truth," and when Isocrates adds that "private persons will soon find that their so-called *ἐπιστημὴ* leads to less success in affairs than the *δόξαι* of other people," and will regard this employment of time as *ἀδολεσχία* and *μικρολογία*—the suspicion dawns on us that these Sophists are no other than the disciples of Socrates. And the suspicion becomes a certainty when we, remembering the Gorgias and the Phaedrus and the strained relations

between Plato and Isocrates, find (in the *περὶ Ἀντιδ.*) that these disputatious people are in the habit of speaking ill of discourses of the public and useful sort (*βλασφημοῦσι περὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τῶν χρησίμων*): when Isocrates adds with insulting generosity that their disputations—which he associates with astronomy and geometry—may possibly do young men some good as intellectual exercises, if they do not spend too much time on them and so “get stranded among theories of the old Sophists (*τῶν παλαιῶν Σοφιστῶν*), such as Empedocles and Parmenides:” and when we find Plato’s works unmistakably alluded to in another dialogue as the “Laws and Republics composed by Sophists.” The testimony of Isocrates then comes to this: he attacks the Sophists in the same style as Plato: only Isocrates calls Sophists just those whom Plato and posterity call Philosophers, while the more honourable title of “Philosophy” he reserves for his own special industry, the Art of Public Speaking. When two antagonists, with vocations so sharply contrasted as those of Plato and Isocrates were, both claim for themselves the name of Philosopher and endeavour each to fix on the other the odious appellation of Sophist, we may surely conclude that either term is in popular usage so vague as easily to comprehend both, and that the two are varyingly contrasted according to the temper of the speaker. This is confirmed when we look again at Xenophon. We have seen that Philosophy with him was a profession that the vulgar called *λόγων τεχνή*; we may notice in contrast with this that he speaks contemptuously of physical enquiries, into the nature of “what the Sophists call the *κοσμός*”—so far coinciding with Isocrates. No doubt the honest man’s conception of Philosophy did not go beyond the dialectical ethics of his master. Plato again admits in the *Politicus* that one who wishes to introduce into politics any principles more scientific than the current maxims and prejudices is sure to be called by people in general *μετεωρόλογος καὶ ἀδολεσχής τις σοφιστής*: thus using the very words of Isocrates and seeming to allow that the latter’s application of the term is in no way exceptional.

we may go further than this and
Plato’s own use of the term

Σοφιστής, we can see clearly that it is applied to two distinct kinds of teacher, corresponding respectively to the two classes into which Isocrates divided his contemporaries and rivals. Plato of course does not include himself or Socrates in either of these classes, any more than Isocrates conceives himself amenable to the charges which he marshals *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*. But just as Isocrates is obliged to admit that he would be commonly ranked in one of the two divisions: so Plato cannot deny that there is a strong family likeness between his master's method and that of the other kind of Sophist, and that it requires considerable subtlety to distinguish the two: and does not scruple to attack as sophistical teaching the favourite doctrines of his fellow-disciples.

As this point is one to which Grote does not expressly advert, and as it seems to me of considerable importance not only for the present controversy, but generally for the right understanding of Plato's dialogues, and even to some extent in the determination of their chronological order, I shall allow myself to dwell on it at some length.

It seems to me that those dialogues of Plato in which Sophists are mentioned fall naturally into two groups, and that in each of these the being called Sophist exhibits a strongly and definitely marked character, so different from that of his homonym in the other group, that if they had not been called by the same name, no reader would ever have dreamt of identifying the two.

Let us first take the Sophists with whom we are by far the most familiar—Protagoras, Polus, Hippias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus. What is the common characteristic of these persons, as presented by Plato?—besides that of receiving pay, which must surely be considered an accident rather than a property of any class of teachers. We cannot even say that all professed to teach virtue, for Gorgias expressly disclaims any such profession. The one attribute found in all of them is that they are rhetoricians and declaimers, in the habit of making long speeches, and quite unused to that interchange of question and answer which is the essence of the Socratic manner of discourse. It is true that they have reflected upon language and

verbal distinctions: but upon this, as on other subjects, they can only talk at length: they are not prepared to define their abstract terms (or use them with precision), and are perfect tiros in the art of argumentation. The contrast between Protagoras and Socrates in this respect is almost tediously emphasized in the dialogue that bears the former's name. Protagoras can scarcely be brought to the requisite brevity of answer: he will insist on "orating." And the unsuspecting innocence with which he and Hippias and Polus submit themselves at first to the Elenchus, their absolute incapacity to see whither the questions are leading, the swift and sudden shame of their overthrow, are the comic effects on which the dialogues rely for their lighter entertainment. Thrasymachus, in the Republic,⁷ is not quite so fresh: he knows somewhat more what Socrates is after, and thinks he can parry the invincible Elenchus: but still like the rest he is essentially a rhetorician, his forte lies in long speeches, and at the critical point of the discussion he wishes to make his escape, "having deluged our ears with a regular *douche* of discourse," as Socrates says.

Let us now turn to the other group of dialogues and examine the Sophist as he is defined in the Sophistes and caricatured in the Euthydemus. The difference of type is most striking. The Sophist's manner of discourse is no longer sharply contrasted with that of Socrates: it is rather, as Professor Campbell says, "the ape of the Socratic Elenchus." A shifty disputer has taken the place of the windy declaimer of the other dialogues: instead of pretentious and hollow rhetoric we have perverse and fallacious dialectic. The Sophist of the Protagoras and Gorgias has close affinity to the *ρήτωρ* and is with difficulty distinguished from him: in fact Plato can only distinguish them by restricting the sphere of *ρητορικὴ* to forensic speaking: this, he tells us, is a quackery that simulates justice, while the sophists are more ambitious quacks who mimic the art of legislation. These latter then correspond to the teachers of *πολιτικοὶ λόγοι* among whom Isocrates classes himself—strongly objecting to be confounded with those who merely wrote and taught for the law-courts—except that the latter carefully avoids the more vague and extravagant professions which Protagoras

and others probably made : he still, however, maintains that in so far as Virtue, Practical Wisdom, and Political Science can be taught, the teaching of them is involved in and bound up with the art of public speaking, his own *φιλοσοφία*. This, he claims, does impart *τὸ λέγειν εὖ καὶ φρονεῖν* in so far as these are not gifts of nature and effects of practice : and as making this claim he is distinctly Plato's Sophist of the first type. Still this restriction of *ῥητορικὴ* to its forensic application is somewhat forced : both Sophist and Rhetor would be popularly regarded as professing the art of declamatory or rhetorical discourse and so naturally classed together and confounded : as Plato himself tells us in the *Gorgias*, *φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτά*.

But the Sophistes of the dialogue so called is expressly contrasted with both the Statesman and the Rhetor : he is the Professor of Disputation, of the art of question and answer according to rules, *ἐριστικὴ*,—thus exhibiting exactly the character which Isocrates tries to fix upon Plato. Further we are told that this Sophist claims to deliver men from groundless conceit of their own knowledge by cross-examining them and pointing out their inconsistencies : the special function of Socrates. Of course Plato does not admit that the Sophist is the true Dialectician : but he resembles him as a wolf does a dog. He is a tremendous arguer, and able to impart to others the argumentative art. The difference between him and Socrates is that his effect is purely negative : he begins and ends with captious disputation, his skill is simply to bewilder and perplex : he is not, as Socrates, a midwife of true knowledge.

It is just this difference which is dramatically exhibited in the *Euthydemus*, with much broad drollery of caricature. Here a couple of Sophists of the eristical sort are seen exercising their art on an intelligent youth. They put captious questions to him and entangle him in contradictions by means of verbal quibbles, until he does not know whether he is standing on his head or his heels. Socrates then takes him in hand and, by gentler questioning, ultimately draws out of him answers of remarkable point and pregnancy : and so the true Dialectic is contrasted with its counterfeit Eristic.

The difference is clear enough to us, who are accustomed to trace the whole growth of philosophy from the fertile germ of Socratic disputation. But we can see even from Plato himself that it would be much less clear to unphilosophic contemporaries: that the effect of the Socratic interrogations on a plain man would be just this bewilderment and perplexity and sense that he had been taken in by verbal quibbling, which Plato describes as the effect of Eristic Sophistry. At any rate the Sophist of the Sophistes and the Euthydemus is much more like the disciples of Socrates than he is like the Sophist of the Protagoras and the Gorgias. And therefore while the uninstructed public, as we have seen, would lump Declaimers and Disputers together as Professors of the Art of Discourse; I think Mr Jowett's "intelligent Athenian" would be much more certain to grasp the distinction between the teachers of public speaking who more or less claimed to impart political wisdom on the one hand, and the teachers of disputation and ethics on the other, than he would be to appreciate the finer differences that separated Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from the Socratic Schools.

But we may go further than this. Plato himself does his best to obliterate these latter differences: not of course as far as his own teaching is concerned, but certainly in respect of his brother Socratics.

Even the received Histories of Philosophy do not altogether conceal this fact from the student. It is true that he reads in one place of Sophistical Eristic, which he is led to look on as a part of the charlatan's stock-in-trade: and in another place of Megarian Eristic, which he regards as a development of philosophy. But he can get no clear notion of the difference between the two: and when he comes to the Euthydemus he finds them indistinguishably blended in the object of Plato's polemic¹.

Not only is the whole manner and method of the Sophists

¹ The identification is at least suggested in the Sophistes; cf. Campbell, p. liv, where indeed Prof. C. supports to some extent the view here main-

tained, though he does not contrast P.'s two uses of the term. In the main

in this dialogue a manifest caricature of the manner and method of Socrates—the Sophists profess *εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείαν προτρέψαι* by means of dialogue: they challenge the interlocutor *ὑπέχειν λόγον*: their examples are drawn from the common objects and vulgar trades, the frequent recurrence of which in the talk of Socrates was (as we learn from Xenophon) an established joke¹—but further they maintain positions that we know to have been held by Megarians and Cynics: their fallacies and quibbles are just like those of Eubulides, and we may fairly presume that what we have here presented to us as “Sophistic” is neither more nor less than a caricature of the Megarian Logic.

In short, there is only one kind of Eristic in Plato's view: and the only reason why historians insist on distinguishing two kinds is, that they have made up their minds that there must be a broad line of distinction between the Sophists and the disciples of Socrates.

The results so far obtained—that among the Sophists attacked by Plato we can distinguish two kinds², corresponding to two classes distinguished by Isocrates: that in one of the Isocratean species Plato is polemically included, while with the corresponding Platonic Sophists Plato's fellow-disciples are inextricably commingled—all this seems to me certain, and quite sufficient to refute the received opinion that there was a broad and clear historical distinction between Sophists and Philosophers. The position which I shall go on to maintain is more hypothetical, and I am anxious to separate it from what I have so far tried to prove, in order that any doubts which may be felt with regard to the one may not extend themselves insensibly to the other.

I am disposed to think that the Art of Disputation which is ascribed to Sophists in the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophistes* (and exhaustively analysed by Aristotle in the *περὶ Σοφιστικῶν Ἑλέγχων*) originated entirely with Socrates, and that he is altogether responsible for the form at least of this second species of Sophistic.

¹ They talk of oxen and sheep, the cook, the smith, the potter.

² It is not of course meant that P. himself clearly distinguishes the two.

Thus to turn the tables on the arch-antagonist of Sophistry, and charge him with sowing the sophistical tares which his great pupil is so earnest to separate from his dialectical wheat, will seem a paradox. And I cannot prove it: but I think I can show that it is the most probable hypothesis.

My first argument is one of general historical probability. I do not see from whom else the method could have been derived—as far as the form is concerned: for no doubt its sceptical and destructive aim, and the logical puzzles and paradoxes which it uses, may be traced to Protagoras and Zeno. But as a method of conducting argument, it seems to me just an “ape of the Socratic Elenchus:” a deliberate, artificial reproduction of the spontaneous and characteristic manner of the great sage, a manner which shared and expressed—and indeed seems to us inseparable from—his philosophic and personal originality, his Induction and his Irony.

I am aware that the authority of Diogenes Laertius stands in the way of this view. He states on Aristotle's evidence that Zeno was the originator of Dialectic, thus making no distinction between the Zenonian and the Socratic methods. More definitely he refers Eristic to Protagoras: *πρῶτος ἔφη*—he says—*δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις. Οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας*: and afterwards enumerates among his writings a *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν*.

Now this last assertion is rather an awkward fact for me: and I thought at first that it was impossible in face of it to maintain my hypothesis. But on reflection there appeared to be fair ground for discarding it: for (1) we cannot really reconcile Diogenes and Plato, but are forced to choose between the two, and (2) we can suggest a very probable explanation of D's assertion, assuming it to be erroneous.

First, then, it seems to me quite incredible that if Protagoras had really not only practised, but actually invented, Eristic, as described in the *Sophistes*—methodical disputation by short questions and answers—he could ever have been represented as Plato represents him in the dialogue which bears ¹. For here he is not casually or slightly, but⁺ prominently contrasted with Socrates,

opposite method of long speaking. It is true that he professes to be able to speak at any length that may be desired: but this is only a bit of his brag: it is quite clear that he cannot. The Elenchus is quite new to him, and he falls a most helpless victim to it. Now the coarsest satirist would not describe a man as quite unskilled in an art which he had himself invented: and Plato is not a coarse satirist: and moreover, as Grote well observes, he is not here even a severe one, as far as Protagoras is concerned: he wishes to allow him such credit as he deserves, and so he does not put in his mouth (as in the case of Prodicus and Hippias) a piece of affected verbiage to make him ridiculous, but an able and interesting dissertation. He treats him with consideration and fairness, if not with esteem, as a master in his art such as it was.

It seems to me then that Plato could not have known what is stated by Diogenes, and at the same time that he must have known it, if the statement had been true. He was no doubt aware that Protagoras maintained the thesis, *ὅτι εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*, which was a favourite with the Eristics: indeed he himself traces this connection in the Euthydemus. And I am inclined to think that it was on this reference that the statement of Diogenes was based; if so, we can conjecture exactly how he was misled. Protagoras, no doubt, was in a manner Eristic, just as Zeno was, but it was in a rhetorical manner: he very likely wrote a *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν*, as D. says: but if so, we must suppose it merely to have contained instructions how to make speeches on both sides of a case, no doubt with the aid of logical fallacies. Diogenes finding the reference in the Euthydemus, and not thinking of any other Eristic than *τὸ νῦν ἐπιπόλαιον γένος*, as he afterwards calls it, naturally attributes this latter to the famous father of sophistry¹.

But I should not rely on this hypothetical reasoning, if it were not supported by strong general probabilities. Surely the whole conception of Socrates and his effect on his contempo-

¹ I may observe that D. goes on to say that Protagoras taught *ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰς ἀσθήσεις* which is obviously derived from the Theætetus. misunderstood. It

is not therefore very bold to conjecture that his other statement is simply derived from the Euthydemus misunderstood.

rarities, as all authorities combine to represent it, requires us to assume that his manner of discourse was quite novel: that no one before had systematically attempted to show men their ignorance of what they believed themselves to know. Suppose a society to which the "Art of Wrangling," as Locke calls it, is familiar, and the historical Socrates, whom we seem to know as well as we know Dr Johnson, seems quite *dépaysé*: we feel that his philosophical originality and his moral earnestness must have expressed themselves in some quite different manner.

But Socrates once there, appearing to the public as the Arch-Sophist, who overcame all rivals in wordy fight, and by his greater impressiveness and attractiveness to youth threw them all into the shade, so that comedians naturally selected him to represent the class—what could be more natural than that he should have a host of imitators? Indeed, Xenophon expressly tells us of such men who, from the free and abundant banquet of Socratic discourse, carried away fragments which they sold for money.

The question then is, would Plato call such men Sophists?

It must be borne in mind that a Sophist, in Plato's peculiar use of the term, combined two attributes: he taught for pay, and he taught sham knowledge: and the term might seem to be applicable wherever these attributes were found in combination. If then there were among the disciples of Socrates men who taught for pay, not having private fortunes like Plato, and who taught sham knowledge, i.e. doctrines with which Plato disagreed: how was he to regard them? I imagine he would be puzzled, and would make distinctions among them. There might be some like Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, in whom he would feel an absolute want of philosophic earnestness: with these, whether they had or had not formed part of the—no doubt varying and irregular—circle who listened to Socrates, he would recognise no tie of brotherhood: and would not hesitate, if occasion offered, to satirise them under the invidious term. There would be others like Aristippus, who certainly took money for his teaching, and against whose theory and practice Plato would feel a strong aversion: but who was yet a man of

convictions, and a man of speculative force and originality. He would be difficult to class. And in fact, though Aristotle speaks of him as a Sophist, Plato never does, never indeed mentions him personally, though he is understood to be directly controverting his theories in two dialogues. If, again, there were also members of the School of Megara, with which Plato had at first felt the closest affinity, and from which his divergence had been slow and gradual: if these undoubted Socratics had fallen away into the wickedness of taking fees, while their dialectical method degenerated more and more into captious and purely negative disputation: Plato, we may suppose, would be pained and perplexed. But he might gradually come to recognise that these men, even though they might be old friends and actual co-disciples of Socrates, were yet essentially Sophists, and their teaching Sophistry.

I conceive, then, that Socrates was seed and source of a new kind of Sophistry, the post-Socratic Sophistry, as we may call it: which it was extremely difficult for the subtlest mind to distinguish from the profession of Socratic philosophy. Or may we not say, that the distinction would be properly impossible, conjecturing that the proper positive and negative characteristics of the Sophist, presence of fees and absence of philosophic earnestness, would not be found together? It is clear that Plato's conception of a Sophist involves the—I trust—groundless assumption that “the man who takes fees must be a quack:” and if he found men taking fees, whom he would shrink from calling quacks, though he might deplore their philosophic aberrations, he would be in a dilemma as to the employment of the term.

At this point, one wants to know exactly how far the Socratic principle of not taking fees was carried out in what we are accustomed to call the Socratic schools, intensively and extensively: how many acted on it, and how strictly. No doubt all true disciples of Socrates would be reluctant to abandon the principle, and to give for gold what gold should never buy¹. But *il faut vivre*: and what were men to do who had neither

¹ Cf. *Memorabilia*, I. c. vi. § 13.

the *ἀνταρκεία* of Antisthenes, nor the fortune of Plato? To the latter, indeed, who is described to us as consuming his full share of τὰ ἔξω ἀγαθὰ, such men might fairly say, in the words of Euripides,

πρὸς τῶν ἐχόντων τὸν νόμον τίθης.

Then, again, there are different ways of effecting the transfer of commodities: one may veil or attenuate the repulsiveness of the transaction in various degrees. Even the virtue of Socrates is said to have gone out frequently to dinner: Quintilian, indeed; reports a tradition that 'Socrati collatum sit ad victum'.¹ Plato was, as I have said, well-born, and probably well to do: but even he, if we may trust the Epistles, did not disdain presents from Dionysius and other friends. Poorer Socratics, one may surely assume, would take similar presents with less scruple, and the practice would gradually become regular. At this stage it would be difficult to distinguish presents from fees: especially from fees claimed in the magnificent manner of Protagoras. I observe that Dr Thompson has no hesitation in identifying the disputatious Sophists of Isocrates, who imparted virtue for four or five minæ, with "some of the minor Socratics:" and it seems probable that the number of such paid Socratics would increase as time went on, and the personal influence of the master declined. In fact, the principle of gratuitous teaching was so impracticable, that it must be given up: until the community generally saw the propriety of supporting philosophers, as in Plato's model state, they must get a livelihood out of society somehow.

Meanwhile, I think, we may assume that the first type of Sophist was declining: or rather was gradually shrinking back into the rhetorician out of which he had expanded. The new dialectical method had the attraction of novelty: and at the same time all the nobler element of the strong and widespread influence which had thronged the lectures of Protagoras and Hippias, the enthusiasm for wisdom and virt^u ~~aspirations~~

¹ The same authority adds that Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus *marce* acceptaverint: so that the *prince*

tion and the sublime credulity of youth, would be attracted and absorbed by the new teaching. Isocrates, no doubt, with his "philosophy" represents in a manner the old Sophists: but in his profession of practical wisdom there was but a meagre residuum of the magnificent promises of Protagoras. There were besides, as Aristotle informs us, teachers who gave systematic instruction in political science, using collections of laws and constitutions. But such moralists as Prodicus we may assume to have quite disappeared in the 4th century: they are in fact, to use Welcker's phrase, "forerunners of Socrates" and true ethical philosophy: they represent an earlier and ruder stage of moral reflection: when the Socrates has come their day is over. The time, then, would arrive when Eristic would be the only prominent rival of Dialectic: and when Plato, looking abroad for the quack teacher to contrast with the true philosopher, would discover him among his old friends and comrades, and find in his features an odious resemblance to the revered lineaments of his master. But this view of Eristic would not come to him all at once: there would be a clear interval between the time when he distinguished it as a perverse and mistaken dialectic from his own method, and the time when he actually identified it with Sophistic.

Now I think that just this appears if we arrange the dialogues of Plato in the chronological order which would on other grounds be most probable, and trace his employment of the two terms—Sophistic and Eristic—down the stream of time.

Take first the Protagoras. This is generally placed in the first group of the dialogues, chronologically arranged. I am inclined to place it among the very earliest. At any rate I regard it as representing Plato's recollections of the actual collision between Socrates and the original Sophists. Here there is no mention of Eristic: nor does it appear in the Gorgias, which however must be placed at a considerable interval from the Protagoras in order to allow time for the complete change that has taken place in Plato's ethical view. This dialogue indeed is less directed against the old-fashioned sophistry than against rhetoric. It is true that Plato places σοφιστική, as "Quackery of Legislation," side by side with ῥητορικὴ: but I think he is

more concerned to attribute this quackery to Athenian politicians generally than to any professional teachers. A similar view to this is developed again in the Republic, in one of the most brilliant and effective passages that Plato ever wrote: "You, the Public," he rings forth, "are the arch-Sophist, it is your Public Opinion that corrupts youth." It may be observed that Thrasymachus, who is the victim of Socrates in the prolusive dialogue that fills the first book of the Republic, is not called a Sophist, and does not profess the art of conduct: he is merely a rhetorician who maintains a popular immoral paradox. The Republic, though it has much affinity to the Gorgias, must be placed, I think, at a certain interval after it: because Plato's ethical view has been again somewhat modified. He is no longer in the extreme of reaction from the hedonism of the Protagoras: he submits to try the issue between Virtue and Vice by the standard of Pleasure. Now here for the first time we come across Eristic as a method. The word *ἐριστικός* has been used before in the Lysis. But there it is employed untechnically and quasi-eulogistically: it is implied that the youth called *ἐριστικός* has dialectical capacity. In the Republic however (v. 454) we hear of an *ἀντιλογική τέχνη*, into which many fall unwillingly, *καὶ οὔονται οὐκ ἐρίξεν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι*, because they are unable *κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν* and so they *διώκουσι κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν*. Here we have already a method or manner of reasoning, in no way connected with Sophistry, but obviously belonging to persons seriously engaged in the pursuit of truth.

In the Meno, again, which I should place between the Gorgias and the Republic, we have Sophistic and Eristic side by side and unconnected. The Sophists are still our old friends: they are not exactly attacked: they are even half-defended against Anytus, who is made to confess that he knows nothing about them, though it is possible that he may be right in despising them. But Eristic is noticed quite independently: it is contrasted with the method of Socrates as a perverse kind of Dialectic. "If I were one of the σοφοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοὶ καὶ ἀγωνιστικοί, I should say *ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀπορία τὸ ἐργον λαμβάνειν*

"λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν:" and again Socrates objects to the ἐριστικός λόγος that οὐκ ἔστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ὃ οἶδεν οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν.

This latter position is examined at length in the *Theætetus*, which I consider to belong to a group of dialogues later than any yet mentioned. This group is defined in my view by two characteristics. (1) The concentration on ethical and political interests, due to the influence of Socrates, has ceased: Plato's attention is fixed on questions from a social point of view more narrow and professional, from a philosophical point of view more central and fundamental—on knowledge: its nature, object and method. He has passed definitely from the market-place into the school; and as an indication of this, (2) he is now engaged in controversies with other philosophers: an element absent from the earlier dialogues—even from the *Republic*. When he takes up ethical questions again, as in the *Philebus*, the more scholastic and technical treatment is striking.

Now in the *Theætetus* perverse dialectic is noticed, though not by the name of Eristic, but by that of *Sophistic*, which here bears its later meaning. "If," says Socrates, "you and I were engaged in *Sophistic logomachy* (ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαυτήν) we should go on verbally confuting each other: "a sort of confutation that produces no real conviction."

This then is the first identification of Sophistic and Eristic: that is, if I am right in connecting closely the *Euthydemus* and the *Sophistes*, previously discussed. I know that the *Euthydemus* has generally been placed earlier: but I think this is due to a mistaken inference from the style. The extreme difference of form has blinded readers to the substantial affinity of its polemic with that of the *Sophistes*.

I am aware that any argument which depends on an assumption as to the order of Plato's dialogues is insecure, on account of the difference of opinion that exists on the subject. In particular, many would dispute the place I assign to the *Theætetus*. But most, I think, would allow at any rate that there was a time at which Plato attacked as *Sophists* moralists and politicians, a later time at which Sophist as a perverse disputer, and a time be

which he contended against the same sort of perverse disputations without identifying it with Sophistry. And this seems strongly confirmatory of my view that this kind of disputatious Sophistry is post-Socratic and a degenerate offshoot of Socratic method.

H. SIDGWICK.

NOTE ON HERODOTUS v. 28.

μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἀνεσις κακῶν ἦν καὶ ἤρχετο τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ Νάξου τε καὶ Μιλήτου Ἴωσι γίνεσθαι κακά.

THE MSS. have *ἀνεως* or *ἀνεος*. Editors have adopted Reiske's conjecture of *ἀνεσις*, and the common translation would be 'Afterwards, but for no long time, there was a respite from suffering. Then from Naxos and Miletus troubles gathered anew about Ionia' (Rawlinson). Grote would join μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον, understanding apparently, 'So after a little time of trouble there was a respite from suffering, and then, &c.' Probably no one ever felt content with either of these explanations. It may be worth considering whether the true reading be not *ἀνανέωσις*, a word which gives unexceptionable sense and which might well be corrupted into *ἀνεως*. It is used by Herodotus elsewhere.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

ACCORDING to the received interpretation of Bk. v. ch. 5 of the so-called *Nicomachean Ethics*, the author attempts in this difficult passage an explanation of the laws of value. It is obvious that, if that is his intention, he fails egregiously. That he should have failed in such an inquiry is neither impossible nor even improbable: but is it quite certain that we have formed a right conception of the end which he has in view?

The following extract from Sir A. Grant's commentary will serve to recal not only the usual interpretation, but also the doubts and difficulties which have suggested themselves to most readers of the *Ethics*:

“‘Now the joining of the diagonal of a square gives us proportionate return.’ The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made, but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange. What, then, is the law of value? It is enunciated a little later (§ 10). *δεῖ τοίνυν —τροφήν*. ‘As an architect (or a farmer it may be) is to a shoemaker, so many shoes must there be to a house or to corn.’ That is, the value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it. The sort of comparison here made between the quality of farmer and shoemaker seems connected with a Greek notion of personal dignity and a dislike of *βαναυσία*. Such feelings are opposed to the impartial views of political economy, and are quite superseded by the law of supply and demand. If it be asked what is to determine the quality of labour, it will soon be seen that *quality* resolves itself into *quantity*, that the excellence of labour must be measured also by supply and demand. We cannot be sure that we have

above the full statement of Aristotle's ideas upon value, but if we have, they are imperfect."

In my opinion ch. 5 should be read in close connection with ch. 2-4, the passage as a whole being an attempt at once to connect and to distinguish three kinds of particular justice. In order to connect these three kinds of particular justice, the author regards them each as *ἀνάλογόν τι*: in order to distinguish them, he represents each by a special and appropriate kind of *ἀναλογία*, the word *ἀναλογία* being employed in the larger of the two senses recognized by the Greek mathematicians, and therefore including arithmetical proportion, which is strictly speaking a *μεσότης*. Cf. Nesselmann, *Die Algebra der Griechen*, pp. 210-212, where it is shown from Nicomachus Gerasenus and Iamblichus, that, though properly *ἀναλογία* meant geometrical proportion (all other proportions being *μεσότητες*), *ἀναλογία* and *μεσότης* are frequently used synonymously for any kind of proportion. I shall henceforth use the word proportion as an equivalent for *ἀναλογία* in its extended meaning.

Premising that in the earlier part of ch. 3 particular justice has been made to consist in *τὸ ἴσον*, and that it has been afterwards explained that the *ἰσότης* spoken of is *ἰσότης λόγων*, or *ἀναλογία*, § 8, 'between the persons and the things, according to some standard' (*πρὸς τι*), §§ 5, 6, I proceed to state, as briefly as possible, the substance of the investigation of distributive, corrective, and commercial justice. In the course of my summary, it will, I hope, appear, that the purpose of the author is merely to translate into the language of proportion the following proposition: 'Particular justice is attained in distribution, correction, and barter, when the parties are, after the transaction, in the same position relatively to one another, as they were before it.' What constitutes identity of relative positions, the author does not ask. The investigation is in fact introduced in order to justify the statement made in 3 § 8, *ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι*, just as the list of virtues is introduced in II. 7 to justify the definition of virtue. But though the author's principal aim is to show that the just in distribution, in correction, and in com-
links
it worth while to enter it

because Plato had taken one kind of proportion, ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρική, as the rule of justice (*Gorg.* 508 A, *Laws* 757 A, B), whilst the Pythagoreans had endeavoured to reduce all justice to retaliation, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, a phrase which may be interpreted by reference to proportion.

1. The first of the three kinds of particular justice, distributive justice, in the distribution of property or honour secures to the individual a share proportioned to his desert. Desert is differently estimated in different cases: for example, in a democracy freedom constitutes desert, in an oligarchy wealth or birth, in an aristocracy ἀρετή.

Thus distributive justice assigns to the persons concerned shares such that the position of the persons relatively to one another is not altered by the distribution, but does not determine what constitutes alteration of relative position.

Let A, B, C, D be proportionals, so that $A : B :: C : D$. Hence alternando $A : C :: B : D$; and componendo A taken together with $C : B$ taken together with $D :: A : B$; which last proportion exactly represents distributive justice as above described. Or, as the author expresses it, distributive justice consists in the conjunction or composition of A and C, B and D, A, B, C, D being proportionals (ἡ ἄρα τοῦ A^1 ὅρου τῷ Γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ B τῷ Δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, § 3 § 12), since by such conjunction the position of the two parties, relatively to one another, is not altered: whether, as in a democracy, A and B are equal, and therefore C and D ; or, as in oligarchy and aristocracy, a difference is assumed between the persons, which therefore necessitates a difference in the shares assigned to them. Cf. *Politics*, III. 9. 4. Distributive justice then may be represented by the formula

$$A + C : B + D :: A : B.$$

But mathematically when A taken together with C is to B taken together with D as A is to B , A, B, C, D are said to be in geometrical proportion. Hence distributive justice is a geometrical proportion.

¹ The Editors print $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$ here, A, B, Γ, Δ in ch. 5. As the proportionals are in both cases lines, not

numbers (else we should have the proportion $1 : 2 :: 3 : 4$), I have restored capitals in the present passage.

At this point I would call attention to 3 §§ 11, 12: ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὑπερ ἢ νομῇ συνδυάζει· καὶ οὕτως συντεθῆ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ Α ὕρου τῷ Γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Β τῷ Δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Here σύζευξις seems to mean what in the language of proportion is called σύνθεσις (cf. Eucl. v. Def. 15), our 'componendo;' the more familiar word being employed in preference to the technical one, because, according to strict usage, σύνθεσις can hardly be applied to the union of persons and things.

2. Corrective justice, the function of which is to remove inequality after it has arisen, deprives the gainer of his unjust gain, and restores to the loser his unjust loss, the words 'gain' and 'loss' being used in an extended sense. The author does not limit this kind of justice to the correction of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα, but says expressly, 2 §§ 12, 13; 4 § 1, that it is also concerned with ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα (πρᾶσις, ὀνή κ.τ.λ.), i.e. with the correction of voluntary transactions in which the balance has been disturbed, whether fraudulently or by consent¹. Cases of such disturbance will hereafter present themselves.

Now when one man has appropriated what belongs to another, the latter has as much less, as the former has more, than his just right. Hence the former is in excess of the latter by twice the amount by which the former is in excess, or the latter in defect, of his just right. Manifestly justice is attained when the unjust gain of the one is taken from him and restored to the other.

But what we have called the just right of both is an arithmetical mean between the excessive position of the one and the defective position of the other. Corrective justice is therefore represented by an arithmetical proportion in which the positions of the two parties, after the wrong and before the correction of it, are the extremes. Of course, as the author points out in 5 § 4, it may be necessary, in estimating the loss of the injured person, to take into account his superior position.

¹ There is therefore in 2 §§ 12, 13, no such confusion

It is not necessary to take into account the wrong done to the state, because we are now considering injustice of the particular kind, which consists in unfairness, not universal injustice, which consists in the violation of law.

3. At the beginning of ch. 5, the author criticizes the Pythagorean theory that justice consists in τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, i.e. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τὸ κατ' ἰσότητα, or retaliation, and objects that it does not apply either to distributive, or to corrective, justice. In commercial transactions however τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is the bond of society: but the ἀντιπεπονθός which regulates commercial transactions is, not τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τὸ κατ' ἰσότητα (retaliation), but τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν (reciprocal proportion). Now ἡ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἀντίδοσις is secured by ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις. [I defer for the present the examination of this difficult phrase.] For example, let *A* be an architect, *B* a shoemaker, *C* a house, and *D* a shoe. If *A* and *B* agree that a house and a shoe are of equal value, barter may take place without altering the position of *A* and *B* relatively to one another: or in the symbolism of ch. 3,

$$A + D : B + C :: A : B,$$

whence

$$A : B :: D : C.$$

But as barter does not take place between persons of the same trade, the transaction will be in general more complicated, *C* and *D* not being of equal value. In general then *B* will give to *A*, *x* shoes in return for his house. Hence commercial justice is represented in general by the proportion

$$A + xD : B + C :: A : B:$$

whence as before



$$A : B :: xD : C.$$

But when $A : B :: xD : C$, *A* and *C* are said to be reciprocally proportional to *B* and *xD*; in the language of the Greek geometricians they ἀντιπεπόνθασιν. Cf. Euclid, VI. 15, ἔστω ἴσα τρίγωνα τὰ ΑΒΓ, ΑΔΕ, μίαν μὲν ἴσην ἔχοντα γωνίαν τὴν ὑπὸ ΒΑΓ τῇ ὑπὸ ΔΑΕ. λέγω ὅτι τῶν ΑΒΓ, ΑΔΕ τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνθασιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἴσας γωνίας, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅτι ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ ΓΑ πρὸς τὴν ΑΔ οὕτως ἡ ΕΑ πρὸς τὴν ΑΒ. See

also Simson's Def. 2 of Bk. VI: "Two magnitudes are said to be reciprocally proportional to two others, when one of the first is to one of the other magnitudes, as the remaining one of the last two is to the remaining one of the first." Hence commercial justice is represented by reciprocal proportion, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

It will be observed (1) that in this explanation of ch. 5, I have followed exactly the method of interpretation adopted in ch. 3; (2) that according to my view the author not only limits the application of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς to commercial transactions, but also gives a new meaning to the phrase by the addition of the words τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, (3) that I conceive the author to mean no more than that 'A and B exchange on equal terms if xD is equivalent to C , x having been determined by the higgling of the market.'

I return now to § 8: ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ A, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ B, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὴν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. The phrase ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις is understood by the older commentators and by Sir A. Grant to mean the junction of the diagonals AD , BC in the square $ABDC$, by Mr Williams to mean the junction of one diagonal of a parallelogram the sides of which are the lines A , B , D , C .



But, (1) ἐφ' ᾧ A, &c. are lines, not as in Sir A. C points; else how could they be proportion

in Sir A. Grant's note on ch. 3 § 9, where four mathematical points are apparently regarded as proportionals):

(2) in Mr Williams's figure, which avoids the former objection, D and C are made equal to A and B , i.e. the shoes and the house to the architect and the shoemaker respectively, whereas it is clear that the shoes should be equal to the house, the architect to the shoemaker:

(3) the junction of the diagonal is called in Greek *ἐπί-ζευξις*, not *σύζευξις*; cf. Euclid, *passim*:

(4) Sir A. Grant and Mr Williams fail to show why "the junction of the diagonal" is mentioned, whereas the author says expressly that *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις* produces *τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, and implies that *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις* and the proportion $A : B :: D : C$ are different ways of representing the operation of barter. Compare § 8 with § 12.

Now it seems reasonable to assume that *σύζευξις* is used here in the same sense as in 3 § 12, and that if *σύζευξις* in the last-named passage means the composition of A and C , B and D , *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις*, "cross conjunction," means the composition of A and D , B and C . The reason of the nomenclature is apparent if we arrange four proportionals thus:

$$\frac{A}{B} \qquad \frac{C}{D}$$

'Cross-conjunction' then will give us the proportion

$$A + D : B + C :: A : B,$$

whence $A : B :: D : C$, as before.

Similarly in the *Eudemian Ethics*, VII. 10, we have *ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν*: i.e. whereas the superior claims that the proportion shall stand

$$A + C : B + D :: A : B,$$

whence

$$A : B :: C : D,$$

the inferior thinks that the just proportion is

$$A + D : B + C :: A : B,$$

whence

$$A : B :: D : C,$$

C being what A receives from B , D what B receives from A .

(If we would assimilate these proportions to the proportion of v. 5, we must transpose *C* and *D*, as in the latter passage *C* and *D* are what *A* and *B* give, not what they receive.)

Now in the proportions which express the claims of the superior and the inferior in friendship, *A* and *B*, and therefore *C* and *D*, are assumed to differ; in barter *A* and *B* exchange on equal terms wares, *C* and xD , equal in value: but the author reduces friendship to a simple case of barter when he explains that the inferior is entitled to the greater amount of assistance, the superior to the greater amount of honour. Thus unequal friends barter assistance and honour, as the cobbler and weaver barter wares. *Nic. Eth.* ix. 1. 1.

It follows that a good man will not be on terms of friendship with a superior, unless the superior in rank is also superior in merit, because otherwise the inferior will not feel for the superior that love and regard by which the superiority is required. *Nic. Eth.* viii. 6 § 6.

As however friendship in general assumes equality of persons, quantitative equality (τὸ κατὰ ποσόν) is the primary rule of friendly intercourse, proportionate equality (τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν) being of secondary importance. In justice, proportionate equality ranks first, quantitative equality second. *Nic. Eth.* viii. 7 § 3. Cf. Nicomach. Gerasen. ii. 21 § 5, where a geometrical proportion is said to be κατὰ ποιότητα, an arithmetical proportion κατὰ ποσότητα. Hence the primary rule of friendship is arithmetical proportion, because friends are in general equals; cf. 2 § 13, where χρήσις, 'friendly loan,' is specially mentioned as one of the voluntary transactions with which corrective justice is concerned. If however the friends are unequal, the rule of friendship is proportionate, qualitative equality, i.e. that form of geometrical proportion which is called reciprocal.

$$\text{Manifestly in barter} \quad \frac{A}{B} = \frac{x D}{C} = 1,$$

the formula $A : B :: x D : C$ being preferred to $A : C :: B : x D$ only because the former proportion represents the exchange of *A* and *B* after the exchange, the latter

it. Now from these two proportions which represent the relations of A and B before and after the exchange, we obtain the proportion

$$A : B :: B : A.$$

Accordingly the author of the *Magna Moralia* I. 33 substitutes for the Eudemian theory the simple statement that exchange takes place 'when the farmer is to the architect, as the architect is to the farmer,' i.e. when the claims of the two have been equated by the ordinary process of higgling.

I return now to the fifth book of the [*Nicomachean*] *Ethics*. In 5 § 12, we read—*εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχῃσι τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι· γεωργὸς A , τροφή Γ , σκυτοτόμος B , τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ · εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία.* Substituting a colon for a period after *ἄκρον*, and a colon for a comma after *αὐτῶν*, I translate:—'The parties and the wares must not be reduced to proportion after the exchange has taken place, else one or other extreme will have both the superiorities' (i.e. one will have more than his just right, the other less, and the case must be dealt with by corrective justice), 'but when each has his own: then, men are on equal terms and can trade together because their claims can be equated in this manner,— A is a farmer,' &c. (i.e. whilst the mutual demand lasts, x can be ascertained).

I regard this sentence as a warning that the terms of the bargain must be determined, in other words that x must be determined, by the ordinary process of higgling, before the exchange takes place, that is, during the continuance of the mutual demand; cf. § 11: e.g. A must arrange with B , before the transfer is effected, how many pairs of shoes the latter is to give him in return for a house. If A accepts one pair of shoes on account, trusting that B will subsequently make up to him the market value of the house, and B takes advantage of A 's negligence, it is no longer an affair of commercial justice, but of corrective justice, which, as has been pointed out in 2 §§ 12, 13, and in 4 § 1, plays a part in the rectification of voluntary trans-

actions such as *πρᾶσις*, *ὠνή*, *δανεισμός*, *ἐγγίη*, *χρήσις*, *παρακαταθήκη*, *μίσθωσις*, as well as in the rectification of involuntary transactions, such as *κλοπή*, *μοιχεία*, *κ.τ.λ.* In the case supposed *A* has now got one pair of shoes only, whilst *B* has got a house worth x pairs of shoes, and $x - 1$ pairs of shoes into the bargain. Hence *A* has $x - 1$ pairs of shoes less than his just right, *B* has $x - 1$ pairs of shoes more than his just right. Thus *B* has the advantage of *A* to the extent of $2(x - 1)$ pairs of shoes: in the language of our author '*B* has both superiorities¹.'

If then the time for arranging the terms of the bargain is allowed to pass by, the two parties to the transaction are to be regarded as two extremes, one of which exceeds the mean by as much as the mean exceeds the other: the reciprocal proportion of commercial justice must therefore be supplemented by the arithmetical proportion of corrective justice. The words *τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον* point unmistakeably to this interpretation, since *A* and *B* cannot possibly be regarded as extremes in the proportion $A : B :: D : C$. For *ἔταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν* the commentators refer to 4 §§ 8, 14, forgetting that, whereas corrective justice restores to each his own, commercial justice is attained when each surrenders his own. It seems to me clear that in the present passage these words are antithetical to *ἔταν ἀλλάζωνται*, meaning 'before they have delivered up their respective wares.'

Thus, as I understand the author, he justifies in ch. 3—5, the assertion made in ch. 2, that *τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν μέρει* is *ἀνάλογόν τι*, and assigns kinds of proportion to the several kinds of particular justice. In so doing he shews controversially (1) that the *γεωμετρικὴ ἰσότης* of Plato does not include all the varieties of particular justice, and (2) that the Pythagorean theory of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* (retaliation) is applicable only to commercial transactions, and to them only if by *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* is meant *τὸ ἀντιπεποιθός τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν* (reciprocal proportion). On the other hand he has not attempted any investigation of the laws of value, and is wholly innocent of the theory "that the

¹ Mr H. Richards has anticipated me in referring to 4 §§ 10, 11 for the explanation of *ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς*

and *τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον* (*Ιουρατ* - " -
logy, Vol. IV

value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it." Economically, he contents himself with the statements that barter presumes mutual demand, and that the terms of the barter must be settled before, not after, the needs of the two parties are satisfied.

There are a few minor difficulties which deserve a passing notice.

(1) In 2 § 9, the words τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν should be omitted. In this conjecture I am anticipated by Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien*, I. p. 40).

(2) The words—ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο ἀνήρουντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐπάσχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον—which are usually printed both in 4 § 12, and in 5 § 9, clearly belong to the latter place. I think also that the relative ὃ should be inserted before ἐποίει, an evident conjecture in which I am anticipated by Rassow.

(3) The line quoted in 5 § 3, should surely run εἴ κε πάθοι τὰ τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεία γένοιτο, not εἴ κε πάθοι τὰ κ' ἔρεξε.

(4) The text of 5 § 13 can hardly be right as it stands: ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἐν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ᾖσιν ἀλλήλων ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέχεται τις, οἶον οἶνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς. The extraordinary harshness of the sentence will be mitigated if we remove the comma after οἶνου, and read either οἶνον, or ἐξαγωγῇ. Both of these readings have MS. authority of some sort.

I venture to add one or two miscellaneous suggestions in regard to the text of the three Eudemian books.

VI. 9, 4, ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύζεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. Madvig anticipates me in substituting δεῖν for ἰδεῖν. For the phrase προτίθεται δεῖν, cf. Plat. *Sophist.* 221 A, ὅπερ ἄρτι προϋθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν.

VII. 5, 5, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον.

Plainly the author means τοῦ πάθους ἀκρατῇ, ἀπλῶς δ' ἀκρατῇ οὐ λεκτέον. That ἀκρατῇ may stand for ἀκρατῇ ἀπλῶς is proved by 12 §§ 1, 4, where αἰρεταί and φαῦλα mean respect-

ively ἀπλῶς αἶρεταί and ἀπλῶς φαῦλα: but the omission of ἀκρατῇ with πάθους seems to me unjustifiable. I would suggest τοῦ πάθους ἀκρατῇ, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ λεκτέον.

VII. 6, 1, εἰκε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνεις, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ὃν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν. Omit the superfluous οἷ before πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι.

HENRY JACKSON.

FRAGMENTS OF GREEK COMEDY.

THERE are two fragments of the Old Comedy preserved in the sixth book of Origen *Contra Celsum*, which I do not find in Meineke.

The first occurs in p. 310, Spencer's ed. (Lommatzsch, vol. xix, p. 390), where Origen is defending Moses' cosmogony. Celsus attacks the account of the Cherubim and the flaming sword, and adds,

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα μηδὲν νοήσας Μωϋσῆς ἀνέγραψε ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ παραπλήσιον τι ποιῶν οἷς παίζοντες οἱ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιηταὶ ἀνεγράψαντο, Προῖτος ἔκτεινε Βελλεροφόντην, ὃ δὲ Πήγασος ἦν ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας. Ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι μὲν γελωτοποιεῖν θέλοντες, τοιαῦτα συνέταττον.

Spencer reads ἔγημε in the margin for ἔκτεινε, but this spoils the metre. We might easily get two half lines, Anapaestic tetrameters,

—Προῖτος δ' ἔκτεινεν Βελλεροφόντην,
'Ο δὲ Πήγασος ἦν ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας.

The second fragment is in p. 329, Spencer's ed. (Lommatzsch, xix, p. 431), and comes in an extract from Celsus.

“Ἐξῆς δὲ τοιαῦτά τινα λέγει ὁ Κέλσος· “Ἐτι μὲν εἵπερ ἐβούλετο ὁ θεὸς, ὥσπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ κωμῳδῷ Ζεὺς, ἐκ τοῦ μακροῦ ὕπνου διῷπνίσας, ῥύσασθαι τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐκ κακῶν· τί δὴ ποτε εἰς μίαν γωνίαν ἔπεμψε τούτο, ὃ φατε, πνεῦμα;... Ἄλλ’ ὁ μὲν κωμῳδὸς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ γελοιοποιῶν συνέγραψεν, ὅτι Ζεὺς ἐξυπνισθεὶς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἔπεμψε· σὺ δὲ οὐκ οἶε καταγελαστότερον πεποιηκέναι Ἰουδαίους πεμπόμενον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν υἱόν;”

Neither Spencer nor Lommatzsch gives any note on either passage.


E. B. COWELL.


EARLY in 1868, I pointed out a comic fragment in the paroemiographi, Apostol. vii 20, ἐνὸς χανόντος μετακέχνηεν ἄτερος for μετέσχηκεν. The alteration is of the slightest

ἀκεχην for ἐσχηκ

and adds a new word to the lexicons. As this emendation appeared in a school book, it seems worth while to repeat it where it may be more likely to fall under the eyes of scholars.

JOHN E. B. MAYOR.





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